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The New World Order Is Here - Peter Zeihan | YouTubeToText
YouTube Transcript: The New World Order Is Here - Peter Zeihan
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Core Theme
The United States is poised to lead the next global era not due to inherent brilliance, but due to the significant demographic and geopolitical challenges facing other major powers, particularly China, compounded by shifting global economic and security landscapes.
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America doesn't win the next era because
it's brilliant. It wins because everyone
else is screwed. What's that mean?
Doesn't exactly fit on a bumper sticker,
but yeah, that broadly works. Uh, you
got two big things that are going on.
Uh, number one, in the globalized world,
it's all about who you can access
safely. And in the Western Hemisphere,
we really don't have to worry about any
security threats from a trade point of
view. So, people always talk about, oh,
if the US and China get into a war,
won't that be bad for X, Y, or Z? say I
don't mean to suggest it would be a
piece of cake, but that the Chinese are
dependent on trade and we're not. Uh
it's really that simple. And if we can
nail down Canada and Mexico in a
productive relationship, you know, we
used to call that NAFTA or NAFTA 2.
We're now having second thoughts. Uh
that's half the hard work right there.
Uh in addition, we export food, we
export energy, the Chinese import both,
biggest in the world in fact. Uh and so
maintaining supply chains for us is an
issue of building the industrial plant.
And while you can't just wave a magic
wand and make that happen overnight,
we've done this several times before.
Every country on the planet has. Of
course, we can do it again. It would
just be nice if we started sooner rather
than later. Uh the other piece is that
the Chinese stopped having babies about
45 years ago, and they're now on the
verge of running out of 50-year-olds,
and there is not an economic model that
humans have yet to dream up that will
work with where they will be
demographically in less than 10 years
time. So, we are living in the
equivalent of like 2006 subprime where
everyone's like all ooh and ah and it's
uh appropriately apocalyptic from you uh
to start. Um the stuff about China is is
that a challenge of just geography
uh vyro biome top soil just sort of the
the constitution of where they are is
that that's sort of one of the
fundamental problems.
>> All of that all of that is a legitimate
concern. uh the river where most of them
live on uh the Yellow isn't navigable.
They have never been able to use it for
trade. So, they've never internally
traded among themselves. Uh the one
river they have that is navigable, the
Yang Sea, has always been an
independent, well, I should say always,
but often been a political uh an
independent political entity going back
for 3,000 years of Chinese history. And
down in the south and the tropics where
you've got Hong Kong, you've got
citystates on little enclaves of flat
land that have always looked to the
outside world rather than the Chinese.
Uh the soil sucks. uh the northern part
where 70% of the population lives, it's
lowest soil in a drought zone. So if
anything ever happened to logistics or
distribution, what would go down in
northern China would be what has gone
down in northern China 27 times before
and that's civilizational collapse. If
we were talking about any country that
had fewer people than the Chinese have
always had, you know, that would just be
the end of them. just that there have
always been enough Chinese in the past
to pick up the pieces and move forward
on the other side of the break. But that
requires you having children. And so
this really is an end to the concept of
China and the concept of even the Han
Chinese because we're in a situation now
where where probably they have more
people over age 54 than under. And I'm
sorry that just doesn't work. Uh and
very soon it will be over. That's before
you consider the broader geography of
China versus the rest of the world. You
got the first island chain off the
coast. So the Chinese have never ever
ever been able to be a global commercial
power except when the United States when
it created the global system told
everybody that they couldn't bring guns
to trade talks. And that one decision
that we made allowed the Chinese to play
on the global field in a way that they
just never could until that point. And
so lo and behold, this is the one era of
Chinese history where they're unified
and successful.
>> Tell me more about the guns to the
meetings rule and how that helped.
>> Sure. So before World War II, it's a
good break. Um, we basically had an
imperial system where if you wanted
links to resources and markets and
populations that were outside of your
home country, you had to build a navy
and you went and took it. You built your
empire. And those empires attempted to
not trade with one another if they could
help it. They just traded within their
own network. Uh that model generated
what we like to call history and it led
to World War II when all the empires
crashed and burned at the same time
fighting for dominance. Well, at the end
of World War II, the only navy that was
left that was worthy of the name was the
American Navy. And we had never been a
trading power because we more or less
had a continent to ourselves and we're
still digesting the continent. So we had
this idea that we will use our navy to
protect everyone and we will allow
everyone to trade with anyone else and
we will allow our market to be open to
your goods if if in exchange we get to
write your security policies so we don't
get another conflict like this again.
And so one of the things that people
want to break down the trade
relationships and say that it's unfair
for the United States, what they forget
is it was supposed to be unfair to the
United States from an economic point of
view. We bribed up an alliance. And if
you remember your history, it wasn't
just Britain and Germany and Japan and
Korea and Taiwan and Italy that were
allies during the Cold War. It was
China, too, because it was all about
boxing in the Soviets. And it worked
beautifully. Uh the idea that this
should be reccalibrated in a post cold
war environment, perfectly reasonable,
but if you don't want to pay people to
be on your side, they need another
reason to be on your side. And so what
we're seeing in American politics right
now is this kind of um cognitive
disconnect where we [snorts] still want
everyone to do everything we say,
but we also don't want our market open.
And that is not a viable long-term plan.
>> Okay. So, Chinese demographic collapse.
You've said China will be gone in 10
years. China as we currently understand
it. Yeah. There'll still be some Han.
Give it 50 years there might not be.
>> Uh so, China very populous. Uh people
would might say, well, if I just look at
the numbers, you said before that
numbers were the solution last time.
There's more numbers now. I'm going to
guess that the issue is that the numbers
are trending in the wrong direction.
that it wasn't a good so bad. So bad. [laughter]
[laughter]
>> So um
since I talked to you last there there
seems to be this reckoning that's going
on in the statistical community in can
in I said Canada. Where'd that come
from? Sorry you picked me up right after
doing another project in China. Uh the
issue appears to be that um
they now believe the stata stat
statisticians now believe that the local
and regional governments have been lying
about their demographic data for over 25
years. Uh and so after let me back up um
after Tianaan Square you know 10,000
people killed by tanks in the in
downtown Beijing the Chinese Communist
Party is like well that was no fun
whatsoever. Let's try to not ever have
to do that again. Uh, one of the ways
we're going to make sure that happens is
we discovered that, you know, there were
kind of two kinds of protesters. You had
the white collar workers that just made
signs and they were really easy to run
over with tanks. And then you had the
ones that were kind of scary that
brought wrenches and guns. So, you had
white collar and you had blue collar.
So, why don't we move our entire economy
from a blue collar economy to a white
collar economy? Problem solved. Because
white collar folks live in high-rise
apartments. You can cut off their water.
You can bolt them into their house. You
know, there's lots of ways you can deal
with white collar protesters. Blue
collar a little different. So, they
started advancing their STEM work. They
started secondary and tertiary education
systems. And, you know, well, this
wasn't a stupid plan. Uh, we can
critique how successful the transition
was and why they were a manufacturing
economy and still are and really weren't
ready for that kind of fast transition.
Different topic. But the thing is when
you go to primary school and secondary
school and tertiary school, the first
time you pay taxes is typically when
you're 21, 22, or 23. So there's a
delayed gratification here, which as
Americans like to say, the Chinese have
no problem with. It's false, but
whatever. So
the first big crop of these new white
collar workers who were supposed to be
working at high paid jobs and paying
lots of taxes that was supposed to
manifest in calendar year 2019
but then there was co and in China co
lasted a lot longer and they really
didn't get recovery until 2023 maybe
even early in 2024 and so they didn't
get any good data and then when they did
get the data they're like whoa
tax receipts are down. That's the
opposite of what's supposed to be
happening. And when the statistitians in
Shanghai went and looked back at
everything like, okay, here's the
problem. In a first world country, there
are dozens, hundreds of touch points
where the government becomes convinced
that you're a real person. You know, you
your mom goes to neonatal, you're born,
every immunization, metriculation for
every grade level, you pay taxes, you
you get your driver's permit, you get
your driver's license. There's thousands
throughout your lifetimes. The first
three in China, not birth because until
recently, not all Chinese were born in
hospitals. The first one was when you
get a single battery of immunizations at
some point around 6 months old. What
they discovered was that the doctor who
was giving the shots got paid per shot.
So the doctors lied about the number of
shots that they got. [snorts]
The second point is when you enroll in
kindergarten. Well, local governments
get subsidies from the federal system
based on how many students metriculate.
So the local government's lied about
that. The third point is when you pay
pay national taxes for the first time,
which is typically 17, 18, 19, unless
you switch to tertiary education, then
it's 21, 22, 23. So, you get to calendar
year 2024
and the Chinese realize that the
children that they thought started to be
born in the late 1990s were never born
at all.
And so the question they have and
there's no way to get the data is um did
we overount our population by 100
million people or did we overount by 300
million people
or more?
So even according to the official
statistics, China is no longer the most
populous country. That's India. Has been
for a while. Probably has been since
about 2006. The Chinese are now publicly
admitting that their birth rate has been
lower than the United States's since 1991.
1991.
And it looks like it might be
significantly worse than that. So yeah,
10 years, high confidence.
Wow. Um, since the last time that we
spoke, AI has taken on even more of an
important role. Uh, yeah, I'm aware. I'm
aware. [snorts] like just I think one of the
the
it's it's an odd uh it's not happening
and it's good that it is uh sort of
scenarios that happens especially when
it comes to birth rate decline is
whether it's we don't need more people
on the planet we're a scourge on the
earth fragile world hypothesis climate
change in future it doesn't matter in
any case capitalism life's miserable and
I don't want kids or young people to be
born into
>> everyone's trying to shoehorn it into
their existing world view
>> correct yeah yeah the demand for answers
outstrips their supply. So they
repurpose old answers into a new
problem. Um, one thing that I am
interested about is uh some of the
losses in productivity uh being offset
by increases in efficiency enabled
through robotics and AI. China seems to
be pushing pretty hard on this stuff and
not bad at stealing AI technology when
push comes to shove and repurposing it.
