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2025 Intel Summit: Evolving Alliances for a New Era

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The discussion explores the evolving landscape of international alliances and nation-state cooperation in response to a more complex and volatile global security environment, emphasizing the need for agility, new partnerships, and technological adaptation.

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Good afternoon everyone.

Welcome. My name is John Doyen. I'm the

executive vice president for INSA. I

want to welcome you to our session today

on evolving alliances for a new era. Um

uh we're excited you're here. A couple

things before we get started. I do want

you to notice that there's some cards

look like this. Cards on your seat. If

you have questions, you can use these

cards to write down your questions and

we'll have some of our staff collecting

them during the discussion and then

they'll be um shared. That's how you get

your questions up. Also, um I wanted to

uh give a big thank you to the sponsor

for this session which is 10X National

Security. Thanking them for their

support to help make this all possible.

And then I'd like to go ahead and get us

started by invite uh introducing the

panel. So let me see if I can um

in let's see what order am I going to do

this. I'll start with uh we have Colonel

Johns. Um John is the deputy assistant

secretary cyerspace and digital policy

from the state department. Uh sitting

next to him is major general retired

John Howard from New Zealand. He's also

the former deputy director for

Commonwealth Integration at the Defense

Intelligence Agency. Sitting next to him

from Poland is Brigider General Yaruslav

Shroski. How'd they do on that? Okay. Um

he's the Chief Military Counter

Intelligence Service from the Ministry

of Defense. And then uh the fourth

panelist is Rear Admiral Mike Studman,

retired. He's on the board of adviserss

with National Bureau of Asian Research.

And we're pleased to have as our

moderator for today's session the

Honorable Means Harris who's the former

acting under secretary for intelligence

and security at the Department of

Defense. So Means over to you and our

distinguished guest for today's session.

>> Good afternoon and thanks for joining

us. Thank you to all the panelists. I am

thrilled to be here with you today and

looking forward to what I think will be

a pretty lively conversation about

evolving alliances for a new era. Given

the diverse perspectives and experience

on today's panel and our theme, I'd like

to start the conversation by offering

each of you the opportunity to reflect

on nation state cooperation today

through two questions. So, we'll work

our way down the line, but the two

questions that I thought might tee us

off well are, what are the most

consequential changes you've observed in

how nation states are cooperating to

address national security issues and

what do you think they signal about the

era we're entering and the challenges

that lie ahead. We'll start with our my

colleague Das Mills.

>> Thank you, Milansancy. Um well, we're

obviously living in a uh a different era

and it's uh with uh raging wars uh in uh

in Europe uh uh tension in Asia uh from

uh uh from China and uh and really it is

in many ways a trilateral world uh that

we're living in. But I think one of the

biggest things is just uh focus on

national security spent. I'm state

department now uh even though I many

years in the in the title 10 or defense

world uh but I think a lot of it is

commitment to uh national security spend

and that's a key metric. Last year we

were just discussing debating uh whether

2% and and frankly many countries were

were not really close to the 2%

uh but now we're in a far more realistic

and robust world of 5% at least for NATO

uh three and a half core one and a half

enabling but that's really uh I think

the signal of what's going on and what

really constitutes a true partner is

really contribution to national security

excuse me. Thank you. I've just flew in

from New Zealand, but I'm still coming

to grips with the time zone. Great to be

back here. Great to see friends. I think

Dave, I just saw in the audience that we

were talking about a hucker uh a while

ago. So, I'm a New Zealander and I'll

speak as a New Zealander and I'm no

longer serving. So, I'll speak as a free

citizen with a strong opinion. Um, and

I'd like to be quite candid if I can. So

what I've come to realize over the last

3 to 5 years is a growing interest in

national security outcomes and issues in

the private sector that previously I had

not seen from where we sit at the bottom

of the world as a former prime minister

once said paused like a dagger over the

heart of Antarctica. Um our threat has

fundamentally shifted and changed. the

threats that you talk about that we face

in relation to uh China, Iran, DPRK,

violent extremism, they haven't reduced,

they've increased and as a result the

discussions that I've been involved in

are so much more complex and it's really

hard to get those complexities through

to sometimes our political leadership

and I'm talking about New Zealand even

though I've got all those flags behind

me. um getting it the issue through with

clarity. And what I was really heartened

to see in February 22 was the speed at

which we were able to declassify

information in an attempt to create

strategic deterrence and how that was

achieved against current policy settings

and policy was really pushed hard so

that it's messages could be passed. Uh I

think the challenge as we go forward

will be how can we replicate that at

volume and velocity to create even

>> Thank you. Thank you Milansi and thank

you for inviting me to this

distinguished channel uh panel. Uh I

just flew from Poland and uh uh from the

place where some dynamic

uh and robust uh changes especially with

military sphere are happening. But uh of

course uh uh to give you the

consequential changes I have to start

from the from the reasons why things are

changing in in especially in our region.

Uh I will try during my my interventions

today not to reveal any classified

information. I'm still active but uh of

course uh to give you a a first glance

picture from from Poland. Of course the

I I would mention three issues. Uh the

first one uh is of course war in Ukraine

which we count from 2014 not from 2022.

Of course, the hot stage of 2022 is is

is key at this stage. Uh but it happens

that I used to be 10 years ago a defense

atache of Poland in DC and I was going

back and forth to many places to include

Congress, Department of uh uh defense by

that time uh to to give our reasoning.

