0:05 you
0:15 Malaka Hawaiian unbalanced on are we
0:19 done big penis
0:21 [Music]
0:49 [Music]
1:11 [Music]
1:22 [Music]
1:33 you
1:35 before we start our webinar here are
1:38 some reminders and guidelines for our
1:40 virtual participants first please
1:42 observe proper webinar and video
1:44 conferencing etiquette also please
1:47 change your settings to speaker view we
1:49 are also kindly requesting all
1:51 participants to turn off their video you
1:54 may post your questions regarding the
1:56 lectures through the link flashed in
1:57 your screen alternatively you may also
2:00 post your questions through the chat box
2:02 in your zoom console
2:04 lastly details on how to get your
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2:08 of the webinar we expect your adherence
2:11 to these guidelines thank you very much
2:22 you
2:29 the biorisk Association of the
2:31 Philippines in collaboration with the
2:33 Philippine Association of medical
2:35 technologists warmly welcomes all our
2:37 virtual participants to our 4th join
2:39 webinar this webinar will focus on
2:42 biosecurity the awareness of
2:44 laboratorians in biosafety and
2:46 biosecurity measures particularly during
2:48 this time of pandemic shall be
2:50 highlighted for them to be alert in
2:52 recognizing by a security threat the new
2:55 technologies and the dual use research
2:56 of concern will be discussed and
2:58 participants will learn why it is
3:00 important to know how to identify it
3:02 what is the role of risk benefit
3:04 assessment and how to develop a risk
3:06 mitigation and communication plan let us
3:09 all welcome our session moderator for
3:11 this webinar he is an active be Rapp
3:13 member a practicing veterinarian an
3:16 associate professor from the college of
3:18 veterinary medicine of central Mindanao
3:20 University ladies and gentlemen dr. Jose
3:23 Ovid & Co jr. good evening everyone once
3:29 again welcome to the fourth webinar of
3:31 the bio race Association of the
3:33 Philippines in collaboration with the
3:35 Philippine Association of medical
3:37 technologists on laboratory biosecurity
3:40 2020 a focus on emerging biotechnology
3:43 and dual use research
3:48 so concern the next session is viewed by
3:51 our official participants bye-bye Azul
3:53 and we also have our viewers through
3:55 Facebook that is currently streamed live
3:57 via the Facebook group of the Bureau to
4:00 fall to formally open the event and
4:02 welcome you all I give you the present
4:04 at the national president of the permit
4:06 and that and vice president of Europe
4:08 mr. Ronaldo who know a very good day in
4:15 a bio stage in biosecurity thanks to all
4:18 our participants join me around the
4:20 world it is my distinct honor and
4:23 privilege to represent both the diary's
4:26 Association of the Philippines and the
4:28 Philippine Association of medical
4:29 technologies in welcoming you with the
4:33 for joint webinar entitled laboratory
4:36 biosecurity 2020 a focus on emerging
4:40 biotechnology in dual use research of
4:43 concern laboratory by safe is more than
4:47 just in guarding of dangerous pathogen
4:50 and of seeds from individuals or
4:52 organizations who would use them for
4:55 harm while protection of dangerous
4:58 pathogens and have scenes is obviously
5:00 appropriate the scientific medical and
5:05 pharmaceutical communities should also
5:08 consider protecting materials with
5:11 historical vertical epidemiological
5:15 commercial or scientific value this
5:19 decision should be taken with due
5:21 consideration to the fam the scientists
5:24 serve only as temporary custodians of
5:27 valuable scientific assets whose past
5:30 and current value to science will be
5:33 understood but missed utility for the
5:36 future can only be estimated
5:39 dual use research of concern is life
5:42 sciences research that is intended for
5:45 benefit but which might easily be
5:47 supplied to do harm and SARS co2 is not
5:52 an exemption the advances of science
5:55 open doors to infinite possibilities to
5:58 make use of acquired knowledge and
6:00 techniques systems and controls should
6:03 be in place to avoid illegitimate or at
6:07 ethical research researchers laboratory
6:11 workers and by safety and laboratory
6:14 biosecurity managers should communicate
6:17 and collaborate and strive to find the
6:21 correct ethical balance for the
6:24 activities performed the possibility the
6:27 dual use research might result in his
6:30 use either intentionally or accidentally
6:34 is a long-standing concern of silence
6:37 the issue abroad and encompass the only
6:41 research in public health but also
6:44 security scientific publishing and
6:48 public communications the technology and
6:51 ethics and wider societal issues so
6:56 let's take this opportunity to learn
6:59 more and be more responsible in the use
7:03 of research as we aim towards improving
7:06 life - life sciences have an enjoyable
7:11 webinar and good day to everyone thank
7:14 you very much
7:19 thank you so much Durrani and now see it
7:24 to our first stop on a decade and by
7:27 security in the Philippines our speaker
7:30 is the physician pathologist by
7:32 profession who after finishing anatomic
7:35 and clinical pathology at Mojave Medical
7:38 Center in Ankeny TV show
7:43 was to shift career to medical research
7:46 at the research and biotechnology of st.
7:48 Luke's Medical Center in castle City in
7:50 2001 he co-founded the Philippine
7:53 biosafety and biosecurity Association
7:55 incorporated in 2008 meanwhile taking
7:58 the US Department of State banded
7:59 advanced biosafety officer training
8:01 course finishing as botched won in 2011
8:04 with his training and background in
8:06 biosafety he was appointed as biosafety
8:09 officer of st. Luke's Medical Center in
8:12 2013 in Quezon City and in global 1620
8:19 seeing the tremendous risk laboratorians
8:22 were facing with a gamut of pathogens in
8:24 the laboratory because permit to join
8:28 with him in embracing biosafety and
8:30 biosecurity which permit and
8:33 conditionally accepted it was then that
8:35 he founded a biased Association of the
8:37 Philippines incorporated also known as
8:39 Mira in 2015 with
8:44 Georgio his founding officers were
8:46 medical technologist his efforts to
8:49 advocate my safety in the country
8:50 despite the hurdles and once he needed
8:53 to climb he successfully overcame all
8:55 this and caught the eye of the
8:57 International Federation and biosafety
8:58 associations in Ottawa Canada and
9:00 awarding him the title if Bob I saved
9:03 the hero in 2016 he sought professional
9:06 certification with if BA in bio risk
9:09 management and biosecurity and obtained
9:11 these in 2017 without further ado help
9:16 me welcome dr. Miguel Martin in Moreno's
9:19 ii the bureau founding an incumbent
9:22 president breathing everyone i will
9:26 present you tonight i experience on how
9:29 beer up and I together with pomade
9:32 advocated laboratory by security and by
9:34 safety in our country let me share my
9:38 slides this presentation will focus on
9:41 my involvement in its advocacy on our
9:43 laboratories in the Philippines came to
9:46 know about my safety and biosecurity in
9:49 the last 10 to 11 years this
9:51 presentation is my own creation and does
9:53 not mirror the goals and objectives of
9:55 permit and/or Dara I personally learned
10:00 all about by safety biosecurity and then
10:03 by risk management way back in 2008 when
10:06 the laboratory I was working with
10:09 recommended me to join a training funded
10:11 by the u.s. Department of State
10:13 biosecurity engagement program it does
10:20 it like to move okay so this next two
10:25 slides this is the first one or my first
10:26 original slides way back in 2008 that I
10:30 used to present to participants to show
10:32 definitions and key terms I use in the
10:34 course to review why safety is about
10:38 prevention of unintentional risks or
10:40 protecting people from pathogens well by
10:43 security's focus on preventing in
10:45 intentional risk or protecting pathogens
10:49 from the people in addition to
10:51 protecting occupational workers
10:53 laboratory biosafety safeguards the
10:56 public and the environment from
10:58 students involving pathogens and toxins
11:01 bioscience laboratory personnel and
11:03 management have a similar responsibility
11:06 to implement by security systems but the
11:09 concepts on biosecurity are much less
11:12 understood than biosafety the word
11:15 laboratory is used in front of biosafety
11:18 and biosecurity to help guide the
11:21 definition and avoid confusion with
11:24 other meanings of the words by safety
11:26 and biosecurity however my safety and by
11:29 security principles apply to situations
11:32 outside the laboratory as well such as
11:35 field work or in the transport of
11:37 biological materials the term
11:44 biosecurity has multiple meanings
11:46 definitions and this can lead to
11:48 confusion among participants to make
11:51 sure everyone is on the same page it is
11:53 important for us to clear about which
11:56 meaning of biosecurity world we are
11:58 referring to in this webinar the
12:00 definition was list this definition was
12:03 lifted from the 2006 edition of the WH
12:06 overlap by biosecurity guidance and it
12:10 states protection control and
12:13 accountability for valuable biological
12:16 materials within laboratories in order
12:18 to prevent their unauthorized access
12:20 loss theft misused diversion or
12:24 intentional release here is the official
12:30 wh-wha publications showing the
12:32 evolution of the first edition in 1983 I
12:37 have not seen the hard copies of the
12:40 1983 and 1993 editions the very the very
12:44 first edition I got my hands on was the
12:47 Towson free edition i witnessed its
12:49 evolution and improvement since then the
12:53 2004 edition was used for a very long
12:56 time until the 4th edition came out in
13:00 2009
13:04 and laboratory biosecurity as defined in
13:08 the fourth edition refers to
13:10 institutional and personal personnel
13:13 security measures designed to prevent
13:16 the loss safe is use diversion or
13:20 intentional release of biological agents
13:22 being handled in the laboratory a little
13:28 thoughts about laboratory biosecurity as
13:31 being emphasized in the fourth edition
13:34 addressing laboratory by City theories
13:37 in many ways parallels and complements
13:39 that of by safety risk management
13:42 effective by safety practices start a
13:45 foundation of laboratory biosecurity and
13:49 biosecurity risk mitigation must be
13:52 performed as an integral part of an
13:55 institution's by safety program
13:57 management there are many challenges and
14:02 Kavya - Kavya associated with
14:05 implementing by security policies and
14:08 procedures for example many biological
14:11 agents against which protection is
14:14 needed can be found in the National
14:16 Environment an in addition biological
14:20 agents of interest may only be used in
14:22 very small quantities or may be capable
14:28 of self-replicating making them
14:30 difficult to detect or 25 in some cases
14:34 the process of quantification may itself
14:36 posts by safety and by seeking risks
14:43 furthermore while there is potential for
14:46 malicious use of this biological agent
14:49 the use is valuable for many legitimate
14:52 and benign benign diagnostic commercial
14:55 medical and research applications for
14:59 this reason it is essential to properly
15:02 assess potential biosecurity risk and
15:05 establish appropriate mitigation
15:07 measures that can reduce is without
15:10 hindering scientific processes and
15:12 progress these measures should comply
15:16 with with nano standards and regulatory
15:18 procedures can be proportionate to the
15:21 assess risks to achieve this an approach
