This discussion explores the complexities and potential consequences of U.S. intervention in Venezuela, contrasting perspectives on regime change, international law, and the strategic interests of major powers.
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Will President Trump's Venezuela
operation be a success or another lesson
in regime change? Do you realize, Tom,
that 18 different times during the Cold
War, we uh knocked off regimes? 18
different times [music] and not in one
single case did we produce a stable
liberal democracy at the end of the
process. It hardly ever happens. uh the
threats that [music] uh Maduro and his
regime pose to stability in the Western
Hemisphere [music] and to the United
States directly, harboring Iranians who
are conducting terrorist activities
across the hemisphere. And because we
are acting at the request [music] of
what is the legitimate government, the
the people who actually won the election
in Venezuela, I think we're well within
any [music] reasonable person's
understanding of what international law
requires. as in the case of throwing out
Hello and welcome to Switzerland, a new
program about politics, modern history,
and international relations. I'm your
host, Tom Switzer.
Today on the show, John Bolton, former
national security adviser to President
Trump and author of The Room Where It
Happened that was published in [music]
2020. And John Mirshimer, professor of
political science at the University of
Chicago and author [music] of The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics that was
published in 2001.
Two leading American foreign policy
thinkers, two views. Bolton versus M.
Well, in the past week, Washington has
taken out the Venezuelan dictator
Nicholas Maduro from power, but John
Mirshimer is highly skeptical about the
mission. The idea that the United States military
military
uh the United States national security
establishment can go into a country that
has serious political problems. We can
wreck the regime and then we can rebuild
it from the bottom up with the American
military, please. But first, John
Bolton. John, welcome to my new program.
>> Well, glad to be with you. Good luck
with it. Uh now in 2019 you were Trump's
national security adviser and you backed
Venezuela's opposition in an effort to
remove Maduro and you've since lamented
that the first Trump administration's
failure to oust him that was one of its
saddest moments. So am I right in
thinking that you're now celebrating
Trump's mission to dislodge Majuro?
Well, I think it was the right thing to
do to uh to extract Maduro. Um he was
clearly the head of the of the uh of the
gang running the country and uh the
symbol to the world of what has happened
to the people of Venezuela and also the
stability of the Western Hemisphere. But
removing Maduro alone is not enough. The
rest of the regime is still there. And
and remember this goes back 30 years now
to the time Hugo Chavez staged a coup
against the legitimately elected
government of Venezuela. Maduro is
Chavez's successor. He steals elections
himself quite regularly. This is a a
hardcore group of people. They've been
in power 30 years. They're not going to
give it up easily.
Okay. So, just to clarify your position
then Maduro's cronies are still running
the joint. they're running Venezuela and
they don't seem to want to give it up.
So, do you think then that Trump,
President Trump is willing to settle for
Maduro 2.0?
Well, you know, it's it's a great
surprise to the MAGA supporters of Trump
that we've now decapitated a foreign
regime. And then on Saturday, the
president said, "We're going to run
Venezuela for a while." Something that
uh on Sunday, Marco Rubio ran away from
on the Sunday talk show saying, "No,
we're just going to talk about policy."
But the fact is that by undercutting the
legitimate democratic opposition in uh
Venezuela, Trump is seems to be
suggesting we'll deal with the
dictatorship if we can get our way on
oil, which undercuts the very legitimacy
of our claim to go in and remove Maduro
in the first place.
>> Yeah. Well, I mean the the acting
president Maduro's vice president uh
Deli Rodriguez, she has in recent days
invited the US to quote work together
cooperatively. Um and of course for his
part uh Trump boasts that she will do
what the US wants especially with
respect to resource access. Otherwise
expect a second wave of military
intervention. Meanwhile, as you say,
shelvy plans for a democratic
transition. Why can't that strategy work?
work?
>> Well, the the I think what the
government in Venezuela is doing is
playing for time. They're they're
obviously taken by surprise that
Maduro's ouster, although there is some
theorizing that maybe Deli Rodriguez
collaborated with the US. I I would be
skeptical of that. We don't have facts.
We'll have to find out. But I think they
are trying to show an openness to
negotiate in order to buy time. They
need to be sure that they've got their
ducks in a row. That the army, the
military forces remain loyal, that the
collectivos, these gangs of motorcycle
riding thugs that they use to intimidate
the civilian population remain loyal.
