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Will Israel attack Iran again? The Geo-Strategic background | Deep Dive Defense | YouTubeToText
YouTube Transcript: Will Israel attack Iran again? The Geo-Strategic background
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Video Transcript
Welcome to Deep Dive Defense. Over here,
we give rare insights you won't hear elsewhere.
elsewhere.
In today's video, we look at the
potential for a renewed conflict between
Iran and Israel and analyze the
likelihood of such a confrontation.
Following the 12-day conflict in June
2025, both sides have legit reasons to
engage each other again. So, we start
with looking at the motivations and
limitations of each side.
From the Israeli perspective, the failed
decapitation attempt last summer has
effectively resulted in an Islamic
Republic of Iran that possesses
approximately 450 kg of 60%
highlyenriched uranium. Adding to this
issue, there are no International Atomic
Energy Agency inspectors available to
report on the whereabouts of this
weaponizable material. In practice, a
nation with Iran's level of
technological capability could readily
utilize that 60% enriched uranium.
employing a specialized nuclear device
design to establish a credible arsenal
of more than two dozen nuclear warheads.
Consequently, the uncertainty
surrounding Iran's intentions for this
material is placing pressure on Israel
and its key ally, the United States, to
take some form of action. The other
factor motivating Israel towards a
second conflict is its critical
situation resulting from nearly 2 years
of war against Gaza.
The 12-day conflict was initiated
because Israel felt compelled to act due
to existential fears, speculating that
the element of surprise and its
intelligence exploits would lead to a
successful decapitation strike and the
subsequent downfall of the Iranian leadership.
leadership.
However, this perceived long-term
existential threat remains largely
unaltered by the outcome of the 12-day
confrontation. Therefore, another
attempt to assassinate identified
Iranian leadership figures appears to be
an attractive option, provided such
individuals can be identified and
tracked on a wide scale. Should such an
opportunity arise, the risks associated
with a renewed attack may be considered
acceptable. For Israel, it is clear that
any second conflict would need to
conclude very quickly after such a
second decapitation attempt. If
unsuccessful, Iran would need to be
incentivized to accept another pause in
hostilities, primarily through the
threat of direct United States involvement.
involvement.
From the Iranian perspective, the ideal
scenario would be a multiple month-long
conflict characterized by a relatively
low pace and intensity. This would
create a war of attrition that is not
aggressive enough to legitimize direct
US involvement. This scenario would
exploit Iran's advantage in firepower
derived from its vast ballistic missile arsenal.
arsenal.
Iran has certainly learned from its
analysis of how Israel conducted its
attacks during the 12-day conflict. Many
of the assets utilized during the
initial nights of that conflict, namely
in situ sabotage assets that were
smuggled into Iran over long periods and
placed by sabotage teams are now largely
expired. This particular type of
advantage does not exist on a scale
comparable to the first attack anymore.
Furthermore, the type of the warfare
during the summer was characterized by
the use of guided standoff munitions,
weapons that can best be described as
means to crack the shell in order to
allow lowcost aerial bombing to
subsequently take over. However, the
short duration of the 12-day conflict
was sufficient to substantially deplete
Israel's arsenal of these highly
expensive standoff assets. Consequently,
a second attack can hardly rely on a
similar supply of munitions to project
firepower onto Iranian targets if it's
prolonged. It may be sufficient to
deliver a similar scale of firepower as
was seen in the 12-day conflict, but not
much beyond that. It is certainly not
enough to compete with the volume of
firepower Iran can generate with its
ballistic missile force. The scale of
firepower Israel is able to project can
be deduced from the strike pattern
observed during the 12-day conflict.
One of the key secondary objectives
after the decapitation of the leadership
was to degrade Iran's missile production
capability. Therefore, from the two
separate industries of liquid and solid
propellant ballistic missiles, the solid
propellant division was selected as the
target. This is due to its production
infrastructure being mainly above ground
which reduces the risk of a catastrophic
cascade explosion in an accident. Within
this unhardened above ground production
infrastructure, Israel selected the
bottleneck component without which
production is not possible, namely the
propellant mixers. These production
critical facilities were likely struck
by high-end air launched ballistic
missiles like the Golden Horizon or Air
Laura, which possessed a high
probability of penetrating the local
defenses. The available firepower was
not sufficient to target other critical
elements of the solid propellant missile
production infrastructure. delicate
high-tech objects, the destruction of
which would have reduced Iran's
production capability for solid
propellant missiles for a much longer
period, would have required more firepower.
firepower.