I mean honestly it's it's software. It's
really easy to steal. You just need a
jump drive.
>> Yeah. Um
how much could that be a lifeline uh for
somebody like China and then also for
the rest of the world when we think
about demographic decline uh more broadly?
broadly?
>> Sure. Well, let's start with the
obvious. Um 80% of applications for AI
that I have seen and the other 20% are
not a different category. They're just
in in flux. But 80% I've seen it's not
about where we have the work shortage.
It's about white collar workers. It's
about making white collar workers either
redundant or more productive. And if
you're into some degree of data
coalation and assessment, uh you're in
real trouble. Uh if you have the brain
power to take the data in front of you
and make something of it, you're
probably fine, at least for now. So
right now, if you're like say a
parallegal, oh god, you're screwed. that
whole job category is going to go away
because your job is basically to
research multiple cases and bring the
information together for someone who
will then take it and do value ad. Your
job is to collate and AI can do that in
seconds. Um once you start doing the
value ad, uh the way my doctor put it is
it's kind of like 8020. It's like 80% of
it's pretty good and 20% of it is really
not. And when you're prescribing
medications, the 20% really matters.
So doctors are fine, but the people who
do the research for them maybe not so
much. That's not where the job shortages
are. The job shortages in the advanced
world, especially in the United States,
are all blue collar. They're welders.
They're electricians. They're not
coders. Uh so it's not that this is a
negative from my point of view. It's
just it's getting a little overhyped.
And most of the people who are doing the
the writing and the panicking about it
are of course white collar workers. Um,
and that colors the discussion. Uh, it
doesn't mean that it will always be like
that, but that's where we are now. And
the pace of improvement, while it's very
noticeable, I would yet I would not yet
call it revolutionary or particularly
impressive. Uh, I mean, I use it, but
I'd like to think I'm pretty good at
that 20%.
>> All right, that's piece one. Uh, piece
two, the Chinese. Um, the Chinese
problem is that they've run out of
people under age 50. And it's people
under age roughly 45 that do the
consuming and have the kits. And there
is no way that a can AI AI can help with
consumption or child rate.
So the robotic systems that the Chinese
are working on, not that they're not
important, but AI only helps to a degree
there. Uh AI is cannot physically move
things. Um it can learn from systems. It
can design systems even to a degree
again 8020. uh but it can't actually produce.
produce.
Artificial intelligence is a completely
different technological suite from automation.
And even if automation could s solve the
production side of the equation as the
Chinese run out of workers, robots don't
pay taxes. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> And they can't raise kids
and they can't consume product. And so
even if the Chinese could maintain their
production levels without people,
they'd still be dependent on
international trade that they can't
guarantee and on the large asset of the
United States in the long term. Doesn't
change their core problem.
>> Yeah. AI isn't going to be able to fix
the top soil.
>> No. No. I mean, not as we understand it.
>> Yeah. Well, may you give us 50 years.
We'll see. Um
>> Yeah, we'll see.
>> Uh Japan, South Korea,
>> 50 years, that is the right time frame.
I I haven't talked to anyone who's
involved in Silicon Valley at all who
expects us to get general thinking AI
before the 2040s. And based on what's
going on with the large language models,
that date keeps getting moved back. This
is not a technology that's leading us in
that direction.
>> Interesting. the sort of uh
technological progress that typically
you see at this exponential curve with
AI seems to be doing what history does,
crawling and then leaping and then
crawling and then leaping and it makes
it kind of inherently unpredictable. I
don't think many people saw what was
going to happen with LLMs in advance. I
remember reading Nick Boston from Super
Intelligence what a decade ago I think
that came out maybe. Yeah, a decade,
let's call it 10 years ago, something
like that. And uh that was the best
minds on the planet contributing to the
best mind on the planet trying to work
out whether or not. At no point was it
well, you know, these sort of things are
going to predict what you're going to
say next and then if you just scale that
up enough and Nvidia becomes a $3
trillion company, maybe you'll be f
maybe maybe we're going to get it that
way. Nobody saw it coming. Um, so yeah,
there were some
>> considering considering that you can fit
the entire algorithm set and training
data for chat GPT on a thumb drive
that's about half the size of this. No,
it's like it's like I look at Nvidia's
uh valuation like you know this I mean
great for them but you know this is this
this is the very definition of a bubble.
All it takes is a couple of corporate
thefts and everything that's special
about them goes away.
>> Wow. Yeah. the uh the security must be
intense for that. Okay, so uh Japan,
South Korea, Italy hitting new fertility
lows even more than in the past.
Interesting that this has now sort of
come across into into Europe. When when
will the media and sort of the wider
world accept that birth rates are as big
of a priority as they are?
>> I mean, everything with demographics is
glacial. It takes decades for it to
arrive and so everyone's just like, you
know, hurry up and wait, hurry up and
wait. and then the day it arrives it's
too late because you are now a bloody
smear under the glacier. Um in the case
of Japan we actually have a culture that
saw this coming and they have done a
number of things over the last 30 years
to make it easier to have children to
stay in the workforce longer and so
their birth rate is actually right risen
quite a bit nowhere near replacement
levels. I don't want to oversell it but
it's now higher than not just China and
Japan and Taiwan and Germany and Italy
but also the Netherlands and India and [laughter]
[laughter]
Thailand. Yeah, India India is aging. Uh
so the the math is going in a different
direction. Um everyone is still sliding
but we're all sliding at a little bit
different rates and you play that out
over decades and it really matters. So
China probably with the data we have
right now is in the worst shape and
after that it's a kind of a three-way
tie between or among Germany, Italy and
Korea most likely.
The fact that this bleeds across into
Europe sort of west is um I don't know
it feels it it definitely feels like
it's coming home to roost in a way. It
it's way less theoretical uh with the
fact that it's it's already spread over here.
here.
>> Yeah. At at the moment, most people are
when they think about demographics at
all, they think about it in terms of
federal budgets and the baby boomer
retirement and how much it costs to pay
for pensions. And you know, that's
that's part of it, but that's just the
leading edge. Uh the baby boomers are
aging out. The last of them are going to
be retired in 5 years. Uh and in most of
the world, there wasn't an echo
generation like the millennials in the
United States. So, we really are at the
beginning of the end here.
Are we entering a labor shortage that no
one's ready for? Is there is there any
country that can handle demographic
collapse the best better?
The bottom line is if you still have
people in 30 in your 30s uh that you
still have a chance to have kids. So
when I look at countries like say you
know not just the United States but
Germany no excuse me not just the United
States like India or Mexico or Poland or
Brazil you know these are all places
that have not passed that Rubicon just
yet. And so with the way we understand
economic theory and the way that we
understand biology and parenting they
don't require a reinvention. they just
need to encourage their young people to
have kids for some in some way for
whatever reason they want to modify uh
the language. But once you pass that,
once your average age slips past 40 and
especially past 45, there's no longer a
traditional biological path.
>> It's about smoothing the decline,
stretching it out. And a number of
European states have proven to be very
good at that. Japan has proven to be
surprisingly good at that, but it's
still a bit of a starvation diet in the
long run unless you change the economic
model. So whether it's fascism or
socialism or capitalism, everything is
based upon the balance between labor and
capital and supply and demand. That's
how we understand economics, how we have
understood them for a millennia, half a
millennia. [gasps]
If you can come up with something new,
and I'm all ears, then maybe it will
work in a different demographic profile.
Um, at the moment, the leading theory,
and it's it won't work, is of course,
um, modern monetary theory. Uh, that
just shuffles those four factors. It
doesn't really change the math. What
[snorts] the Trump administration seems
to be trying, whether or not they're
doing this consciously or not is a
question, uh is some sort of um metered
demand, a restricted demand model where
your demand is only met if the
government greenlights it and other
people's demand that just doesn't count.
That doesn't factor in. I'm not saying I
think this is a good idea. I'm saying
it's like the only thing that I've seen
in the last decade that might
I I keep on hoping for some sort of
fantastic hopeful
legup, some lifeline that's going to be
thrown. And every time that I do deeper
and deeper research into it, it it just
gets kind of worse. Well, I guess what
I'm interested from a geopolitics
standpoint is how a shrinking workforce
changes the relationship between
countries. We understand sort of what it
does within countries. Um, but how does
that change the geo part of the geopolitics?
geopolitics?
>> Countries that are aging out but haven't
yet crossed that line, they've run out
of consumption but they're not yet a
retirement home. Those countries are
really, really dependent upon exports.
And Korea is probably the poster child
for that. China is very close second.
They need an open globalized world
because they can never consume what they
produce. And so if they're going to have
any income and any long-term tax
capacity, it's going to come from
selling stuff to other countries. thing
is of course
>> the the countries that have the youth
India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey haven't
risen in wealth to a level to absorb
global manufacturing capacity. The only
first world country of size that's left
that is still a net consumer is the
United States. And while I can say a lot
of negative things about the Trump
administration, one thing that they
really do understand is the consumer
base of the United States is a tool of
geopolitical power and extending or
denying that to other countries is a
very powerful negotiation tactic. I
mean, we we needed to negotiate a second
round of Bretonwoods, a second round of
globalization. This is one way to do it.
>> Wow. I totally Yeah, that that makes
complete sense. If you have a shrinking
population internally and you don't want
your GDP to just fall through the floor,
you need to get people who do have spare
people, you do have countries that have
spare people to buy your stuff.
>> The alternative is absolutely limitless
mass immigration, which from a cultural
point of view, no one's a real fan of.
>> No. Uh, how much of a solution versus a
crutch is immigration when it comes to
stemming the tide?