They want to level set with China,
Russia, uh, uh, Iran, and Cuba to make
sure they've got their support. And I
think it's just a classic uh uh uh game
plan to drag out negotiations in in
hopes that new options will emerge for them.
them.
>> But just say for argument sake the new
leadership in Caracus works with
Washington ends ties to the drug
trafficking uh cuts its links with
Russia and China, Iran. This is the the
axis of autocracies. Again, why couldn't
that strategy work? Well, I if it if it
wouldn't if it would work, yeah, may
maybe that would be acceptable. But one
of the reasons that Maduro's still in
power up until Saturday was precisely
because the likes of uh Russia, Cuba,
China, and Iran want the regime in
place. They may not care about Maduro.
He may be expendable, but uh but they
want the regime to stay in place because
it suits their interest. Just take
Russia and Cuba. Uh Venezuela is a good
forward operating base for Russia for
its activities in uh in the hemisphere.
Uh and uh it's got the advantage it's
not as close to the United States as
Cuba is. And Cuba needs Maduro or needs
the regime in power because they depend
on oil coming from Venezuela. And the
Havana regime fears that if Maduro
falls, they may fall too. And I hope
they're right.
>> Okay, we'll get to Cuba very soon, John.
But just on the perils of regime change,
you seem to be optimistic about the
process, but isn't couldn't it mean uh a
regime change mean a real danger of a
power vacuum or something even more destabilizing?
destabilizing?
>> Well, look, in 2018 and 2019, the
opposition worked to fragment the Maduro
regime at the top and they thought they
had a number of deals worked out where
military leaders would defect and and
they would be able to take power. that
that didn't work, but they were ready to
assume control of the government. Now,
we don't know whether Trump has followed
through on that. We don't we don't know
uh whether those contacts were made, but
I think that uh to throw the opposition
under the bus uh means that you're
potentially going to engage in
transactions that strengthen the hold of
the regime uh in in Venezuela. And
whether these others will back away, I
think is uh is is deep speculation.
>> But John, you're a realist. Essentially,
you're not a neoconservative, as your
media detractors call you. You'd
recognize that democracy is not an
export commodity. It's essentially a
do-it-yourself enterprise that requires
special circumstances and conditions.
So, why are you so keen on a democratic
transition in Venezuela?
Well, because I don't think that the
Maduro regime even without Maduro uh is
going to give up its ties to the to the
autocracies. I mean, the Minister of
Defense's name is Vladimir Padrino. Now,
Vladimir is not an ancient Spanish name,
and it reflects the background of of
politics in in much of Latin America.
China, just to give an example, which
wants oil wherever it can get it, uh,
looks at Venezuela's oil reserves, 17%
of the proven oil reserves worldwide,
bigger than Saudi Arabia, bigger than
the United States. China currently buys
80% of Venezuela's export of oil.
They're not going to want to see that
disappear. They want they want sources
that that they control. So it's more
complicated today I think harder to
dislodge the foreigners than it was back
in 201819.
>> Your critics John would say just look at
the history of US involvement in this
region. You know the US occupation of
Haiti for example I think it was from
1915 to 1934. The Americans had occupied
it for 20 years and by most accounts
left it in a disgraceful shambles. uh
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua. This
is what the critics would say to you.
And they'd say these interventions
produce not stable liberal democracies,
but uh authoritarian strong men. How
would you respond to those critics who
are warning that same thing here? >> Sorry.
>> Sorry.
>> Yeah. I think they're short on history.
uh you know in uh uh in Haiti the
country was a shambles when we went in
and it was a shambles uh when when we
left and it was a shambles when Papa
Doier was running it. It was a shambles
when he and his son were overthrown. I'm
sad to say it's a shambles today. We
didn't cause it. Let let's be clear.
Nicaragua maybe we should have stayed
longer and then it wouldn't be ruled by
the communist dictator Danny Ortega
who's still in power there today. Uh, I
mean, it's it's a you have to look at
this on a on a case-byase basis. The
fact is that what the Maduro regime has
done over the past 15 years is given
opportunities for adversaries of the US
and stability in the hemisphere to come
in and use their territory to their
advantage. It's sort of like in that in
that sense the Afghanistan of South America.