15:27 stimulated to the biosafety risk
15:29 assessment framework should be
15:31 undertaken with specific focus on
15:34 biosecurity to identify whether an
15:37 institution mylord possesses biological
15:40 agents that may be attractive to those
15:43 who may wish to use them maliciously the
15:46 depth of this biosecurity risk
15:48 assessment should be proportionate to
15:50 the identified risk for most
15:53 laboratories biosecurity risk assessment
15:55 can often be combined with a bi safety
15:58 risk management rather than being a
16:01 standalone activity as with biosafety
16:05 the biosecurity risk process also
16:08 includes the development of strategy to
16:11 manage the biosecurity risk by selecting
16:15 and implementing biosecurity mitigation
16:17 measures a laboratory biosecurity
16:20 program is required to prepare implement
16:23 oversee and review these processes
16:26 according to the requirements of the
16:27 facility in many cases this can be
16:31 combined with by safety program
16:32 management although it may need to be a
16:35 standalone program where the bicipital
16:38 risks identified are severe and/or in
16:41 numerous I know you will recognize this
16:47 figure it was the one we started using
16:49 way back in 2006 so for a short review
16:53 physical security
16:55 into access control intrusion detection
16:57 alarm assessment response and then you
17:00 have personal security background checks
17:03 periodic investigations which has
17:05 already evolved into something higher
17:07 now pathogen security or otherwise known
17:11 as material control and accountability
17:14 focusing on detailed inventory internal
17:17 external transfer and inactivation and
17:19 disposal records of pathogens and of
17:22 course transport security and forever
17:26 three-way packaging system knowing from
17:29 where how and where will it be
17:31 transported no having a knowledgeable
17:34 eye at a person certified personnel on
17:37 board always an information security
17:39 which deals with confidentiality
17:42 integrity and availability of
17:45 information in also passwords and
17:47 backups so this was the these were the
17:50 elements of by security way back in 2006
17:53 when I started lecturing with permit and
17:57 other associations in 2014
18:04 after after attending a conference in
18:08 Europe I came home with this information
18:12 of having eight pillars of biosecurity
18:14 already which I cascaded right we a day
18:17 after I arrived I think that was in
18:19 permit Bulacan chapter so we see the
18:24 five pillars as described earlier and
18:25 additional three pillars our
18:28 organization management awareness in bio
18:32 preparedness attestation management is
18:34 simply ensuring management in
18:36 administration that they fully support
18:38 the biosafety and biosecurity program of
18:40 the institution by institutionalizing
18:43 the program and finding resources for
18:46 its program implementation and
18:47 activities awareness sorry
18:51 awareness is simply making sure that the
18:53 by safe in biosecurity program policies
18:55 with cascaded to the entire institution
18:57 from top to bottom and from left to
19:00 right by your preparedness and incident
19:02 management is preparing the laboratory
19:05 against any form of lab activity
19:07 disruption and now to respond to the
19:10 disruption of the recovering back after
19:12 the disruption is resolved which was us
19:16 which was termed resiliency in the new
19:24 whu-oh laboratory by safety manual of
19:28 2019 we have eight new pillars in the
19:34 addition to the lab base as weh-weh show
19:37 has made big changes in this edition
19:40 where from the regional five elements
19:43 inventory control let me get that out
19:48 from the initial five elements inventory
19:52 control information control personnel
19:54 control physical sensitivity control
19:57 transport control and the last is
20:01 emergency incident response plan as I
20:06 say
20:07 w-h-o made changes were from the
20:09 original five elements the one the one
20:11 element from the 2014 list which was my
20:14 preparedness they have added two new
20:17 pillars which are dual use research of
20:21 concern and emerging by technology these
20:24 two additions will be the topic of our
20:27 next two speakers thank you very much
20:30 for your attention
20:31 these are my references in the case you
20:33 would like to read on we thank you so
20:55 much dr. Martin thank you
21:00 for those who have questions you can
21:02 place it in the chat box we will have
21:04 the open forum after all the speakers
21:06 have delivered your thoughts so we will
21:09 proceed with our next talk on dual use
21:11 research and dual use research of
21:13 concern our next speaker is working as
21:16 technical adviser at health security
21:18 partners where she provides coordination
21:21 and technical support to a chess piece
21:24 health security programs in Pakistan
21:26 she has five if ba certifications and is
21:30 serving as an if but global mentor she
21:33 has also worked as a SME an ambassador
21:35 to Pakistan in 2013 to 2016 and a chess
21:42 Speas hell secure the future fellow in
21:46 2015 she has been providing by a risk
21:49 management critter national
21:50 organizations please help me welcome dr.
21:53 submarines our what sir war hello and
22:02 one good evening and I am very thankful
22:05 to be rep and permit for the invitation
22:09 to discuss tea you are see today and in
22:12 2015 I assess the level of awareness and
22:15 attitudes of researchers in Pakistan
22:18 towards still use research of concern
22:20 through a survey and published my
22:22 findings since then I have been truing
22:25 training on dual use research of concern
22:27 and updating my knowledge on it so I
22:30 know that this topic might be new to
22:33 majority of you so I welcome your
22:36 questions and I'll try to answer your
22:38 questions as many questions as possible
22:40 in this lecture or maybe or maybe you
22:44 can I will be able to answer your
22:47 questions to email after this lecture as
22:49 well so let's discuss why you need to
22:54 know about the URC and what actually
22:56 means by the term DRC so I'm sharing my
23:00 screen
23:17 I'm turning off my video so that you can
23:21 there's no internet reception okay so
23:27 what is dual use research of concern
23:29 this is very important for all of us to
23:32 know what does this mean because this is
23:35 a new concept and it came in early
23:38 twenty thousand twenty twenty thousand
23:41 but this concept is still new among many
23:44 of us and we need to understand this why
23:47 it is important and why it is relevant
23:50 to all of us in 2001 there was a group
23:55 of researchers who manufacture who
23:59 constructed like they made a polio virus
24:02 using the nucleotide sequences which are
24:04 present and databases on the Internet
24:06 and what they did they took the sequence
24:10 from the database and they synthesized a
24:13 polio virus from scratch in their lab
24:15 they synthesized that polio virus from
24:18 chemically synthesized oligonucleotides
24:21 and when they published these findings
24:23 in 2002 this sparked a huge debate in
24:26 the scientific community that why this
24:28 experiment was needed at its first place
24:31 what was the need to manufacture a polio
24:34 virus in the lab because possibly this
24:38 could be a recipe or you can say this
24:41 could be an idea for people with bad
24:43 intentions that similarly like polio
24:45 virus many other viruses can also be
24:47 synthesized in the lab and these viruses
24:50 could be very good candidates for
24:54 biological weapons so this was very
24:57 important to understand that what were
25:00 are the dual use consequences of this
25:03 research the researchers who did this
25:05 research they defended themselves by the
25:07 same that we want to test the
25:09 possibility that is is it possible to
25:12 construct a virus in lab but and they
25:16 also defended themselves by saying that
25:18 if this virus polio virus is present all
25:21 around the world then why why they will
25:27 feel the need to synthesize it in lab so
25:29 this this doesn't
25:30 make sense so but this sparked a huge
25:34 debate in the scientific community later
25:36 on in 2005 there was a research in which
25:40 they constructed the influenza virus
25:42 Spanish flu you many of you might know
25:46 that Spanish flu came in 1918 and this
25:48 pandemic stayed in the world from 1917
25:51 to 1920 and 50 million people died in
25:55 this pandemic which is 3 percent of the
25:58 world's population at that time so they
26:00 reconstructed that virus in their lab
26:03 and this reconstruction again got many
26:07 questions on it that why it was
26:09 important to construct this deadly virus
26:12 in lab so the researchers had said that
26:16 if we will not prepare if will not study
26:18 this virus we will not be able to make
26:20 countermeasures will not be able to make
26:22 vaccines will not prepare ourselves for
26:24 future similar pandemics that's why it
26:27 is important to construct this virus in
26:29 lab and to study it to explore the
26:32 pandemic potential of this virus so you
26:34 see that biological research there are
26:36 both a peaceful can also be used for
26:40 peaceful purposes and there are some
26:43 harmful this can also be used for
26:46 harmful uses as well so what comes in to
26:48 harmful use it can be used by bio
26:50 terrorists or other people who have bad
26:54 intentions they can be used as bio
26:56 weapons and what are the peaceful
26:58 purposes they can be used in
26:59 pharmaceuticals vaccines and diagnostics
27:01 now this is the dual use component of
27:04 biological research early on it was
27:07 there was a concept that dual use is
27:10 only dual use research is a limited
27:13 group of research projects now with the
27:16 passage of time people have and the
27:19 scientific community has started
27:20 thinking that dual use research is not
27:23 only a limited role number of research
27:26 products are not only dual use research
27:28 possibly all biological research all
27:31 biological research can at least
27:33 theoretically be dual use because for
27:36 example if you are doing the research
27:38 who are studying just the pathogenicity
27:39 of the virus or you are just studying
27:43 whether
27:44 it is resistant to certain antibiotics
27:46 or not these simple pieces of
27:47 information when they combine that could
27:50 generate an information which can be
27:52 used with by people with bad intentions
27:53 so now we can say that every research is
27:58 possibly dual-use and this is why it is
28:02 important for all of us to know about
28:05 how we should be looking at our research
28:09 projects how should we have a security
28:11 mindset to look at our risk projects and
28:14 ourself decide what are the benefits of
28:16 this research and how my research can be
28:19 misused by someone else okay so in this
28:23 lecture we'll see how to identify which
28:26 research is dual use research of concern
28:28 and once we identify that this
28:33 particular research project is D u RC
28:35 which is B you would use research of
28:37 concern what will we do about it well
28:40 how will we assess and how we will
28:41 manage the risks which are associated
28:43 with it in so let's start with the
28:47 controversy which again came up in 2011
28:49 that too many scripts were submitted to
28:51 nature and science and these too many
28:53 scripts in these too many scripts there
28:56 was successful synthesis of a more
28:58 deadly variant of highly pathogenic
28:59 influenza and what was the most worrying
29:03 thing about it was that this influenza
29:06 had 60 percent mortality rate so you can
29:09 see that Spanish flu has only 2.5
29:11 percent mortality rate but this avian