Uh of course I was partially successful

by that time. uh so still

discussing the percentage of our our

budget we are now uh spending 4.7% of

GDP which is uh really high effort of of

my country the second issue uh the

second reason is uh the uh coming to the

to the topic of our uh panel of course

the Indopacific shift of US uh uh that's

very uh very important for for my

country and the third one strategic

autonomy or the ambitions of some

European nations with this regard. So we

have to look at those three uh issues

and the consequential consequential

changes uh because of that uh in our

region and in Europe of course some

other places we are looking for strong

and reli reliable partners. I have to

say of course that NATO stands still

from our perspective, but we cannot

neglect any any bilateral and new possible

possible uh

partners or or alliances.

Uh the the the the second one is the

elevation of disinformation nowadays and

this is the the issue that we are very

much uh uh observing in Poland and

trying to combat this issue. And the

third one

the we need a robust information sharing

something we are discussing at NATO for

last 25 at least years. And the third

one of course the fourth one the last

one uh we need a very strong political

military and industrial cooperation

uh of course to include our our major

partner US and I will stop with that.

Thank you.

>> Great. Hi, good afternoon. It's great to

be on the panel with uh old friends and

new ones here and great to see so many

familiar faces out here in the audience.

I think I might start uh because I think

uh context is everything by just

describing how I've begun to think about

the geopolitical environment and I have

this little thing called the dangerous

D's and I describe kind of these uh

these macro trends which I think uh it's

important to get right before we start

talking about alliances or changes and

the first D is destabilization

uh the second one is del globalization

The third one is disintegration, old

ways of doing business, new norms, new

networks. And then you have disinformation.

disinformation.

Uh and then you have depopulation in

advanced societies. And so given all of

those things, you have a world under

stress. Uh and there's not a safe

country out there. Everybody is

grappling with how to deal with all

these macro trends. And I think uh what

you found people have concluded probably

accurately that the old ways that we

would be able to deal with these things

are insufficient to need today.

And so people are looking for how to

deal with these big challenges and they

are tired of you know committee work or

things that move too slowly or never get

the job done or in many cases the

organizations are actually occupied by

your adversary right that can actually

co-opt and subvert from the inside and

so you don't get anything done. So the

question is what new structures need to

build on the old and the question is

whether or not to abandon the old altogether

altogether

or if they still have agency you

maintain an investment in the old

because they have some legitimacy and

they have some effectiveness still

associated with them and you don't want

to give them up potentially to an

opponent. But what are the new

structures that also are going to be fit

for purpose? And we're not just talking

about the security elements. talking

about the climate change elements, the

economic, the trade, you know, space,

health, those kinds of things too. And

you can read countless articles now

about, you know, many laterals, which

is, I think, the new way to add to the

lattis work of the old system. uh

international bodies uh you know the

traditional alliances now have as option

sets more bilaterals trilaterals

quadrilaterals and so on and so forth

and you're seeing them proliferate not

only on the red side or the adversary

side right as they you know work new

defense arrangements think Russia North

Korea Russia Iran uh new economic

organizations which are designed to

exclude the west that China has been

leading all around and you also have the

the blue side also looking to say I need

to create small pockets of cooperation

that can get things done in the

timelines that are truly going to be

relevant and I think that there are lots

of examples of what those minilateral

miniaterals look like uh and I think

that they are now augmenting kind of the

old and so I think you're going to have

an amalgam a very complex set of

relationships that exist out there, many

of which are going to give countries

more flexibility. Uh maybe you're only

going to be operating on certain things

for a certain amount of time, but to me,

this is sort of the new format for how

uh interstate relations are going to

develop and mature in the 21st century.

>> Amazing. You guys have set the table for

such an interesting conversation. I

think where I where I'd like to take it

is to ask General Howard to reflect on

those remarks and think about how the

traditional alliances are adapting to

this new world order as our five our

five eyes rep here today. Um are are the

traditional structures adapting to keep

pace with this and where do you see

opportunities for those constructs to

really embrace change?

Okay. So, I'd um fully agree with what

Mike said in relation to the changing

nature of coalitions. The structures

that we have leaned on for so long um

still offer value,

>> but I' I'd challenge them to move faster

than uh the traditional pace of going

into another workshop or into another

plenary discussion to say what might

good look like. We need to move and

create information sharing policies,

information sharing culture and

technologies at the speed of mission,

threat and relevance. So by that I mean

we need to drive harder against the

status quo. Um and we should be

questioning that each and every day

because the threat is becoming more

complex. I think the challenge really is

to accelerate

from what we've currently got and then

to work out what good will look like not

tomorrow but what I call the coalition

after next. We we tended if we think

back to when my good friend who just

came in down the back and I we were Bob

Sharp. We were down in Sentcom and we

had 60 nations in the coalition village.

That was what we thought was a coalition

and we were trying to project political

and military force and there was a lot

of aslaus would say a lot of friction

just to get something to occur.

We should have learned from that. We

need to become a learning organization

from a coalition point of view and we

need to drive into the coalition after

next and and by that I think the

opportunity is more embedded for

integration. Um, liaison is great, but

it doesn't get you into the heart of the

problem. And if we can integrate and and

seek out and bring partners who may not

traditionally have integrated roles,

find the talent, bring the talent in and

allow them to really thrive and then we

would have a nontraditional

coalition that would move at the speed

of relevance.

>> Very good. I invite all of you to jump

in if there are responses to to uh any

of your fellow panelists, but I I think

I would turn to General Stros to ask how

Poland's thinking about this in in this

emerging environment. How are you

thinking about new partners deepening

your relationships particularly given

the challenges, you know, in the Indoacific?

Indoacific?