America.
>> Okay, sticking with the critics though,
uh, and this is an unlikely critic. This
is the UK Daily Telegraph. the British
newspaper that you contribute calling
columns quite frequently. Now they raise
serious doubts about this intervention.
Let me quote from its editorial and we
put this on the screen. Quote, "A war
which directly focuses on the resources
of a sovereign state in this manner
would appear to confirm all the worst
suspicions held by nations doing
business with Washington." Now that's
the Conservative Telegraph in
Washington. Meanwhile, all the usual
suspects, John, like the Guardian
newspaper in Britain, the New York
Times. Um, no surprises here. They're
staunch critics of Donald Trump, but
they say that the coup is illegal. It's
unprovoked. It violates sovereign
territorial rights. This is the
counterargument. And all this suggests
that might is right and return to great
powers dominating spheres of influence.
and they would all say that what Trump
has done here is a marked step away from
the rules and norms of the liberal
international order. Again, John, your
response to the critics?
>> Well, I'm not defending Donald Trump. I
I mean, I think he is so transactional.
He doesn't have a theory of spheres of
influence or anything like that. He sees
a deal. They've got oil. I want the oil.
He you know, he was a big critic of US
efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein in
in Iraq. and uh he would say repeatedly,
I I was one of the first ones against
it. Now, of course, if we could have
taken the oil, then I would have been in
favor of it. That that's how he looks at
things. I'm not looking I'm not looking
at it that way. I'm looking at it from
the perspective we did we did approach
Venezuela in 2018 2019, which is seeing
these threats to stability in the
Western Hemisphere, which has a direct
impact on the United States and taking
action accordingly. I I'm not suggesting
that's what Trump is doing. I don't
think he understands what I just said.
Uh and uh and and it's legitimate to
criticize Trump, but not not the effort
to overthrow the regime at the request
of the Venezuelan opposition.
>> Okay. But how would China view the
overthrowing of the regime? Won't Xi
Jinping just see this raid as
vindication for possibly taking over Taiwan?
Taiwan?
>> Well, because I think that the
circumstances are completely different.
the the argument that the Chinese would
make is that Taiwan is a sovereign part
of China. The the people of Taiwan beg
to disagree with that and uh uh and and
so the circumstances there the Chinese
do not have the approval of the
legitimate government of Taiwan asking
them to intervene. Uh it's the Chinese
who are threatening the stability of
Taiwan, not vice versa.
>> What about Russia? I mean the Kremlin
and its supporters might say that if the
US can use military force to topple
array regimes in its sphere of influence
then Moscow is justified in playing hard
ball in Ukraine to protect its sphere of influence.
influence.
>> Well, it's not a question of spheres of
influence. And what what the Russians
are doing is the same thing China is
doing with Taiwan. Vladimir Putin fully
believes that Ukraine should be part of
the Russian Empire again. And and he has
committed unprovoked aggression against
it. that that's not nearly the same as
what Venezuela has been doing to the
United States. Ukraine had no designs
against Russia. It wasn't uh engaging in
any activity that threatened Russian
security or sovereignty. So, you know,
you can use the words this is you could
be the opponents are using words uh that
have different meanings in different
situations, but you can't disguise the
facts which is that Venezuela is not the
same as Ukraine or Taiwan.
>> Okay. What about other countries? I
mean, you've got Trump now threatening
military strikes against another
unpopular anti-western regime. That of
course is Iran. The Mullers being your
nemesis. Uh, now that he's ousted
Maduro, could other countries be next,
like Colombia?
>> Well, he he is he is in full Trump flow
here of uh as he described it in the art
of the deal. You say the most outrageous
thing you can and and people say, "My
god, he's going to invade Greenland."
and uh and they say, "Well, what do we
do to stop it?" And you know, in Trump's
dealmaking, if he if he says uh the most
outrageous thing and gets 30% of what he
asked for, he considers it himself a
great coup. Uh I I think people should
uh should try and keep a grip on things.
Uh but I would say if Trump did invade
Greenland, it's the end of the NATO alliance.
alliance.