29:14 influenza had 60 percent mortality rate
29:16 and this was also able to transmit
29:20 between mammals to air route airborne
29:22 route and this sparked a huge debate and
29:26 nature in size recognized the dual use
29:29 potential of this research and they said
29:31 why it is important to do this research
29:33 why you feel the need to make a more
29:35 deadly variant of highly pathogenic
29:37 avian influenza so the scientists said
29:40 that we want to see what is possible
29:45 what is possible rather than just sit
29:48 and wait how niche natural mutations or
29:51 natural mutations which are occurring
29:52 they can possibly generate a more
29:55 avian influenza strain which can spark a
29:57 global catastrophic
29:58 so this is how the scientists justified
30:01 this so you can see that since both how
30:06 early 2000 2001 there have been a lot of
30:09 research projects which were which came
30:11 up which has dual use potential but how
30:14 we will distinguish between dual use
30:17 research and dual use research of
30:19 concern so dual use research is simply a
30:22 research project any research project
30:24 which have which is done by a researcher
30:28 for good purposes for beneficial
30:30 purposes but there can be some risks
30:33 associated with it not by safety risk
30:36 there are risk that it can be used by
30:39 someone else by someone else not by the
30:41 researcher who is doing this research by
30:43 someone else using the information using
30:46 the project of that research using the
30:48 technology which is being generated as a
30:49 result of that research he can misuse
30:52 this information this prod product and
30:55 this technology so they're both uses
30:57 there are peaceful uses and there are
30:59 harmful uses of of one research but when
31:03 we will call this research as dual use
31:05 research of concern there are two main
31:08 points on it so how wh showed the
31:10 financed it so it's it's important that
31:12 you understand the basic concept that
31:14 what is dual use research the biological
31:17 research which can have both peaceful
31:19 purposes and which can be used for bad
31:22 purposes as well but how we will define
31:25 dual use research of concern this is
31:28 research biblia Cho defines is that is
31:30 intended for benefit like the researcher
31:33 is doing it for benefit but it can be
31:37 easily miss applied to do harm okay so
31:40 let's see how NSABB defines this
31:45 research there are two important points
31:47 one is the scope and second one is how
31:51 immediately is can be Mis applied so
31:53 whenever we designate a research as dual
31:56 use research of concern so that word
31:59 concern is important because it means
32:02 that it has a huge scope of broad
32:06 potential consequences or
32:09 threat to public health and safety group
32:10 to crops to plants to animals to
32:13 material to environment so it means what
32:16 is the score it should be has
32:18 significant threat to public health and
32:20 safety and it should be immediately
32:22 misapplied you should be able to move
32:24 immediately miss supplied okay so when
32:27 we see at the definition of the you are
32:29 see any research project which can be
32:32 easily miss applied immediately miss
32:35 applied in as a broad significant threat
32:38 to public health means its scope of
32:40 destruction is very high then we will
32:43 call if SD you are see okay so this is
32:46 the difference between D u R and D you
32:48 are see when when the word concerns
32:50 attach with it it means it has a huge
32:52 scope of catastrophic destruction and it
32:57 can be immediately miss applied you do
32:59 not need a lot of information a lot of
33:02 support in terms of like all the
33:04 information is readily available in this
33:06 research project that it can be upon me
33:08 supplied to to do harm for example if we
33:11 take the first example in our first
33:13 example we saw that they make a highly
33:15 pathogenic avian influenza virus strain
33:18 if that strain is released into the
33:20 environment it can immediately call
33:23 cause major public health it can
33:27 threaten Public Health and Safety can
33:28 cause a lot of deaths immediately okay
33:31 and it's scored because deaths is very
33:33 high that's why we can designate that
33:35 research as dual use research of concern
33:38 so when the experiments there were
33:41 controversial experiments when they
33:43 start coming up in 2001 and then two and
33:46 then three national research council in
33:49 us they made a committee which was
33:54 chaired by Fink okay
33:55 so they made a committee in 2004 and
33:58 they all the scientists came together
34:01 they sit together and this this thought
34:05 that we should do something about it
34:07 before this these research projects are
34:11 being published openly and every anyone
34:13 can access this information and can use
34:15 it for bad purposes so these were a few
34:18 there
34:19 made like they make a sync report and
34:23 the name of this Fink report is
34:25 biotechnology in an age of terrorism
34:27 confronting the dual use dilemma so they
34:31 made this report which is called as Fink
34:33 report and what were the recommendations
34:34 of this roofing report they said that we
34:38 should educate the scientific
34:40 community's national and international
34:42 organizations they should educate
34:45 researchers about dual use research of
34:48 concern because ultimately the
34:50 researcher is the one who knows his
34:52 research the best the researcher is the
34:55 one who decides to do this particular
34:57 project and it is very important to
35:00 educate that scientists if that
35:02 scientists is able to identify the URC
35:05 he will be able to report he'll be able
35:08 to take proper mitigation for my years
35:10 from the very start
35:11 it's very important to educate
35:13 scientific community it's very important
35:15 to educate the other stakeholders okay
35:18 then the second point is review of plans
35:21 for experiments so what does this mean
35:24 that for example IR EVG institutional
35:27 review entity or it can be make part of
35:30 institutional biosafety committee
35:32 whenever the research project comes to
35:34 IBC for approval they should have D you
35:37 are C experts on board who can evaluate
35:40 that research project whether it has any
35:42 dual use potential or not and if there
35:45 any any D you are see potential comes up
35:47 they should address it they should ask
35:49 researchers to take proper mitigation
35:51 measures or modify in their research
35:53 then publications take stage review
35:56 tells us that the journals which which
35:58 review the articles and which publish
36:00 the articles they should have a DRC they
36:04 should review it from the DRC
36:05 perspective okay so if for example in
36:08 our earlier example we saw that in
36:11 nature and science bathe themselves
36:12 reported they came up that this research
36:15 has to lose potential and it should be
36:17 taken care of okay so this is very
36:19 important that the journals should have
36:21 proper people who have the expertise in
36:26 to you RC and they should evaluate
36:27 research projects on the URC grounds
36:30 then they feel the need of create
36:32 our National Science Advisory Board for
36:34 biosecurity who can provide advice or do
36:37 one use research both government and for
36:39 the researchers in addition to this
36:41 there should be improved communication
36:45 between law enforcement and life science
36:46 organizations because ultimately if you
36:48 are going to report something you'll
36:50 have to both of these stakeholders you
36:52 understand each other so otherwise it
36:54 will not be able to properly highlight
36:57 these problems and report these problems
36:59 six point was that so for example a
37:02 researcher made a very highly package
37:04 anak infinite avian influenza virus in
37:07 their lab and but not intentionally but
37:10 unintentionally this virus was if it is
37:12 released into the environment it can
37:14 cause similar damage of broad potential
37:18 consequences that is why it is also
37:20 important to have proper physical
37:22 containment and it should they should
37:24 sort out the biosecurity and personal
37:26 issues and then there should be
37:28 international oversight because these
37:31 research because the publication goes
37:33 everywhere anyone from around the world
37:37 can access this publication it means
37:39 they will they can use this information
37:40 if there is no coordination in among
37:43 international internationally then it
37:46 will not work there should be consensus
37:48 there should be international
37:51 internationally - to be consensus
37:52 between countries on how to regulate and
37:55 how to do proper oversight of this kind
37:58 of research okay so now we will discuss
38:00 what are the seven categories of
38:02 experiments so NSABB which i told you
38:05 that they created a National Science
38:07 Advisory Board for biosecurity they said
38:12 that what we can do we can identify
38:15 could some categories of experiments
38:18 which has high potential that take fall
38:21 under bu RC they have high potential
38:23 that they can fall and do you RC so they
38:26 identified seven categories these seven
38:29 categories for example if you are
38:31 enhancing the harmful consequences of a
38:34 biological agent for example you are
38:35 making it more virulent you are making
38:38 it more like able to infect people with
38:42 more virulent and
38:44 it has more consequences of reinfection
38:47 or disrupting immunity for example you
38:50 can meet you make a virus which is
38:54 against which the vaccination which is
38:56 already in place will not work against
38:59 this virus ok confer a resistant for
39:02 example if you have for example
39:04 doxycycline for Vibrio the making
39:08 strains which are resistant to
39:09 antibiotics or therapeutic interventions
39:12 which are already in place or you are
39:14 increasing their stability in the
39:16 environment you are increasing this
39:18 transmissibility for any reason for
39:20 example there was experiment on cluster
39:22 Clostridium botulinum and the purpose of
39:25 that experiment was to make more
39:27 resistant spores of Clostridium
39:29 botulinum and the reason behind that was
39:31 that these spores will not be able to
39:34 study these spores in detail if you will
39:37 not make it more stable so that's why
39:39 they made their spores more stable but
39:42 that was not for any bad intentions that
39:45 for that were that experiment was for
39:48 good but but ultimately you are giving a
39:51 recipe on how to make cost freedom what
39:54 L&M spores more stable so this is that
39:57 is why it comes under the you are see
39:58 because you are increasing the stability
40:00 increasing the transmissibility oh you
40:03 want to alter the host range like for
40:06 earlier on it was not able to infect
40:09 Birds now it is able to infect Birds for
40:11 everyone it was not able to infect
40:12 mammals now it is able to infect mammals
40:15 or you increase the susceptibility of
40:17 the host population like for example you
40:20 enter a gene into a virus that whenever
40:22 they enter into the body the immune
40:24 system will not work as a result of this
40:26 gene okay or you are generating a normal
40:29 pack version or weakens constituting an
40:32 extent biological agents these
40:34 categories all seven categories of
40:36 experiments they come under they can
40:38 come under the you are see they don't
40:40 come under you a cynic can come under
40:42 the you are so you will have to do
40:43 assessment and will see whether they can
40:45 come in the you are see or not okay so
40:47 these are experiments of concerns
40:49 whenever these experiment at your
