0:27 remember it this is the week by the end
0:30 of which all of you will basically get
0:33 can't figure out what he's up to
0:42 you're laughing no it will happen Kant's
0:49 groundwork is about two big questions
0:53 first what is the supreme principle of
1:11 two big questions now one way of making
1:13 your way through this dense
1:18 philosophical book is to bear in mind a
1:21 set of opposition's or contrasts or dualisms
1:23 dualisms
1:30 that are related today I'd like to talk
1:33 about them today we're going to answer
1:37 the question what according to Kant is
1:42 the supreme principle of morality and in
1:43 answering that question in working our
1:49 way up to con censor to that question it
1:53 will help to bear in mind three
1:58 contrasts or dualisms that Kant sets out
2:04 the first you remember had to do with
2:11 the motive according to which we act and
2:14 according to Kant only one kind of
2:21 motive is consistent with morality the
2:24 motive of Duty doing the right thing for
2:30 what other kind of motives are there
2:34 can't sums them up in the category of
2:40 inclination every time the motive for
2:45 what we do is to satisfy a desire or a
2:48 preference that we may have to pursue
2:51 some interest we're acting out of
2:55 inclination now let me pause to see if
2:59 in thinking about the question of the
3:01 motive of Duty the good will see if any
3:04 of you has a question about that much of
3:08 Kant's claim or is everybody happy with
3:13 this distinction what do you think go ahead
3:13 ahead
3:16 when you make that distinction between
3:18 duty and inclination is there ever any
3:19 moral action ever I mean you could
3:21 always kind of probably find some
3:24 selfish selfish motive can't you may be
3:25 very often people do have
3:29 self-interested motives when they act
3:34 Khan wouldn't dispute that but what Kant
3:40 is saying is that insofar as we act
3:44 morally that is insofar as our actions
3:45 have moral worth
3:49 what confers moral worth is precisely
3:53 our capacity to rise above self-interest
3:58 and prudence and inclination and to act
4:03 out of duty some years ago I read about
4:09 a spelling bee and there was a young man
4:13 who was declared the winner of the
4:16 spelling bee a kid named Andrew 13 years
4:20 old the winning word the word that he
4:24 was able to spell was echolalia does
4:29 anyone know what echolalia is what it's
4:37 it means the tendency to repeat as an
4:42 echo to repeat what you've heard anyhow
4:45 he's he misspelled it actually but the
4:47 judges misheard him they thought he had
4:49 spelled it correctly and awarded him the
4:52 championship of the National Spelling
4:58 Bee and he went to the judges afterward
5:02 and said actually I misspelled it I
5:05 don't deserve the prize and he was
5:08 regarded as a moral hero and he was
5:11 written up in the New York Times miss
5:29 and but when he was interviewed
5:32 afterwards listen to this when he was
5:36 interviewed afterwards he said quote the
5:39 judges said I had a lot of integrity but
5:42 then he added the part of his motive was
5:55 alright what would can't say go ahead I
5:57 guess it would depend on whether or not
6:00 that was a marginal reason or the
6:02 predominant reason in whether or not and
6:05 why he decided to confess that he didn't
6:06 actually spell the word correctly good
6:09 and what's your name Vasco that's very
6:13 interesting is there anyone else who has
6:17 a view about this does this show that
6:20 Kant's principle is too stringent too
6:25 demanding what we can't say about this
6:31 yes I think that Khan actually says that
6:34 it is the pure motivation that comes out
6:36 of duty which gives the action moral
6:38 growth so it's like for example in this
6:40 case he might have more than one motive
6:41 you might have the motive of not feeling
6:43 like a slime and he might have the
6:46 motive of doing the right thing for in
6:49 and of itself out of duty and so wow
6:51 that's more than one motivation going on
6:53 there does not mean that the action is
6:55 devoid of moral worth just because he
6:58 has one other motive so because the
7:00 motive which involves Duty is what gives
7:03 it no moral growth good and what's your
7:06 name Judith well Judith I think that
7:08 your account actually is true to count
7:11 it's fine to have sentiments and
7:15 feelings that support doing the right thing
7:15 thing
7:19 provided they don't provide the reason
7:23 for acting so I think Judith actually
7:25 has mounted a pretty good defense of
7:28 Kant on this question of the motive of
7:33 duty thank you now let's go back to the
7:37 three contrasts it's clear at least what
7:40 Kant means when he says
7:42 that for an action to have moral worth
7:46 it must be done for the sake of duty not
7:49 out of inclination but as we began to
7:51 see last time there's a connection
7:55 between Kant's stringent notion of
7:58 morality and his specially demanding
8:02 understanding of freedom and that leads
8:05 us to the second contrast the link
8:08 between morality and freedom
8:11 the second contrast describes two
8:15 different ways that my will can be
8:18 determined autonomously and
8:22 heteronomously and according to Kant I
8:27 am only free when my will is determined
8:31 autonomously which means what according
8:34 to a law that I give myself we must be
8:37 capable if we're capable of freedom as
8:39 autonomy we must be capable of acting
8:41 according not to a law that's given or
8:43 imposed on us but according to a law we
8:47 give ourselves but where could such a
8:51 law come from a law that we give
9:00 ourselves reason if reason determines my