>> Yes, thank you. Thank you for this

question. uh uh we are as I indicated in

my previous remarks we are very much

looking at NATO that it's our alliance

at how it's adapting and uh it's

adapting quite well especially on the

intelligence side it's uh changed a lot

in recent decade it's created a new

position of deputy uh secretary general

naming him assistant secretary general

for int intelligence regrouping military

and uh civilian intelligence together.

So that's that's something we are quite

pleased um um speaking to to to your

remarks about uh Sentcom and the the the

the village the coalition of the uh

which which was uh very high in numbers.

uh it happened I was there for one year

and a half and I don't believe too much

in 60 nations coalition I would say this

is this is something uh which which is

quite politically correct but uh in

terms of uh uh efficiency u um could be

better I would I would say in diplomatic

words uh and the numbers really really count

count

when I started my my my first tour at NATO

NATO

Poland was joining NATO. There were 16

nations. We there were then plus three

Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. Now

we have 32 which is quite high number of

course but uh uh NATO still has to adapt

of course but we are still reactive I

would say and perhaps one day we will be

kind of offensive adapting ourselves not

only reacted to the to the things which

are happening in Russia mainly of course

but uh don't uh we had we cannot forget

that China has been mentioned for the

first time at NATO strategic concept. So

perhaps one day it could be also the

tool for that possible uh threat in the

future. So uh um in Poland we are

looking at new of course possible

changes uh in terms of new alliances. We

have so-called old V4 uh format with

Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.

But I would say recently uh there are

some disputes between Poland and Hungary

with regards to Ukraine. So uh then

again we are cooperating quite strongly

with uh Germany and France. Of course a

separate channel with uh UK. So we are

quite eager to to to look into new possibilities.

>> Very good.

>> Uh I I would add a couple of things. Um

I do think that the new world order has

yet to settle out. We're in a transition

phase. Uh and the issue I think is about

any coalition the willing there's a

really key word that will is part of

that. And uh if you look like you are

wavering right then it's very clear that

opponents will take advantage of your

lack of desire to commit fully to

something. And these are the things

which are now being judged and I don't

think we know exactly what the answers

uh may be judgments about us versus

European partners, US versus you know

West Pacific partners maybe in South

Asia and them all looking back at the

United States too and saying I am

unclear as to whether or not the

American will exists on issue X Y and Z.

Right? So I do think that we are

undergoing dramatic change. It has been

accelerated by adversaries like Russia

and China who see opportunity left and

right. Uh some are more circumspect than

others. China versus Russia. Uh but they

see opportunity and they are striking

while it's hot. And so what you find is

this pushing and this probing

uh of these formerly blue coalitions to

determine whether or not we will

actually have strength that meets

strength. And we're not just talking

about manufacturing and our defense

industrial base. We're talking about

political strength. We're talking about

the strength of our publics, right? To

be able to back policy choices. And

right now, if you're looking at others

looking at us, I mean, we have to be

very honest about this.

We don't know where, you know, our

president may be on certain issues,

right? And so Japan doesn't know, right?

And the Philippines don't know and NATO

may not know. And so this period of

uncertainty where we don't deliver what

people need, which is fundamentally

about trust, your trust, your

credibility, that buys you, you know,

deterrence, capability. You have a

capability, you communicate it, and you

have credibility. In each one of those

areas, there are question marks that

exist. And I think that you're going to

find that the red side will exploit all

of those to the maximum degree, but they

will halt when they meet something that

they can't get around or they can't get

through. And so the question is whether

or not, you know, we will have these

coalitions that are truly of the

willing, that have the will and the

staying power to maybe escalate, not

just deescalate all the time, but

escalate because there's something very

important that requires us to fight uh,

you know, to the to the last on whatever

it is. And I think because it's been

brought into question that you have sort

of this slippery, you know, calculation

that's occurring in many capitals about

where they should hedge and where they

should align themselves.

>> Yeah. I I think there's an interesting

situation. A lot of the American

strength used to be measured in uh just

pure military, but that's not the center

of gravity of America. It's our economy.

And with the hollowing out of

manufacturing, the exporting of jobs,

the destruction of American society

through globalism,

a lot of our strength evaporated and

it's been illusionary for 30 40 years.

And so a lot of this is really more in

the modern era. Uh we we need we need uh

allies and we need good uh uh nations,

trusted nations. Uh but we also expect

uh uh our good friends to carry their

fair share and there's frankly since the

end of the cold war uh there's been a

just a massive decline and again one of

the one of the core concerns in America

is just the absence and the exporting of

jobs which in the old world was looked

at as a good thing. We now see that that

actually weakened America and so a lot

of our focus is not giving away free

stuff anymore. We don't have it. A lot

of it is uh we want trade uh not aid and

and this is a good counter to uh what

China is offering because really when

you look at all this all roads lead to

China and that's really what is creating

the uh the the friction in the world. Uh

Russia would not be in the game in uh in

in the war in Ukraine if it wasn't for

uh support from China. U they could

argue people say it was Iran. Well,

where does Iran get all the machine

tools from? Where does North Korea get

all the machine tools from? It's all

China. It's all China. So there is an

evolving world and we absolutely need

trusted uh

partner nations but they have to carry

their own weight and that's what we we

want to see skin in the game and uh so

the old world is gone and uh just

America giving away free stuff. We want

we want to participate and provide a a

tangible counter to China and a lot of

that is trade and that's a revival of

American manufacturing.

Uh we we we've now seen the cost of just

pushing that all overseas over the last

few decades. It it hollows out a nation

and so that's what we're focusing on.