40:51 research falls under these categories
40:53 the your research will need
40:56 identification whether this
40:57 for this is purC or north and then it
41:00 will require more concern more vigilance
41:03 and more oversight and then they are a
41:06 select agent these select agents are
41:08 because they are very weak us the name
41:13 us name of these agents is select agents
41:16 they are also called as security
41:18 sensitive biological agents they are
41:20 also called tires tire 1 type 2 agents
41:23 or specially dangerous pathogens there
41:24 are different names for these sorts of a
41:27 sort of agents in different countries
41:28 why these agents are important because
41:31 they have higher potential to be misused
41:33 in as a biological weapon because they
41:37 have like all the properties which a
41:41 biological weapon should have ok so now
41:44 after knowing the 7 categories of
41:47 experiments and after knowing the Select
41:49 agents now we will see how will we
41:51 identify that our research is do you RC
41:53 or not it doesn't mean that your we
41:56 experiment falls under 7 categories that
41:59 it is diverse it doesn't mean that it is
42:01 do you are see if your experiment falls
42:03 under 7 categories if you are working on
42:05 a select agent it doesn't mean that your
42:08 experiment is do you RC to be called as
42:11 bu RC or to be designated as d you are
42:15 see did that particular research project
42:17 should fit into the definition of the
42:19 you are see if it doesn't fit into the
42:22 definition of B you are see whether it
42:24 is one of the seven categories of
42:25 experiments whether it is select agent
42:27 it will not be called Rd you are C okay
42:30 so for to coop to be called as d you are
42:33 C it should fit into the definition of
42:35 you do you are C okay and there is there
42:38 is an other case as well sometimes you
42:40 are doing research which doesn't fall
42:42 under these seven categories you are not
42:44 working on select agents but still that
42:46 research has the potential to be called
42:50 as the you are see for example in early
42:54 2001 - there was experiments in which
42:57 they were making a device which
42:59 transmitted aerosols stood too deep into
43:02 the lungs so they've made it for
43:04 estimate agents to deliver drug deep
43:06 into the lungs but they came up at the
43:09 same device can be used
43:11 for the spread of pathogen as well so it
43:14 doesn't come under seven categories it
43:16 doesn't involve a select agent but it
43:18 fits into the definition of do you RC
43:20 that's why it could be called as the you
43:22 RC okay so once you designate that your
43:25 research is to RC and I only have
43:27 mentioned that to be called as the you
43:29 RC you should have the that particular
43:32 research project should have the scope
43:35 of broad potential consequences or
43:39 significant threat to public health and
43:41 safety and the second thing was it
43:44 should be immediately miss appliable
43:46 okay so it should should should be
43:49 immediacy so what are the two main
43:51 things
43:51 it is the scope and immediacy scope and
43:54 immediacy so to be called as this if it
43:58 has the scope and it can be immediately
44:00 we supply it it will fit into the
44:02 definition of purC okay now what you
44:05 will do about the you are see if you
44:07 have identified that your research
44:09 project is to you who are see it doesn't
44:12 mean that research should be prohibited
44:13 or should not be published okay
44:16 what you do is that if you because we
44:21 cannot hinder scientific progress we
44:23 cannot sign scientific progress just
44:26 because of a small chance that
44:29 bioterrorism or terrorists can use this
44:31 information to make something very
44:34 dangerous for Public Health and Safety
44:36 whatever doe will apply proper
44:38 mitigation meyers why we want to
44:40 identify the Urca at the first place
44:43 that will be able to apply mitigation
44:46 Myers we will be able to see how it
44:49 should be communicated and if there is
44:52 no benefits associated with this
44:56 research what we will do we will
44:58 discontinue you know the research but
45:01 this will be the last option
45:03 do you RC designation doesn't mean that
45:06 you stop research do you just what you
45:08 do you do risk and benefit assessment so
45:12 this is the question that should
45:13 scientist stop the research one it once
45:15 it is designated as to you RC no
45:18 scientist should not stop the research
45:20 they should evaluate it they should see
45:23 what
45:24 are the risks associated with this
45:27 research they should see what are the
45:29 benefits which are associated with this
45:31 PCH for example what are the mix for
45:34 example biosecurity risks they are
45:36 biosafety risks there are risks which
45:39 are associated with communication it can
45:42 cause public public threat like it can
45:46 cause a panic panic in the public it can
45:49 shatter public confidence so these are
45:51 all associated risks it can be used for
45:53 bioterrorism these are the risks which
45:55 are associated with DQ RC but what are
45:57 the benefits the same research can be
45:59 used to make for example as I earlier
46:02 mentioned that to make us for more
46:04 stable so if you make us for more stable
46:07 you able to study it ok so what are the
46:10 benefits it will progress science it
46:13 will what are the benefits it might be
46:15 used the information which is which will
46:16 be generated as a result of this
46:18 research it will be used for therapeutic
46:20 purposes for vaccination for other
46:23 beneficial purposes ok so then comes the
46:26 question that after a careful
46:28 risk-benefit assessment that once a
46:30 research is designated as d you are see
46:33 you assess the risks you assess the
46:36 benefits then you weigh them if the
46:39 benefits are more than the risk what you
46:42 do you will focus on the risks apply
46:45 proper mitigation measures and you will
46:46 try to bring this risk under acceptable
46:49 range okay and you will continue your
46:51 research you will do continuous
46:54 monitoring of your research you will
46:56 plan out accordingly
46:58 you will apply apply proper mitigation
47:00 measures and you will see what how will
47:02 I communicate this research what should
47:05 be my communication plan but sometimes
47:07 it happens for example in certain
47:09 research projects the risks are more
47:11 than the benefits the benefits are very
47:13 few but the risks are very high the work
47:17 what will you do you will either modify
47:21 it a bit if you are not able to control
47:23 the risks with proper mitigation
47:25 measures you will try to control or
47:28 modify your research and if it is not
47:31 possible to modify your wrist your risk
47:34 and still the risks are very high
47:37 you may consider the continuing it okay
47:40 this is the last option that UD
47:42 continued but initially you think what
47:46 mitigation mayor's can be applied what
47:49 control my years you can need to be in
47:51 place how you will continuously monitor
47:53 it and how will you plan communication
47:55 okay now you have risk and benefit you
47:58 have identified the you are C you have
48:00 done risk and benefit assessment and
48:02 then you see that the benefits outweigh
48:05 the risk benefits are more and the risks
48:07 are less then you will see that how you
48:11 can move forward for example the
48:13 benefits are prediction of pandemics
48:16 like we see that they made a more
48:19 virulent strain of avian influenza so
48:21 this was important to have for to
48:24 prepare for the worst-case scenarios or
48:26 to see what is the pandemic potential of
48:28 this virus or you want to understand
48:31 host-pathogen interactions or you can
48:34 want to make effective counter my years
48:36 oh this is very important that there is
48:40 this is this is there is one school of
48:43 thought the things that when the
48:45 research is funded with public money
48:47 public has the right to know about it so
48:50 the renter was the research about the
48:52 highly avian avian pathogenic avian
48:55 influenza virus was under review in
48:58 nature and science journals they said
49:01 that we will publish it
49:03 after omitting critical information like
49:05 critical information which can be
49:07 misused like material and methods but
49:10 later on there was a huge opposition
49:14 against this the scientific one
49:16 one group of scientists do you think
49:18 that how you can like redact some
49:22 information who gave you the right to
49:25 like like hinder a published publishing
49:30 full manuscript so later on they took
49:34 their decision back and they allowed
49:36 full publication because the scientists
49:38 think that if you'll not publish
49:39 complete results the other scientific
49:42 groups cannot challenge that research
49:43 they cannot do it they cannot see
49:45 whether it was actually the case or not
49:48 okay and the risks are for example
49:51 they can be accidental exposure or
49:53 release through rigorous biosafety and
49:55 biosecurity project it procedures it can
49:58 provide a recipe for bioterrorist it can
50:00 provide unnecessary experiments that do
50:02 not have a health or societal benefit it
50:05 can create a normal pathogen so when we
50:07 see it in the context of cobalt 19
50:09 during this pandemic we can foresee
50:12 there this pathogen which if it is which
50:16 it is if it is stored without proper
50:19 biosecurity in my earth these pathogens
50:22 can be acquired by research groups and
50:25 these these research groups can do
50:27 certain types of research on this
50:29 packaging but if they don't know what
50:31 can be the implications of their
50:34 research whether there it is possible to
50:37 use this information some other groups
50:41 can use your information for bad
50:43 purposes so in Co it in this in the
50:45 context of Corbett 19 you need to
50:47 understand that whenever you are
50:49 starting your research you should
50:51 analyze the risks and benefits
50:53 associated with it and if your benefits
50:56 are more than the risks then you should
50:58 properly address these risks in your
51:01 publication and you should publish it
51:03 accordingly okay so it's very important
51:05 that whenever you are going to do any
51:06 research analyze it from this
51:08 perspective that why it is important so
51:12 it is very important to have a security
51:14 mindset okay so how you will communicate
51:17 it so communication is very important it
51:19 in this it is one of the mitigation
51:21 measures so what are you going to
51:24 publish it fully for example you are
51:26 going to include material and methods or
51:28 you want to omit material and methods
51:30 what should be the timing you want to
51:32 publish it immediately or you want to
51:34 publish it later on for example you are
51:36 working on a pathogen whose vaccine is
51:38 not available until yet publishing it
51:42 like publishing this particular package
51:45 and a more virulent strain of this
51:46 pathogen can be more disastrous at this
51:49 point but later on when it's vaccine is
51:52 already available then the risk
51:55 associated with research automatically
51:57 goes down so timing is also very
51:59 important and extent of distribution is
52:01 that up to how how like which people
52:05 want to access your research you want to
52:07 do it open open access completely any
52:10 any person around the world can see the
52:13 content all you want to to access your
52:18 research by certain groups who are
52:20 working doing the relevant research only
52:21 and who applied through proper channel
52:24 to get access so this is responsible
52:26 communication okay so this is basically