9:07 will then the will becomes the power to
9:10 choose independent of the dictates of
9:15 nature or inclination or circumstance so
9:19 connected with Kant's demanding notions
9:22 of morality and freedom is a specially
9:26 demanding notion of reasoning well how
9:31 can reason determine the will there are
9:33 two ways and this leads to the third
9:37 contrast Kant says there are two
9:40 different commands of reason and a
9:43 command of reason Kant calls an
9:46 imperative an imperative is simply an
9:50 art one kind of imperative perhaps the
9:52 most familiar kind is a hypothetical imperative
9:59 hypothetical imperatives use
10:07 instrumental reason if you want X then
10:12 do why it's means-ends reasoning if you
10:17 want a good business reputation then
10:20 don't shortchange her customers word
10:23 make it out that's a hypothetical
10:26 imperative if the action would be good
10:29 solely as a means to something else Kant
10:31 writes the imperative is hypothetical if
10:34 the action is represented as good in
10:38 itself and therefore as necessary for a
10:41 will which of itself accords with reason
10:47 then the imperative is categorical
10:50 that's the difference between a
10:52 categorical imperative and a
10:54 hypothetical one a categorical
10:59 imperative commands categorically which
11:01 just means without reference to or
11:06 dependence on any further purpose and so
11:11 you see the connection among these three
11:15 parallel contrasts to be free in the
11:19 sense of autonomous requires that I act
11:24 not out of a hypothetical imperative but
11:28 out of a categorical imperative and so
11:30 you see by these three contrast Kant
11:35 reasons his way brings us up to his
11:39 derivation of the categorical imperative
11:43 well this leaves us one big question
11:46 what is the categorical imperative what
11:48 is the supreme principle of morality
11:54 what is it command of us can't gives
11:57 three versions three formulations of the
12:00 categorical imperative I want to mention
12:03 two and then see what you think of them
12:05 the first
12:09 version the first formula he calls the
12:14 formula of the universal law Act only on
12:17 that Maxim whereby you can at the same
12:19 time will that it should become a
12:23 universal law and by maksim what is
12:28 can't mean he means a rule that explains
12:30 the reason for what you're doing a
12:35 principle for example promise keeping
12:38 suppose I need money I need a hundred
12:45 dollars desperately and I know I can't
12:50 pay it back anytime soon I come to you
12:52 and make you a promise of false promise
12:55 when I know I can't keep please give me
12:56 a hundred dollars today
12:58 lend me the money I will repay you next
13:04 week is that consistent with the
13:05 categorical imperative that false
13:10 promise Khan says no in the test the way
13:14 we can determine that the false promise
13:15 is at odds with the categorical
13:20 imperative is try to universalize it
13:22 universalize the maxim upon which you're
13:26 about to act if everybody made false
13:30 promises when they needed money then
13:33 nobody would believe those promises
13:36 there would be no such thing as a
13:39 promise and so there would be a
13:42 contradiction the maxim universalized
13:49 would undermine itself that's the test
13:52 that's how we can know that the false
13:59 promise is wrong well what about the
14:02 formula of the universal law you find it
14:09 persuasive what do you think
14:13 go ahead I have a question about the
14:16 difference between categorical ISM and a
14:20 hypothesis that if you're going to match
14:23 between categorical and hypothetical ya
14:26 imperatives right if you're going to act
14:30 with a categorical imperative so that
14:33 the maxim doesn't undermined itself it
14:36 sounds like I am going to do X because I
14:40 want Y I am going to not lie in dire
14:43 need because I want the world to
14:46 function in such a way that promises are
14:48 kept I don't want to liquidate the
14:52 practice of promises right it sounds
14:56 like justifying a means by an ends it
14:57 seems like an instance of
14:59 consequentialist reasoning you're saying
15:01 and what's your name
15:09 Tim Tim well Tim John Stuart Mill agreed
15:12 with you he made this he made this
15:15 criticism of Kant
15:20 he said if I universalize the maxim and
15:22 find that the whole practice of promise
15:24 keeping would be destroyed if
15:27 universalized I must be appealing
15:32 somehow to consequences if that's the
15:36 reason not to tell a false promise
15:39 so John Stuart Mill agreed with that
15:42 criticism against can't but John Stuart
15:49 you're in good company though you're in
15:52 good company Tim Conte has often read as
15:58 Tim just read him as appealing to
16:01 consequences the world would be worse
16:05 off if everybody lied because then no
16:07 one could rely on anybody else's word
16:11 therefore you shouldn't lie that's not
16:14 what cond is saying exactly although
16:17 it's easy to interpret him as saying
16:21 that I think what he's saying is that
16:25 this is the test this is the test of
16:29 whether the maxim corresponds with the
16:31 categorical imperative it isn't exactly
16:35 the reason it's not the reason the
16:38 reason you should universalize to test
16:44 your maxim is to see whether you are
16:51 privileged Nguni dan desires over
16:53 everybody else's it's a way of pointing
16:56 to this feature this demand of the
17:00 categorical imperative that the reasons
17:03 for your action shouldn't depend for
17:06 their justification on your interests
