0:01 Four men of a recon team were deep in
0:03 enemy territory in Vietnam in the pitch
0:05 black night when they saw a strong enemy
0:08 force boxing them in from all sides.
0:09 They realized their worst fear had come
0:11 true and that they'd been compromised.
0:13 The team whispered a frantic call for
0:15 help over the radio set claymore mines
0:17 around them and prepared for the
0:19 inevitable. The rescue mission was soon
0:20 cancelled as it was deemed too
0:22 dangerous. But two Cobra helicopters
0:24 piloted by some outright badass pilots
0:26 were about to disobey direct orders to
0:28 try and save them. what they did would
0:30 defy all odds. But as you're about to
0:32 hear, it would be anything but easy. So
0:34 now, let's start with why the Cobra was
0:36 created because the story behind it is
0:38 quite fascinating. When the Vietnam War
0:39 began, it was thought that the
0:41 helicopter's speed alone would be
0:42 sufficient protection from enemy fire
0:45 and that losses wouldn't be too bad.
0:46 Well, it turns out that wasn't quite
0:48 true because out of 12,000 helicopters
0:50 deployed in Vietnam, half of them
0:52 crashed, with enemy fire accounting for
0:54 a significant portion of that. You see,
0:56 Bell's UH1 Huey, the workhorse
0:58 helicopter of the Vietnam War, although
0:59 a major improvement over early
1:01 helicopters simply wasn't made to
1:03 withstand any kind of fire, even from
1:05 small arms. The helicopter was made from
1:08 aluminum and plexiglass to save weight,
1:10 and the only armor was a bit of steel
1:12 under the pilot's seats and around key
1:13 components, but it wasn't enough to make
1:16 it safe from gunfire. Then, when the war
1:17 intensified and the North Vietnamese
1:19 learned to predict American tactics,
1:21 things became horrible for helicopter
1:23 crews. The air mobile tactic of
1:25 inserting troops directly into or near
1:27 the actual battle was revolutionary and
1:29 effective for the terrain of Southeast
1:30 Asia, no doubt, but it became
1:32 predictable, and the North Vietnamese
1:34 exploited that. To make matters worse, a
1:36 helicopter has to hover low over the
1:38 battlefield for a short time while
1:40 inserting or extracting troops, which is
1:42 its most vulnerable moment, completely
1:44 exposed in the open in the middle of
1:45 hostile territory and attracting every
1:47 available sniper, machine gun, mortar,
1:50 or RPG. They would fly into ambushes and
1:51 get wrecked by Soviet supplied
1:54 anti-aircraft weapons like heavy 51
1:56 caliber machine guns and autoc cannons
1:57 which the North Vietnamese had plenty
2:00 of. Even bursts from an AK at close
2:01 range could take out the pilots or hit
2:04 the oil coolant or fuel line and that
2:05 was it for the helicopter. Quite a few
2:07 helicopter crews were shot down this
2:09 way, some even more than once. A few
2:11 were shot down twice in a row as the
2:12 helicopter rescuing them from the first
2:14 crash also went down. Early in the war,
2:16 the American military was shocked at how
2:18 their helicopters were going down left,
2:19 right, and center. While the
2:21 high-ranking officials were trying to
2:22 find a solution in their air conditioned
2:24 offices, the troops on the ground took
2:26 matters into their own hands and began
2:28 improvising to protect themselves
2:29 however they could. They couldn't add
2:31 sandbags and metal sheets like the
2:32 truckers in the transportation corps did
2:34 when faced with the same problem. But
2:36 they could add machine guns. At first,
2:38 Huies flew unarmed except for the crew's
2:40 personal weapons. But that was about to
2:42 change. The crew chief, the third member
2:44 of the helicopter crew besides the pilot
2:46 and co-pilot, would take an M60 machine
2:48 gun and strap it to the helicopter,
2:49 either with a bungee cord or an
2:51 improvised pintle mount. He'd cover one
2:53 side during approaches and takeoffs,
2:54 firing at anything even remotely
2:56 suspicious on the ground or returning
2:58 fire when under attack. This was, of
3:00 course, much better than nothing, so a
3:01 fourth member was added to cover the
3:03 opposite side from the crew chief, and
3:04 that became the door gunner or the
3:07 so-called shotgun rider. He soon became
3:09 a valuable part of the crew and helped