52:28 do you RC in in the end I will like to
52:32 mention a very key important points that
52:36 the seven categories of experiments if
52:39 your research falls under seven
52:41 categories of experiments okay
52:44 it cannot be do you RC there is a
52:46 possibility that it is the you RC or not
52:48 but if your research falls under these
52:51 seven categories of experiment it
52:53 requires more oversight it requires more
52:56 vigilance it requires more concern okay
53:00 but there are research projects so it
53:02 doesn't fall under these seven
53:04 categories of experiment they are but
53:05 they still are D you are see right now
53:08 why it is naked because now it is
53:11 considered that almost all research
53:13 projects should be should be analyzed
53:16 from the from the very first stage when
53:19 students are designing their projects
53:21 this test we should build a security
53:23 mindset in these students okay the first
53:27 like researchers think that whatever
53:29 they are doing they are doing it for
53:30 good but they don't think that what can
53:33 be the misapplications of my research
53:34 this security bringing a security
53:37 mindset among this these researchers it
53:39 was very important so they are able to
53:42 analyze their research from that point
53:45 and they continuously versus revisit
53:47 their research because they are the most
53:49 responsible in this in this term because
53:51 they are the one who knows they research
53:54 the best ok so this is very important
53:57 that he would build a security mindset
53:59 in our researchers from the very early
54:03 carrier in their in in research ok so
54:08 thank you very much and well maybe we'll
54:13 address questions in time
54:22 thank you very much dr. Sam ring okay
54:30 thank you very much dr. Sami that was a
54:33 very comprehensive discussion on dual
54:37 use research of concern so you can still
54:40 post your questions for dr. serene and
54:42 dr. Marten in the chat box or in the
54:45 link that was provided earlier in the
54:47 session so we will now go straight to
54:50 our last top
54:54 Oh which will be on biosecurity 2020
55:00 ensuring biosecurity Freaker serves as a
55:03 director of scientific programs as
55:04 health security partners or HSV which is
55:07 a nonprofit organization based in
55:09 Washington DC and indicated the building
55:12 local capacity for health security
55:14 globally his training is in molecular
55:17 biology and biochemistry and he holds a
55:20 PhD from John Hopkins University after
55:24 conducting best research for a few years
55:26 our speaker dr. Prasad moved to the
55:29 field of global health security working
55:33 through a number of nonprofit
55:34 organization to strengthen laboratory
55:36 and health security capacity he has been
55:39 supporting partnership to prevent the
55:42 attack and respond to emerging BIOS
55:44 biological threats in the Philippines
55:46 and across the Seon region dr. Prasad
55:49 and H SP has been a partner of Europe
55:51 since the very big
55:55 evening and were working on multiple
55:58 efforts and strengthened by security
56:00 systems in the Philippines with that we
56:03 welcome dr. Prasad kuta bali thank you
56:09 for that wonderful introduction and I
56:12 would I would like to say thank you also
56:16 to dr. Martin and the be Rapp committee
56:19 for inviting me to share my thoughts on
56:23 emerging technologies and biosecurity
56:26 let me share my screen and then we can
56:30 get started
56:36 you
56:43 you
56:46 okay I think both the talks given by dr.
56:51 Martin and by submarine were perfect
56:56 introductions to the topic and this is
56:59 just going to be a continuation
57:01 I think dr. Martin covered the basic
57:05 elements of biosecurity really well and
57:07 then submarine focused on dual use
57:12 research of concern and this is going to
57:15 continue on research but research using
57:18 new technologies that are coming out and
57:21 how they affect our perception of
57:25 biosecurity and what methodologies we
57:28 have to reduce the risk from these
57:32 technologies so I will start by telling
57:38 you what these emerging technologies are
57:40 and how they work and I should tell you
57:43 that I am NOT an expert in these
57:45 emerging technologies my focus area is
57:47 on the biosecurity threats from these
57:51 emerging technologies so are I - I'm
57:54 learning as I go
57:56 every every week there are new
57:59 publications there are new discoveries
58:03 in this field and then you you know
58:06 people like me who bleed it often think
58:09 wow we have not thought about that that
58:12 that poses a significant risk what do we
58:15 do about it
58:16 but then these emerging technologies are
58:19 superbly exciting because they have the
58:22 potential to grow the Bioeconomy they
58:25 can bring jobs they can provide
58:28 solutions to infectious disease problems
58:31 and as well as you know chronic disease
58:34 problems that we face so so there's a
58:39 lot of potential for growth and I'll
58:41 talk about that and then I'll talk about
58:43 the threats from these technologies and
58:45 then mechanisms for addressing the
58:48 threats and ensuring biosecurity
58:52 so there are there are many emerging
58:56 technologies today I will focus on
58:58 synthetic biology and I think some rain
59:01 started us off on that subject and then
59:04 I will talk about gene editing systems I
59:07 think a lot of you must have heard about
59:09 CRISPR casts and then gene drives and
59:13 there are and by the way these are not
59:15 the only emerging technologies there's
59:17 also artificial intelligence there is
59:21 UAVs lots of other technologies that are
59:24 coming up very rapidly that could pose
59:27 biosecurity risk
59:31 so basically synthetic biology brings
59:35 engineering and biology together to make
59:38 new tanks for new use and new
59:42 applications and people have often
59:45 called this the design and construction
59:47 of new parts devices and systems or the
59:50 redesign of existing biological systems
59:54 and this is a quick slide that I have to
59:59 acknowledge dr. G loon from National
60:03 University of Singapore who introduced
60:06 this topic to me and this was a this was
60:09 a great slide from him which compares
60:12 what engineering does when they build a
60:14 machine they start with the raw
60:15 materials and then they just design you
60:18 know resistors capacitors logic gates
60:20 circuits and then you have the machine
60:22 with with with an application and
60:26 similar there are similarly people in
60:30 synthetic biology are looking to do that
60:32 with the components of a cell we have
60:36 enough information now about nucleotides
60:39 basically we have sequence information
60:41 we have genome sequences for a large
60:45 number of genomes and we know how how
60:52 genes produce the produce proteins and
60:56 then proteins direct biochemical
60:58 reactions and then there are networks
61:00 and pathways that ultimately lead to
61:03 some kind of an output from the cell so
61:07 how do we how do we take these various
61:10 components and build something that will
61:13 be useful to us that's the basic goal of
61:17 synthetic biology and there are many
61:20 applications to synthetic biology
61:23 Submarine in her talk told you about how
61:27 they synthesized the poliovirus
61:30 starting from pieces of DNA in the lab
61:34 and then they gave also did that for the
61:37 1918 flu those are example of examples
61:42 of synthetic genomics where you start
61:44 we'll start from scratch and then you
61:46 build a DNA molecule and then you do
61:50 what what is called genome engineering
61:52 and and and others have also worked on
61:58 developing a basic cell a bacterial cell
62:02 for example that can be used for
62:04 synthetic biology there are of course
62:09 you know there are many applications
62:11 including cell factories where you use
62:15 the cell to produce drugs or you produce
62:17 chemicals that are of health useful use
62:20 commercial use you can also develop them
62:26 for genetic circuits so that you know
62:30 you can control what are the outputs of
62:33 the cell you can use it as biosensors
62:36 for detection work and I will talk to
62:40 you a little bit about that soon there
62:44 are many interesting applications
62:45 including covert 19 detection you can
62:50 use them as therapeutic cells
62:53 essentially you know gene delivery etc
62:56 where you are able to change the course
62:59 of a disease through engineering and of
63:03 course bio remediation which is of value
63:06 to in the environment so these are some
63:10 of the these are some of the
63:12 applications and this is why this is
63:14 such a huge big deal many countries
63:18 especially in the ASEAN region have
63:21 invested very heavily in synthetic
63:24 biology there are a lot of startup
63:26 companies that are working on these
63:28 kinds of solutions and there are there's
63:31 of course academic research that is
63:33 supporting these companies and and it's
63:37 estimated that the market will be
63:40 something like the more than 38 billion
63:43 this year
63:46 you
63:49 so we talked about
63:51 reconstituting viruses let me give you
63:54 one more example this is this happened a
63:57 few years ago a Canadian researchers
64:00 developed they basically built the horse
64:05 pox virus from scratch and they used
64:09 they did this they were at a university
64:12 but they did this in using private
64:17 funding so in many countries if you use
64:20 private funding then you don't have to
64:23 do the kind of oversight that sumreen
64:25 was talking about in under dual use
64:28 research of concern so really I mean the
64:32 first time that people heard about this
64:34 research was when it was ready for
64:37 publication it had already been done and
64:39 this was a great concern because you
64:41 know Horse Parks is closely related to
64:44 smallpox and by by doing this research
64:47 and pub wandering to publish it the the
64:50 researchers were basically providing a
64:52 blueprint for people for labs around the
64:56 world to be able to synthesize the
64:59 smallpox virus and I think all of us
65:02 know why that that is a high-risk
65:06 proposition so there there were many
65:10 concerns here including what's happening
65:12 with private funding that you know does
65:15 that is not reviewed by government
65:17 agencies for example if this was an NIH
65:20 National Institute of Health in the US
65:24 funded project then there would have
65:26 been oversight mechanisms there would
65:27 have been review etc but none of that
65:30 was required because this was private
65:32 funding and then the researchers
65:35 themselves they said well we want to do
65:37 this because we don't have access to
65:40 small parts it goes as you know smallpox
65:42 is only stored at the CDC in the US and
65:45 at the vector lab in Russia those are
65:48 the only two labs that are allowed to
65:49 have smallpox and so they said we don't
65:52 have access to that and therefore we
65:53 thought let's start here and come up
65:56 with new vaccines for smallpox that
65:59 would be helpful in case there is
66:02 misuse of smallpox unfortunately that
66:07 was not a good enough justification if
66:10 you again
66:11 some rain talked about risk benefit
66:15 analysis and really it if you go in and
66:18 look at that paper and you read the
66:20 commentary on it it's very difficult to
66:23 justify what was done but you know
66:27 currently there is nothing in place that
66:29 prevents something like this from being
66:33 these kinds of experiments from being
66:35 conducted um I get a lot of interesting
66:42 when I talk about this subject and I've
66:45 talked about it in many countries and I
66:47 get a lot of interesting reactions and
66:49 most of the reactions come from senior
