This content details the experiences of former CIA officers Andrew and Jihei Bustamante, who were tasked with uncovering a mole within the CIA. Their story reveals the complex, morally ambiguous nature of intelligence work, the personal sacrifices involved, and the psychological toll it takes.
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When this story hits the airwaves, it's
going to transform people's opinion
about the CIA and the depths to which
CIA will dive to collect intelligence
that protects Americans. But one of its
own officers became a spy reporting our
secrets to a foreign adversary. My wife
and I were included in an operation to
bait the mole to make a mistake so that
the mole could be found and disclosed.
>> Your wife is here today and you've never
told this story before, have you?
>> No. And your curiosity right now is a
major issue with CIA because they don't
want the world to know who those people
are. It's a dangerous game.
>> Well, obviously my research team tried
to figure out who it was.
>> So, was this the mob?
>> Married CIA spies Andrew and Jihi
Bamante were tasked with unraveling one
of the greatest intelligence operations
in modern history. Their untold story
shows you how to build trust,
manipulate, and thrive under pressure.
What actually happened?
>> A foreign ally contacted CIA and said,
"You have somebody inside your
organization sharing information on
operations, officers, assets to an enemy
country." They deployed us to the
country and crafted new identities, new
aliases so that we could build new
sources of intelligence and try to find
the mole.
>> And we were really successful in doing that.
that.
>> Nobody felt like they were in imminent
danger. But then that changed. My
presence in the enemy country became
known. I called G and said, "I'm coming
home early."
>> And from that, I knew that something was
wrong because it is very real that you
can be disappeared by a foreign adversary.
adversary.
>> Or worse, being captured and the
president can plausibly deny that you're
CIA. So, I had to try to escape this
country. But everything went wrong.
>> And what happens next?
>> A horrible story. So,
So, [Music]
[Music]
>> this is the first time I'm setting you
at home a challenge when you listen to
this episode. Can you figure out which
country Andrew and Jihi were undercover
in as spies from what they say? But
also, our team here have figured out
that the mole in the CIA was one of
these three people. Can you figure out
from what they say which person was the
mole? It might make sense for you at
this moment to screenshot these three
faces and the details below so you can
remember their profiles. And by the end
of the conversation, I want you to
comment below which country you thought
Andrew was undercovering as a spy and
which one of these people was the mole
within the CIA. Let's do this. Listen to
my regular listeners. I know you don't
like it when I ask you to subscribe at
the start of these conversations. I
don't like saying I don't like it being
in there. None of us like it. It's
frustrating. Do you know what's also
frustrating? It's also frustrating when
I go into the back end of a YouTube
channel and I see that 56% of you that
listen frequently to this podcast
haven't yet subscribed and so many of
you don't even know that you haven't
subscribed because I see in the comment
section you say to me, you go, I didn't
even realize I didn't subscribe and that
actually fuels the show. It's basically
like you're making a donation to the
show. So that's why I ask all the time
because it enables us to build and build
and build and build and we're going for
the long term here. So all I'd ask you
is if you've seen this show before and
you like it, help me help my team here.
Hit the subscribe button and we'll
continue to build this show for you.
That's my promise. Thank you to all of
you guys that do subscribe. Means the
world to me. Let's get on with the show. [Music]
[Music] >> Andrew,
>> Andrew,
you've never told this story before,
have you?
>> No, I have never told the story of my
own operational background. It's been uh
it's been something that CI has
forbidden for a long time.
And what's written in this book has
taken you a long time to get approved by
the CIA.
>> Correct. So, uh, all CIA officers sign a
lifetime secrecy agreement. And that
secrecy agreement, uh, gives CIA the
right to to approve or disapprove any
operational elements of our background
that are still classified and that fit
under this very kind of narrow rubric of
sources and methods. Sources and methods
of active intelligence collection.
because of my time at CIA, my work at
CIA, and the sensitivity of that work, I
just kind of assumed I would never be
able to talk about it. And then all that
changed with the first Trump administration.
administration.
>> What was the CIA's response when you
said that you wanted to talk about what
you're going to talk about today?
