0:01 Today we are talking about one of the
0:03 most traumatizing weapons of World War
0:06 II, the Stooka dive bomber. You will
0:08 learn about its capabilities, weaponry,
0:11 terrifying psychological effects, and
0:12 what made being a Stooka crew member
0:15 absolutely horrifying. [Music]
0:28 After World War I, Germany was forbidden
0:30 from developing or producing weapons.
0:33 However, when the Nazis came to power in
0:35 1933, they completely ignored this
0:37 prohibition and in absolute secrecy
0:39 began developing new weapons in
0:42 preparation for another global
0:44 conflict. To bypass these restrictions,
0:47 the Junkers company designed the K47 as
0:49 a civilian aircraft that could later be
0:52 adapted for military purposes. The K-47
0:54 was a rugged two-seater fighter with
0:56 twin rudders and a rear gunner position.
0:58 It was an experimental step toward
0:59 creating a dive bomber capable of
1:02 precision attacks. The concept of dive
1:04 bombing became a central focus as
1:06 Germany sought ways to enhance the
1:08 accuracy of its air strikes. By
1:10 converting the K47 into a prototype dive
1:12 bomber, engineers conducted early tests
1:14 to explore the feasibility of steep
1:17 descent attacks. However, the Stooker
1:19 would take this role a step further.
1:22 actually several steps further. Before
1:24 continuing with the Stooka, let's first
1:26 explain what dive bombing actually
1:28 means. Traditional bombing was based on
1:30 bombers flying horizontally, releasing
1:32 bombs at high altitudes to avoid
1:34 anti-aircraft fire. Because of the
1:36 rudimentary technology of the time, they
1:38 weren't very accurate, resulting in a
1:40 large percentage of bombs not hitting
1:42 their targets and wasting resources. On
1:44 the other hand, dive bombers, instead of
1:46 relying on guesswork for accuracy, would
1:48 descend at great speed at steep angles
1:51 of 60 to 90° directly towards their
1:53 target. This way, pilots had a clear
1:55 view of their target, placing the bombs
1:56 exactly where they wanted, effectively
1:59 hitting bunkers, bridges, and even
2:01 vehicles. Much fewer bombs were wasted
2:03 and a greater number of targets were
2:05 destroyed. We'll tell you more about
2:06 this technique in a bit to show you how
2:08 terrifying it was both for the pilots
2:10 and those on the receiving end on the
2:13 ground. During these tests, a crash
2:15 occurred in which the pilot and engineer
2:17 were killed. During the dive with the
2:19 prototype, the whole tail plane simply
2:21 broke off, leading to the catastrophic
2:24 accident. It became evident that besides
2:26 reinforcing the K47 for greater weight
2:29 and stress during dives, the entire tail
2:31 had to be modified to allow accurate and
2:34 safe vertical dives. After many setbacks
2:36 and experimenting with various solutions
2:38 back and forth, eventually the Ju87
2:40 Stooker took shape as a highly
2:42 specialized dive bomber with an
2:44 interesting addition of a psychological
2:47 warfare method. When it finally entered
2:49 production, the Stooker had some really
2:51 unique characteristics for that time.
2:53 Inverted gull wings reduced drag and
2:55 improved stability. It was operated by a
2:57 pilot protected by a rear gunner with an
3:00 MG15 machine gun. But this made the
3:02 stooker quite vulnerable when operating
3:04 without fighter escorts, as the single
3:06 small caliber machine gun couldn't offer
3:09 much protection. The primary payload was
3:12 a 1,000 kilo bomb mounted under the
3:16 fuselage with combinations of 500 or 250
3:18 kilo bombs under the wings. Besides
3:20 generalpurpose bombs, it could carry
3:22 cluster and incendiary bombs and
3:24 variants with armored casings designed
3:27 for fortified positions to penetrate
3:29 deeply before detonation and cause
3:32 internal damage. Two fixed MG17 machine
3:34 guns were its forward armament for
3:37 strafing runs. Now, let's get to the
3:39 exotic equipment and explain what a dive
3:41 bombing run looked like. The Stooka dive
3:44 began at an altitude of about 15,000 ft
3:47 with the aircraft rolling 180° to enter
3:50 a descent at angle of 90°. During this
3:52 dive, air brakes located under the wings
3:54 slowed the aircraft, giving the pilot
3:56 more time to aim and ensuring a
3:59 controlled descent at speeds reaching
4:02 600 kmh. As the shooker approached its
4:05 target, a U-shaped crutch under the
4:07 fuselage swung the bomb out of the way
4:09 of the propeller, dropping it at the
4:12 optimal altitude of 1500 ft. Immediately
4:14 after bomb release, the Stooker's
4:15 automatic dive recovery system
4:18 activated, initiating a 6G pull out to
4:21 level the aircraft and prevent a crash.
