This content details Henry Wallace's fervent opposition to Harry Truman's post-WWII foreign policy, particularly regarding the Soviet Union, which led to his dismissal from Truman's cabinet and a subsequent, ultimately failed, campaign to undermine the president and alter America's Cold War trajectory.
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September 20th, 1946.
Henry Wallace sat in his Commerce
Department office, staring at the phone.
Harry Truman had just fired him. The
president's voice had been polite but
firm. The decision was final. Wallace
had been vice president of the United
States from 1941 to 1945.
He had sat across from Franklin
Roosevelt in cabinet meetings while they
planned the war effort. He had traveled
the world as FDR's personal representative.
representative.
He had been one heartbeat away from the
presidency for four years. Now he was
unemployed, fired by a man he considered
an accident of history who never should
have been president in the first place.
Wallace picked up the phone and called
his closest adviserss. He told them he
was accepting a position as editor of
the New Republic. From that platform, he
would attack Truman's policies
relentlessly. He was going to prove to
the American people that Truman had
stolen Roosevelt's legacy and was
leading the country toward World War II.
The advisers warned him this would be
political suicide.
Wallace didn't care about his political
career anymore. He cared about stopping
what he saw as Truman's catastrophic
foreign policy. He believed Truman was
betraying everything Roosevelt had
worked for. What followed was one of the
most systematic campaigns to destroy a
sitting president from within his own
party. Wallace would give speeches in
every major city attacking Truman's
policies. He would write articles
accusing Truman of wararmongering. He
would eventually run against Truman as a
third party candidate in 1948
and he would come closer to succeeding
Henry Wallace believed he was the
rightful heir to Franklin Roosevelt's
presidency. This wasn't paranoia. It was
based on four years of reality.
Roosevelt had chosen Wallace as his
running mate in 1940 over strong
objections from party bosses. The
Democratic establishment thought Wallace
was too liberal, too idealistic, too
sympathetic to labor unions and civil
rights. Roosevelt insisted. He told the
Democratic convention he wanted Wallace
or he wouldn't run for a third term.
Wallace became one of the most active
vice presidents in American history.
Roosevelt sent him to Latin America,
China, and the Soviet Union on
diplomatic missions. Wallace chaired the
Board of Economic Warfare. He gave
speeches explaining Roosevelt's vision
for the post-war world. He became the
public face of Roosevelt's domestic and
foreign policy. By 1944, Wallace
genuinely believed he was Roosevelt's
chosen successor. He had earned it
through four years of loyal service.
Then the 1944
Democratic Convention destroyed
everything Wallace believed about his
political future.
The Democratic Party bosses hated Henry
Wallace. They thought he was a dreamer
who didn't understand political reality.
They believed his liberal positions on
labor and civil rights would cost
Democrats votes. Most importantly, they
feared what would happen if Roosevelt
died and Wallace became president.
In July 1944, party leaders met with
Roosevelt at the White House. They told
him Wallace had to go. Roosevelt was
sick. Everyone could see his health
declining. Whoever was vice president
would likely become president before the
next term ended. Roosevelt gave in to
the pressure. He agreed to replace
Wallace, but left the choice of
replacement open. The bosses bypassed
the chaos and handpicked a safe,
uncontroversial senator from Missouri,
Harry Truman. Wallace didn't give up
without a fight. He had delegates. He
had passionate supporters who believed
in Roosevelt's liberal vision. On the
convention floor, Wallace forces tried
to force a first ballot vote before the
bosses could organize against him.
Chicago Mayor Ed Kelly claimed a fire
hazard due to overcrowding in the
stadium. He forced an immediate
adjournment just as the pro-Wallace
chant was reaching its peak. When
delegates returned the next day, the
bosses had marshaled enough support to
give the nomination to Truman on the
second ballot. Wallace was out.
Roosevelt tried to soften the blow. He
wrote Wallace a letter saying he
personally would vote for Wallace if he
were a delegate.
But Roosevelt had also given party
bosses a separate note, saying he would
be happy with Harry Truman or William
Douglas. FDR had played both sides. This
was the ultimate betrayal. Wallace had
been Roosevelt's loyal soldier for four
years. He had been the true believer in
FDR's vision. But in the smoke-filled
rooms of Chicago, the dying president
didn't fight for him. He offered Wallace
polite words with one hand while signing
his political death warrant with the
other. Now he was being dumped because
party bosses found him inconvenient. The
man who replaced him was someone
Roosevelt barely knew.