>> It would be the worst mistake of a
president in in contemporary history.
>> Okay. What that's Greenland. What about
Colombia, though? is I mean Trump has
been talking tough about the Colombian
president and the drug cartel even
though the Colombians maintain they're
not linked with the drug cartel.
>> Well uh you know the the uh I'm not a
big fan of the current president of
Colombia but he was democratically
elected. The government of Colombia does
not threaten the United States. We have
important assets there. We have worked
with the government against illegal
narcotics trafficking. Not as
effectively with this one as with past
ones. Uh and uh and so again the
situations are different. This is
remember Trump runs his mouth a lot and
and it's important to understand that. I
I think the case needs to be made that
that uh that he is in fact undercutting
American interest when he does things
like that not not advancing them.
>> Okay. What about uh Cuba John? And I
mean you were very young in 1961, but
you would remember uh the Bay of Pigs
intervention uh that you know encouraged
basically um Federal Castro to host
Soviet nuclear missiles. So how would
regime change in Cuba differ from say
failed efforts to dislodge the
communists from Havana?
>> Well, I don't think the Bay of Pigs
provoked Castro to get closer to the
Soviet Union. I think he was on a
mission to do that uh really from the
beginning. Uh but I think uh I think it
is fair to say that this troa of tyranny
in the western hemisphere, Maduro, the
Maduro regime in Venezuela, the post
Castro regime in Cuba and the Ortegas in
Nicaragua are leaning against each
other. They're propped up uh by by all
of them. The the regime in Cuba is
extraordinarily unpopular and in
Nicaragua, but they've got the monopoly
on power there, too. uh if if the regime
in Venezuela well and truly falls, which
it has not yet, yeah, I think I think
Cuba is in trouble. And I think uh it's
not because of military action by the
United States. It will be because of the
people in Cuba, not to mention millions
of Cubanameans in Florida who are in
daily touch with their friends and
relatives Cuba. And I think hopefully
Ortega would be just taking out the
remaining trash if he fell.
>> Okay, now back to Venezuela. Uh Trump
does say that you know the US will run
Venezuela during a transition and
American oil companies should control
the oil sector. Now on oil, John, during
your National Security Council meetings
in the first Trump administration, was
the prospect of the US gaining access to
Venezuelan oil. Was that ever a priority?
priority?
>> Well, it was a priority for Trump. As I
mentioned in the case of Iraq, oil is
always a priority. And uh why? uh
because he wants to keep g the price of
gasoline at the pump down. This is a big
part of the politics of the US economy
that will play out in the November
elections coming up. Is inflation still
a risk or is the economy secure? But but
the idea that uh that that that somehow
that is uh a legitimate motivating
factor on its own uh is is just is not
part of any national security argument
that that really is important. there are
bigger issues at play.
>> Yeah. Well, I mean, why would he be so
focused on oil when, correct me if I'm
wrong, hasn't the United States been
energy self reliant [snorts]
uh for the best part of a decade?
>> Yeah. But if Venezuelan oil used to come
into the United States in great
quantities and uh uh we've got a lot of
refinery capacity, I mean, I'd love to
see a democratic government in Venezuela
pumping more oil. The the Chavez Maduro
regime has destroyed the oil
infrastructure. And one reason why
Trump's talk about oil is uh is kind of
a fantasy is that the infrastructure,
the the drilling equipment, the piping,
storage, transport uh capacities are so
degraded that it will take years and
billions of dollars of capital
investment before any kind of meaningful
fix will take place. So whoever is going
to benefit from Venezuelan oil, it's not
going to be Trump. It's going to be the
next president.
>> Okay? Okay. And all this comes at a time
when so many international lawyers are
bleeding about this intervention.
Jeffrey Robertson, the Australian
prominent uh international lawyer, he's
uh written a piece in the Sydney Morning
Herald this week slamming Trump. This
reflects the orthodoxy amongst
international lawyers, isn't it?
Internationally illegal, John, what
Trump's doing.