4:23 This was crucial because the extreme G
4:26 forces experienced by pilots during the
4:28 pullout often cause temporary blindness
4:31 or loss of consciousness. The system
4:33 ensured that even if the pilot blacked
4:35 out momentarily, the aircraft would
4:38 level itself until control was regained.
4:40 Once the nose was above the horizon, the
4:42 air brakes retracted, the throttle was
4:43 opened, and the propeller was set to
4:45 climb, allowing the pilot to resume
4:48 normal flight. However, not all pilots
4:50 trusted this system. Some crews
4:52 disconnected it because its predictable
4:54 recovery pattern and altitude made the
4:56 stooker more vulnerable to ground
4:59 defenses. crews endured extreme physical
5:02 and psychological strain during each
5:04 dive. And of course, the feature that
5:06 made the stooker so infamous, its
5:09 so-called Jericho trumpet. As the
5:11 Germans sought to gain every possible
5:13 advantage over the enemy, psychological
5:16 warfare was certainly one of their key
5:18 strategies. In addition to delivering
5:20 devastatingly accurate bombing runs, the
5:23 aircraft served as a tool to terrorize
5:25 both soldiers and civilians. The sheer
5:28 sight of the aircraft vertically diving
5:30 toward its target was enhanced with a
5:32 simple device that created a terrifying
5:35 and extremely loud high-pitched wailing
5:37 shriek. The tone was deliberately chosen
5:40 to be extremely unsettling, resembling a
5:42 scream that intensified as the aircraft
5:45 accelerated in its dive. It could be
5:47 heard over vast distances even before
5:49 the stooker itself was visible, making
5:51 you certain that bombs were about to
5:54 strike. Yet you had no idea where. This
5:56 simple technique to terrorize its
5:58 victims proved highly effective. It
6:00 traumatized everyone near the receiving
6:02 end of a Stooka strike, spreading mass
6:04 hysteria and panic among both civilians
6:07 and soldiers. Since it created
6:08 additional drag, the siren could be
6:10 removed or disabled depending on the
6:12 mission, such as when stealth or speed
6:14 was needed against well-defended
6:16 targets. Later in the war, it was mostly
6:18 phased out to improve operational
6:21 efficiency. On the morning of August
6:23 15th, 1939, during a dive bombing
6:26 demonstration in secret preparation for
6:28 the invasion of Poland, 13 Stooker
6:30 bombers crashed almost simultaneously,
6:33 killing all 26 crew members. The planes
6:35 dove through clouds, expecting to drop
6:37 their practice bombs and pull out once
6:39 below the cloud cover. However, the
6:40 cloud ceiling was too low, and
6:42 unexpected ground mist gave them no time
6:44 to recover, leading to the tragic
6:46 accident. Stuka prototypes made their
6:49 secret combat debut during the Spanish
6:51 Civil War, where they immediately showed
6:53 their effectiveness in bombing missions.
6:55 Their real deployment came during the
6:57 invasion of Poland, where coordination
6:59 with ground forces had been perfected,
7:01 devastating Polish infrastructure and
7:04 troop movements. Bridges, bunkers, and
7:06 railroads were destroyed with pinpoint
7:08 accuracy, quickly paralyzing Poland's
7:11 defense. Also, the siren was something
7:13 new at this point, never heard before,
7:15 which added to the horror of Blitzkrieg
7:18 tactics. Stookers would dive and bomb in
7:20 waves as part of a meticulously
7:22 coordinated tactic, working closely with
7:24 ground forces with real-time radio
7:27 communication. One of the most effective
7:29 and widely used formations was the Keter
7:32 formation, meaning chain in German. In
7:34 this tactic, Stookers flew in tightly
7:36 controlled groups of three aircraft.