When Roosevelt won re-election in
November 1944, he offered Wallace the
position of Secretary of Commerce. It
was a consolation prize, a cabinet seat
for a man who had been vice president, a
significant demotion that everyone
recognized as such. Wallace accepted
[clears throat] because he still
believed in Roosevelt's vision. He
thought he could influence policy from
inside the administration. He hoped
Roosevelt would recognize his value and
bring him back into the inner circle.
Then Roosevelt died on April 12th, 1945.
Harry Truman became president and Henry
Wallace found himself serving under the
man who had replaced him. The irony was
unbearable. To Wallace, Truman wasn't
just unqualified.
He was a small man filling a giant's
shoes. Wallace had spent years at
Roosevelt's right hand shaping global
policy. Truman was a former habdasher
from Missouri, a failed hat shop owner
and a product of the corrupt Pendergas
political machine. Wallace had been
Roosevelt's trusted adviser for four
years. Truman had met with Roosevelt
exactly twice during his three months as
vice president. Yet Truman was president
and Wallace was commerce secretary. The
resentment wasn't just political, it was
visceral. Truman kept Wallace in the
cabinet initially. It was a gesture
toward party unity. Roosevelt's
supporters needed reassurance that
Truman would continue FDR's policies.
Keeping Wallace as commerce secretary
sent that signal. The cabinet meetings
were excruciating. Wallace sat there
watching the man who should have been
his subordinate struggle with the weight
of the office. Every time Truman made a
decision, Wallace measured it against
what Roosevelt would have done. Wallace
quickly realized Truman didn't share
Roosevelt's vision, particularly [clears throat]
[clears throat]
regarding the Soviet Union. And that's
when Wallace decided he couldn't stay silent.
silent.
The fundamental disagreement between
Wallace and Truman was about Joseph
Stalin. Wallace believed Stalin could be
trusted if America showed good faith.
Truman believed Stalin was a dictator
expanding Soviet control over Eastern
Europe. Wallace's view came from his
1944 trip to the Soviet Union. He had
toured Magadan and the Cola gold mines
in Siberia. These were actually a part
of the Gulog system, but NKVD handlers
disguised them as volunteer labor camps
with well-fed workers. Wallace famously
described the camp director as a
sensitive man. He came away convinced
that cooperation with Stalin was
possible. Truman's view came from
watching Stalin break every agreement
made at Yaltta.
While Wallace saw a partner, Truman saw
a predator. From the rigged elections in
Poland to the looting of East Germany,
Stalin was systematically dismantling
the promises made at Yalta. By early
1946, Truman had adopted a policy of
firmness toward Soviet expansion. George
Kennan's long telegram had explained
that Stalin only respected strength. The
policy that would become known as
containment was taking shape. America
would resist Soviet expansion but avoid
direct military confrontation.
Wallace thought this was
catastrophically wrong. He had seen
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was terrified
of atomic war. Wallace believed Truman's
tough stance would provoke Stalin into
aggression. He argued that if America
just showed trust and cooperation,
Stalin would reciprocate.
Wallace made these arguments in private
cabinet meetings. Truman listened
politely and ignored him. Wallace wrote
memos. Truman filed them away. Wallace
requested private meetings with the president.
president.
Truman was always too busy. By September 1946,
1946,
Wallace was desperate. Truman wasn't
listening. The country was moving toward
the confrontation with the Soviets.
Wallace believed World War II was
becoming inevitable unless someone
stopped Truman's policy. He decided to
go public.
September 12th, 1946,
Henry Wallace stood before 20,000 people
packed into Madison Square Garden in New
York City. He was there to give a speech
about foreign policy. He had cleared the
speech with Truman's staff, or so he
claimed. What Wallace told that crowd
contradicted everything Truman's
Secretary of State was saying in Europe
at that exact moment. While James Burns
was in Paris negotiating with the
Soviets from a position of strength,
Wallace was in New York arguing America
needed to show trust and cooperation.
Wallace told the crowd that Truman's
policy of firmness was pushing the world
toward war. He said America's atomic
weapons were making the Soviets paranoid.
paranoid.