17:09 your needs your special circumstances
17:12 being more important than somebody
17:15 else's that I think is the moral
17:16 intuition lying behind the
17:20 universalization test so let me spell
17:23 out the second Kant's second version of
17:24 the categorical imperative
17:28 perhaps in a way that's more intuitively
17:31 accessible than the formula of universal
17:38 law it's the formula of humanity as an end
17:39 end
17:43 konna introduces the second version of
17:45 the categorical imperative but the
17:50 following line of argument we can't base
17:51 the categorical imperative on any
17:55 particular interest purposes or ends
17:57 because then it would be only relative
17:59 to the person
18:02 ends they were but suppose there was
18:06 something whose existence has in itself
18:10 an absolute value and end in itself
18:15 then in it and in it alone would there
18:18 be the ground of a possible categorical
18:23 imperative well what is there that we
18:28 can think of as having its end in itself
18:32 Const answer is this I say that man and
18:36 in general every rational being exists
18:39 as an end in himself not merely as a
18:42 means for arbitrary use by this or that
18:47 will and here Kant distinguishes between
18:50 persons on the one hand and things on
18:54 the other rational beings are persons
18:56 they don't just have a relative value
19:00 for us but if anything has they have an
19:04 absolute value an intrinsic value that
19:08 is rational beings have dignity they're
19:10 worthy of reverence and respect this
19:13 line of reasoning leads Kant to the
19:15 second formulation of the categorical
19:19 imperative which is this act in such a
19:22 way that you always treat humanity
19:25 whether in your own person or in the
19:29 person of any other never simply as a
19:33 means but always at the same time as an
19:38 end so that's the formula of humanity as
19:43 an end the idea that human beings as
19:46 rational beings are ends in themselves
19:53 not open to use merely as a means when I
19:57 make a false promise to you I'm using
20:03 you as a means to my ends to my desire
20:05 for the hundred dollars and so I'm
20:10 failing to respect you I'm failing to
20:12 respect your dignity
20:16 I'm manipulating you now consider the
20:27 murder and suicide are at odds with the
20:32 categorical imperative why if I murder
20:35 someone I'm taking their life for some
20:41 purpose either because I'm hired killer
20:44 or I'm in the throes of some great anger
20:47 or passion well I have some interest
20:50 some purpose that's particular for the
20:53 sake which I'm using them as a means
20:57 murder violates the categorical
21:01 imperative for Kant morally speaking
21:05 suicide is on a par with murder it's on
21:07 a par with murder because what we
21:12 violate when we take a life when we take
21:15 someone's life ours or somebody else's
21:19 we use that person we use a rational
21:24 being we use humanity as a means and so
21:27 we fail to respect humanity as an end
21:30 and that capacity for reason that
21:35 humanity the commands respect that is
21:39 the ground of dignity that humanity that
21:43 capacity for reason resides
21:46 undifferentiated in all of us and so I
21:50 violate that dignity in my own person if
21:54 I commit suicide and in murder if I take
21:56 somebody else's life from a moral point
21:59 of view they're the same and the reason
22:03 they're the same has to do with the
22:07 universal character and ground of the
22:11 moral law the reason that we have to
22:15 respect the dignity of other people has
22:18 not to do with anything in particular
22:22 about them and so respect contine
22:24 respectives unlike love in this
22:29 way it's unlike sympathy it's unlike
22:33 solidarity or fellow feeling or altruism
22:36 because love and those other particular
22:38 virtues or reasons for caring about
22:40 other people have to do with who they
22:44 are in particular but respect for can't
22:49 respect is respect for Humanity which is
22:51 universal for a rational capacity which
22:54 is universal and that's why violating it
22:58 in my own case is as objectionable as
23:01 violating it in the case of any other
23:10 questions or objections go ahead
23:15 I guess I'm somewhat worried about
23:20 Kant's statement that you cannot use a
23:22 person as a means because every person
23:25 is an end in and of themselves because
23:28 it seems that that every day in order to
23:30 get something accomplished for that day
23:33 I must use myself as a means to some end
23:36 and I must use the people around me as a
23:39 means to some end as well for instance
23:43 suppose that I want to do well in the
23:46 class and I have to write a paper I have
23:47 to use myself as a means to write the
23:51 paper suppose I want to buy something
23:54 food I must go to the store and use the
23:56 person working behind the counter as a
23:58 means for me to purchase my food right
24:02 that's true you do what's your name
24:04 Patrick Patrick you're not doing
24:08 anything wrong you're not violating the
24:10 categorical imperative when you use
24:12 other people as means that's not
24:18 objectionable provided when we deal with
24:19 other people for the sake of advancing
24:23 our projects and purposes and interests
24:27 which we all do provided we treat them
24:31 in a way that is consistent with respect
24:35 for their dignity and what it means to
24:37 respect them
24:49 are you persuaded do you think that Kant
24:54 has given a compelling account a
24:56 persuasive account of the supreme
25:02 principle of morality reread the
25:06 groundwork and will try to answer that