>> No, it's certainly not illegal. And uh
uh I I could go off on what's wrong with
international law for a good long while
here, but I but I'll simply say that in
this case uh the threats that uh Maduro
and his regime pose to stability in the
Western Hemisphere and to the United
States directly, harboring Iranians who
are conducting terrorist activities
across the hemisphere. And because we
are acting at the request of what is the
legitimate government, the the people
who actually won the election in
Venezuela, I think we're well within any
reasonable person's understanding of
what international law requires. As in
the case of throwing out Noriega in
Panama in 1990.
>> Okay, let's conclude where we started,
John. I mean, will Trump follow your
advice on regime change in Venezuela?
It's one thing to take out Maduro, but
will he follow it up with regime change?
Now, you've closely followed and
participated in American conservative
debates uh very closely since Barry
Goldwater's Republican nomination in 1964.
1964.
You're well aware that Trump's MAGA base
is cut from a very different cloth from
the old Reagan Bush conservative
Republican base. Now, many MAGA folks
might ask how this military intervention
in Venezuela squares with Trump's past
pledges to avoid foreign entanglements,
nation building, and regime change. So,
why would given all of that, why would
Trump follow your advice when it could
alienate his MAGA base?
>> Well, I think he has alienated his MAGA
base by grabbing Maduro. It's a it's a
it's indication that within the White
House uh opinions about what to do were
going back and forth like this. I think
ultimately Marco Rubio prevailed
significantly but not totally. Now Rubio
has the dubious distinction of being as
we now call him the viceroy of
Venezuela. He's got to try and make this
mishmash of a policy work. Uh I think
it's politically very fraught for Trump.
Uh it's it's almost impossible to
imagine getting what Trump wants with
the likes of Deli Rodriguez uh and the
others still in place. If we had held on
to the opposition instead of attacking
Mrs. Machado, uh I think our chances
would have been better. Now, we'll see
what happens in the next 24 hours. This
is after all the Trump administration.
>> John, as always, it's wonderful to be
with you. Thanks so much.
>> Thank you, Tom.
>> Well, you're on Switzerland with me, Tom
Switzer. And if you're enjoying our new
program, please subscribe for free and
click the bell at the bottom of the
screen and join our mailing list linked
in the description below. And now to
John Mesh Shimemer. Now John, as I
mentioned earlier, has been a professor
of political science at the University
of Chicago since the early to mid 1980s.
And he's the author of several important
books, most notably The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics. John, always great to
see you. Thanks for being on my new program,
program,
>> Tom. It's great to be here and let me
just wish you a happy new year.
>> You, too. Now, John, I've just been
chatting with John Bolton, who defends
the removal of Maduro, but he warns that
it would be foolish to waste this chance
to restore government to the Venezuelan
people. In other words, this operation
really needs to be about regime change,
not just the removal of Maduro. Uh what
what do you think President Trump is up to?
to?
>> Well, you want to remember that when
President Trump was campaigning for
reelection, he promised us that uh he
was getting out of the business of
regime change. And of course, once you
change regimes, you're then in the
business of social engineering. You're
in the business of nation building. And
President Trump was well aware that we
had done that during the unipolar moment
uh and that it had been an abysmal
failure. And he said that he was going
to reverse that policy and we weren't
going to do that again. Uh and for good
reason. But here we are trying to do
regime change in Venezuela. And the
question you have to ask yourself is
this gonna work out this time? number
one. And number two, when you think
about grand strategy, when you think
about all of America's interests around
the world, does it make sense for us now
to get involved in social engineering,
not only in Venezuela, but maybe in
Colombia, Mexico, uh, and Nicaragua as
well because President uh, President
Trump has been talking in a very, uh,
uh, ambitious way. He seems to have an
expansive agenda of doing nation
building in the Western Hemisphere. So
my argument is is this is probably going
to fail. It's highly likely.
>> But maybe Donald Trump's still not
interested in nation building. Is it
conceivable, John, that he's just done a
deal with Venezuela's vice president
that you give the Americans Majuro and
that helps explain the ease of the
American mission. I mean, no Americans
were killed. You give us Majuro in
exchange for the regime being in place
and just give us the oil. Is that conceivable?
conceivable?
>> It's conceivable, but it's not likely
and it's inconsistent with everything
the president has said up to this point.
He said that we're going to run the
place. He was very explicit about that.
and he doesn't seem to have much
interest uh in anyone uh in the present
government or anyone in the opposition
uh taking over and running Venezuela.