He argued that Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe was defensive, not
aggressive. He claimed Stalin would
allow free elections if America stopped
being confrontational.
The crowd loved it. These were liberals
who wanted to believe Roosevelt's vision
of post-war cooperation with the Soviets
was still possible. They were terrified
of another war. Wallace was telling them
what they wanted to hear. The press
reaction was immediate and explosive.
Reporters pointed out that Wallace had
directly contradicted American foreign
policy while serving in Truman's
cabinet. Foreign policy experts noted
that Wallace's speech would be seen in
Moscow as a sign of American division
and weakness. James Burns was furious.
He cabled Truman from Paris, demanding
to know if Wallace's speech represented
administration policy. If it did, Burns
would resign. If it didn't, Wallace
needed to be silenced.
Truman was in a political trap. When
reporters asked if he had approved
Wallace's speech, Truman told them he
approved the whole speech. He hadn't
actually read it carefully. Wallace's
staff had submitted it for review, and
Truman had waved it through without
paying attention.
Truman spent a week trying to manage the
crisis. He issued a statement saying
Wallace's speech was his personal
opinion, not administration policy. This
satisfied no one. How could a cabinet
member have a personal opinion that
contradicted the president's foreign
policy? Wallace refused to back down. He
gave interviews defending his speech. He
said the American people deserved a
debate about foreign policy. He implied
that Truman's advisers were
wararmongering. He suggested Roosevelt
would have agreed with his position, not
Truman's. This was the final straw.
Wallace wasn't just as green with
policy. He was invoking Roosevelt's name
to undermine Truman's authority. He was
suggesting that Truman had betrayed
Roosevelt's legacy. On September 20th, 1946,
1946,
Truman called Wallace to the White
House. The conversation was brief.
Truman told Wallace he needed a cabinet
that spoke with one voice on foreign
policy. Wallace could either stop making
public statements contradicting
administration policy or resign.
Wallace chose to fight. He told Truman
he had a constitutional right to free
speech. He said the American people
needed to hear alternative views on
foreign policy. He argued that Truman
was betraying Roosevelt's vision of
cooperation with the Soviets. Truman
ended the meeting. He returned to his
office and dictated a letter accepting
Wallace's resignation.
Wallace hadn't offered to resign. Truman
was firing him. The letter was delivered
to Wallace that afternoon.
Wallace was stunned. He had expected
Truman to back down. He thought Truman
needed him to maintain support from
Roosevelt liberals. He believed his
political base gave him leverage.
Wallace had miscalculated completely.
Truman was willing to lose Wallace's
supporters rather than tolerate a
cabinet member who publicly contradicted
foreign policy. Party unity mattered
Wallace sat in his office after being
fired and realized he was free. Free
from cabinet discipline. Free from
administration loyalty. free to say
exactly what he thought about Truman's policies,
policies,
he called a press conference for the
next day. Instead of issuing a gracious
statement about moving on, Wallace
announced he was dedicating himself to
changing American foreign policy. He
said Truman was leading America toward
permanent confrontation with the Soviet
Union. Political analysts said Wallace
had destroyed his political career.
Wallace didn't care. He believed
stopping Truman's foreign policy was
more important than his own political
future. From October 1946 through 1948,
Wallace delivered hundreds of speeches
to packed venues across America,
offering warweary citizens a dangerous
hope that conflict with Stalin was a
choice, not a necessity.
The media coverage was massive. His
criticisms of Truman reached millions of
Americans. He became the most prominent
voice opposing containment.
Truman's advisers were worried.
Wallace's message resonated with
warweary Americans.
Polls showed significant portions of the
Democratic base questioned Truman's
tough stance on the Soviets. Wallace
wasn't strong enough to win elections,
but he was strong enough to split the
Democratic Party. The content of
Wallace's speeches grew more extreme
over time. In early 1947, he began
arguing that Truman's policy was
actually causing Soviet aggression. He
claimed that if America would just
disarm and show good faith, Stalin would reciprocate.
reciprocate.
He suggested the Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe was America's fault for
being confrontational.
These arguments horrified foreign policy
experts. They pointed out that Stalin
had broken agreements made at Yaltta
before Truman had even adopted a tough
stance. Soviet expansion was happening
regardless of American policy.