3:10 with everything around the helicopter
3:12 from maintenance to missions and of
3:14 course laying down heavy suppressive or
3:15 counter fire during approaches to hot
3:17 landing zones. Now the Huey was much
3:19 better protected when it had something
3:20 to shoot with and someone got the idea
3:23 what if more weapons were added. So they
3:25 experimented with more machine guns,
3:27 grenade launchers and miniguns and soon
3:29 forward-firing machine guns and rocket
3:31 pods. It got to the point where some
3:33 Hueies were repurposed purely to carry
3:35 weapons and serve in the ground attack
3:37 role. These became the Huey gunships,
3:38 the first of their kind. They could
3:40 support units on the ground with heavy
3:42 and precise close air support or escort
3:44 transport Hueies called slicks and
3:45 protect them during approaches to hot
3:47 landing zones. They became quite a
3:49 capable fighting unit, but the original
3:51 problem still remained. The Huey gunship
3:53 was now heavier than the transport
3:54 Hueies with all that weaponry and
3:56 ammunition, and they couldn't carry
3:58 enough fuel to go ahead of the slicks to
4:00 prepare the landing zone, stay there to
4:02 cover the insertion, and then remain a
4:04 bit longer to support the troops on the
4:05 ground, as the Cobra would soon be able
4:07 to do. Even more importantly, the Huey
4:09 was simply not built to trade punches in
4:11 direct combat. It was in essence a
4:13 transport aircraft, and making a gunship
4:15 out of it was like trying to make a tank
4:17 out of a cargo truck. Oh, and yes, they
4:18 were doing that as well, but that's a
4:20 different topic. Okay, so now we have
4:22 door gunners and Huey gunships proving
4:24 that the attack role of a helicopter
4:26 could indeed be very effective just if
4:28 it was based on the right platform. And
4:29 this is where the Cobra comes into the
4:31 story. There had been some prototypes of
4:33 helicopters purposefully built for the
4:35 attack role, but none had gone very far.
4:36 However, Bell took what they already
4:38 had, a reliable and familiar rotor
4:40 system, engine, and transmission from
4:42 the Huey and tried to make it work in an
4:45 only 36-in wide fuselage with tandem
4:47 cockpits. The model 209 in particular
4:48 caught the attention of the American
4:50 military. It shared around 80% of the
4:52 Huey's components, but had that slick,
4:55 narrow design and stub wings to carry
4:57 ordinance. The prototype proved very
4:58 agile during testing and able to carry
5:00 serious firepower. And because the
5:02 development of the AH56 Cheyenne that
5:04 was supposed to be the new attack
5:06 helicopter was still years away, they
5:07 ordered this one to be urgently
5:09 developed and made ready for use in
5:11 Vietnam as soon as possible. Some
5:13 modifications were made and soon the
5:16 gunship called AH1G Cobra was born. It
5:18 was the first ever dedicated attack
5:19 helicopter in the world and as soon as
5:22 it was completed in 1967, it was sent to
5:24 its combat debut in Vietnam. Now the
5:26 Cobra's narrow fuselage gave it better
5:29 speed and agility and also presented a
5:31 smaller target from the front. The pilot
5:32 sat in the rear able to fire forward
5:34 firing weapons. And in front of him in
5:37 tandem seating was the co-pilot/g gunner
5:38 who commanded both the chin-mounted
5:40 turret and rockets, but could also fly
5:42 the helicopter from his position if
5:44 needed. These two had to work closely
5:46 together to be effective in combat. They
5:47 now had armored seats and a self-sealing
5:49 fuel tank providing some protection
5:51 against enemy fire. Better than the
5:53 Huey, but still relying mostly on speed
5:55 for real protection. They still had thin
5:57 plexiglass windshields, so they also
5:59 carried flack jackets and the so-called
6:01 chicken plates, ceramic body armor used
6:02 to protect them from bullets going
6:04 through the windshield. Stub wings on
6:06 either side of the fuselage carried
6:09 rocket pods with hydra 70 2.75 in
6:11 unguided rockets that could deliver
6:13 various warheads like high explosive
6:15 smoke or illumination. And each pod
6:17 could carry between 7 and 19 rockets
6:19 depending on the mission. But what's