66:52 researchers and senior members in
66:55 government who say who either say oh you
66:58 know this kind of research is not
67:00 happening in our country or they say we
67:04 don't think this research is valuable
67:06 for our country and so we will not allow
67:08 it
67:10 but the what we see is that there is
67:16 actually this synthetic biology is very
67:20 popular among the next generation of
67:24 scientists and there are many things
67:26 that are happening like the iGEM
67:28 competition which I have highlighted in
67:31 this slide the International genetically
67:33 engineered machine competition which
67:36 happens once a year and it is open to
67:38 undergraduates and graduate students
67:40 from around the world who can submit
67:43 ideas and then carry out the research
67:47 and then they go to the iGEM and present
67:49 their research and they can be and they
67:52 can win awards and and recognition and
67:56 so a lot of groups University groups are
68:00 very interested in this and this year
68:02 it's going to be at the end of October
68:05 and I assume you know of course it's
68:07 going to be a virtual one this one but
68:09 but these competitions are happening and
68:11 if you go and look at the iGEM website
68:15 you will see that there is participation
68:18 from all around the world so even though
68:22 you may not be involved in this research
68:24 in this kind of research or you don't
68:27 know anyone who is your students might
68:30 come up to you and say we want to
68:32 participate in item and we have an idea
68:34 for it and then you have to deal with us
68:38 in addition to item
68:40 there's also what is called DIY bio or
68:45 do-it-yourself biology and you can go to
68:47 these websites and check it out these
68:51 are groups of people citizen scientists
68:55 what we call and these are groups of
68:57 people who get together and they you
68:59 know do experiments in their garage or
69:02 in their they have a small set up and
69:04 and they do and they do biotechnology
69:08 related experiments and there's a very
69:12 popular one called the open insulin
69:14 project all over the US and abroad which
69:18 is focusing on how do we make insulin so
69:21 that you know we don't have to pay the
69:23 prices that are charged by their large
69:25 biotech companies I went and looked this
69:29 morning and there was a very interesting
69:30 group called Manila biopunk and they are
69:33 a do a DIY group in Manila to their
69:37 credit they are very security conscious
69:39 and safety conscious and they are very
69:42 open on their website and they say that
69:44 they do not work with pathogens but it's
69:47 interesting to see that you know as I as
69:50 I do talks in different parts of the
69:52 world and then I I look at the website
69:54 regularly to see what new groups there
69:57 are there are groups all over the all
69:59 over the world and this is actually
70:02 happening we may or may not know about
70:05 it and and the problem with something
70:08 like DIY biology is that it's very
70:11 difficult to regulate this and it's very
70:13 difficult even to educate these groups
70:16 etc because you have to provide first
70:18 you have to find them and then you have
70:20 to get to know them and get their
70:22 confidence only then can you do training
70:25 awareness building and some you know a X
70:29 some amount of regulatory control
70:36 gene-editing this is a very popular
70:40 topic and this everyone
70:43 I would assume has heard about CRISPR
70:45 castes and this is basically a system
70:49 that exists naturally in bacteria and it
70:52 helps the bacteria fight off infection
70:56 by bacteria phages and i have simplified
71:00 that here and basically it consists of a
71:03 protein that is called cass 9 and then
71:06 which you can see here in beige and then
71:10 there is a guide RNA or grna and using
71:16 these two components you can find any
71:18 location in the genome basically you can
71:21 recognize you can read DNA sequence and
71:24 you can find as the sequence that you
71:26 are looking for in the genome inside the
71:28 cell once you find it you can cut at a
71:33 particular location and then because the
71:36 cell will try to repair the cut and we
71:39 know how a repair works we can then add
71:42 a desired sequence that we want in place
71:45 of the cut and that is that you know in
71:50 a very simplified way is how gene
71:52 editing works so you have the ability to
71:54 find any sequence that you want in the
71:57 DNA you have the ability to cut that
72:00 sequence at a particular location and
72:02 then you are able to join it and insert
72:06 a sequence that you would like in in
72:09 that place so you can imagine you can if
72:12 there are mutations that are causing
72:14 disease you can repair it and so this is
72:20 why CRISPR technology is so exciting and
72:24 I will talk about applications in a
72:26 minute I have I have over here a link to
72:31 a TED talk by the person who discovered
72:34 Chris forecast Jennifer Doudna and it's
72:38 a great TED talk and I know that you
72:40 know for a lot of people
72:42 reading publications is not always top
72:45 of your list but listening to a TED talk
72:47 is is always interesting and engaging so
72:51 go check it out it's a great way to
72:54 learn how CRISPR works and what are some
72:56 of the concerns with CRISPR CRISPR kits
73:00 are available for sale from various
73:04 companies so you can buy that there are
73:06 also online resources for designing your
73:10 crisper so basically you have to design
73:12 that IDE RNA in such a way that it will
73:14 recognize the sequence in the genome
73:16 that you are looking for and then there
73:19 is also a DIY or Do It Yourself
73:21 bacterial gene engineering Chris pocket
73:24 that is available for people for people
73:27 who are enthusiastic about trying this
73:29 out and basically it goes in and makes a
73:32 mutation in the in the bacteria in
73:35 e.coli non-pathogenic that allows the
73:38 bacteria to grow on a different media
73:40 and so that way you have basically
73:43 changed the genome of the bacteria and
73:45 therefore you are getting growth on a
73:46 new media
73:48 [Music]
73:51 so here's one application there are many
73:55 diseases and I think people have made an
73:58 inventory of about a hundred diseases
74:00 that are the result of genetic mutations
74:03 and one is blindness and so again there
74:07 is now it's been FDA approved to do a
74:12 clinical trial for a for a gene delivery
74:15 a gene editing system that goes in and
74:18 changes the changes of mutation and
74:20 corrects it so that people are able to
74:23 see again
74:25 now that's a you know that's a great
74:27 example of the kind of applications that
74:29 gene editing provides kind of solutions
74:32 there's also a Co bit nineteen testing
74:37 diagnostic that has got the approval
74:40 from FDA and basically because you can
74:43 read the sequence you should be able to
74:45 recognize any virus or any bacteria or
74:48 other pathogens and so there are a lot
74:51 of diagnostic uses for Co for CRISPR
74:55 this gene editing technology is people
75:01 in plant in the field of Agriculture are
75:05 really really excited about it because
75:07 you have all kinds of applications where
75:11 you can make a disease resistant drought
75:13 resistant you know increased yield etc
75:16 of of basic foods grains and so from
75:23 that even commercial crops and from that
75:26 you know that will ensure food security
75:29 and that will ensure that we have the
75:31 best the best the best plants and see
75:35 it's available to to propagate and and
75:38 this has always been done by the plant
75:40 community they have always been looking
75:42 for better qualities of thryce a better
75:44 quality of maize etc but now they have a
75:48 tool that saves them time effort and
75:50 money livestock
75:55 Genet gene-editing is very big and it's
75:59 easier to do experiments and livestock
76:01 so now there are pigs that are resistant
76:03 to major diseases PEDV and PRRS and
76:08 these are again in the experimental
76:10 stages at this point but these pigs a
76:13 bit have been created and they are
76:16 resistant to the D to the disease
76:18 because the receptor which is used by
76:21 the virus has been modified in these
76:24 pigs in chicken this is not at the
76:28 animal stage yet this is in the lab
76:30 stage where they have modified one of
76:33 the proteins so that the so that the
76:35 cell can be resistant to influenza so
76:39 you can imagine in the livestock sector
76:41 this is huge if these kinds of animals
76:45 are allowed and they are found to be
76:48 safe this could change you know the
76:51 livestock sector forever but there are
76:53 concerns with these kinds of things when
76:55 you put pressure on the pathogen
77:00 remember the seven things that summary
77:03 in pointed out the seven areas of
77:05 concern for research one of those was
77:09 change of host range what if what if as
77:13 the result of this there are mutations
77:15 in the virus that alter the hostile host
77:18 range or that alter transmissibility
77:20 pathogenicity so those are the kinds of
77:24 concerns and questions that will have to
77:26 be asked before these kinds of things
77:28 are actually allowed in in mass
77:32 production for livestock and of course
77:37 we had the worst case scenario happen
77:40 when a Chinese scientist edited human
77:44 embryos and mutated the ccr5 gene which
77:48 helps to make people resistant to HIV
77:51 infection and and since then this of
77:56 course is a huge moral dilemma because
77:58 you can imagine all kinds of designer
78:00 babies you can also imagine all kinds of
78:03 design or applications for military
78:05 purposes etc that can be done if we go
78:08 down this
78:09 and therefore scientists all over the
78:12 world have called for a moratorium on
78:14 germline editing in humans then based on
78:21 gene editing there is something called a
78:24 gene drive now if you look at the left
78:26 side of this figure you will see that if
78:29 you use CRISPR and you change one copy
78:33 of the gene or one chrome one allele as
78:36 its labeled here then normally over
78:41 generations it takes the pattern of
78:44 normal inheritance and all of you have
78:47 studied this at some point or the other
78:48 in biology and genetics this is this is
78:53 normal inheritance where there's that's
78:58 where there's a limited probability of
79:00 being passed on to the next generation
79:02 but then if you do a trick using CRISPR
79:08 castes what is called a gene drive where
79:12 you are able to modify both copies then
79:17 what happens is that over time all of
79:22 your progeny will have the mutation will
79:25 have the change that you have created so
79:28 this gene drives are a way to make
79:30 population wide changes and I could go
79:33 into this and explain in detail but we
79:35 don't have the time here so I leave you
79:37 with a very interesting TED talk from
79:40 Jennifer Khan that that describes how
79:44 gene drives work and this is very
79:48 exciting for those people who are
79:50 working on vector borne diseases because
79:53 in the lab they have been able to create
79:55 a gene Drive that basically leads to a
79:59 population collapse of mosquitoes where
80:02 the female offspring cannot bite and
80:04 therefore they cannot produce eggs and
80:06 therefore over a few generations the
80:09 mosquito population dies out so this you
80:13 know this is still in the experimental
80:15 lab stage and but people are very
80:19 excited about this so a couple of years
80:22 ago when there was a
80:23 all for a moratorium on gene drives
80:25 several countries voted against it
80:29 because they are very much interested in
80:32 pursuing these technologies to control
80:35 vector borne diseases which caused huge