Well, as the four of you have worked

across multiple capitals in your

esteemed careers, I think my question

for in response to this conversation is

a lot of that takes time, right? Each

individual government will take time to

make the investments to grow industry.

It will take time to grow the economy

you're talking about. What are the

trade-offs in the near term? Are we able

to operate across theaters? Can we be

responsive to the dynamic threat

environment that has been referred to

several places here today? You know,

what do we do while that is developing

while while countries are coming?

>> Well, again, you you know, the true

strength and what President Trump is

showing is the power of the economy and

the the power we are the largest economy

in the world. Let's start acting like

it. For some reason, for 30 years, we've

acted like we're this small a smaller

economy. that is we still have immense

economic power and yet president after

president have failed to use that and

again I I just point to the last last

year the big uh harrah at the NATO

summit was suddenly in the last 5

minutes before the NATO summit 22 of the

32 nations had reached 2% now I would

say there was some creative accounting

going on there uh suddenly but oh no

more we can't afford af for any more

than that now everybody's suddenly only

at 5%. We just needed new leaders. We

just needed new leadership to bring that

magic number. Now everybody can afford

5% suddenly. So the these things are

important and uh using our economy as

the center of gravity, not just

constantly projecting military force all

over the world and an umbrella over

everyone. It's actually our economy and

that's what's important.

>> I don't subscribe to those views. I

think that you know we have our own

interests and we pursue them with all

instruments of national power but I also

believe that you know simply going

transactional or tariffing uh these

things drive our friends away and you

can see India just sent troops to be

part of Zapad you know uh with Russia

and Barus uh and they're hedging clearly

with Modi going to the parade in Beijing

we've lost you know years and years of

investment in that relationship ship

which had some elements of

counterbalancing. It wasn't going to be

the perfect counterbalancer.

But, you know, we have to be careful of

overusing any one instrument, right?

Because this stuff will have a backlash

and it's already showing up the limits

of your power. And so, you can squander

a lot of that trust by simply going into

an extraction state here using your

economy. So, are we trying to win

friends or we trying to, you know,

repel, you know, friends here? You can't

separate out, you know, an a very very

strong move like tariffs from the

overall relationship. They aren't

divisible. They are actually

interconnected and people make judgments

about whether or not they want to work

with the American side or not. And once

burned, they're going to feel those

scars for a long time to come. And we

have to realize that there's a bunch of

intangibles here. not just a bottom line

on whether or not we increase the stock

of three companies in the United States,

but whether or not actually we're

earning friends that allow us to

actually deal with those big

complicating macro trends that I talked about.

about.

>> If I may add from the Polish perspective

and uh I would say like that my career

always linked quite hard to the to the

US. Uh I I I was trained at Fort Benning

uh Georgia exactly 30 years ago and we

always looked at us uh at your val

values at your friendship. Of course we

understand the economy Polish economy is

doing quite well. Uh but uh the at the

end of the day this is the trust and the

credibility between the soldiers from

the lowest level to the to the highest

level. But of course the military

doesn't do all and we know that uh uh we

need also a heavy and uh much better

cooperation between our industry to

include of course military one. Uh we

have invested a lot in uh our military.

We have invested a lot in some um new

equipment especially from US and we

acquired uh billions uh uh for for your

uh beautiful equipment I would say. Uh

so that is the perspective from Poland

and we always believe in values.

So to give us the perspective of a much

smaller nation. So New Zealand is the

size of the city of Melbourne population

wise. Our GDP is one third of defense US

defense annual operating budget. Um and

often we are quite openly declared as

strategically irrelevant. Um unless

we're talking about rugby and we're not

going to have that discussion. Um,

it's a really challenging issue and I

completely agree. A nation must do what

it should for its own national interest.

But when the shared interests align,

then we can move faster and do things.

The example I'll give you is the recent

deployment of a Chinese destroyer group

into the Tasman Sea. Um, unannounced

live firing between New Zealand and

Australia. Now that's a thousand mi of

cold sharkinfested water, but to turn up

and start live firing with a a very

capable platform is a signal. Um, and

you don't need a PhD to understand what

that signal is to be able to counter it

and do something and spend more than 1%

of GDP. Then a democracy needs the

social license to actually vote. And

that is challenging in my country. uh

frustrating for me having lived here and

enjoyed the protection that that US has

given many nations and some of that is

lost all too quickly on a social media

post. So the the reality of having that

deep political discussion and saying we

need combat capability if there is a

surface combatant there you can't go out

there with your logistic sustainment

platform and have a meaningful

discussion. So strategic deterrence and

shared strategic deterrence. Your

question earlier was about how do how

might we create craft statemanship? How

how would we do that if next time the

combatant comes down it's one of four

flat decks that may be out there. I

think there's three a float inside the

first island chain. What will that look

like in 24 months? We do we have 24

months to craft policies to share

information? And I note the chairman of

the NATO military committee came to the

southwest Pacific. Now you've got to ask

yourself the reason NATO exists is not

to come down into the southwest Pacific.

There is a deliberate decision at the at

the ambassador level in NATO.

If I may add, speaking about time, I

based also upon remarks from General

Phillips from for the for the key key uh

speaker during our lunchon. Uh that is

something which really changed the

dynamics and uh uh I give you one

example very very tangible one. when we

bought your your Patriot systems uh

couple years ago, we started to train

our soldiers at Fort Seal, Oklahoma and

it was intended to be year and a half,

two years depending on your specialty

and when the war started in Ukraine and

the patriots fortunately were given to

Ukraine, the training took six weeks. So

this is something that we have to look

across the board our our structures our

training our capabilities to include

NATO perhaps to include the decision-m

process at at ambassador ambassadorial

level and uh military committee uh which

are represented by by the the the chief

of general staffs. So these are the

timing issues is also crucial for for

any preparations.