6:21 more interesting is the Cobra's nose
6:24 turret where the 7.62 62mm M134 minigun
6:27 and a 40mm automatic grenade launcher
6:29 were positioned. These gave the Cobra
6:31 some serious firepower and could cover a
6:32 wide arc fired by the gunner or by the
6:34 pilot when locked forward and aimed by
6:36 turning the entire helicopter. This was
6:38 the basic and initial armorament for the
6:40 Cobra and very soon it would evolve with
6:41 different weapons from additional
6:44 forward firing miniguns to a 20 mm
6:46 rotary cannon and tow or other missiles
6:47 for fighting armor which would be
6:49 introduced later in the war. So now, as
6:50 you see, the Cobra had serious
6:53 capability to support ground units with
6:55 precise fire, but its missions would
6:57 also evolve once it entered combat. Also
6:59 remember that besides the seats for the
7:01 pilot and co-pilot, there was no place
7:03 for anyone else to fly on a Cobra, which
7:04 would be important when we get to the
7:06 insane mission of that badass pilot
7:08 we'll tell you about. As for speed, the
7:12 Cobra had a maximum of 219 km hour and a
7:15 range of about 300 km. Pilots loved to
7:17 fly it as it could skim just feet above
7:19 the treetops, water, or ground in the
7:21 so-called nap of the earth flight. This
7:23 would muffle the rotor sound and help
7:24 avoid detection before popping up to
7:26 attack, surprising the enemy on the
7:28 ground. Because it was anything but a
7:30 safe technique, as you can imagine, the
7:32 Cobra required a well-trained pilot to
7:33 fly it, as it was a temperamental
7:36 machine. Soon, around 300 Cobras were
7:37 operating in Vietnam, and they replaced
7:39 the Huey gunships in attack roles. Their
7:41 firepower and speed were highly
7:43 appreciated and immediately recognized
7:45 by the enemy who learned to respect and
7:47 fear the snakes. Troops on the ground
7:49 could now call in air support and get
7:51 heavy fire delivered exactly where they
7:53 needed it. Unlike fast-moving fighter
7:55 jets that often missed and sometimes hit
7:57 friendly units with bombs or nap, which
7:59 by the way happened disturbingly often.
8:01 But the North Vietnamese used what was
8:03 called the hugging the belt tactic where
8:05 they would always try to stay as close
8:07 to American troops as possible so that
8:09 fire support either from air or
8:11 artillery would be dangerously close.
8:13 The Cobra solved this problem of
8:15 friendly fire because its pilots usually
8:16 could directly see where they needed to
8:18 shoot and infantry was always relieved
8:20 when cobras were nearby. They also began
8:22 escorting Hueies, either slicks
8:24 inserting troops or dust offs on medevac
8:26 missions. But someone soon got an even
8:28 better idea or crazier if you ask me.
8:30 These were the so-called hunter killer
8:32 missions. Here, the Cobra would work
8:34 together with the O6 Loach scout
8:36 helicopters. The men flying these were
8:38 not ordinary men because what they
8:39 essentially did with this small toy
8:41 looking helicopter was act as bait for
8:44 enemy fire. They would fly low and slow
8:45 scouting areas suspected of enemy
8:47 activity while the cobras stayed behind
8:49 and high out of enemy sight. If the
8:51 loach spotted something suspicious on
8:53 the ground or received fire, which was
8:55 usually the case, the twoman crew would
8:57 mark that position with smoke grenades
8:59 and pull away, at least hopefully if the
9:01 enemy fire didn't get them first, while
9:03 the Cobra would dive in and blast the
9:04 marked position. They were quite
9:06 effective at this, and the enemy began
9:08 thinking twice before shooting at what
9:10 appeared to be an unarmed, vulnerable
9:12 helicopter. Although quite a few loaches
9:14 were shot down this way, unsurprisingly,
9:15 however, it wasn't much better for the
9:18 cobras either. At the peak of the war,
9:20 there were almost,00 Cobras of various
9:22 versions in Vietnam and they flew over 1
9:24 million combat hours during the
9:26 conflict. So, it's not a surprise that
9:29 around 300 cobras were lost in action,
9:30 which is a significant portion if you
9:32 think about it. Almost 1 in three or
9:34 four cobras were lost. During Operation
9:37 Lamson, for example, in just 6 weeks, 26
9:39 cobras were shot down. But despite the