80:37 devastation particularly in sub-saharan
80:40 Africa
80:43 so this is the most important and
80:47 interesting piece from my perspective on
80:51 how do we control these technologies and
80:54 how do we make mitigate the risks so
80:57 that we can continue to work on these
80:59 technologies and all the amazing
81:01 discovery that we are seeing so we don't
81:04 want to stop science we don't want to
81:06 stop the economy but at the same time we
81:09 get it we can be safe and secure so at
81:13 the national level at all levels you
81:16 need policy there is currently no policy
81:18 on this that is satisfactory anywhere in
81:22 the world but it's an opportunity for
81:24 people to come together and talk about
81:26 this and come up with effective policy
81:29 at the national level there should also
81:31 be a body that will review approve and
81:34 provide oversight of this kind of work
81:36 now in many countries especially in
81:39 ASEAN in Singapore and in Malaysia they
81:43 have taken as you know in every country
81:45 there is a body the national biosafety
81:47 committee etc that looks at GMOs and
81:51 reviews all GMO products so that
81:54 committee has taken over the research
81:59 oversight review and oversight functions
82:02 in some countries the problem is that
82:05 committee has no experience in biosafety
82:07 or biosecurity they have always worked
82:11 on GMOs and so now they are trying to
82:14 bring in biosafety and biosecurity
82:16 experts in order to be able to review
82:18 this kind of work because ultimately all
82:21 gene-editing falls under genetic
82:23 modification of one kind or the other
82:26 and there needs to be awareness raising
82:30 at the national level institutionally
82:34 policies are required some rain
82:37 mentioned this and I will reiterate
82:40 there needs to be robust institutional
82:44 bio risk committee everyone is used to
82:47 institutional biosafety committee and
82:51 people are quite good at doing biosafety
82:54 risk assessments and biosafety met
82:56 in biosafety measures in many countries
82:59 now because biosafety has been around
83:01 for a long time but biosecurity is a
83:04 different thing and there aren't there
83:07 isn't a lot of expertise and people are
83:09 frankly not very comfortable with doing
83:12 biosecurity risk assessments or doing
83:15 biosecurity mitigation all institutions
83:19 of course need a robust biosecurity and
83:21 DRM system by risk management system
83:24 training education and a culture of
83:26 responsibility all of these things we
83:28 have previously talked about at the
83:36 individual level some countries have a
83:39 code of conduct that they have developed
83:41 for scientists so that they will comply
83:44 with the policy they will comply with
83:47 the best practices and also individuals
83:53 scientists need to be very comfortable
83:57 with risk assessment and mitigation this
84:00 is a difficult thing to learn and this
84:02 is a difficult thing to do and you know
84:05 for those of you who have attended
84:06 biosafety and biosecurity talks risk
84:09 assessment is usually the toughest
84:10 subject area and so but people need to
84:16 get better at doing risk assessment and
84:18 mitigation and and the other thing I
84:21 will say is that so far all of our
84:24 biosafety and biosecurity programs are
84:26 all focused on life scientists on
84:30 biologists or health scientists we need
84:33 to bring the engineering community into
84:36 this because you will notice that as
84:39 more and more people do synthetic
84:41 biology and gene editing systems etc for
84:44 example if you remember I told you about
84:46 the international competition called I
84:48 gem if you look at the teams of aij M it
84:52 consists of maybe 25% to 50% of the team
84:57 is is from the life sciences of biology
85:00 or biotechnology the other 50% is from
85:04 pure engineering mechanical engineers
85:07 you know
85:09 materials engineers etc who have no
85:13 background whatsoever in safety SiC
85:16 biosafety biosecurity or risk assessment
85:20 and mitigation measures and they don't
85:22 even know that these things exist so we
85:26 really need to take everything that we
85:29 have been teaching and everything that
85:30 we have been learning and expand this
85:33 and so for you know organizations like
85:37 bee wrap this means outreach to
85:40 communities that are beyond what the
85:45 current outreach is how do you engage
85:48 engineers how do you get them interested
85:51 in these kind of things these are all
85:53 challenges that all of us face and we
85:55 have to think about it and we have to
85:57 come up with solutions and again you
86:00 know both funding agencies and journals
86:03 funding agencies are responsible for
86:05 funding the research so they need to
86:08 make sure there's sufficient review and
86:10 oversight journals of course will
86:14 publish the results which can be misused
86:16 and therefore they also need peer review
86:19 policy peer review and oversight so some
86:26 read mention the seven areas of
86:28 identifying threats in research I think
86:32 the first for the way I have grouped it
86:34 over here the first four are related to
86:37 pathogens or toxins and so if you're
86:41 doing work with pathogens or toxins then
86:43 you have to be careful about those
86:45 categories and you have some idea
86:48 already that you know oh my research
86:50 could be do use dual use research of
86:53 concern but now we come to these three
86:56 areas that I have highlighted in bold
86:59 here which is altered the host range of
87:02 tropism of an agent or toxin this can be
87:06 done unknowingly and this can be done
87:08 with this can be an unintended
87:10 consequence for example I showed you the
87:13 CRISPR chicken or the CRISPR pigs that
87:17 are being developed for livestock
87:19 industry that could be an example of how
87:23 we are going to change the hosts range
87:24 of the of the agent this next thing is
87:29 interfere with the generation of
87:31 immunity to an agent or toxin and this
87:35 is very important because we are going
87:39 to come up with new and new with newer
87:42 solutions to tackle simple thing simple
87:46 chronic conditions in the body in the
87:48 process we might alter the immune status
87:52 of the person and therefore that person
87:55 might be far more susceptible to the
87:58 dangerous pathogens these are the kinds
88:01 of things that we have we have to think
88:02 two steps ahead and we have to start
88:04 thinking about what will be the what
88:08 will be the consequences of our research
88:10 and our applications of these
88:11 technologies down the road and the city
88:15 the number seven is of course connected
88:17 to number six the susceptibility of the
88:20 host to an agent I will also focus that
88:25 I will also reiterate and focus on the
88:30 pillars that Martin outlined at the very
88:33 beginning of the talk the pillars are
88:36 still really important you need to have
88:39 you need to think about outsider threats
88:41 you need to think about insider threats
88:44 you need to have things like inventory
88:46 control information control personnel
88:50 control physical security transport
88:53 security and emergency response plants
88:56 all of those things need to be in place
88:59 those are all the same best practices if
89:03 you are working with synthetic biology
89:05 and emerging technologies you need to
89:07 have all of those systems in place in
89:09 your lab in order to be able to make
89:12 sure that you are ensuring biosecurity
89:17 with that I thank you for your attention
89:19 and I think now we'll take questions
89:23 till I pass this on to the beer wrap
89:26 committee
89:31 okay thank you so much dr. Prasad okay
89:40 thank you to all our three speakers so
89:46 now we will be reading some questions
89:47 that are raised by our participants in
89:49 the chat box okay let me try for some
90:03 rain sorry sorry okay more or less there
90:15 were some common questions for some ring
90:19 hello submarine can you dr. Simon can
90:22 you hear me yes I can hear you yeah okay
90:26 I think most of the questions are
90:29 related to the current and Debbie so we
90:33 have here some questions from some
90:35 Marita Lapita from mr. Tandon Matthew
90:42 and marina Bautista so more or less the
90:47 questions evolve on with the current
90:49 pandemic of copied 19 do you think the
90:53 Kovach name team pandemic is a product
90:58 of and love a product of a laboratory or
91:02 laboratory groans most of the questions
91:04 the question either it can it be a
91:09 biological weapon or is it in an
91:13 intentionally released so they're just
91:15 asking for your opinion on this matter
91:17 okay
91:19 so we cannot say this because there have
91:21 been a lot of theories rolling around
91:23 the social media and internet that this
91:26 could be one of the biological weapons I
91:29 will try to clear one thing that
91:30 biological weapon is not only the a used
91:34 for different purposes for example they
91:36 are not only to make like to the time'
91:40 connecticut they don't only want
91:42 people to die they can be for other
91:45 purposes they can be for agriculture
91:48 against agriculture against Lance so
91:50 these are different types of
91:51 bioterrorism event especially if we
91:53 specifically talk about covering
91:55 nineteen so before there is a prove or
92:00 evidence that this could be one of the
92:02 biological weapons of lepton virus we
92:05 cannot say for sure that whether it is a
92:08 biological weapon or not I would like to
92:10 press on rice Prasad to comment on it
92:12 this as well
92:14 thank you something I think as you
92:18 mentioned there has been a lot of
92:19 speculation in the media and this has
92:23 been politicized at various levels but I
92:27 will draw your attention to a nature
92:29 paper I want to say it was a couple of
92:32 months ago now which looked at the
92:36 sequences very carefully and looked at
92:39 the evolution of the virus and there
92:43 they and the authors concluded that in
92:50 all probability this is a naturally
92:53 occurring virus that its mother nature
92:58 that produced this virus and that's how
93:01 this virus came into the world and and
93:03 then of course you know it started in
93:05 animals and then it infected human
93:08 beings and then it spread there was
93:10 human to human transmission and now it's
93:12 all over the world there is no there is
93:17 no evidence to suggest that in any way
93:19 that this was engineered because if you
93:22 if you look at the other corona viruses
93:25 and if you look at their sequences and
93:26 then you look at this sequence etc there
93:28 are ways of telling if this was a
93:30 man-made modification and those things
93:34 are not present in this virus in this
93:36 sequence and so any speculation there's
93:41 no basis for any speculation on that
93:44 there's also been speculation on whether
93:46 this was the result of a biosafety
93:48 incident where there was accidental
93:51 release and again you know currently
93:54 there is no information to suggest
93:56 that was the case because at the Wuhan
93:59 Institute etc there was no you know
94:03 people didn't fall sick and you know
94:05 there wasn't and there wasn't a virus
94:08 that was you know identical in sequence
94:11 etc so um again you know I think as we
94:15 speak there is a wh o panel that is
94:17 currently in China that is looking into
94:20 this and I'm sure they will produce a
94:22 report but from all indications this was
94:26 Mother Nature I think we underestimate
94:29 what Mother Nature is capable of
94:32 producing and so you know this was a bad
94:36 virus that made its way to humans and
94:38 then now it's all over the world so
94:42 thank you very much for marina and dr.