My my sense is that the bureaucracies uh

that have sustained alliance networks

and new coalitions, they will continue

to do the right thing and uh they sort

of understand the world as it is and

they're free of politics. Uh and they

generally have uh clean information or

have the ability to actually filter and

understand really what's going on. and

that we can count on them to see us

through. Maybe some of these challenges

as political leaders uh come and go. At

the same time, uh you know, it's better

if you have alignment between all the

political engagements and then what is

happening kind of in the behind the

scenes uh perhaps with some uh less

senior people and combatant commanders

are less senior people than what the

White House, the cabinet would issue.

when you have uh confusion, when it

looks like you have different signals

being sent from the very top versus the

bureaucracies that are sort of doing the

day-to-day, then that's harder for the

bureaucracies to sort of compensate for

over time. I think we've actually done

it pretty well. I think we've seen our

way through. And I think it's true not

just in the United States but other

governments too that you find that uh if

you dig deep no matter how volatile the

situation maybe ro and Japan is a good

example those intelligence leaders were

sharing continually throughout it was

too important for us to forego the

intelligence relationship right uh and

the US uh right there ensuring that uh

the flows uh continued and so I think

the the alignment between the political

class and the rest of the government

agencies that are doing the work uh you

know should be there and I think that's

stressed right now. I think we'll be

able to you know see it through. I want

to make another comment uh though that

you know we can't just be thinking in

terms of having the strength to work

together to deter right we well I think

we've overused the word deterrence

integrated deterrence to me is a very

hackne phrase uh you found you know last

few years that everybody's you know it

passes the lips all too easily and we

didn't identify what we were actually

deterring whether or not we're talking

about just the Taiwan straight crossing

we're talking about an invasion of

another NATO nation right somewhere in

Europe and this failure to actually

identify what we mean by deterrence uh I

think has not served us very well and

the the fact of the matter is these

coalitions are very important to these

bureaucracies and the political

commitment to them are very important

because our adversaries will not be

deterred I mean wise up they're they're

operating and moving they're conducting

political warfare information warfare

are economic warfare you're at war right

and so I'm not sure what we're waiting

to deter and building up our is it only

drones for a cross straight crossing

right because I think we're

misidentifying the nature of the

conflict that we're currently in we need

friends we need the friends to be united

and to operate in the mode of trying to

shape things hourly and daily and weekly

because we are having, you know, our

adversaries present us with more and

more disadvantages that we're finding

harder to mitigate, right? And so

anyway, just a few comments there, but

let's let's actually add uh to our

lingo. It's not just about deterrence.

It's also about assurance and it's also

about shaping every single day as if

today's the Super Bowl because that's

how they think about competition in the

grand rivalries of today.

>> Yeah, I'm I'm a little curious about the

word of bureaucracies here. I I thought

that was a negative adjectival

expression here. So I'm not sure dep I

mean I don't know if this is a shadow

government here or something like that.

I never thought bureaucracies so

depending on bureaucracies to do

anything. I spent 40 years in

government. Uh I'm not sure depending on

bureaucracies to uh perhaps undermine

the elected uh body here. I don't know.

I'm not tracking on that.

>> So well if I could finish admiral here.

We we absolutely want uh trusted

partners. That's there's no question of

that and it should never be questioned.

But we shouldn't be illusional either.

The admiral mentioned India. India's

well I I I would love to have better

relations with India but India despite

sanctions by the previous administration

and going back has been consuming on the

side sanctioned oil and uh you know they

got caught with their hands in the

cookie jar on that. It's as simple as

that. So too bad. um you know I'm sorry

I would love to have better relations

and I think we're working on that with

India but at the same time and sanctions

don't work a lot of a lot of talk about

sanctions there's sanction and then

there's sanction enforcement

unfortunately that's one of the problems

here there's been very little sanction

enforcement if we're going to put in a

sanction we got to enforce it or it's

worthless and uh again the India is a

great example of that they got caught uh

with buying a gas and oil from

sanctioned oil but also China and that's

the challenge here because of an

undersized military because of a uh a

lot of it's because of our industrial

base especially our navy we can't

enforce sanctions we can India and China

have been buying sanctioned oil for 5 10

years here uh it really took a over the

last few years it's really taken a spike

>> what what I mean by bureaucracies is

simply public servants that uh are

professionals that aren't political

appointees that come in for a short

period of time. In fact, political

appointees become part of the

bureaucracy. It's not simply a dirty

word. Uh we we've actually our strategic

culture has suddenly started to malign a

so-called deep state when they have good

Americans trying to do right by their

country and they're servicing the

American people and doing all the things

that make a big society like ours go.

They have the right kind of knowledge.

they have the right kind of expertise.