9:41 high risk, they were doing the job that
9:43 no other machine in the world could do
9:45 at the time. And now, let's talk about
9:46 what you've been waiting for. What
9:48 happens when a Cobra is piloted by some
9:51 badass men? It was June 18th, 1968, and
9:53 a four-man long-range reconnaissance
9:55 patrol was operating deep behind enemy
9:57 lines in South Vietnam. They were part
9:59 of a covert wildcat team assigned to
10:01 gather intelligence about enemy activity
10:03 in the area. Long-range recon missions
10:06 were extremely dangerous as the small
10:08 teams were on their own and far from any
10:09 help if they were compromised or
10:11 surrounded in enemy territory. It was
10:13 around 900 in the evening, pitch black,
10:15 when Sergeant David Hill, the leader of
10:17 the recon team, looked through his
10:19 Starlight scope and to his horror,
10:21 realized that enemy soldiers had just
10:23 blocked three sides around them. Moments
10:24 later, the fourth and last side where
10:26 they could escape was also blocked. They
10:28 were now trapped in an open rice patty
10:31 with about 80 enemy fighters clearly
10:32 determined to find them. The four men
10:34 silently lay down in a narrow water
10:37 buffalo trail, set claymore mines around
10:38 them, and took up positions back to
10:40 back. Each man covering one direction,
10:42 waiting for the inevitable firefight
10:44 they knew they wouldn't survive that
10:46 night. Private Firstclass Robert Ellner
10:48 whispered into the radio an urgent call
10:50 for help, asking for whatever possible
10:52 artillery, air support, or extraction.
10:54 Given their position, there wasn't much
10:56 command could do, and it's even said
10:58 that they hesitated to attempt a rescue,
11:00 as it would surely cost more lives
11:01 trying to save them than leaving four
11:03 men to fend for themselves. However, the
11:05 call for help was answered by first left
11:07 tenant Larry Taylor, who was stationed
11:09 at a base near Saigon. He and his
11:12 co-pilot Jo Ratliff jumped into their
11:14 Cobra helicopter with the call sign
11:16 Darkhorse 32. They were accompanied by
11:18 Captain Roger Tricker and his co-pilot,
11:20 Captain Richard Driggs, flying with
11:22 another Cobra as their wingmen, and they
11:24 raced toward the position of the small
11:26 team. The night was pitch black with no
11:28 lights on the ground, and they had to
11:30 locate the coordinates only by radio
11:32 direction. Remember, this was a time
11:34 with no modern night vision devices, and
11:36 they had to find four men on the ground
11:38 surrounded by the enemy in complete
11:40 darkness. After about 20 minutes of
11:42 flight, the two Cobras arrived on scene
11:44 and contacted the team on the ground,
11:45 whispering over the radio. Taylor was in
11:47 command, and he didn't want to fire his
11:49 rockets until he knew exactly where the
11:50 team was, so he wouldn't risk hitting
11:52 them. They agreed that once the Cobra
11:54 flew directly over them, the team would
11:57 confirm it at that exact moment, which
11:59 they did. However, the pilots still
12:00 couldn't pinpoint their position, so
12:02 Taylor requested that they fire a flare.
12:04 With no other option, the recon team
12:06 fired off a flare that immediately
12:07 revealed their position, both to the
12:10 Cobra pilots and to the enemy only about
12:12 100 meters away. Now, the enemy opened
12:14 fire from all sides toward the flare,
12:15 and the Cobras engaged in a heavy
12:18 firefight while the recon team fought
12:20 back with their personal weapons. Traces
12:22 filled the air, and both Cobras were hit
12:24 by bullets multiple times. In about 45
12:26 minutes of fighting, the Cobras fired
12:28 their miniguns and rockets while the
12:30 team tried to push the enemy back. A
12:32 rescue Huey helicopter was requested to
12:34 come and pick up the team while the
12:35 cobras tried to suppress the area.
12:37 Taylor was frantically radioing
12:39 headquarters, asking when the rescue
12:40 helicopter would arrive until he was
12:42 finally told that because of the heavy
12:44 fire from the ground, the rescue was
12:46 cancelled. Taylor and his wingman were
12:47 now running low on ammunition and fuel,
12:49 and there wasn't much they could do.