94:44 Purcell dr. Martin do you have any
94:46 comment okay okay so summary we also
94:59 have a question here if you have a
95:00 research that is sort of to be dual use
95:05 research of concern is it advisable to
95:07 publish it in an open access journal
95:10 it's a principle and risk benefit
95:12 assessment whenever you are planning
95:14 communication of this type of research
95:17 which is a D you are C you always do
95:19 risk benefit assessment before planning
95:22 your communication so as for your risk
95:25 benefit assessment you will decide
95:26 whether you are going to publish it in
95:29 full or you want to read X of
95:32 information or whether you want to
95:34 publish it or in open access and to
95:37 everyone or you want to extract some
95:40 information so this all depends on risk
95:42 benefit assessment and this can vary
95:43 from one research to another and
95:46 majority of the cases they the
95:49 scientific community has supported open
95:51 publication like they they supported
95:55 giving access to all researchers around
95:57 the world but definitely it depends upon
96:00 the risk as well if the risk of
96:01 communicating it in open access general
96:04 is very high then definitely the
96:07 communication would plan accordingly
96:09 so there's no one it varies from one
96:12 research to another so there is no one
96:14 answer to this question whether you are
96:15 will do it always
96:17 or you cannot do it okay so thank you
96:22 summary so we have here another question
96:24 for dr. Prasad from Jade email really of
96:28 essential questions regarding genetic
96:31 modification under engineering so a
96:34 nation should have a policy and
96:36 oversight for this technology does the
96:39 world have a governing body for this
96:41 different nation have different agendas
96:43 belief and policy is there an
96:45 international body that can control and
96:48 is there sanction or penalties when
96:51 present so currently there isn't a
96:56 dedicated international body for this
96:59 but for example if there are experiments
97:03 on humans that would be under the
97:06 purview of World Health Organization
97:10 approvals for animals CRISPR animals and
97:13 generated animals etc should in
97:18 principle be reviewed by ie and also at
97:23 the biological weapons convention which
97:26 most countries in the world are
97:28 signatories to there is now increasing
97:31 awareness and there's increasing talk
97:34 about measures that countries should
97:38 take and in order to reduce the risk of
97:42 all of this but to to answer your
97:45 question there is no single body that is
97:48 able to review these kinds of things and
97:50 and it's going to be very challenging to
97:53 do that because remember that remember
97:57 that if you require lengthy review
98:00 process and approval processes and
98:02 things like that that will significantly
98:05 affect your bio economy and so no
98:10 country wants to you know be
98:12 disadvantaged when it comes to the
98:15 economy and when it comes to growing
98:17 biotechnology so the solutions will have
98:21 to be it
98:23 it will have to be carefully calibrated
98:26 and this is one of the challenges that
98:29 we face okay thank you
98:33 so we have here a very interesting
98:35 question which can be answered by dr.
98:37 Prasad and the rest of the speakers do
98:40 you think the moral restrictions hinder
98:42 the progress of gene-editing science
98:44 what is your personal take about the
98:47 application of gene editing on humans do
98:49 you approve why or why not
98:52 this is from Lee Marvin okay I can start
98:58 and then I'll pass it on to my
98:59 colleagues
99:00 so bioethics is critically important I
99:07 think that's what you mean by moral
99:10 responsibility ethics is not something
99:15 that everyone learns in school or in
99:19 college or later on at the job site
99:25 ethics is also you know I believe me I
99:30 have actually taken ethics classes that
99:32 have been so boring that you know it's
99:35 hard to stay awake the way that ethics
99:38 are currently taught and so we have to
99:43 we have to make changes we have to make
99:45 changes to make sure that people have
99:48 when they are thinking about ethics they
99:51 have real-life examples real-life
99:53 dilemmas like the one that summary
99:55 imposed you know when when people that
99:57 this influence the research and they
99:59 wanted to publish it that was also an
100:01 ethics question should that kind of to
100:05 ask the question should research be
100:07 conducted or should research not be
100:09 conducted it's yes it's a risk benefit
100:12 analysis but it's also a bioethics
100:15 analysis you know and and especially
100:19 given all the controversies that are
100:21 taking place around kovat 19 whether it
100:24 was man-made whether it was an accident
100:26 etc more and more those of us who do
100:29 scientific research will have to explain
100:32 to our communities what we are doing how
100:35 risky it is and what may
100:37 do we have in place to avoid the risk
100:39 and so ethics is a big part of this and
100:43 so we really have to we really have to
100:47 come together and invest in this and
100:50 when it comes to human and gene editing
100:52 I think that you know there are two
100:55 types here one is germline editing where
100:58 essentially you are affecting germline
101:01 cells and therefore you are affecting
101:03 future generations I am in favor of a
101:07 moratorium on that I don't think we are
101:10 in a place where you know we should be
101:13 trying those kinds of experiments but on
101:16 the other hand the example that I showed
101:18 you where you can correct a person's
101:20 vision by taking the cells modifying
101:24 repairing the genetic mutation and
101:29 putting it back or you know doing it in
101:32 vivo those kinds of things should be
101:35 allowed in my mind because a if you make
101:40 that change that does not get passed on
101:42 so those are that's the distinction I
101:46 would make some reen how do you see this
101:48 as dual use research of concern I think
101:54 because their research if there's not
101:58 one person can master in all types of
102:01 research and usually we see that maybe
102:04 code of conduct development of code of
102:06 conduct in each and every organization
102:08 can help people understand the ethical
102:12 values but and what they are needed to
102:16 or require to do but this is also there
102:19 is also one thing can add that code of
102:21 conduct always helps those who want to
102:23 follow it it is not for people who don't
102:26 follow it the code of conduct also have
102:28 some limitations so maybe one thing can
102:30 be developing a code of conduct in each
102:33 organization and following it maybe you
102:36 can develop a national code of conduct
102:38 and then institution code of conduct for
102:40 this particular type of research which
102:41 is being conducted in all universities
102:53 okay so for thank you very much to all
102:57 our speakers and thank you for the
103:00 participants for all your questions for
103:02 those whose questions were not read we
103:05 will try to collate all your questions
103:07 so the speakers can address it later and
103:09 thank you so much for your active
103:10 participation in jury engaging open
103:16 forum thank you so much so will now
103:29 proceed to the synthesis of the session
103:32 so the next session is indeed very
103:35 interesting and fruitful so you would
103:37 like to thank when it once again our
103:39 three speakers for discussing the
103:42 biosecurity with the dual trends and
103:45 emerging technologies so doctor Moreno
103:48 our first speaker highlights the basic
103:50 concepts of biosafety and biosecurity as
103:54 well as mentioned the milestones OB
103:56 rapid vomit in the last decade here in
103:59 the Philippines he also presented the
104:01 new pillars of biosecurity emphasizing
104:04 the dual use research of concern and
104:06 emerging technologies as a way of
104:08 introducing the next two topics of our
104:11 speakers
104:15 so dr. summary discussed the concepts of
104:18 dual-use research of concerns she also
104:20 showed us why is it very important to to
104:22 know about it and how to identify its
104:25 categories and in the event that we know
104:27 we have dual use research of concern
104:30 she also discussed on what to do about
104:31 it how to do risk benefit assessment and
104:34 how to develop a risk mitigation and
104:37 communication and responsible
104:39 communication plan and lastly dr. Prasad
104:42 introduced to us synthetic biology and
104:45 its applications as well as on how to
104:47 mitigate the risk of the applications of
104:50 synthetic biology and how to strengthen
104:52 biosecurity measures against the new
104:55 biosecurity tracks so indeed the three
104:58 talks are very timely during this time
105:01 with a current situation that we have
105:04 synthetic biology as well as dual use
105:07 research of concern as it has its
105:09 benefits as well as the risk so our
105:11 speakers of discuss on water
105:16 the risks and the benefits and how to
105:18 make that the next session will create a
105:20 big impact on our own facilities and our
105:24 own institutions on the way we see
105:26 biosecurity in this modern age so thank
105:31 you very much
105:36 [Music]