>> At this point in time, it's at best a
like a really thin cane. Uh, if you [laughter]
[laughter]
if if your goal is to use someone else's
young people to pad your demographic so
you don't fade away, you need to start
before you have a problem. And this is
one of the reasons why the settler
societies have always had faster growth
than the rest of the world. So the
Aussies, the Kiwis, the Americans, the
the Canadians, uh this has been less of
a problem for us because none of us are
from where we're living now. And we've
been bringing in waves of people over
and over decade and decade into the
centuries. Um but if you start it today,
so let's let's just take Germany because
the numbers there are really clear and
the Germans are great with numbers. So
we can trust them. You know the Germans
just to hold where they are average age
of like 50 just to hold here already
export dependent just just to not slide
anymore. They need to bring in 2 million
people a year that are under age 25 forever
forever
in a country that only has 80 million people.
people. >> Wow.
>> Wow.
>> Fast forward 20 years and the Germans
are less than a third of the population.
>> It's not viable anymore. Had they
started back in the 50s be a different conversation.
conversation.
Yeah, that's crazy. I didn't realize the
numbers were that bad. Okay, you
mentioned uh Trump administration there.
What do you make of Mandani's New York
win? Is it remarkable? Is it indicative
of some important trend?
>> No. I mean,
if if there is a trend for Mandani, it's
the same trend for from Trump. These are
two people who never had a real job in
their lives and all of a sudden are now
political leaders. We should not expect
this to go well.
in New York, just like it hasn't exactly
>> I'm I'm interested in whether or not
there is something
remarkable or or unique, noteworthy uh
happening with elections and and
populism and sort of rising nationalism.
You've got uh US election cycle
volatility, a little bit of that. You
got farmer protests in Europe. You
mentioned migration and a ton of people
having problems with that.
>> I wonder whether that could be driving
some political change, not just inside
the US, but I'm I'm interested in what
you think about um those dynamics and
the others impacting how the world at
large generally thinks about populism, nationalism,
nationalism,
internal politics.
>> Well, a couple broad demographic
thoughts. As a rule, the younger cohort,
25 and under, tends to be more
politically radicalized, more
classically, excuse me, not classically
liberal, more projoratively liberal,
woke, whatever you want to call it, uh,
and uh, much more in favor of things
like redistributive economic policies
because they don't have anything to
lose. They only have the possibility of
gains. It's it's just it's age math. And
that has been true in every part of the
world throughout the entire modern era.
Nothing's weird there.
Flip it. When you turn 65, your income
goes away. You're now either on a fixed
income or the assets you've accured over
your life, that's all you have. That's
all you will ever have. And so you get a
little crotchety. And so the environment
we're in today in most of the world, the
young cohort is getting smaller and
smaller and smaller and more brittle and
more desperate, whereas the older cohort
is getting larger and larger and larger
and more oified and more unwilling to
make any compromises.
Throw that against a globalization. We
have the time where we're looking
through some of the most radical
economic transformations because of
what's going on with globalization and
deglobalization at least in our lives.
Certainly since the 70s I'm sorry
certainly since the 40s probably since
the 1870s and based on definition maybe
since the 1500s. At the same time we
have our first ever as a species
demographic inversion. Of course it's
Yeah. I wonder whether
I wonder whether the increased
radicalization will have some sort of a
bump when those young people become
slightly older. If their economic uh
situation doesn't improve by as much as
they'd hoped, as much as their previous
generations has hoped, I wonder whether
that will hold on to some of that sort
of progressive radicalization uh or tamp down
down
>> be the first time in history if it happens.
happens.
>> Yeah. uh t down the inevitable
trajectory that goes from higher
openness to lower openness, higher sort
of liberal worldview to more
conservative worldview. Um but yeah, I
mean the the prospect that the future is
going to be owned by the people who have
children and the only people who are
having children really fascinating stats
I'm sure that you saw um looking at
where the birth rate decline has come
from if you organize it by political
cohort inside of the US and from 1990
it's almost exclusively been taken out
of people that are left-leaning. So that
>> no there's a couple problems with that
data point. Um I saw the same study.
Number one, they the way they defined
left lead. Okay. The um the classic
Democratic party in the United States.
There are three clusters to it. You've
got racial minorities, you've got
organized labor, and you have the the
educated coastal elites. The way that
study defined it, it was just that third group.
group. [laughter]
[laughter]
>> And interesting,
>> the first two groups tell us something
different. Uh number one, the uh the
middle group, the organized labor,
they're socially conservative, always
have been. And now they're voting that
way. And they really like I would well
really like Trump. Might be a bit of a
stretch, but Trump is not a pro business
guy. He's probably the most anti-
business president US has had in my lifetime.
lifetime.
And the unions love it.
Then you've got the racial minorities
and blacks and Hispanics and Asians
agree on nothing. Um, Asians tend to be
much better educated, much more wealthy,
not necessarily politically conservative
or liberal, more likely to be independent.
independent.
>> African-Americans tend to have been
locktop into the Democratic party for
quite some time, but they voted for
Trump in the biggest uh percentages
we've ever seen in modern history. and
the Hispanic split right down the middle
this last election. Uh they are economically
economically
for a degree of redistribution not
anything like uh the coastal elites. Um
they tend to be the most upand cominging
part of the United States. So they're
most likely to shift economically
conservative which doesn't put them in
the Republican party either anymore
because that's not what the Republican
party is today. But at the same time,
they're the most anti-immigration group
we have. They want family reunification
for their family and no one else.
So the Democratic Party has shattered as
an institution. And when people start
talking about conservative or liberal,
you really have to ask what it is
they're how they define those terms
because the way America defines those
terms has changed radically in just the
last 5 years.
>> It is crazy. the the top line of data
that we're seeing at the moment. I'm
seeing more and more graphs from stuff
like our world in data and and like we
got the stats etc. uh being posted on
social media. There's a great great guy
from the FT that's doing a load of stuff
in terms of data visualization. His
stuff's getting shared around a lot. Uh
but there always are nuances and when
you dig into those you find out that the
story might not be the story as is
>> politics has always been messy and now
we're in a time of change so it's really
messy. M uh speaking of Trump, Trump
elevates Saudi Arabia to major non-NATO
ally status. That sounds like the the
most ligious slap on the wrists that I
can think of. Uh but is that a big deal?
Like what US Middle East tensions are
they important? How how much should we
be concerned? [sighs]
>> I'm not going to say they're unimportant
because that would just be rude. But um
the idea that Saudi Arabia is an ally is
a real stretch. And I'm not just saying
that because uh Muhammad bin Salman
ordered the dismemberment and cooking of
a journalist and then used the same
barbecue pit for a diplomatic party for
300 people later.
>> And they cooked Jamal Kosigible as well.
>> They I mean they didn't eat him. I was
cooked him.
>> Yeah. They [clears throat] dismembered
him. They put him in a giant barbecue
pit. They burned all the evidence. And
then later that day, they held a
diplomatic barbecue event using that
barbecue pit to make sure they could
destroy all the forensic evidence.
>> So there was little little particles of
Jamal Kosigible probably inside of a
little bit of the barbecue.
>> Yeah. Let's just put that to the side
for the moment.
>> Seasoned with journalist. What a [ __ ]
horrendous story. Uh
Uh
the rulers of Saudi Arabia are literally
the house of Saul. It's a family and MBS
is a member of that family and King
Abdella of old was part of that family
and it is this family that created the
global jihadist movement that the world
has had so much heartburn with. It is
this family who their support created
things like al Qaeda and ISIS
and is indirectly at worst responsible
for things like the 9/11 attacks. So the
idea that Saudi Arabia is an ally in any
way requires an immense stretch unless
you go back to the cold war when we
needed Saudi crude to fuel the tanks of
Germany and Italy and Britain and Japan
and Korea and China in order to fuel the
alliance. So if you want to rebuild that world,
world,
Arab oil to fuel an alliance to fight
whoever, you know, there's a
conversation to be had there on strategy.
strategy.
But anything else, uh, this is not a
country that has been our friend for a
very long time. >> Wow.
>> Wow.
What do you make of the future of
energy? EV demand slowing a little bit,
shale production and stuff's going on,
nuclear renaissance. What's the future
of energy look like in your opinion?
uh any country where
EVs are not subsidized, there are no
EVs. So, uh that hopefully would tell
you everything you need to know about
that supply chain. Um that doesn't mean
that all green tech is stupid. Just that
one piece. As for green check large, if
you're in a sunny place, put up solar.
If you're a windy place, put up wind. Uh
you know, I would like to think that
that's not a particularly complicated conversation.
conversation.
If you're not in a sunny place, maybe
you shouldn't put up solar. Why people
have trouble with that statement bothers
me. I mean, I I I live at 7,500 ft above
Denver. I get 330 days of sunshine a
day. Of course, I have solar panels on
my roof. But if I lived outside of
Toronto, I would get the solar radiation
per year. Why would I be so stupid as to
put solar panels on my roof in Toronto?
It's like this this idea that the
technology works everywhere is really a
problem. Uh and that goes for the others
too. Natural gas, oil, nuclear, all of
them. Um because if you you have to have
the infrastructure that goes with it and
that infrastructure is there, why would
you burn that power source? Nukes are
getting interesting. Uh the United
States seems to in bits and pieces being
moving on from 1973 finally. It's only
been 51 years to 52 years.
Uh the hope is that the small modulars
will work, but right now we still have
yet to build a prototype. And so until
there is a prototype, I can't tell you
what the supply chain might look like.
But the the sexy nature of it is if you
can fit a nuclear reactor into a 10 20
foot container unit and just plug it
into a decommissioned coal plant's
transformer network and basically
produce as much power as the old coal
plant did for 5% of the cost of building
a new power plant. Well, that that
sounds great.
If the technology works, let's build it
once and then we'll talk about it.
How far away from that technology are we?
we?
>> We were supposed to get the prototype
last November and then the company doing
it went belly up. We've had three more
countries, excuse me, three more
companies say that they're working on
it. Uh I have not seen what I consider
to be a reliable time frame for when
their prototype will come online.