Wallace was blaming the victim. But
Wallace's supporters didn't care about
expert analysis. They cared about
avoiding war. And Wallace was the only
prominent political figure telling them
war could be avoided.
In early 1947,
American intelligence agencies noticed
something disturbing. Soviet propaganda
was quoting Henry Wallace extensively.
Radio Moscow broadcast his speeches.
Soviet newspapers reprinted his
articles. Wallace's criticisms of Truman
were being used to undermine American
foreign policy. Wallace didn't see this
as a problem. He argued that Soviet
media quoted him because he was telling
the truth. If Stalin's government found
his message useful, that was because his
message was correct. The real issue was
Truman's aggressive policy, not Soviet
propaganda. But the intelligence
community saw something more troubling.
Wallace was receiving assistance from
organizations with Soviet connections.
The groups organizing his speaking tours
had ties to communist parties. His staff
included people who had worked with
Soviet front organizations. Wallace
might be sincere in his beliefs, but he
was being used by Moscow. In March 1947,
Truman delivered a speech to Congress
announcing what would become known as
the Truman Doctrine. He requested
funding to support Greece and Turkey
against communist insurgencies. He
declared that America would support free
peoples resisting subjugation by armed
minorities or outside pressures.
Wallace's response was immediate and
scathing. He called the Truman doctrine
a declaration of war on the Soviet
Union. He argued Truman was establishing
an American empire. He claimed the
president was betraying the United
Nations and Roosevelt's vision of
collective security. The attack
resonated with Wallace's base, but
horrified mainstream Democrats. Even
liberals who questioned containment
thought Wallace had gone too far.
Supporting Greece and Turkey wasn't
wararmongering. It was preventing Soviet
expansion through strategic assistance.
Wallace didn't moderate his message. In
June 1947,
Secretary of State George Marshall
announced the European Recovery Program
to rebuild Western Europe. Wallace
denounced it as economic imperialism,
designed to encircle the Soviet Union.
The Marshall plan was enormously popular
with the American public and European
governments. Wallace's opposition made
him look increasingly isolated and
extreme, but he pressed on, convinced he
was preventing catastrophic conflict
In December 1947, Henry Wallace
announced he was running for president.
He would lead a new progressive party
dedicated to peace and cooperation with
the Soviet Union. The announcement
shocked the political establishment.
Wallace knew he couldn't win. Third
party candidates never won presidential
elections, but he believed he could
force Truman to change course on foreign
policy. If Wallace drew enough votes
away from Truman, the president would
have to moderate his stance on the
Soviets to win re-election. The
Progressive Party platform called for
immediate negotiations with Stalin,
withdrawal of American troops from
Europe, sharing atomic weapons
technology with the United Nations,
including the Soviet Union, dismantling
American military bases abroad, ending
economic assistance tied to
anti-communist conditions. It was
everything Moscow wanted. Soviet media
celebrated Wallace's candidacy.
Communist parties in Europe endorsed
him. Wallace accepted their support,
arguing that anyone who wanted peace
should be welcome in his coalition. This
was politically catastrophic. Wallace's
association with communists allowed
Truman to paint him as a Soviet dupe or
worse. Liberal Democrats who might have
supported Wallace's message refused to
join a campaign tainted by communist
connections. Wallace campaigned across
America in early 1948.
His rallies drew thousands. His message
of peace resonated with voters tired of
international tensions. Polls showed him
drawing 10 to 15% of the vote. Almost
entirely from Democrats who would
otherwise support Truman. Democratic
party leaders panicked. If Wallace
pulled that many votes, Truman would
lose to Republican Thomas Dwey. The
White House would flip to Republican
control. Democrats would lose Congress.
Everything Roosevelt had built would be
dismantled. Truman's political adviserss
begged him to moderate his foreign
policy to win back Wallace supporters.
Truman refused. He wasn't going to
change American strategic policy to win
an election. The Soviets were expanding.
