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Wake Up Call: Refinery Disaster in Philadelphia | USCSB | YouTubeToText
YouTube Transcript: Wake Up Call: Refinery Disaster in Philadelphia
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Summary
Core Theme
A catastrophic fire and explosion at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refinery, caused by a corroded pipe elbow rupture and subsequent hydrofluoric acid (HF) release, highlighted critical failures in mechanical integrity, safety verification, safeguard reliability, and the need for inherently safer design in the industry.
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Voiceover: June 21, 2019,
the Philadelphia Energy Solutions,
or PES Refinery in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
A dangerously corroded pipe elbow ruptured,
releasing process fluid into the refinery's
hydrofluoric acid or HF alkylation unit.
The process fluid then ignited
causing a fire and series of explosions.
The fire and explosions caused the release of
over 5,000 pounds of highly toxic HF,
launched a 38,000-pound vessel fragment offsite
and resulted in an estimated property damage loss
of 750 million dollars.
Owens: Thankfully despite the urban location
of the PES Refinery,
the local community was not seriously harmed.
But it could've been worse.
Our investigation found that a critical safeguard
intended to protect the local community
from a release of hydrofluoric acid
did not function as designed.
If a large amount of hydrofluoric acid
had escaped from the refinery,
the consequences could've been disastrous.
This incident should be a wakeup call
to industry and regulators
to take every step possible
to prevent a similar event from occurring.
Voiceover: The Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery
was the largest oil refining complex on the east coast
and could process up to
335,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
Within its hydrofluoric acid alkylation unit,
the refinery produced alkylate,
a high octane blending component of gasoline.
That was done by using hydrofluoric acid as a catalyst.
HF is a highly toxic chemical
that is particularly hazardous
if a release occurs
because it vaporizes, becoming airborne.
Breathing HF can cause lung damage, and skin contact
with HF can cause severe burns and death.
On the day of the incident,
the HF alkylation unit was operating normally.
Shortly before 4:00 a.m. a board operator
in the refinery's main control room
performed a routine change
in the configuration of the process within the unit.
The operator increased the flow of process fluid
in an area of the unit
by a total of seven barrels per hour.
Stable operation continued with no abnormal pressure
or temperature changes in the unit
as a result of these actions.
But nevertheless at 4:00 a.m.
a severely corroded pipe elbow within the unit ruptured.
Flammable process fluid containing mostly propane
along with a small concentration of HF
escaped through the failed pipe elbow.
The leaking process fluid formed
a large ground-hugging vapor cloud about 10 feet high
that engulfed a portion of the unit.
Moments later the vapor cloud ignited,
causing a massive fire.
Approximately 30 seconds later,
the board operator took steps
to prevent the release of additional HF.
This was done by rapidly draining the unit's
339,000 pounds of hydrofluoric acid to a special vessel
which contained a large amount of flammable hydrocarbons.
For over 20 minutes, the jet flame erupted
from the failed pipe elbow,
wakening the steel bottom of the vessel
and causing it to stretch and thin.
The vessel then ruptured,
launching three huge fragments into the air.
The CSB found that there were no emergency
isolation valves installed in the HF alkylation unit
to remotely isolate nearby hydrocarbon sources
that could then flow through the failed elbow.
And these valves are not explicitly required
by the current API standard
on safe operation of hydrofluoric acid alkylation units.
Grim: Prolonged releases and fires in HF alkylation units
can cause equipment ruptures,
compromise safeguards
or lead to releases of toxic hydrofluoric acid.
Companies need to install
remotely operated emergency isolation valves
to quickly stop releases
before they become catastrophic events.
Voiceover: As a result,
the CSB made a recommendation to API
to update its standard on
safe operation of hydrofluoric acid alkylation units
to require installation of remotely operated
emergency isolation valves on the inlets and outlets
of all hydrofluoric acid containing vessels,
and any hydrocarbon containing vessels
meeting defined threshold quantities.
The CSB found a fourth safety issue
that contributed to the incident at the PES Refinery
which is safeguard reliability in HF alkylation units.
At PES the HF alkylation unit
was equipped with a water spray mitigation system
that was a critical safeguard
in the event of an HF release.
The water mitigation system was designed to use
cannons to spray large volumes of water at any HF release
in order to suppress the amount of vaporized HF
so that it could not travel
offsite to neighboring communities.
But when the control room operator tried to remotely
turn on the water pumps that fed the water cannons,
it was not possible because the
control system communication to the water pumps
as well as a backup power system in the unit
had both failed during the initial fire.
Although API recommends fireproofing these elements,
it does not specifically require companies to do so.
Instead 40 minutes elapsed from the time of the release
before a worker was able to manually turn on the pump.
In the meantime, highly toxic HF was able
to freely escape from equipment and vaporize into the air.
Grim: Hydrofluoric acid alkylation units
present unique hazards due to the presence of
highly toxic HF alongside large quantities
of flammable materials within one unit.
The damage to the water spray mitigation system at PES
demonstrates that active safeguards
or safeguards that require a person
or technology to trigger their activation
have the potential to fail
in major incidents involving fires and explosions.
Critical safeguards and their
associated control system components
must be protected from fire and explosion hazards.
Voiceover: As a result,
the CSB made an additional recommendation to API
to update its standard to require protection of critical
safeguards and associated control system components
from fire and explosion hazards,
including radiant heat and flying projectiles.
And to help ensure that new API
safety requirements and recommendations
are implemented effectively nationwide,
the CSB recommended that the EPA should develop a program
that emphasizes inspecting refinery HF alkylation units
to verify that companies
are complying with API's standard.
The fifth and final safety issue highlighted by the CSB
in its report on the incident at PES
is inherently safer design.
Of the 155 U.S. petroleum refineries
currently in operation in the United States,
46 operate HF alkylation units.
But hydrofluoric acid is highly toxic
and is one of the eight most hazardous chemicals
regulated by EPA's RMP program.
The other acid catalyst
used in refinery alkylation units is sulfuric acid.
Although sulfuric acid is highly corrosive and can cause
skin burns upon contact, it remains a liquid upon release.
Therefore it does not present the same risk
to surrounding communities
as HF which vaporizes
upon release and has the potential to travel offsite.
In addition,
alternative alkylation technologies have been developed.
These include a solid acid catalyst
as well as the new ionic liquid acid catalyst
which was developed by Chevron.
Using a sulfuric acid catalyst
or other new alkylation technologies
would prevent offsite human exposure
to HF in the event of future incidents.
Replacing highly toxic chemicals with less hazardous
chemicals is an inherently safer design approach.
Grim: Currently there is no federal regulatory requirement
for refineries to analyze
inherently safer design strategies
to reduce the risk of serious accidental releases.
Technologies are being developed
that could be safer alternatives to HF alkylation,
and refiners should periodically
evaluate these available technologies.
Voiceover: In its report, the CSB recommended that the EPA
require petroleum refineries
to conduct a safer technology and alternatives analysis
as part of their Process Hazard Analysis
as evaluate the practicability of any inherently
safer technology,
and initiate prioritization to evaluate whether
HF is a high priority substance for risk evaluation.
If it is,conduct a risk evaluation of HF
and implement any identified corrective actions
as required by the Toxic Substances Control Act.
Owens: The destructive event
at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery
exposed weaknesses not only in PES policies
but also industry standards and federal regulations.
We call on the American Petroleum Institute,
the refining industry
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
to implement our recommendations and help make sure
that another catastrophic incident
in a hydrofluoric acid alkylation unit never occurs.
Thank you for watching this CSB safety video.
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