>> The labs are involved. People are
working on it. But I'm sorry.
>> Without that is nuclear dominance not as inevitable.
inevitable.
>> Yeah. nuclear. If you're going to build
a large plant, let's just put the
regulatory and the the nimi concerns to
the side for a moment. From the day that
you put a shovel in the ground and you
have every dollar that you need to get
it set up, you're talking about 4 to 8
years, probably closer to eight. And
that assumes that the power grid can
take the power. One of the problems we
have in the United States is because the
period from roughly 1985 until roughly
2020 was a period where we were moving
towards higher and higherend industry
that used more precision labor and more
equipment uh but less smelting and
electrical work. It meant that the
amount of stuff that we were producing
was actually going up in value but the
amount of power that we needed to do it
was going down in value. And as we move
from manufacturing and agriculture to a
services economy, same thing. Power
demand stagnated or dropped until very
very recently, largely because of AI,
but also because of the
re-industrialization effort we're now
going through because of the Chinese
problems and decolonization. So for 35
years, we really didn't build out the
grid because we didn't need to. Now we
need to. And the biggest thing that is
missing is high voltage long range
transmission lines. Something that's
like 70 kilovolts or higher. The only
part of the country right now that has
spare transmission capacity is this
little triangle from Pittsburgh to St.
Louis to Chicago, uh, Appalachia, coal
country. Because in the ' 60s, '7s, and
' 80s, we had a [clears throat] number
of administrations who realized, here's
where the coal is. It's cheaper to move
electricity than coal. So, let's burn
the coal locally and send the power out
to the population centers. You basic
math. Uh so the federal government
stepped in and helped push through all
of this development work. And so now
this zone has like quadruple the long
range transmission that they're using.
In some places less than a fifth.
[gasps] Uh it's the only place that
could really build out what we need
quickly. Um everyone else in the country
needs to build those lines before they
think about things like nuclear power.
Because if you build nuclear power, you
might be able to supply your city right
there, but you're not going to be able
to ship it anywhere else.
>> That's in part a regulatory issue, but
it's mostly just hardware.
>> How effective is nuclear when it comes
to the um excess capacity from the grid?
I have a friend who helps to build uh
crypto mining facilities in West Texas
and one of the things that they do which
is supposedly of a massive benefit to
the grid is they are able to turn on and
turn off their requirement for buying
energy. So there is additional energy
that's available on the grid and he
pushes a button or the people that he
builds the plants for push a button and
they go we'll take your cheap energy.
Fantastic. We'll go and mine us some
more Ethereum. Um
how uh how much tolerance how much foot
on foot off gas do you have with nuclear
plants? Do you know?
>> Uh from a technical point of view, you
can go up and down whatever you want.
But going up looks a lot to the nuclear
regulatory commission like a meltdown.
So functionally, no, not at all. So
nuclear is only for base load in the
United States. And I think that's
broadly a good way to look at it. Uh so
for data centers, nuclear is a good
match because data centers churn 24
hours a day. Nuclear goes 24 hours a
day. Solar and wind for data centers are
some of the stupidest things I've ever
seen people put on paper. Uh because to
make that work, you need to build five
times the solar and wind that you would
need to power the center and then build
a massive at least 24hour duration
battery system. By the way, no one in
the country has more than 10 minutes
and just the cost is just extreme and
even then it wouldn't be stable or
reliable. Uh so nukes, yeah, nukes would
work for that. You mentioned EVs when
they're not subsidized.
No bueno.
What are the underlying d is that
consumer demand? Is that cost? Is that
prohibitive ability to produce? Like
what what are the underlying dynamics?
>> It's electricity. It's really simple.
Electricity is easy to generate. It's
kind of squirrely to transmit and it's
almost impossible to store in an
economically viable manner. You need a
supply chain that is among the most
sophisticated that humanity has ever
produced that produces and processes a
dozen major elements. And in order to
do the transition the United States
under the B administration said that it
wanted to do get to a majority EV
situation in less than 25 years, we
would need every scrap of lithium and
copper and malipium and tantelum
[sighs] and graphite and all the rest
from the entire planet and no one else
could have any at all just to do EVs
just here. So, no, it was always [ __ ] moronic.
moronic.
Uh, that
and the cost that's attached to it is
ownorous. So, of course, if you aren't
if you have to pay for it all yourself,
sales are basically dropping to zero. Um Tesla
Tesla
Musk talked to good game not viable
economically not viable geop viable
geopolitically and we don't have the
processing materials uh here in the
United States to do it anyway.
>> So that suggests assuming that Elon isn't
isn't
ignorant of this I I have to assume that
he isn't. He tends to do his researcher.
You should think of everything that he
says in that light. But the that the
knowledge that this is the future of the
EV market that in order to be able to
make this work within the US, you need
this absurd volume of rare earth
minerals processed in the right way,
capacity, all the rest of the thing. Not
only did the stars need to align, but
you also need to align a bunch of weird
rocks in one of those rock towers on the ground.
ground.
that is betting the entire future of the
com company on the direction of the
country and
is he basically in your opinion is he
making an assumption that the subsidies
will continue to roll in because that
makes Tesla very uh
uh
>> it's a nonviable company by any normal math
math
>> but if you get continuing support
because there is a push toward green
because EVs are seen as the best way to
help climate change so on and so forth
it it is riding that the EV revolution
is riding off the back of subsidies
coming from any government. Is that the
way to look at it?
>> Uh for for for Tesla at this moment as
we understand physical chemistry. Yes.
Uh there's nothing viable at Tesl there
there's very little that's viable at EV
large anyway even before you consider
the cost of the supporting
infrastructure buildout which is a
couple of trillion dollars on top of
everything else. Uh just the vehicles
don't do what they were have been
advertised to do. uh they're also net
dirtier than gasoline because of the
production cycle on the front end. Now,
if you change the electrical system in a
way that I don't understand today, I
reserve the right to change my mind. If
you move away from lithium as the core
component of battery storage into
something that is less environmentally
damaging its production and more energy
dense and can take the vibrations
better, I reserve the right to change my
mind. But in the last five years, I
haven't even seen a prototype system for
suggested for any of this. The closest I
would say would be the slow motion move
from lithium cobalt batteries to lithium
iron batteries.
That might help with energy storage at
the grid level. Might really make a
difference. But for transport, no. It's
less dense than what we had.
>> Where does the net dirty come from? What
what is the dirty? Well, people always
forget that the electricity comes from
somewhere. And if let's say I I've got
an 11 kilowatt system on my house. If I
had a Tesla and the sun shone for 24
hours a day at my high altitude noon
peak, took me 2 and 1 half days to
charge the car.
So you're not using solar and wind to
charge your car. You're using fossil
fuels. And so the only potential gain
that you're getting is that an EV engine
is more energy efficient than a gas
engine on a mile per mile basis. But the
cost, the carbon cost of generating the
vehicle in the especially the battery in
the front end is just so much more. Uh
and if you're living in a place that's
predominantly coal and you're driving an
American style sedan, you're over the
long term generating a lot more carbon
than anything before. Now those are some
very broad statements and there are a
thousand exceptions to them based on
local situation. So for example the
Chinese vehicles uh from a weight basis
are less than half that of the American
vehicles. They would never pass our
safety tests but they're smaller and
they kill a lot of people but because
they're so much lighter a lot of what I
just said does not apply to the Chinese
situation. So a Chinese e Chinese EV can
break even on a carbon cost basis within
10 years maybe
>> but at the price of a few pedestrians.
>> Societies make choices when they start
Okay. Um
what are the what are the other sort of
damages with with regards to production
when it I know I understand about the
the lithium. Uh I I remember Joe had
some guy on his show talking about
cobalt mining and it was [ __ ]
disgusting. It was insane. Um
>> it's disgusting in every sense of the
word. Yeah. Environmentally, chemically,
and socially.
>> Yeah. Um what what else what else is
there going into EVs which are a little
uh byproducts we wouldn't realize?
>> I didn't top off my study for this. A
big one's graphite. Uh graphite is
basically a synthetic form of carbon. [clears throat]
[clears throat]
Uh there is a natural graphite which is
vastly preferred but the chemical
structure is very limited to a few
specific minds. So the cost goes up as
it's more of it's used. There's a
synthetic version. Uh basically you're
using it for the electricity regulating
the electricity flow in a battery. And
if the graphite is not the right kind,
you basically get the electricity
starting to leak out into the battery
itself, which can get a little blammy,
but more likely it's just going to be a
huge efficiency loss. Um, copper,
obviously, anything that uses
electricity is going to use a huge
amount of copper. Lithium, we've already
covered. Cobalt's a mess. Uh, manganese
using a lot of alloys for both copper
and steel. Um, sometimes you're going to
put this in the electrodes as well.
>> There just there's a lot of moving
pieces. Um, and that's one of the
reasons why I'm a little hopeful because
a lot of people are playing with a lot
of different chemistries to see if they
can kind of come up with something
better. We just haven't hit it.
Isn't there a rule in the UK that they
want to go completely
gaspowered vehicle free by 2030? That
there's no more or is that is that elsewhere?
elsewhere?
>> Lots of countries have announced that
either for their cities or for their
countries and unless they're willing to
subsidize it to a huge degree, it's not
going to happen anywhere. Um, that
doesn't necessarily mean that I have a
problem with those goals. I mean, lots
of time, well, you know, let me use the
California example. California gets a
lot of [ __ ] California deserves a lot
of the [ __ ] that they get. But when it
comes to regulation, uh the state
legislature has empowered their
regulatory bodies to create these
regulations to say, you know, we want to
be carbon-f free or we want to on the
grid by this year, we want to have no
non-EVs sold in the state by this year.
And as time moves on, if the technology
is not manifesting, make that policy,
the regulator has the authority without
going back to the state legislature to
move the date or change the mandate. Uh
it's a little bit more intelligent than
most people give California credit for.