He's going to run it. Uh so it doesn't
look to me like this is one of these
operations where he goes in and he
quickly uh kidnaps uh Maduro uh and lets
somebody else in that regime take over.
uh and then we're done with it. He's
talking much more ambitious terms.
>> Your argument then is that this
operation makes no sense. But you've
also argued, John, through decades of
scholarship that great powers will go to
great lengths to defend their vital
interests in their sphere of influence.
That's your argument. and that in the
United States case uh the defense of the
Western Hemisphere has always been the
number one strategic priority for the
Americans. So by that logic uh isn't
Trump's Venezuela operation sound
strategy? He's just protecting America's
spheres of influence. No. The Monroe
Doctrine, which is what this is all
about, says that the United States wants
to ensure that no distant great powers
form a military alliance with any
countries in the Western Hemisphere or
move military forces into the Western
Hemisphere. Distant great powers are
supposed to keep out. That makes
eminently good sense. But there is no
threat at this moment of any distant
great power moving into the Western
Hemisphere. This is a classic case of
imperialism, right? What Trump doesn't
like is the fact that Venezuela stands
up to him. And furthermore, he wants
Venezuela's oil. So, he's going to take
over Venezuela. He's going to run it.
And he's made it very clear that he's
going to take their oil. Uh but there's
no threat from Venezuela of any
consequence in the Western Hemisphere
and it has nothing to do with the Monroe
Doctrine. John Washington says there's
evidence to show that not just Russia
but China, Iran, they've been in cahoots
with the Maduro regime in Caracus. And
this is the so-called access of US
adversaries we all too often hear about.
And you know the argument here is that
if if if Moscow won't tolerate uh
Western meddling in its sphere of
influence, why on earth should America
tolerate Russian and Chinese and Iranian
influence in uh in their sphere of influence?
influence?
>> I don't know what cahoots means when you
say they're in cahoots with the
Venezuelans. The fact is that they have
good relations, the Venezuelans, with
the Russians and the Chinese, and there
is economic intercourse uh among those
different countries. There's no question
that the Chinese get oil from Venezuela,
but that's not inconsistent with the
Monroe Doctrine. What the Monroe
Doctrine is all about is keeping uh
great powers from forming military
alliances in the hemisphere and putting
military forces uh in the hemisphere
much the way the Soviets did during the
Cuban missile crisis. That's verboten.
But there's no evidence that that is
happening. And I am sure if there was
any indication that Venezuela was moving
to form a military alliance with either
Russia or China, we would land on them
like a ton of bricks. And I believe we
would be justified in doing that. But
what we're talking about here is a
situation where Venezuela is not a
serious threat to the United States and
it's not a serious threat to the Monroe
Doctrine. We just want their oil. But
aren't Russia and China, this is what
the administration would say to you,
they they're moving to secure control
over Arctic sea roots and precious
minerals and that could threaten US
interests. And moreover, you've often
said, John, um we've had these
discussions many times over the years
that it really doesn't matter what uh
Western Europe and America thinks about
Russia when they expand NATO. I mean,
the Americans and Brussels will say that
NATO expansion is a benign intent. it
matters what the Russians think in this
game because we've got to be conscious
of their strategic sensibilities.
Doesn't that same logic apply here? It's
what the Americans think and they don't
like it when they see Russia and China
having some kind of relationship with
Venezuela in its sphere of influence.
>> Well, let's just first talk about the
Arctic uh because this gets at a very
important point. The United States has
serious strategic interests. Core vital
interests are at stake uh in Europe uh
in East Asia with regard to China, in
the Middle East, and even in the Arctic
at this point in time. What you say
about the Arctic is true. Given all the strategic
strategic
priorities that we face, I ask you Tom,
does it make sense to get into nation
building in Latin America at this point
in time when you're trying to deal with
Russia? when you're trying to deal with
China, when you're worried about what's
going on up in the Arctic where both the
Russian and the Chinese the Russians and
the Chinese are very active and where
you're talking about going to war
against Iran again and you're worried
about shutting down the conflicts in
Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, just think of
the list of important issues that we're
dealing with and then say to yourself,
does it make sense to go to war against Venezuela?