Uh it's not perfect. Bureaucracies can

be streamlined etc. Every leader I know

who goes into a new command tries to do

some of that streamlining and

reorganization. But at the same time, we

depend on our public servants to advance

American interests. And we ought not to

treat them as if they're the enemy.

in the interest of time, I'm going to

take us down a different different path

here just because several of you

referred to the importance of the

defense industry technology, the need to

collaborate uh in new and different

ways. you know, given the centrality of

AI, the emerging partnerships across

countries that are not part of, you

know, our traditional intelligence

sharing relationships, can you offer

some reflections on the how how you're

thinking about AI technology, open

source intelligence as enabling tools

for the for the world today? How are we

how are we thinking about making sure

that we are evolving the toolkits as we

are evolving the partnerships? Well,

with AI and that's been one of the the

most important things as far as an

export strategy is the American AI

export strategy. We dominate there's a

there's a magic five uh that uh in chip

production which is really the

foundation of a of AI. uh it's uh Taiwan

obviously it's Japan it's the US um

Netherlands and then South Korea we have

some situations in uh in South Korea but

it's first of foremost the chips and

that's what China wants is those chips

they've spent billions of dollars trying

to replicate uh the chip production and

they just haven't been able to do it so

that's a power and that's leverage and

that's that's a tool obviously there's

large language models and there's also

the uh applications, but we we we feel

that is a center of gravity to really uh

again as a counter to the uh to the Silk

Road belt and road uh that that's a

that's a very attractive option and and

counter to that

>> for sure. I think, you know, my

reflection is that I think it's changing

the way we're thinking about, you know,

some of the foundational work of, you

know, working with allies and partners.

And so I would offer, you know, if the

panel wants to to reflect on that, how

are we thinking about, you know,

collaborating in new and different ways?

How are we thinking about integrating

new technology amid the kind of emerging

challenges of the day and new alliance structures?

structures?

Meansancy, I would offer that the the

limitations of our partnership typically

comes down to whether or not we can

trust that when we share information, it

can be protected. And this has been a a

major issue for every partnership. In

fact, you know, America with leaks has

proven not to be able to protect some of

the intel that we've gotten through our

alliance networks too. So, this is kind

of as a shared problem. And the

question, you know, Rob tried to answer

that earlier, Rob Joyce, about whether

or not, you know, AI enabled capability

favors the defense or the offense. And

the answer is, well, both are going to

be, you know, adopting it uh and

growing. And if you're behind, if you're

not on the leading edge, you're

vulnerable, right? So how do you

actually uh get into that mode where

you're you're not uh on the trail edge

of adopting that technology but you're

there learning with it and and securing

your networks because if if you can't do

that right and I do think AI is going to

help us essentially give a lot of

capability rather than saying to you

know Japan and the Philippines and other

partners let's say we want you to grow a

cyber security force that has this

amount of skills. You can go to these

courses, whatever. AI promises to

actually be able to give them cyber

security in a box to a certain degree,

right? Where somebody else can be

developing and improving that AI through

machine learning, but you're giving away

that capability so they can run on their

networks to identify where there may be

vulnerables. You're always hunting,

you're always sensing, you're always

nipping things in the bud, for example,

files moving in the wrong place or

xfiltration. And so I do think that that

is very promising. If we don't get that

fielded, if it's sluggish this way, I

think we will still find that we're

going to hit the left and right limits

of what we can do in these networks

because ultimately that's the

showstopper. If you can't protect

information that we're going to give

you, if we're going to go right over the

enemy, we can't afford to just put it

down a civ, right? And so to the extent

AI helps there, I think that can

strengthen the partnership. To the

extent that we're slow, then I think

that it will be a drag on our on our

alliances and our networks.

>> Perhaps I'd ask ask our partners here in

the middle uh to offer some reflections

on how you think it'll it will impact

interoperability. You know, you were

talking about shrinking training

training timelines. We're talking about

trying to figure out standardized ways

to work together. lessons from previous

you know collaborations. How how are you

seeing your countries think through this

you know emerging technology

environment? Yeah, first of all this uh

changes in uh um AI cyber I I I'm

looking mainly from the disinformation

perspective which is key to to fight

some Russian influence especially in

Poland or uh perhaps some other

countries but uh this is key uh to

success how to uh to fight and to use

this uh uh technology changes uh uh in

with this regards uh

how I I I would add one thing because

the this is the issue for uh looking for

new partners or going out of the box

from traditional way of thinking. Uh I

am the chief of the military counter

intelligence which is called internal

service but so I should be in Poland all

the time but that's that's that has been

changed uh for the for the protection of

of information uh for the protection of

of Poland we need uh robust

collaboration uh with our partners uh uh

of course also in terms of uh new

uh techniques, new uh possible

applications and uh technologies. So uh

the coming back to the information

sharing which could be uh secured uh uh

the trust and credibility I mentioned

before was me mentioned by my fellow

panelists is key to this aspect but so

the changes in in my country are are

focused on on those issues as well and

going out of the box uh thinking and

trying to understand uh the the reality

as and as I indicated

to be ahead of our major uh enemy, not

to react to his actions.

So, I'd offered probably three

reflections. The technologies that are

now present across the intelligence

communities and all of the nations that

we work with are light years ahead of

what we used to have. And I think this

gives us the opportunity to think

differently about the human in the

intelligence cycle. The process,

exploitation, dissemination aspect. If

we're able to collect for release, given

that collect may be machine-based, if we

can start with that mindset, then we can

get straight into write for release,

which should speed up information

sharing. If policies don't allow that,

then we have a problem.

>> Uh the way that I used to describe it

when I worked at DIA was the only way to

fix an ailing patient is to give the

patient CPR to stop it terminating. CPR,

culture, policy, risk. Culture will

destroy everything. And if the culture

is I must start with secret, no foreign.

And if I'm writing and I don't have the

authority to change that caveat, then

how am I making the boat go faster? I'll

use the sailing analogy because there's

a couple of sailors in the room and I'll

use the America's Cup. And the America's

Cup has at times not lived in America.