>> Well, that's what's interesting. They
had two different responses. When I
first submitted the request in 2019 to
CIA to write about my operational
background, we went through kind of some
normal bureaucratic back and forth and
they ultimately said yes, you can write
about it in in detail. And then in 2021
when we submitted the manuscript and it
was complete, the world started to
change. In 2022, uh, multiple major
issues, uh, erupted between major
adversaries of the United States and CIA
came back and and removed their previous
permission. Uh, they basically said that
in light of current geopolitics,
everything in the book was now reclassified.
reclassified.
>> How did you get the CIA to change their
mind so that you could release this book
and talk about what you're going to talk
about today?
>> We engaged with an attorney, one of the
top attorneys in the space of classified
information and publishing information.
So the attorney believed that because of
the effort that my wife and I had put
into the book, CIA would back off. And
ultimately that is what they did. When
we threatened them with a First
Amendment lawsuit, they came back and
said, "We don't want to go down that
road. We think we can collaborate on
this. We'll approve your book uh and you
can move forward."
>> Why do you think they didn't want you to
publish this book and this story to get out?
out?
>> When this story hits the airwaves, it's
going to transform people's opinion
about CIA in two big ways. First,
they'll understand that CIA is not what
the movies portray it to be. It's not
superhuman spies who go out there like
James Bond or Jason Bourne who are one
man against the world. That's not how
espionage works. Espionage is a team
sport. You have wins, you have losses.
The second thing is they'll actually
they'll start to understand the depth to
which CIA will dive to collect
intelligence that protects Americans.
Inside this book, we talk about a mole
that actually penetrated CIA that CIA
has never acknowledged. Inside this
book, we talk about new tactics that CIA
learned from terrorism and then used
against our own most strategic
adversaries. I don't think people
recognize that CIA is morally ambivalent
to how it executes espionage operations.
The goal is to keep Americans safe.
>> When you say in this book you disclose
that there was a mole within the CIA,
what does that mean for someone that
doesn't know what a mole in the CIA is?
One of the worst things that can happen
to an intelligence service is that one
of its own officers
becomes a spy for a foreign adversary.
That is what I'm referring to when I
talk about a mole.
>> And you were involved in that operation
to find the mole within the CIA.
>> Correct. More specifically, my wife and
I were included in in an operation to
kind of f it out the mole to bait and
and tempt the mole to make a mistake so
that the mole could be found and disclosed.
disclosed.
>> And your wife is here today, >> correct?
>> correct?
>> And we're going to bring her in and talk
to her as well. But for the for anyone
that doesn't know your backstory, which
would be pretty remarkable seeing as
you've been on this channel now a few
times. Um, could you give me a whistle
stop tour of your professional
background up until the point that you
met Jihi?
>> Yeah, absolutely. So, I'm from a rural
place in Pennsylvania. Uh was like the
only brown kid in a white high school,
but I ended up going to an air a
military academy. I went to the Air
Force Academy. And from the Air Force
Academy, I go into the Air Force. The
Air Force teaches me how to fly. They
teach me a foreign language. And then
they teach me about nuclear weapons and
nuclear missiles. And I serve as a
nuclear missile officer in the Air
Force. So, CIA picked me up. Uh and in
my first my first day on the job in CIA,
that's the day that I met my wife. Um
she was sitting in the back of the
classroom. I of course worked my way to
the front of the classroom and uh and
from there our training just kind of
overlapped and we we became close. Well,
Ji is here so I'd like to hear her
>> Was there any inconsistency in the story
he told?
What was your perspective? There's
always another perspective. And are you
allowed to date in the CIA?
>> Oh, yeah. It's encouraged. Um because
it's really hard when you're keeping so
many secrets to date somebody outside of
the CIA and not be able to tell that
because we had friends who did that who
did that. You have to keep your whole
life secret. So you're lying to them
about where you're going and what you do
>> dayto day
>> dayto day every single day. So you're
building a relationship
>> and lying all the time and it's really
difficult. So, if you date within the
CIA, you know, if you're in different
divisions or whatever, like maybe you
can't talk about everything in detail,
but you at least know what's going on.