But what occurred was insufficient to
systematically degrade that entire
production infrastructure in long term.
These observations provide clear hints
regarding the firepower limitations
Israel faces against distant high-v
value targets. This is due to the very
complex and high-end nature of weapons
like the Golden Horizon air launched
ballistic missile. During the summer
conflict, Iran accepted the halt of fire
upon Israel's request for reasons that
remain unclear. The relatively moderate
government of Iran's president poses
places a strong emphasis on diplomacy
both towards regional actors such as the
Gulf States and international ones.
However, the manner in which Iran was
attacked by Israel while it was engaged
in negotiations with the United States,
combined with Iran's subsequent
acceptance to pause the conflict at the
request of the US and Israel, was a
clear demonstration of deescalation
intent. This demonstrated to all
regional and international actors that
the war and escalation were not Iran's
choice, but rather that Iran did
everything it could to avoid further
escalation. These actions have created
the impression of a passive and fearful
Iran being attacked by an aggressor with
no apparent boundaries.
The subsequent Israeli attack on Qatar
in September has further illustrated
that Israel and the United States are on
the side of escalation while Iran seeks
to deescalate and pursue diplomatic solutions.
solutions.
This status quo therefore presents an
opportunity for Iran to refuse a pause
in hostilities should a second Israeli
attack occur. This time, Iran possesses
the legitimization to continue its
retaliation until a ceasefire negotiated
to its advantage is reached. Should Iran
be attacked a second time, this
international and regional
legitimization not to deescalate, can be
combined with Iran's vast ballistic
missile arsenal's firepower, hence it
could be used to launch salvos of a
relatively small numbers of ballistic
missiles every day for months, thereby
creating an unbearable situation for the
Israeli side. The risk for Iran here is
that massive attacks involving large
ballistic missile salvos could easily
create such devastation that the United
States could legitimize its renewed
direct involvement to save Israel.
As mentioned previously, the relatively
low firepower Israel can effectively
project on Iranian targets using
standoff guided weapons is too limited
to cause sufficient devastation that
could force Iran to the negotiating
table. Iran possesses a vast strategic
depth as a country of 90 million people
and is many times the size of Israel.
The same is not true for its opponent
and therefore a scenario of Israel
attacking Iran's critical infrastructure
would be highly irrational given Iran's
capability to strike Israel's critical
infrastructure on a wider and more
intensive scale. Hence, an escalation
into a so-called countervalue conflict
appears to be deterred by both sides.
This dynamic that also occurred during
the summer conflict in which Israeli
strikes on energy and oil infrastructure
were met with proportional strikes by
Iran and then stopped on both sides.
For Iran, it is clear that Israel
remains a nuclear power with an even
larger nuclear power as its direct
supporter. Therefore, the rule of
proportionality must be adhered to since
two critical attacks on vital targets
could be perceived as putting Israel's
existence at risk and prompt a nuclear
attack on Iran. Therefore, it can be
stated that Iran's robustness and its
capacity to withstand punishment are
utilized to respond proportionally to
Israeli attacks.
At this point, Iran's previously
mentioned access to 450 kg of 60%
enriched uranium further provides it
with a credible nuclear retaliation
capability should it be attacked with
nuclear weapons. Iran would almost
certainly immediately assemble nuclear
warheads, leveraging its proven
capability demonstrated during the
intentional or unintentional leak or
theft of details from its early 2000's
nuclear weapons project, the Ahmmed program.
program.
Consequently, within the deterrence
equation, Iran possesses a form of
insurance up to the nuclear escalation
level. However, it would not attack
Israel on a disproportional scale due to
the reality that Israel and the United
States are active nuclear powers.