And we're going to probably see a lot of
places climbing down. Uh we've seen a
lot of countries in the last couple of
years back away from a lot of what
they've done with EVs because it's just
not working out.
Which country do you think is closest to
being wiped out by energy shortages?
at scale? The Chinese are the ones in
the in the biggest pickle. Uh they
import about 70% of their oil about
similar number for natural gas and the
major vast majority of that comes
through the straight of Mala probably
were originating in the Middle East. And
so if you ever have a real dust up with
either Japan or the United States or
India, Vietnam or Australia or Sri Lanka
or Pakistan or Roman, that all stops.
It's really easy to cut completely. Um,
for more traditional places, uh, the
Europeans are getting clever. I'm not as
worried about the Europeans as I used to
be, uh, three years ago.
>> There's plenty of reason to be worried. [snorts]
[snorts]
Uh three years ago when the Ukraine war
started uh the Europeans were in the
situation where they thought that if
they didn't side with the Russians that
the lights were going to go out but in
the three years since they've built a
lot of infrastructure to bring in carbon
energy [clears throat] from other places
and it has been broadly successful. Uh
and so they've backed away from a political
political
goal that was questionable economically
and made a very clear strategic decision
that is broadly working out for them.
But they didn't sacrifice all of their
plans. So they realize, you know, maybe
solar and wind does not work in the world's
world's
least windy, least sunny continent. [laughter]
But conservation and efficiency are
still very good plans.
>> So you you've seen some change in
mindset and a little bit more realism in
the policy and it's it's showing benefits.
benefits.
>> I'm interested in sort of what the
future of the green energy movement
looks like. This sort of green
transition and it's how possible it is
at the current levels of stability and
technology and rollout and instability.
There are no EVs. There are no battery
chassis. There is no solar. There is no
wind. There is no nuclear without
globalization. Too many of the parts,
too many of the materials come from a
different continent. And so if we're not
all doing this together, none of that
happens. And so you should move on. Uh
if you're in the Western Hemisphere
where there is more mining than
consumption, that's probably going to be
a little easier. But for the Eastern
Hemisphere, hard pass. It's just not
going to work. Now again, if you change
the technology on me, I reserve the
right to change my mind. But that's
where we've been for the last 25 years.
>> How much of the Eastern Hemisphere being
card carrying, flag waving, we are going
green people? It seems to be mostly a
western thing in any case. No,
>> for the most part, yeah.
>> How hopeful are you for a green
transition in the west?
If the technology is not ready and if
westerners are not leaving living living
in places where the technology can be
applied in a way that actually drops
your carbon. Putting up a solar panel
doesn't make you green. Putting up a
solar panel that reduces your carbon
footprint that makes you green. And most
people who live in the west don't live
in a place where that is true.
I think that's one of the reasons why uh
there is a lot of criticism in the UK
around the sort of green movement that
we've had a very viciferous government
uh pushing hard toward this as an
outcome that they want and a country
that really doesn't seem to be
particularly well suited for most of the
technologies like I I you mentioned
Toronto's sort of 1/5ifth of the amount
of sun that you got I I have to assume
that the UK is maybe even worse. We have
to go down. We have to go south in order
to get to Toronto if you fly from the
UK. So, we're further up. Um,
>> believe it or not, London actually gets
a little bit more sun than Toronto, but
like just minuscule. Glasgow though.
God, no.
>> Yes. And I was from 3 hours away from
Glasgow. So, yeah. I
>> wind offshore wind in the North Sea is
brilliant. Look at Norway. I mean,
Norway has been subsidizing. I don't
mean to suggest that they're not, but
they get over half of their electricity
from wind now. Now, because of the
dispatchability issue, they're probably
pretty close to peaked on that. They
probably can't do much more.
>> What's dis dispatchability?
>> The availab ability just to flip a
switch and more electricity surges into
the system. You can't do that with green
tech at all. You can do it with
batteries, but batteries are not good
enough to store more than a few minutes
of power on a grid level for most
places. So, the first half for the for
the Danes was easy. The second half, I
have no idea how they're going to do that.
that.
>> How interesting.
What is uh what's an important mineral?
What's the most important mineral that
no one's paying attention to?
>> I mean, it's really unsexy, but copper,
it's like you want to expand your grid,
you need copper. You want to do more
industry, you need copper. You want to
do anything with green tech, you need
copper, and you need a lot of it. Uh the
United States wants to double the size
of its industrial plant. The United
States, in order to do that, needs to
increase its grid by half. That means we
need to consume about 12 times as much
copper for the next 30 years as we have
for the last 30.
>> Where does that come from? Where where
is most of the copper in the world?
>> The only country in the world that has
what you would consider maybe surge
capacity to increase output on anything
less than a 5year time frame is Chile uh
the outcome the desert. Uh number two is
the United States. Uh number three is
Canada. Number four is Mexico. But
>> is that good for the US then that all of it?
it?
>> That's great. But that's the ore. Then
you got to turn it into copper metal.
That's China and India.
>> So either way,
>> we can't keep it. We can't keep it
domestically and then convert it over here.
here.
>> Well, I mean, we could. We've chosen not
to. But um and you know, it's not a new
technology. This dates back to like the
early 1800s. You basically heat it up,
you boil off the sulfur, uh you heat it
up some more, you purify into metal, and
then you turn it into other things. Uh
there's nothing that to stop us from
doing that except for the cost, the
footprint, the pollution. These are real
things and to this point, America has
chosen to just let someone else do it.
>> Isn't it an interesting oraborous thing
that in order to be able to increase the
capacity of the grid to be able to move
to something like nuclear, which would
be a cleaner fuel, you need to do
something which on the front end would
look like pissing out more pollution
into the atmosphere and would cause an
awful lot of protests. Because look at
these big we shouldn't be doing our
copper ore at home. Look at the big
black clouds. It's perspective being
able to see over big timelines is uh is is
is
>> one of the many many many and that
assumes it works and the green
technologies that we have right now
don't. So spending $30 trillion or
whatever the most current number is to
achieve net zero in the United States by
2050 assumes these technologies actually
do what they say they're going to. And
we already know that they don't. We have
plenty of math to prove that. This is
why I'm really big on physical chemistry
because we need to find new ways to do
things. And we don't know what chunks of
the land on the planet we're going to
need access to to make those
technologies work until we've built some
of them. And
>> yeah, this one is based on gadalinium.
This one is based on whatever the [ __ ]
>> Yeah. Until we know the answer to that
question, we don't know how to prepare.
>> How fascinating. What do you think? What
do you think the biggest surprise in
energy is going to be over the next
decade or two, it seems to me, at least
based on what you're saying, the
technology that is promised is not able
to deliver that which it is promising.
Uh, so will the surprise be
disappointment or will the surprise be
an actual surprise?
>> It's going to be one of each. Uh, let me
give you the bad and then the good. Uh,
first [laughter] first the bad. Uh,
we're we're very close and we have been
very close for three years to a
significant break in international
energy markets. Whether it's the Russian
stuff going away or something happening
in the Persian Gulf or something
happening in Malaa or something
happening to China, the
production of vast volumes of crude is
going to fall away. And the consumption
of vast volumes of crude is going to
fall away for demographic and
geopolitical reasons. And I can't tell
you which one's going to happen first. I
can tell you that whichever one does
happen first will then lead to the other
one. And [ __ ] will get real in a lot of
places very, very quickly. uh and for
those of us who still want electricity,
we will then basically have to fight to
get access to the fossil fuels that will
allow us to have it. And that will look
different in every part of the world.
>> Second thing, at some point in the next
decade, our physical chemistry is going
to improve to the point that we have a
new idea that we will then want to apply
whether it's in generation,
transmission, or storage. I don't know,
one of the three, maybe more than one,
that will generate a completely new
arms race in order to access that
technology and apply it. And whoever can
figure that out leaves the old problems
behind. I mean, the petroleum age was a
was a mess. I understand why people
would like to go beyond it. The green
age, if it happens with today's
technologies, would be worse.
But that's not going to stop us from
trying to invent something new. And as
soon as we do, maybe it's a capacitor,
maybe it's a battery, maybe it's power
beaming, I don't know.
>> We start with a completely new set of
goals, needing a completely different
set of materials and different
concentrations, and that changes the
geography of what we are concerned
about. So we might 10 years from now be
more obsessed with Bolivia than we right
now are with Saudi Arabia and Iraq. [laughter]
[laughter]
All depends upon where the technology goes.
goes.
>> Well, it's interesting. America was
obsessed with Bolivia for a little
while, but for a different type of
substance that they were exporting. >> Yeah,
>> Yeah,
>> we're good.
>> Bring back those days. Um,
>> cocaine. Sorry, I just had to say that.
>> That's okay. That's a statement that
needs to be made. Unless it can power an
electric vehicle, in which case, has
anyone tried that? Who knows? Um,
>> I'm sure somebody in New York has.