You know why somebody's going TDY or
where they're going for a training um
session or
>> we can explain to each other like, "Hey,
I'm going to go work with the Spanish.
I'm going to go work with the with the Canadians."
Canadians." >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> But when you're dating somebody on the
outside, you can't say those things. So,
it becomes, "I'm going on a business
meeting. I'm going on a trip." crazy.
>> And we've had many friends who have had
relationships explode or melt down
because the the partner starts to
>> ask very logical questions. We had one
good friend of ours who was an outsider
who was dating one of our good friends
who was an insider
>> and she pulled me aside one day and she
was like, you know, he goes on all these
business trips but he never takes any
suits. She's like, I think he's cheating
on me. And I was like, "No, he's
actually going to a tactical training
course where you don't need to wear
anything except BDUs, but I can see your
concerns." So, you have to walk your
like there's a lot of walking people off
a cliff because they start to come to
the wrong conclusion
>> about what their actual uh partner is doing.
doing.
>> Chihi, what's your journey into the CIA?
>> Mine was kind of an unexpected journey
because I went into social work working
with um survivors of torture from other
countries, with refugees, with asyles.
But before I got that job, I'd actually
I'd spent my entire last year of grad
school going to job fairs. And I wanted
what I really wanted was to work for the
federal government for like the larger
mission for the United States, for like
the people of the United States. But
then nobody was calling me back. And I
was like, okay. I was like, I'll just
submit an application, like an online
application to CIA, which I thought was
funny. And then a few months later, I
got a call back. She was like, come to
the information session. So, I went in
like a random hotel with these like
nondescript signs outside and you walk
in and you're like, I don't know if I'm
in the in the right place. And then they
close the door and they're like, welcome
to the CIA recruiting session. And
you're like, this is so bizarre.
>> And um
>> do they tell you what your role is? Cuz
I know there's several different roles
in in the CIA.
>> Mhm. Targeters began
uh during the war on terror. And because
what they initially did was target
individuals for capture or kill for the military.
military.
>> Okay. So what what does that mean? They
targeted people for capture or kill for
the military. So you would
>> find the person to capture or kill. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> In a foreign country.
>> Yes. And so because you know everybody
else is doing their job of you know
logistics or weapons or fighting or
strategy. So the targeted position was
really important because it takes time
to to go through all this data to piece
together this puzzle of who is
important, who is important to capture,
who's important to kill, and how do you
get to them? The how do you get to them
is the piece that like everybody else
wants to know, but they don't really
have time to do that and their other
job. So they carved out this targeter
role. So one person can do all this
research and identify and the you know
terrorists were really fascinating
because they had how their organizations
were structured and so you really needed
somebody who could look I mean it's like
u like targeting the mafia right like
everybody has a role like there's a big
organization everybody has a role it is
in your favor if you're t if you're
going after them to find out who who's
who connected to who how Can you get to
different people? Cuz you're never going
to be able to just get the top person
right away. So, how do you get there? Right.
Right.
>> And you became a targeter. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> So, your job was to figure out who to
capture and kill
>> or capture or >> or
>> or
>> And what was your role in the CIA? How
was your role different? Can you explain
it for a layman?
>> Yeah. So, where Ji was trying to find
the individuals that were of interest,
my job was to learn what to do after a
target identified those individuals. How
do you actually meet the person? How do
you befriend the person? How do you win
their trust? How do you collect their
secrets? What's known as a a field
officer, an operations officer, a case
officer? Those are the different
terminologies that we use internally.
But you essentially have every case is
kind of handed over from person to
person. So raw information, sometimes
open source information is handed to a
targeter who creates a profile, a
dossier, a targeting package who hands
it to an operations officer who goes out
and actually makes that first contact.
And then when first contact is made, we
pass all the information back and it
goes back to all the same people to
build the next package for the next target.
target.
>> So jihei would identify the individual
and then your job was to fly overseas,
go undercover and make first contact
with that individual to extract
intelligence from them.