7:38 Each Keta would execute their dive
7:40 bombing runs sequentially with one plane
7:42 diving to attack while the other two
7:45 maintained altitude awaiting their turn.
7:47 This method ensured a continuous
7:49 bombardment of the target, maximizing
7:51 destruction and overwhelming enemy
7:54 defenses. A more extensive variation was
7:57 wave attacks. While one wave carried out
7:59 its bombing run, others would rearm and
8:01 refuel at nearby airfields, keeping the
8:03 pressure almost constantly on the
8:05 target. Stookers then supported the push
8:08 in France, even helping in neutralizing
8:10 the heavily fortified Ebanale fortress
8:12 in Belgium. Previously considered
8:14 impregnable. Stookers were used to
8:16 attack weak spots, assisting
8:18 paratroopers in capturing and securing
8:20 positions. The Stooker quickly became a
8:23 symbol of Luftvafa dominance early in
8:25 the war. Then the Battle of Britain came
8:27 and against a wellorganized defense, the
8:30 Stooker's limitations became apparent.
8:32 British fighter planes such as the
8:34 Spitfire and Hurricane exploited the
8:36 Stooker's slower speed and lack of
8:38 effective protection to intercept and
8:40 shoot them down. Stookers without
8:42 fighter escorts were easy targets for
8:44 allied fighters and needed to be
8:47 escorted by Messmid fighters. After
8:49 catastrophic losses of entire squadrons
8:51 of Stookers, the Luftvafer was forced to
8:53 withdraw them from the Western Front.
8:56 However, its job was far from over. With
8:58 the invasion of the Soviet Union, the
9:00 Stooka was heavily employed again.
9:02 Precision bombings of Soviet
9:04 infrastructure and troop concentrations
9:07 allowed Germany to punch through vast
9:09 regions of the Soviet Union and almost
9:11 reach Moscow. One of the Stooka's most
9:14 significant roles was tank busting. The
9:17 Ju87G model introduced in 1943 was
9:20 equipped with twin 37 mm flack cannons
9:23 mounted under its wings. Shooker Panza
9:25 squadrons became specialists in hunting
9:28 Soviet tanks. Hans Olrich Rudell, the
9:30 most famous Shooker pilot, was credited
9:33 with destroying over 500 tanks and
9:34 earned the highest award in the German
9:37 military. Soviet tankers had to adopt
9:39 new strategies and use camouflage and
9:41 dispersal techniques to minimize damage
9:44 from these attacks. Even traps were set
9:46 for shookers with fake tank formations
9:48 made of wood arranged in tight clusters
9:51 and anti-aircraft guns hidden nearby,
9:53 ready to ambush the bombers as they dove
9:56 to attack the decoys. Stookers also
9:58 played a crucial role during the battles
10:00 around Stalingrad, fiercely attempting
10:02 to support the encircled German army. At
10:05 this stage of the war, squadrons flew an
10:08 average of 500 sorties per day, losing
10:10 one aircraft daily while inflicting
10:13 significant losses on Soviet forces.
10:15 However, from this point forward, Stooka
10:18 losses increased drastically. Also, the
10:20 Stooka saw extensive use in naval
10:22 warfare. During the Battle of Cree in
10:25 1941, Stookers targeted British shipping
10:28 and naval vessels, sinking multiple
10:31 ships and crippling Allied logistics in
10:32 the Mediterranean.
10:35 JU87R models with extended fuel tanks
10:37 for longrange operations were used to
10:39 disrupt supply lines and destroy
10:41 convoys, becoming one of the most feared
10:44 aircraft for Allied sailors. Besides
10:46 pure destruction and disruption of the
10:48 enemy, Stookers were used for medevac
10:51 missions with specially designed gondola
10:52 mounts attached to the wings that could
10:55 carry wounded soldiers. As the war
10:57 turned against Germany, the stooker
10:59 began to show its age. Outclassed by
11:01 faster, more advanced Allied aircraft
11:03 and anti-aircraft defenses, its
11:06 vulnerabilities became glaring. Despite
11:08 this, Stuka crews continued to fly
11:10 high-risk missions, often with little