>> Yeah. Um, global. So this increasing
reliance globally because if you're
going to increase capacity it means that
you need to uh coordinate more and you need to be more reli I didn't I totally
need to be more reli I didn't I totally didn't realize the fact that just
didn't realize the fact that just because you have the raw material
because you have the raw material doesn't mean that you can process it
doesn't mean that you can process it where it is it can be sent away and then
where it is it can be sent away and then come back. So global supply chains are
come back. So global supply chains are more important than ever. Been a few
more important than ever. Been a few years since we spoke. What's happening
years since we spoke. What's happening with the state of global supply chains?
with the state of global supply chains? I've heard you say that they don't
I've heard you say that they don't survive without a global security
survive without a global security guarantor and that that era is over.
guarantor and that that era is over. >> Yeah. Right now the ore comes from one
>> Yeah. Right now the ore comes from one place. It's primarily processed in
place. It's primarily processed in China. It's sent to a third loca
China. It's sent to a third loca location to be purified to a degree that
location to be purified to a degree that you can then actually use it and then it
you can then actually use it and then it gets turned into an intermediate
gets turned into an intermediate product. Uh so step one no matter who
product. Uh so step one no matter who you are, no matter where you are, uh
you are, no matter where you are, uh that second that first processing step
that second that first processing step that's done in China, that has to be
that's done in China, that has to be done somewhere else. uh if we don't get
done somewhere else. uh if we don't get that right, we don't get to try at
that right, we don't get to try at anything else.
anything else. >> What about the rest of the global supply
>> What about the rest of the global supply chain? Uh global food systems, other
chain? Uh global food systems, other stuff like that. What what what else has
stuff like that. What what what else has changed?
changed? >> Uh I've been pleasantly surprised about
>> Uh I've been pleasantly surprised about global f fuel food systems. Um the
global f fuel food systems. Um the sanctions against the Russians have not
sanctions against the Russians have not yet uh impacted the fertilizer supply
yet uh impacted the fertilizer supply system. and fertilizer as a category.
system. and fertilizer as a category. There's like 11 different kinds, but
There's like 11 different kinds, but fertilizer as a mass category. Russians
fertilizer as a mass category. Russians are still the world's largest exporter.
are still the world's largest exporter. Without that, there is no food
Without that, there is no food production in Brazil at all. And it
production in Brazil at all. And it looks pretty dicey in the Middle East,
looks pretty dicey in the Middle East, North Africa, and especially um the
North Africa, and especially um the South Asian zone. We haven't had that
South Asian zone. We haven't had that problem. Uh in the meantime, the
problem. Uh in the meantime, the Americans continue to spin up more and
Americans continue to spin up more and more nitrogen fertilizer because that's
more nitrogen fertilizer because that's primarily made from natural gas. and the
primarily made from natural gas. and the Canadians continue to spin up more and
Canadians continue to spin up more and more potachsh fertilizer because they've
more potachsh fertilizer because they've got that in Saskatchewan. So, we're
got that in Saskatchewan. So, we're seeing other suppliers come into the
seeing other suppliers come into the system. Uh they realize that it's a
system. Uh they realize that it's a race. Uh and so far that's working out.
race. Uh and so far that's working out. Um long-term still a real problem, but
Um long-term still a real problem, but we're not facing the acute crunch that
we're not facing the acute crunch that we were. [sighs] Uh Trump's tariffs are
we were. [sighs] Uh Trump's tariffs are pushing manufactured goods for
pushing manufactured goods for agriculture the other direction. Um,
agriculture the other direction. Um, basically oversimplifying here, but the
basically oversimplifying here, but the more complicated the se the uh the more
more complicated the se the uh the more complicated the manufacturing supply
complicated the manufacturing supply chain happens to be, the more steps
chain happens to be, the more steps there are, the more players. If you have
there are, the more players. If you have a high tariff system, it pushes your
a high tariff system, it pushes your steps out into somewhere else because
steps out into somewhere else because otherwise you're paying the tariff every
otherwise you're paying the tariff every time something crosses your border. Yep.
time something crosses your border. Yep. >> And so easier to take the handful of the
>> And so easier to take the handful of the steps that you do and do them somewhere
steps that you do and do them somewhere else and just pay the tariff once when
else and just pay the tariff once when the thing comes in finished. for simple
the thing comes in finished. for simple manufactured products that only have a
manufactured products that only have a half dozen steps or so that tends to
half dozen steps or so that tends to come to you because that's easier to
come to you because that's easier to collate. So when it comes to things like
collate. So when it comes to things like plastics and textiles and furniture,
plastics and textiles and furniture, Trump's tariffs have reshort
Trump's tariffs have reshort manufacturing, but when it comes to
manufacturing, but when it comes to aerospace and computing and electronics
aerospace and computing and electronics and automotive, it's pushing stuff away.
and automotive, it's pushing stuff away. And agricultural equipment is definitely
And agricultural equipment is definitely in that se second category. So, we're
in that se second category. So, we're seeing John Deere, for example, has
seeing John Deere, for example, has already cut more jobs in the last 10
already cut more jobs in the last 10 months than it did in the previous 20
months than it did in the previous 20 years.
years. >> Wow. I did not know that.
>> Wow. I did not know that. >> Yeah, it's it's getting pretty bad in
>> Yeah, it's it's getting pretty bad in the Midwest right now.
the Midwest right now. >> Shipping disruptions. How big of a deal
>> Shipping disruptions. How big of a deal is that?
is that? >> Yeah. Right now, the Asians realize that
>> Yeah. Right now, the Asians realize that this is where their bread is sputtered
this is where their bread is sputtered and they're going out of their way to
and they're going out of their way to get along. Uh the Chinese have not
get along. Uh the Chinese have not interrupted any uh shipping. And in
interrupted any uh shipping. And in fact, they've even leaned on the
fact, they've even leaned on the Houthies and the Iranians uh to stop
Houthies and the Iranians uh to stop [ __ ] around in the Red Sea because
[ __ ] around in the Red Sea because they realize they're the ones who would
they realize they're the ones who would be most screwed if that gets broken.
be most screwed if that gets broken. [sighs and gasps]
>> So far, >> good news.
>> good news. >> Yeah. Well, look, you mentioned you
>> Yeah. Well, look, you mentioned you mentioned Russia there. Uh the last time
mentioned Russia there. Uh the last time that we spoke, that was that was sort of
that we spoke, that was that was sort of front page news. What is happening with
front page news. What is happening with the Russia Ukraine conflict? Is it
the Russia Ukraine conflict? Is it entering a new stage at the moment?
entering a new stage at the moment? What's going on?
What's going on? >> Every three months we're in a new stage.
>> Every three months we're in a new stage. Uh we're in something called the second
Uh we're in something called the second revolution in military affairs which is
revolution in military affairs which is applying digital technologies to
applying digital technologies to warfare. Uh the first phase was in the
warfare. Uh the first phase was in the 1980s and 90s when the United States
1980s and 90s when the United States started making things like smart bombs
started making things like smart bombs or cruise missiles. Now it's going onto
or cruise missiles. Now it's going onto much cheaper platforms because uh
much cheaper platforms because uh lowcost semiconductors are ubiquitous
lowcost semiconductors are ubiquitous around the world and anyone can make a
around the world and anyone can make a drone. And so we've got Ukraine, which
drone. And so we've got Ukraine, which inherited part of the old brain trust
inherited part of the old brain trust from the Soviet missile and aerospace
from the Soviet missile and aerospace things, combined with a country that's
things, combined with a country that's desperate to survive, combined with
desperate to survive, combined with these new inputs that they can bring in
these new inputs that they can bring in from abroad and making thousands of
from abroad and making thousands of drones a day. So every 3 months there's
drones a day. So every 3 months there's a new page. Uh, first it was
a new page. Uh, first it was singleperson drones, then it was
singleperson drones, then it was jamming, then it was drones with
jamming, then it was drones with missiles, then it was water-based
missiles, then it was water-based drones, then it was mass drones, then it
drones, then it was mass drones, then it was Shahed drones, and it was Shahed
was Shahed drones, and it was Shahed drones that could do a limited amount of
drones that could do a limited amount of target selection. Now, uh, it's
target selection. Now, uh, it's something called the the Octopus drone,
something called the the Octopus drone, which the Ukrainians are just starting
which the Ukrainians are just starting to use, which is a drone interceptor.
to use, which is a drone interceptor. Uh, it's a new day every day, and I have
Uh, it's a new day every day, and I have no idea how this is going to play. I can
no idea how this is going to play. I can tell you with the technologies that
tell you with the technologies that existed pre-war exactly how this war
existed pre-war exactly how this war would have gone.
would have gone. >> Those aren't the technologies that are
>> Those aren't the technologies that are being used in the war anymore.
being used in the war anymore. Isn't that so so interesting that all of
Isn't that so so interesting that all of the dangerous assumptions people had
the dangerous assumptions people had about modern warfare, all of the
about modern warfare, all of the predictability, I mean war war is
predictability, I mean war war is unpredictable enough, uh but when you
unpredictable enough, uh but when you apply the uh growth curve of technology
apply the uh growth curve of technology to warfare, uh you just end up with I
to warfare, uh you just end up with I mean that that weird evolution between
mean that that weird evolution between uh offense and defense that we saw
uh offense and defense that we saw happen. Well, drones have come out and
happen. Well, drones have come out and this is better than using a Hellfire
this is better than using a Hellfire missile. And then instead of using that,
missile. And then instead of using that, you get a net and these drones are
you get a net and these drones are defeated by a net. And now the drones
defeated by a net. And now the drones have a little thing on the front that
have a little thing on the front that cuts the net. And now the nets are made
cuts the net. And now the nets are made of this material. And now there's an EMP
of this material. And now there's an EMP that blasts them out of the sky. And now
that blasts them out of the sky. And now there and the uh pace of innovation with
there and the uh pace of innovation with kinetic consequences
kinetic consequences is it's mad. It re it's been absurd. Uh
is it's mad. It re it's been absurd. Uh >> right. But this is why it's called the
>> right. But this is why it's called the revolution in military affairs. Um, if
revolution in military affairs. Um, if you go back to roughly 1935,
the technologies we were using then up until 2022 with the exception of the
until 2022 with the exception of the introduc introduction of the jet really
introduc introduction of the jet really hadn't changed. I mean, it was guns, it
hadn't changed. I mean, it was guns, it was artillery, it was tanks, it was
was artillery, it was tanks, it was ships, it was subs, it was helicopters.
ships, it was subs, it was helicopters. The jet was the only one that was
The jet was the only one that was introduced and that was introduced late
introduced and that was introduced late in World War II, 1944.
in World War II, 1944. We've had more technological evolutions
We've had more technological evolutions in the last 3 years just in Ukraine than
in the last 3 years just in Ukraine than the rest of the world combined has had
the rest of the world combined has had since 1960.
since 1960. >> Wow.