Iran appears quite certain and confident
that Israel lacks the conventional
firepower to seriously threaten the
country. Thus, the situation ultimately
depends on Israel's intelligence
capabilities to prepare the conditions
for a successful simultaneous
decapitation attack. An attack Israel
still hopes would trigger a popular
uprising and the downfall of the Iranian leadership.
leadership.
The incentives for Iran to want a
renewed conflict with Israel are however
different. In 2019, during the first
Trump term, Iran initiated a covert
escalation campaign in the Persian Gulf
to force a confrontation with the United
States or to receive concessions in
return for halting those covert attacks.
At that time, Iran was subjected to an
economic maximum pressure campaign,
effectively a total economic warfare
waged against it. The last remaining
option it had to break free from those
severe economic conditions was to use
its offensive military power or the
threat of it to clarify the power
balance with its opponents.
6 years later in September 2025 with the
Europeans activating the so-called
snapback UN sanctions against Iran, the
county has again been forced into a
maximum economic pressure condition.
However, the different international
landscape of today combined with the
weakening effects that sanctions have
over time means that the pain felt by
Iran's economy is lower. Yet, Iran again
has only its offensive military power to
affect this economic maximum pressure campaign.
campaign.
The goal here is to force the opposite
side into negotiations and the lifting
of some or all sanctions. Therefore, it
becomes obvious that a second conflict
between Iran and Israel offers Iran the
prospect of agreeing to a ceasefire
under the condition that the West's
maximum pressure campaign is halted.
Unlike in 2019 when Iran was viewed as a
pariah state by many international
actors, this time Iran is in a victim
position due to the events of recent
history and Israel is viewed as a pariah
state by many nations in the
international community. Hence, Iran
could exploit this condition of being a
victim to carry out a war of attrition
that would ultimately result in a
favorable deal for Iran. Here, it must
be said that Yemen's Ansarala as Iran's
ally is constantly attacking Israel with
Iranian drones and ballistic missiles on
a limited scale. Hence, Iranian weapons
are indirectly but regularly applying
pressure on Israel. While the reverse is
not true for Iran, which has issued
threats that any proven attack by Israel
would result in a renewed ballistic
missile fire. This dynamic has
progressed to the point where even US
tanker vessels have now been threatened
with attacks by Yemen's Ansarala if they
intend to pass through the straight of Baband.
Baband.
In summary, an Israeli attack on Iran
would still be a high-risk, highly
irrational action which it could not
perform entirely on its own. But the
potential reward of a toppled Iranian
government and the insurance of United
States involvement if the situation
spirals out of control may still render
this option a viable one for Israel. For
Iran, the current situation is
significantly better than it was in
2019. Its ally Yemen's Ansarala is
constantly attacking Israel on a low
scale and the effects of the sanctions
and the maximum pressure campaign are
felt much less acutely by a population
and economy that has grown accustomed to
the conditions.
Yet, the option to force the West to the
negotiation table to ease or remove
sanctions, may be viewed as attractive
enough to escalate, either through a
direct attack on Israel with a surprise
ballistic missile strike, as was done in
October 2024 during Operation True
Promise 2, or to conveniently wait for
Israel to conduct its second attack on
Iran. It would be speculating that it
can survive the initial strike to then
take the initiative and escalate the
situation into a prolonged war of
attrition against Israel.
Ultimately, Israel utilized its most
favorable attack conditions during the
12-day conflict, which included larger
reserves of both ballistic missile
defense interceptors and standoff attack
weapons. It also had the element of
surprise, covert in place sabotage
assets, and novel methods of warfare at
its disposal.
Much of those advantageous positions
will not hold true for a second round of
conflict. In turn, Iran had its early
warning radar network badly hit and a
portion of its air defenses degraded.
However, this is arguably a much less
critical handicap. Hence, by all means,
a second attack would be even more
irrational than the first one.
>> I'm not happy with Israel. You know,
when when I say, "Okay, now you have 12 hours.
hours.
>> You know what? We have we basically have
two countries that have been fighting so
long and so hard that they don't know
what they're doing. Do you understand that?
>> So that's all for today. If you liked
it, give a thumbs up, comment, and
subscribe. It really makes a difference
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