12:51 They were ordered to return to base,
12:52 basically leaving the recon team to be
12:54 killed, as saving them would likely get
12:56 more helicopters shot down and even more
12:58 people killed. Taylor was still
13:00 frantically doing calculations and
13:02 finally decided to act on his plan. The
13:04 team on the ground screamed over the
13:06 radio that they were out of ammo except
13:07 for a few hand grenades they were
13:09 probably saving for themselves to avoid
13:11 being captured alive. Taylor then
13:13 ordered over the radio for them to
13:15 position all their claymores on one side
13:17 of the rice patty. When he gave the
13:18 signal, they would detonate the mines
13:20 and run in the opposite direction as
13:22 fast as they could toward a nearby
13:23 clearing. Taylor then ordered his
13:25 wingman, who was already low on fuel, to
13:27 fire all remaining ammo and return to
13:29 base while he went in for one last
13:30 attack with the few rounds and rockets
13:32 they had left. Both Cobras fired
13:34 everything they had and were now
13:35 completely out of ammo. But Taylor
13:37 wasn't going back to base. He gave the
13:39 signal to the team, turned on his
13:41 lights, and made a faint strafing run
13:43 without ammo to draw the enemy's
13:44 attention to himself and give the team a
13:46 chance to reach the clearing. He then
13:48 turned around and went down to land
13:50 while taking heavy fire. But if you
13:52 remember, the Cobra had no space for
13:54 passengers besides the two pilots. When
13:56 the team saw Taylor's Cobra landing,
13:57 they sprinted toward it, throwing their
13:59 last hand grenades behind them. As
14:01 Taylor said later, he didn't need to
14:03 tell them anything because all four men
14:04 immediately jumped on and clung to the
14:06 skids and rocket pods. They were on the
14:08 ground for only 10 seconds before Taylor
14:10 heard two hard taps on the canopy,
14:12 meaning simply go. But Taylor couldn't
14:14 just fly off the way he normally would
14:16 because the rotor wash and wind could
14:18 easily blow them off. He had to
14:19 carefully balance between flying gently
14:22 and slowly while also evading enemy
14:24 traces. By his calculations, they had a
14:26 25-minute trip to base with only 20
14:28 minutes of fuel. When they were finally
14:30 clear of enemy fire, he carefully landed
14:31 the team in a spot where they could
14:33 connect with nearby friendly units, then
14:35 raced back to base, running dangerously
14:37 low on fuel. After jumping off, the
14:38 fourman team quickly asked for the
14:40 pilot's name and saluted him for saving
14:42 their lives before he flew off. Taylor's
14:44 Cobra barely made it back to base with
14:46 the little fuel they had left. The two
14:49 Cobras combined fired 32,000 minigun
14:52 rounds and around 150 rockets, doing
14:54 everything they could to save the team,
14:56 with Taylor directly disobeying orders
14:58 to do so. The pilots were awarded silver
15:00 and bronze stars, while Taylor's Silver
15:02 Star was upgraded to the Medal of Honor
15:04 long after the war in 2023. As for the
15:06 Cobra, it continued its combat journey
15:08 through the Vietnam War. But it didn't
15:10 end there. While the Huey was mostly
15:11 withdrawn after the war, the Cobra was
15:13 improved and evolved through many
15:15 versions. Modern technology was added,
15:17 including night vision, laser
15:19 rangefinders, and improved 20 mm cannon,
15:21 better armor for the pilots, and many
15:23 other upgrades. These improvements made
15:25 the various versions of the Cobra a
15:27 highly useful attack platform, and it
15:29 even saw intense action in the 1990s
15:31 during Operation Desert Storm.
15:33 Modernized Cobra versions are still used
15:35 by many countries today, despite being
15:37 designed so far back during the Vietnam
15:38 War. The Cobra's direct descendant is
15:41 the AH1Z Viper with Hellfire missiles
15:43 and the most advanced modern systems.
15:45 However, the US Army eventually shifted
15:47 toward a newer platform with the project
15:49 that became the AH64 Apache. A
15:51 helicopter that essentially does
15:53 everything the Cobra did but better and
15:55 with the most sophisticated technology available.