>> Wow. >> And so the rules we don't know. We are
>> And so the rules we don't know. We are only in the very very early stages of
only in the very very early stages of developing the weapons much less the
developing the weapons much less the doctrine much less being able to play
doctrine much less being able to play that against a battlefield. Um and we
that against a battlefield. Um and we are very fortunate in the west that the
are very fortunate in the west that the Ukrainians will want to partner with us
Ukrainians will want to partner with us because they are doing in real time uh
because they are doing in real time uh the sort of experimentation that is
the sort of experimentation that is costing lives that if we were doing this
costing lives that if we were doing this in a broader conflict would have already
in a broader conflict would have already claimed a million people.
claimed a million people. >> Yeah, I was going to say I wonder how
>> Yeah, I was going to say I wonder how many countries are uh watching Ukraine
many countries are uh watching Ukraine and Russia almost like a lab. Yeah, the
and Russia almost like a lab. Yeah, the last time something at this scale
last time something at this scale happened, a major conflict in which
happened, a major conflict in which people were watching, it was either the
people were watching, it was either the Crimean War or the American Civil War,
Crimean War or the American Civil War, because those were the two conflicts
because those were the two conflicts where industrialized technologies first
where industrialized technologies first really hit the field, whether it was a
really hit the field, whether it was a Gatling gun or penicellin or the
Gatling gun or penicellin or the railway.
railway. And people are watching and thinking,
And people are watching and thinking, well, this is a good explainer, uh, a
well, this is a good explainer, uh, a good, um, sandbox for us to observe what
good, um, sandbox for us to observe what these new technologies are going to be
these new technologies are going to be like. How how are these
like. How how are these >> say I'm dark? [laughter]
>> say I'm dark? [laughter] >> Well, look, I mean, yeah, I'm not saying
>> Well, look, I mean, yeah, I'm not saying that Russia and Ukraine is being used as
that Russia and Ukraine is being used as an experiment for the rest of the world
an experiment for the rest of the world to watch, but that's what the people who
to watch, but that's what the people who are not invested in it directly will be
are not invested in it directly will be will be thinking, right? Look at this.
will be thinking, right? Look at this. Look at look at look at the way that
Look at look at look at the way that this goes forward. I that seems to me I
this goes forward. I that seems to me I was interested in what the most
was interested in what the most dangerous assumption about modern
dangerous assumption about modern warfare was, but the uh the the
warfare was, but the uh the the assumption that it is predictable or
assumption that it is predictable or that it follows any of the rules that
that it follows any of the rules that have been established in the past seems
have been established in the past seems to be a pretty [ __ ] good one.
to be a pretty [ __ ] good one. >> Yeah. Now, we still need energy. We need
>> Yeah. Now, we still need energy. We need still still need food. When you're
still still need food. When you're talking about drones, you need
talking about drones, you need electricity specifically. So, that adds
electricity specifically. So, that adds another layer of things to it. But yeah,
another layer of things to it. But yeah, uh the rules are changing very quickly.
uh the rules are changing very quickly. What conflicts are more important than
What conflicts are more important than Ukraine at the moment?
Ukraine at the moment? >> At the moment, that's really the only
>> At the moment, that's really the only one that matters because that has the
one that matters because that has the nuclear question because of the Russians
nuclear question because of the Russians that deals with the northern European
that deals with the northern European plane. So, automatically draws in all
plane. So, automatically draws in all the Europeans. It has the issue of
the Europeans. It has the issue of uniting Eurasia under a single power.
uniting Eurasia under a single power. So, the Americans get interested. Uh,
So, the Americans get interested. Uh, and then of course the Chinese are
and then of course the Chinese are providing the industrial base that's
providing the industrial base that's necessary for the Russians to carry out
necessary for the Russians to carry out the war in the first place. So,
the war in the first place. So, everyone's involved uh in some way. Uh
everyone's involved uh in some way. Uh it is by far the most critical one out
it is by far the most critical one out there. Uh we'll probably have a few new
there. Uh we'll probably have a few new ones in the next few years. Um whenever
ones in the next few years. Um whenever you break the economic model, politics
you break the economic model, politics gets all wonky and security issues
gets all wonky and security issues naturally bubble up from that. And
naturally bubble up from that. And that's before you consider a
that's before you consider a technological change. So you know, maybe
technological change. So you know, maybe we figure out what the next energy
we figure out what the next energy technology is. We have something fresh
technology is. We have something fresh to fight over in a world where all of a
to fight over in a world where all of a sudden oil is not as reliable. It's one
sudden oil is not as reliable. It's one of many ways this could go. M what about
of many ways this could go. M what about South China Sea stuff that was big deal
South China Sea stuff that was big deal for a while.
for a while. >> I never found that sexy. Never. It's
>> I never found that sexy. Never. It's just I mean just it's ringed by hostile
just I mean just it's ringed by hostile countries. Vietnam, Philippines,
countries. Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia. Um it's not that
Indonesia, Malaysia. Um it's not that deep so subs don't play a big role. The
deep so subs don't play a big role. The energy in it, the reserves are not all
energy in it, the reserves are not all that interesting. And the sand islands
that interesting. And the sand islands that the Chinese have built are, as the
that the Chinese have built are, as the name suggests, built of sand. And so the
name suggests, built of sand. And so the Chinese have already stopped stationing
Chinese have already stopped stationing aircraft on them because the runways
aircraft on them because the runways aren't functional.
aren't functional. And if you see this as a naval
And if you see this as a naval projection issue, projecting through an
projection issue, projecting through an area rung by ringed by a half a dozen
area rung by ringed by a half a dozen countries who hate you, you put a few of
countries who hate you, you put a few of the new tomahawks that the United States
the new tomahawks that the United States is developing that are truck mounted and
is developing that are truck mounted and you can't do anything with that except
you can't do anything with that except for loose ships. And even if you could
for loose ships. And even if you could secure it, you have now made it 17th of
secure it, you have now made it 17th of the way to the Persian Gulf. Big [ __ ]
the way to the Persian Gulf. Big [ __ ] deal. Uh the Chinese are boxed in. I
deal. Uh the Chinese are boxed in. I I've never found the South China Sea
I've never found the South China Sea interesting.
interesting. >> Wow. You I've seen so many uh video
>> Wow. You I've seen so many uh video documentaries and stuff talking about
documentaries and stuff talking about these land grabs that breathless.
these land grabs that breathless. >> Yeah. Yeah. This is, you know, it's this
>> Yeah. Yeah. This is, you know, it's this sort of um odd geopolitical red tape
sort of um odd geopolitical red tape loophole which is permitting China to
loophole which is permitting China to expand the size of its country by saying
expand the size of its country by saying this is us and this is us and this is us
this is us and this is us and this is us and it's slowly going to engulf the
and it's slowly going to engulf the entire South China Sea. Uh
entire South China Sea. Uh >> yeah, when public relations is your
>> yeah, when public relations is your strategic policy, it's not a very good
strategic policy, it's not a very good policy. Uh, if you want to take it
policy. Uh, if you want to take it seriously, the Chinese have to conquer
seriously, the Chinese have to conquer Vietnam first, then we'll talk because
Vietnam first, then we'll talk because if they don't control the coast, there's
if they don't control the coast, there's no point in controlling the water.
Surely based on your theory about China being in a lot of [ __ ] over the next
being in a lot of [ __ ] over the next decade and a metric ton of [ __ ] over the
decade and a metric ton of [ __ ] over the next 50 years,
next 50 years, >> is there not the potential for them to
>> is there not the potential for them to do something desperate, whatever that
do something desperate, whatever that means, silly, more aggressive, more rule
means, silly, more aggressive, more rule it out, but there's nothing that they
it out, but there's nothing that they could do that would fix their underlying
could do that would fix their underlying core problems. They can't change their
core problems. They can't change their geography.
geography. They'd have to conquer the entire first
They'd have to conquer the entire first island chain to have a chance to project
island chain to have a chance to project beyond. And even then, they're not going
beyond. And even then, they're not going to have a two ocean navy because there's
to have a two ocean navy because there's only one ocean.
only one ocean. Um, they're not going to solve their
Um, they're not going to solve their demographic problems with the war. The
demographic problems with the war. The only country where you could maybe turn
only country where you could maybe turn enough people into slaves to round out
enough people into slaves to round out your demographic structure would be
your demographic structure would be India. The Himalayas are in the way
India. The Himalayas are in the way independent of the fact that that would
independent of the fact that that would be really hard. [gasps]
be really hard. [gasps] Uh, so there's nowhere they can go. Uh,
Uh, so there's nowhere they can go. Uh, the resources aren't within easy reach.
the resources aren't within easy reach. The demographic situation requires Star
The demographic situation requires Star Wars style cloning and the strategic
Wars style cloning and the strategic situation can't be solved with a navy
situation can't be solved with a navy that is anything less than five times
that is anything less than five times the powerful power of the American Navy.
the powerful power of the American Navy. And they're nowhere close. They have a
And they're nowhere close. They have a lot of ships, but whenever you see like
lot of ships, but whenever you see like a tonnage per tonage comparison for a
a tonnage per tonage comparison for a ship, keep in mind that their ships suck
ship, keep in mind that their ships suck and are a lot heavier.
and are a lot heavier. So, a 40,000 ton Chinese carrier and a
So, a 40,000 ton Chinese carrier and a 40,000 ton American carrier, this one is
40,000 ton American carrier, this one is an order of magnitude more powerful than
an order of magnitude more powerful than this one. They're slower. They can't
this one. They're slower. They can't maneuver. They need too much fuel.
maneuver. They need too much fuel. >> Uh before you consider things about the
>> Uh before you consider things about the hardware that they might launch,
hardware that they might launch, >> okay, that does not necessarily preclude
>> okay, that does not necessarily preclude them from doing something silly or
them from doing something silly or something kinetic or aggressive.
