uprising and the downfall of the Iranian leadership.
leadership.
The incentives for Iran to want a
renewed conflict with Israel are however
different. In 2019, during the first
Trump term, Iran initiated a covert
escalation campaign in the Persian Gulf
to force a confrontation with the United
States or to receive concessions in
return for halting those covert attacks.
At that time, Iran was subjected to an
economic maximum pressure campaign,
effectively a total economic warfare
waged against it. The last remaining
option it had to break free from those
severe economic conditions was to use
its offensive military power or the
threat of it to clarify the power
balance with its opponents.
6 years later in September 2025 with the
Europeans activating the so-called
snapback UN sanctions against Iran, the
county has again been forced into a
maximum economic pressure condition.
However, the different international
landscape of today combined with the
weakening effects that sanctions have
over time means that the pain felt by
Iran's economy is lower. Yet, Iran again
has only its offensive military power to
affect this economic maximum pressure campaign.
campaign.
The goal here is to force the opposite
side into negotiations and the lifting
of some or all sanctions. Therefore, it
becomes obvious that a second conflict
between Iran and Israel offers Iran the
prospect of agreeing to a ceasefire
under the condition that the West's
maximum pressure campaign is halted.
Unlike in 2019 when Iran was viewed as a
pariah state by many international
actors, this time Iran is in a victim
position due to the events of recent
history and Israel is viewed as a pariah
state by many nations in the
international community. Hence, Iran
could exploit this condition of being a
victim to carry out a war of attrition
that would ultimately result in a
favorable deal for Iran. Here, it must
be said that Yemen's Ansarala as Iran's
ally is constantly attacking Israel with
Iranian drones and ballistic missiles on
a limited scale. Hence, Iranian weapons
are indirectly but regularly applying
pressure on Israel. While the reverse is
not true for Iran, which has issued
threats that any proven attack by Israel
would result in a renewed ballistic
missile fire. This dynamic has
progressed to the point where even US
tanker vessels have now been threatened
with attacks by Yemen's Ansarala if they
intend to pass through the straight of Baband.
Baband.
In summary, an Israeli attack on Iran
would still be a high-risk, highly
irrational action which it could not
perform entirely on its own. But the
potential reward of a toppled Iranian
government and the insurance of United
States involvement if the situation
spirals out of control may still render
this option a viable one for Israel. For
Iran, the current situation is
significantly better than it was in
2019. Its ally Yemen's Ansarala is
constantly attacking Israel on a low
scale and the effects of the sanctions
and the maximum pressure campaign are
felt much less acutely by a population
and economy that has grown accustomed to
the conditions.
Yet, the option to force the West to the
negotiation table to ease or remove
sanctions, may be viewed as attractive
enough to escalate, either through a
direct attack on Israel with a surprise
ballistic missile strike, as was done in
October 2024 during Operation True
Promise 2, or to conveniently wait for
Israel to conduct its second attack on
Iran. It would be speculating that it
can survive the initial strike to then
take the initiative and escalate the
situation into a prolonged war of
attrition against Israel.
Ultimately, Israel utilized its most
favorable attack conditions during the
12-day conflict, which included larger
reserves of both ballistic missile
defense interceptors and standoff attack
weapons. It also had the element of
surprise, covert in place sabotage
assets, and novel methods of warfare at
its disposal.
Much of those advantageous positions
will not hold true for a second round of
conflict. In turn, Iran had its early
warning radar network badly hit and a
portion of its air defenses degraded.
However, this is arguably a much less
critical handicap. Hence, by all means,
a second attack would be even more
irrational than the first one.
>> I'm not happy with Israel. You know,
when when I say, "Okay, now you have 12 hours.
hours.
>> You know what? We have we basically have
two countries that have been fighting so
long and so hard that they don't know
what they're doing. Do you understand that?
>> So that's all for today. If you liked
it, give a thumbs up, comment, and
subscribe. It really makes a difference
in the YouTube algorithm and is a great
support to the channel. The real
enthusiast can become members and given
access to exciting membership area
material. Thanks for your support and motivation.
Click on any text or timestamp to jump to that moment in the video
Share:
Most transcripts ready in under 5 seconds
One-Click Copy125+ LanguagesSearch ContentJump to Timestamps
Paste YouTube URL
Enter any YouTube video link to get the full transcript
Transcript Extraction Form
Most transcripts ready in under 5 seconds
Get Our Chrome Extension
Get transcripts instantly without leaving YouTube. Install our Chrome extension for one-click access to any video's transcript directly on the watch page.
Chrome Extension