Containment was necessary. Wallace's
supporters would have to choose between
By summer 1948, political analysts were
predicting Truman's defeat. The
Democratic Party was fracturing. Wallace
was pulling liberal votes. Southern
Democrats had bolted over civil rights
to form the Dixierat party. Thomas Dwey
was running a strong Republican
campaign. Every poll showed Truman
losing. Newsweek surveyed 50 top
political writers. All 50 predicted Dwey
would win. The Chicago Daily Tribune
prepared a victory headline for Dwey
before the votes were counted. Truman's
presidency appeared finished. Wallace
didn't need to win. He just needed to
make Truman lose. By siphoning liberal
votes in New York, Michigan, and
Maryland, he was handing key states to
the Republicans.
Then something changed in the final
months of the campaign. Events in Europe
vindicated Truman's policy and exposed
Wallace's naivity. In February 1948,
communists staged a coup in
Czechoslovakia, overthrowing the
democratic government. The Soviet Union
blocked all ground access to West Berlin
in June, forcing the Berlin Airlift.
These events demonstrated exactly what
Truman had been warning about. Stalin
wasn't interested in cooperation or free
elections. Soviet expansion was real and aggressive.
aggressive.
Wallace's arguments about Stalin's
defensive intentions looked absurd.
American voters shifted. Wallace's poll
numbers dropped from 10 to 15% down to 5%.
5%.
Liberals who had been tempted by his
peace message decided containment was necessary.
necessary.
Warweerary Americans realized that
cooperation with Stalin wasn't possible.
On election day, Wallace received only
2.4% of the national vote. He won no
electoral votes. His campaign succeeded
only in demonstrating how wrong he had
been about Soviet intentions. Truman won
re-election in one of the greatest
upsets in American political history.
Walls's two-year campaign to destroy
Truman's presidency had failed
completely. Worse, it [snorts] had
discredited the very position he was
advocating. His association with Soviet
propaganda had made opposition to
On June 25th, 1950, North Korean forces
invaded South Korea with Soviet weapons
and Stalin's approval. The attack was
unprovoked and clearly coordinated with
Moscow. It proved everything Truman had
argued about Soviet intentions. If
America had followed Wallace's advice
and withdrawn from Asia, South Korea
would have fallen in weeks. If America
had shared atomic weapons technology
with the United Nations, as Wallace
proposed, the Soviets would have had
nuclear weapons years earlier. If
America had dismantled its military, as
Wallace recommended, the entire Korean
Peninsula would be communist.
The Korean War destroyed what remained
of Wallace's credibility. Stalin had
proven he would use military force to
expand communist control. Cooperation
and trust were irrelevant to Soviet
strategy. Containment was the only
policy that worked. Wallace issued a
statement supporting Truman's decision
to defend South Korea. It was a quiet
admission that he had been wrong about
everything. Stalin couldn't be trusted.
Soviet expansion was aggressive, not
defensive. military strength and
alliances were necessary. By 1952,
Wallace had retreated from public life.
He wrote occasional articles, but never
again challenged American foreign
policy. He had spent two years trying to
destroy Truman's presidency and ended up
destroying his own legacy instead.
In 1952, Henry Wallace published an
article in This Week magazine titled
Where I Was Wrong. It was the closest he
ever came to a full apology. He admitted
he had been naive about Soviet
intentions. He acknowledged that some
organizations supporting his 1948
campaign had been controlled by
communists. He conceded that containment
had been necessary, but Wallace never
admitted the fundamental mistake. He had
been so convinced Truman was wrong that
he spent two years trying to destroy a
president who was actually right. He had
given speeches that Soviet propaganda
used to undermine American policy. He
had run a campaign that nearly cost
Truman reelection at a critical moment
in the Cold War. He died in 1965 largely
forgotten by American politics. Former
supporters had quietly distanced
themselves. Liberal intellectuals who
once cheered his speeches admitted they
had been wrong. His name became
associated with naive appeasement.
Obituaries noted his service as vice
president and his achievements in
agriculture. Most glossed over his
two-year campaign against Truman. Henry
Wallace spent two years trying to
destroy Harry Truman's presidency
because he believed Truman was wrong
about the Soviet Union. History proved
Wallace was the one who was wrong. His
tragedy wasn't a lack of patriotism. It
was a surplus of hope. He looked at
Stalin and saw a partner because the
alternative was too terrifying to
accept. In the end, conviction proved no
substitute for judgment. And being
Roosevelt's vice president didn't make
someone qualified to be Roosevelt's successor.
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