something kinetic or aggressive. >> Exactly. just purely out of desperation
>> Exactly. just purely out of desperation shape the environment on their way out
shape the environment on their way out the door. I can't rule it out. But
the door. I can't rule it out. But generally countries don't die that way.
generally countries don't die that way. There has to be something that they
There has to be something that they think that they can achieve.
think that they can achieve. >> The reason that I don't dismiss it
>> The reason that I don't dismiss it completely
completely is that um Chairman Xi has basically
is that um Chairman Xi has basically gotten rid of all of his adviserss. Uh
gotten rid of all of his adviserss. Uh his last real one was seven years ago
his last real one was seven years ago now. And when you eat nothing but the
now. And when you eat nothing but the propaganda all day, you know, it kind of
propaganda all day, you know, it kind of messes with your head. I mean, this is a
messes with your head. I mean, this is a guy who has written 30,000 pages of
guy who has written 30,000 pages of ideological treatises in the last 10
ideological treatises in the last 10 years. That doesn't leave a lot of time
years. That doesn't leave a lot of time to govern. And it may be that his mind
to govern. And it may be that his mind is just mush now and that yes, he pulls
is just mush now and that yes, he pulls the trigger. Uh it's not a very
the trigger. Uh it's not a very satisfying explanation, but that's
satisfying explanation, but that's really the only way I see it happening.
really the only way I see it happening. Yeah. Wow. Wow. I It really does sort of
Yeah. Wow. Wow. I It really does sort of go to show the the issues of intense
go to show the the issues of intense isolation. Uh, you know, we've it's one
isolation. Uh, you know, we've it's one of the reasons that supposedly Japan has
of the reasons that supposedly Japan has a particularly unique culture, which is
a particularly unique culture, which is what happens if nobody's allowed to
what happens if nobody's allowed to leave or enter for half a millennia. And
leave or enter for half a millennia. And look at this. It's formed into this
look at this. It's formed into this place that's as close to an alien planet
place that's as close to an alien planet as you can whilst staying on Earth. And
as you can whilst staying on Earth. And isn't isn't that interesting? Um, but it
isn't isn't that interesting? Um, but it also
also >> doesn't have the uh corrective
>> doesn't have the uh corrective mechanisms for stress testing your
mechanisms for stress testing your ideas. If all of the people around you
ideas. If all of the people around you and all of the country around you
and all of the country around you basically is sort of a yes country, like
basically is sort of a yes country, like a yes men, uh
a yes men, uh you can end up with some pretty
you can end up with some pretty squirrely ideas that you start
squirrely ideas that you start believing. I suppose
believing. I suppose >> that's one of the reasons why I really
>> that's one of the reasons why I really like countries like the United States or
like countries like the United States or Germany or Australia uh or Brazil
Germany or Australia uh or Brazil because the states have as much power as
because the states have as much power as the national authorities. And so you get
the national authorities. And so you get a lot of policy experimentations on
a lot of policy experimentations on everything from labor policy to tax
everything from labor policy to tax policy to culture policy uh throughout
policy to culture policy uh throughout the entire system. And we we make some
the entire system. And we we make some bad decisions. No argument.
bad decisions. No argument. >> But we also make some good ones and then
>> But we also make some good ones and then we learn from one another.
we learn from one another. >> Which which country is quietly becoming
>> Which which country is quietly becoming uh a greater power than most people
uh a greater power than most people might realize, do you think?
might realize, do you think? >> Mexico. If Mexico was located anywhere
>> Mexico. If Mexico was located anywhere else in the world with the industrial
else in the world with the industrial plant that it is, we would already talk
plant that it is, we would already talk about it as being more powerful than
about it as being more powerful than Germany or France.
Germany or France. >> But wow,
>> But wow, >> all that trade relationship was with the
>> all that trade relationship was with the United States. So excuse everybody's
United States. So excuse everybody's perspective.
perspective. Doesn't mean that they don't have very
Doesn't mean that they don't have very real problems. They do. But from as an
real problems. They do. But from as an industrial power, they're already
industrial power, they're already massive.
massive. >> What What is their advantage?
>> What What is their advantage? >> They're right next to the United States.
>> They're right next to the United States. So you you've got the technology, you
So you you've got the technology, you got the infrastructure, you got the the
got the infrastructure, you got the the consumption base, and they can
consumption base, and they can complement what they do with what we do.
complement what they do with what we do. It's a great relationship. I literally
It's a great relationship. I literally trickle down.
trickle down. >> Yeah,
>> Yeah, >> that's a little harsh. Mexicans are very
>> that's a little harsh. Mexicans are very good at what they do, too. But if Mexico
good at what they do, too. But if Mexico hadn't been to the next next to the
hadn't been to the next next to the United States, it probably wouldn't have
United States, it probably wouldn't have the trade or economic half that it has.
the trade or economic half that it has. But if you could take this somehow and
But if you could take this somehow and move it somewhere else. Yeah. Massive.
move it somewhere else. Yeah. Massive. Massive. Wow. Okay. And when it comes to
Massive. Wow. Okay. And when it comes to alliances,
alliances, tenuous ones, which is what's the one
tenuous ones, which is what's the one that you're concerned about in terms of
that you're concerned about in terms of fragility? What's what are the or what
fragility? What's what are the or what are the alliances that you think are
are the alliances that you think are more fragile than they seem?
more fragile than they seem? >> Um, let me give you two. One that's up
>> Um, let me give you two. One that's up and coming and one that I thought we had
and coming and one that I thought we had solved and now I'm not so sure. So, up
solved and now I'm not so sure. So, up and coming is Vietnam. Uh, huge
and coming is Vietnam. Uh, huge population, very young, excellent
population, very young, excellent educational system. uh 40% of their
educational system. uh 40% of their college grads are STEM. Uh and they're
college grads are STEM. Uh and they're now at a higher average technical skill
now at a higher average technical skill set for their workforce than the Chinese
set for their workforce than the Chinese are. And they're now trying to catch up
are. And they're now trying to catch up with the industrial workforce or I'm
with the industrial workforce or I'm sorry, with the industrial
sorry, with the industrial infrastructure. Um long-term, they're
infrastructure. Um long-term, they're absolutely going to be a top five
absolutely going to be a top five trading partner for the United States
trading partner for the United States unless we absolutely muck it up. Uh
unless we absolutely muck it up. Uh they're fascists, so we have to keep
they're fascists, so we have to keep that in mind. Um just because they're
that in mind. Um just because they're they're good at what we need them to be
they're good at what we need them to be good at doesn't mean they're wonderful
good at doesn't mean they're wonderful people. their government's kind of
people. their government's kind of goooo. Um the one the other one is
goooo. Um the one the other one is Japan. Now Japan is a country that I
Japan. Now Japan is a country that I used to be concerned about because it
used to be concerned about because it was another naval power. Uh most of the
was another naval power. Uh most of the resources they need are not local. So
resources they need are not local. So they have to go out and get them. And in
they have to go out and get them. And in a world where the United States cares
a world where the United States cares less about globalization, that means
less about globalization, that means that the Japanese by default have to be
that the Japanese by default have to be more aggressive. That doesn't mean a
more aggressive. That doesn't mean a fight is inevitable or much less
fight is inevitable or much less imminent, but all of a sudden it is a
imminent, but all of a sudden it is a possibility.
possibility. And the Japanese under Trump won came to
And the Japanese under Trump won came to the United States to cut a deal on the
the United States to cut a deal on the future and basically signed a deal that
future and basically signed a deal that was mixed economic and security uh needs
was mixed economic and security uh needs and basically gave in to Trump on
and basically gave in to Trump on everything they cared about. And so they
everything they cared about. And so they thought that if they could sign a deal
thought that if they could sign a deal with Donald Trump that they were in
with Donald Trump that they were in because he was the most reactionary,
because he was the most reactionary, erratic American president we've ever
erratic American president we've ever had. And they're like, if we can cut a
had. And they're like, if we can cut a deal with him, we're good. Reasonable.
deal with him, we're good. Reasonable. Trump 2 comes along, badmouths the deal
Trump 2 comes along, badmouths the deal that Trump won cut, and all of a sudden
that Trump won cut, and all of a sudden the Japanese are in the wind again. The
the Japanese are in the wind again. The difference between eight years ago and
difference between eight years ago and now is now the Japanese have two super
now is now the Japanese have two super carriers that they didn't have 8 years
carriers that they didn't have 8 years ago and all of a sudden they are a naval
ago and all of a sudden they are a naval superpower and they were already the
superpower and they were already the second most powerful naval power in the
second most powerful naval power in the world. And so now it matters a great
world. And so now it matters a great deal if this relationship falls on the
deal if this relationship falls on the rocks.
rocks. So hopeful the Japanese would rather
So hopeful the Japanese would rather have a deal than not have one. But
have a deal than not have one. But a lot of hard work was done by Trump to
a lot of hard work was done by Trump to get that deal and it worked and it stuck
get that deal and it worked and it stuck and then he burned it.
and then he burned it. >> Trump versus Trump.
>> Trump versus Trump. >> Yeah,
>> Yeah, >> Peter, you're great. I love speaking to
>> Peter, you're great. I love speaking to you. It's great to get an update,
you. It's great to get an update, apocalyptic as it may be. Uh,
apocalyptic as it may be. Uh, >> welcome.
>> welcome. >> Let's bring this one into land. Where
>> Let's bring this one into land. Where should people go to keep up to date with
should people go to keep up to date with everything you've got going on?
>> Fiction. Yeah. >> The end of the world fiction hopefully.
>> The end of the world fiction hopefully. >> Awesome. Peter, I appreciate you, mate.
>> Awesome. Peter, I appreciate you, mate. Congratulations. You made it to the end
Congratulations. You made it to the end of an episode. Your brain has not been
of an episode. Your brain has not been completely destroyed by the internet
completely destroyed by the internet just yet. Here's another one that you
just yet. Here's another one that you should watch.
should watch. Go on.
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