The way that New Zealand took it with

Sir Peter Blake was innovative and

culturally driven. And he had one mantra

carved in a piece of wood where the boat

lived. If what we do today does not make

the boat go faster, why are we doing it?

If what we do today does not make the

boat go faster, why are we doing it?

As an analyst, if you are unable to

write at the speed of release, if there

is a human in the process who is slowing

that down, then the policy maker

decision maker may not be able to have

the engagement with a international

partner or a private sector partner. So

somehow we should use the technology to

drive that culture and we should be

quite clear about where is the risk.

Now, the risk may be that you've got

something from me and I don't want it

shared or you've given me something and

we don't want it shared or it may be a

third party and we're not quite sure

what to do with it because we're still

having policy discussions. We need

policy that is information age based,

intentbased, and people need to have the

confidence and authority to say, "Well,

I will share as opposed to what may or

may not have happened where I went to my

friend and

took the top off the document and gave

it to him when we breached and then

afterwards either I got the document

back or we burnt it or I'm not saying

that happened,

but I know in an operational setting

sometimes people are forced to take

risks and we shouldn't put that that

risk on the individual. We should that

put that political risk where it needs

to sit. That means culture, policy and risk.

>> What building off of that, you know, a

lot of this will be dependent on

industry to industry collaboration. And

so wonder if you could offer a few

reflections on, you know, your views on

how we broaden the, you know, in

broadening that toolkit. There's the

policy piece. How do we how do we make

sure we are having our intelligence

organizations able to accomplish the

mission with the latest tools? But a lot

of that is dependent on the space the

innovation space that's not within

government. And so how how are you

seeing the partnership between industry

and government from your various perspectives?

perspectives?

>> I'm happy for anybody to jump in.

>> I mean I I I think uh we we've made some

strides in this. If you talk to Trey

Witworth, he'll he'll talk about Maven,

you know, tonight if he gets to the

fireside chat and, you know, we've we've

had a number of different initiatives,

different organizations within the

Pentagon. Uh we have some we struck some

uh deals, inked contracts uh with a

number of leading companies to be able

to adopt this technology. uh the ODI has

tried to take it seriously maybe moving

too slow but in some cases you really do

want to be very careful uh with regard

to what the technology brings and

whether or not you put everything in one

sock right or whether or not you have

sort of the humant over here and the

sigant and cyber over here what so there

are arguments both sides with regard to

you know security as well as performance

uh with regard to these capabilities so

you know I I do think we're getting

along uh I do think that there's even

more opportunity uh here. I think that

there are plenty of industry partners

who totally understand the security uh

aspects and and are working very very

hard to deliver you know what we need.

Um, so I I have I'm very optimistic

about how we're going to actually do

this partnership going forward. And and

if we can ease up some of those

impediments that used to make everything

so darn sluggish, then all the better

because new competitors, maybe small

companies that have something new to

offer now also have a chance to be

competitive, not just sort of the the

traditional primes.

I think it's also the agility of

government and we've we've talked about

this for for years but it's the agility

of government to consume and take in

innovation from the private sector. uh

we still have a a requirements process

that is uh challenging and uh I mean

anybody who's been involved in that it

just speed is not uh normally associated

with that but uh taking in uh goodness

from the private sector that's one of

the key things and that's that's that's

hard for that's hard for government to do

>> I mean I think forums like this go a

long way in providing you know an avenue

for that type of dialogue I think we've

seen over the last probably 10 years

some significant reforms on the US side

and how we're thinking about technology

adoption and the increasing the speed. I

wonder if our our colleagues from Poland

or um have seen the same or

>> Yeah, we have seen the changes from from

your perspective of course, but we

believe that still there are some hards

uh which could be um taken away I would

say or could be faster. Uh, of course

I'm not speaking about US bureauc bureaucracy.

bureaucracy.

Uh, but uh anyway uh I I I am a great

advocate of of cooperation and I believe

in Poland. Of course we are very much

like a younger brother of US who who who

is still learning but uh the the the

potential is there and the cooperation

between private small and and medium

companies. Uh, of course we have also

industrial base uh which is which is

quite uh sluggish in some cases. So uh

we saw those those changes. I saw them

by by myself but still I believe uh we

need the cooperation not only within

military uh um in military case but also

in some other um

on some other issues which which build

some relations uh steady relations we need.

need.

>> My experience is when someone sees a

bright idea they latch on to it pretty

quickly. Um, and it's not bound by

geography or passport.

>> Um, New Zealand has a space industry,

would you believe? >> Mhm.

>> Mhm.

>> Rocket lab. I mean, we're launching cube

sets as an industry. >> Um,

>> Um,

once you see it, if you're a operator,

you'll go straight to the best solution. Um,

Um,

that is something I've seen throughout

my career. um you know the establishment

of the um from Maven the joint

artificial intelligence center and what

flowed from that was very impressive uh

and I I keep looking at bright young

people as we see outside.

>> Yes. doing some amazing things. And I

walk down there and there's Jane's, you

know, we all grew up with Jane's books,

you know, and now the platform they've

got is completely different and world

class, but it I still go to my book now

and again cuz I'm analog.

>> We're old. Yeah. But the the young

analysts these days can do such amazing things

things

>> and they'll they'll bring these ideas to

you. We had a particular operation and a

young a young corporal came to me with

an idea and we let him run with it and

as a result others went straight to that

solution. So my sense is those that have

to create strategic effect will embrace

good ideas quickly.

>> That's great. That's actually a great

note for the for the revelation that we

have run the clock out gentlemen. Uh we

have just a few minutes left and so I

think you know again kind of kind of

thinking about those remarks I'd ask for

any final reflections you have when you

think about looking 5 10 years in the

future what will alliance building in

this era like what does success look

like? You know what are the things that

we should be considering? Is it you know

new technologies? Is it new new

partners? Is it new um power dynamics?

What will success look like 5 10 years

from now? And I will go in this order

down and we'll let Admiral Sudman offer

the final word today.

>> Okay. Well, I hope it means a peaceful

world uh first of all and uh that we uh

we we have uh uh both our alliance

partners and uh also trusted nations

that we have uh created uh new

relationships with and uh uh first and

foremost again with trade because that's

really uh trade and diplomacy that's the

way it should start and should be. So uh

I think there's good opportunity here

and I just uh we do we are living in a

uh in a very volatile world and uh uh

there is a a lot of lot of uh not just

in Ukraine that is just it is and our my

my uh our Polish colleague here is

feeling it directly but uh there's a lot

more around the world going on. So

hopefully we will make sure there's no

con long conflict.

Great. Thank you.

>> So, I'm not expecting human nature to

change. I'm expecting complexity and

volatility, ambiguity. Um, I would like

to think that our shared values remain

shared and that we are still able to

work through the the big strategic

issues that we know are in front of us.

I you know and in 5 years when I hope to

be doing more hunting and fishing and

relaxing that we're still not arguing

about can I release must must I may go

asking my parents if I can. I'd like to

see that we empower the young people

that are here to be future directors of

agencies where they're not having the

discussions that Bob and I used to have

when we beat our head against the wall

because it didn't make sense. So, I'd

like to see that happening and I'd like

to thank every American here for what

you do for those of us that have faith

in that. So, you recovered my dead and

wounded on a battlefield.

>> Thank you.

>> Speaking about changes in 5 10 years, we

don't believe that Russia approach will

change in that uh period of time. Uh we

haven't uh also believed that in the in

the past. So uh just of as as I

mentioned a couple times during my

remarks uh we strongly believe that still

still

your respective country USA will be uh

present in Europe. We believe that NATO

will be strong, of course, stronger with

the potential of European nations uh

bet getting better in all dimensions. Uh

so just adapting to the to the new uh

reality but still the same threat from

the east. Uh and it's quite hard to find

new partners. I would say from our

perspective it's not that many nations

all over the world. Uh and still from

our perspective and thank you for that.

US is the key partner for Poland.

>> Thank you.

>> If we're not more astute about our state

craft and our place in the world, the

United States uh that the center will

not hold and China will gain

increasingly sway over the world. In my

view, they have a vision for the future.

We haven't laid out a vision for the

world. Uh we are certainly

deconstructing parts of the vision out

of frustration. That's legitimate

frustration. But what do you put in its

place? what is the vision that American

Washington will set out in crafting it

with other allies and partners to say

this is the world that I think we should

aim for and it should reflect kind of

the reality of our times which means

it's going to be a more disintegrated

world with different blocks and a

multi-polar world uh I don't think we've

seen that vision yet it could come

through a national security strategy

could come through something else uh but

absent that the Chinese have one and

they've been propounding it for a long

time right and they're adding to the

global development initiative, the

global security initiative, the global

you know civilization initiative and now

the global governance initiative right

they are very good at uh pretending that

they're not doing what they're doing and

they've convinced most of the global

south in fact that the winning you know

formula is to be more closely allied

with China than with others you have a

strengthening red block which has

already made significant grounds. 140

countries that used to trade primarily

with the United States now trade

primarily with China. The world is being

transformed under our nose. China will

be the setter of standards because they

are investing in people in international

institutions and because they're

developing the technology and harvesting

it from our economies and all the rest.

And so I sometimes have a very bleak

sense of maybe where this could go on

our current trajectory. If we don't

change course then I think that we are

handing a win to China because we will

look unilateral. we will not look like the benign hegeimon anymore and it will

the benign hegeimon anymore and it will be more economically attractive and

be more economically attractive and maybe even from a security point to

maybe even from a security point to hedge stronger with Chinese even amongst

hedge stronger with Chinese even amongst our our our allies that you would never

our our our allies that you would never think would do that right at the very

think would do that right at the very middle at the very minimum they could be

middle at the very minimum they could be playing a middle game right rather than

playing a middle game right rather than just being all on one side and so if we

just being all on one side and so if we don't wake up to this we don't

don't wake up to this we don't understand the geopolitical trajectories

understand the geopolitical trajectories and the momentum that China has and the

and the momentum that China has and the skills and techniques that they've used,

skills and techniques that they've used, their strategims, that we're going to

their strategims, that we're going to find ourselves in a much lonelier place

find ourselves in a much lonelier place uh going forward. And so I would just

uh going forward. And so I would just cast a warning to anybody that's still

cast a warning to anybody that's still in the community, still in the

in the community, still in the government that we're going to actually

government that we're going to actually need to see the world for what it is and

need to see the world for what it is and start acting as if we need friends to be

start acting as if we need friends to be able to create the world that we really

able to create the world that we really want and keep those things that we want

want and keep those things that we want to, you know, protect. Thanks.

to, you know, protect. Thanks. >> Thank you very much.

>> Thank you very much. >> Russia.

>> Russia. >> Well, thank you. Thank you all for your

>> Well, thank you. Thank you all for your thoughts today. We could go on for

thoughts today. We could go on for another hour, but I think we are freshly

another hour, but I think we are freshly out of time per per our moderator here.

out of time per per our moderator here. So,

So, [Applause]

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YouTube Transcript:2025 Intel Summit: Evolving Alliances for a New Era