>> And not at first by the time that CIA
started utilizing us as a tandem couple.
A tandem couple is a term that means a
married, truly married, CIA trained
couple. When we started becoming a
tandem couple, that's how we were a
one-two punch for operations. Prior to
that, we were in separate offices in
separate divisions doing separate work.
So, we got along uh and we were
complimentary because I understood the
challenges of her job and she understood
the challenges of my job, which made
both of us better working with our
counterparts in our different offices.
>> So, where where does the story begin? Andy,
Andy,
you know, you you wrote this book to
tell a story. So, I'm asking you the
question. Usually, I' I'd hazard a guess
where to start, but where does this
story begin? From my perspective, the
story really starts on uh on I think it
was a winter day when we were both
called in to a counter intelligence
office that was a massive oak table. It
was a it was a senior executive
leadership type of room.
But there were only three people there.
It was she, it was me, and it was the
leader of what's known as Falcon House,
which is this group of specialists
inside of CIA focused on one particular
adversary, an adversary that we've had
to codeename Falcon to maintain
confidentiality with CIA.
>> And so Falcon is a country basically.
>> Falcon is a country. Correct. And that leader
leader
revealed to us that they believed there
was a penetration, a mole that was
inside of Falcon House, inside of CIA,
and that they needed us to agree to do
an operation so that the mole will make
a mistake here. Cuz if the mole makes a
mistake here, we'll find him. But we
can't have you be here cuz if you're
here, the mole will find you. And then
we don't know what happens if the mole
finds you. So, we're going to send you
across the world to go work in this
other country, Falcon being the country,
while we here as the experts in
Washington DC try to find the mole. And
that was privileged information that
neither of us as junior officers ever
thought we would hear. And I think that
I know for me I was kind of giddy with
excitement and gi was a little bit more
apprehensive with this can't be real.
But that was for me that's where the
story starts is when these two people
her and with her anxiety disorder and
and me with my kind of lackluster CIA
career when we got pulled into this
office that was clearly outside of our
league and invited to do this operation
um without that first meeting Shadow
Cell would have never happened. So from
that moment onwards, how long was it
before you flew to the foreign country
in question?
And what was your objective when you got
to that foreign for foreign country? So
I guess it's like a subobjective to find
the mole and there was another main
objective which was going to help find
the mole.
>> You got to I mean you're using great
terminology. There were primary
objectives and secondary objectives. And
the primary objective was to build a new
set of reporting assets, a new source of
intelligence, several new sources of
intelligence in Falcon, the actual
country. And to to help you frame what
Falcon is, there's only a handful of
countries that are true stark
adversaries to the United States. Every
one of those countries has limited to no
diplomatic relationship with the United
States. That's how hostile they are. Any
one of those countries could be Falcon.
The reason that we have to codeame the
country is because CIA in today's
geopolitical world has has demanded we
don't disclose the name of the country.
So we call it Falcon.
>> What are the United States adversaries
where we don't have any relationship
with them? There's also like North
Korea, there's Russia, there's Iran we
know of. Are there any others? >> Cuba.
>> Cuba.
>> Cuba. Mhm.
>> Yeah. There's and those are uh there's a
mix there of countries that we do have a
relationship with, but it's not a warm
relationship versus countries we have no
relationship with. So, we have no
relationship with North Korea.
>> We have a cold relationship with Russia,
>> right? We have a cold relationship with
China. We have no relationship with Iran.
Iran.
>> So, they're all considered hard targets,
but of various levels.
>> Okay. So this the objective is the
primary objective is to build a new team
in this country, but the subobjective is
in building the team, you're going to
find out hopefully who the mole is
because the mole is going to make a mistake.
mistake.
>> The mole's going to try to find us
because the mole's job is to prevent CIA
from collecting secrets about Falcon.
Cuz the mole is working for Falcon intelligence.
intelligence.
>> The mole is working for that country,
>> right? The mole is part of the CIA but
working for the adversarial country.
>> Bingo. Which is the worst combination
you can have. Um, so some of the most
famous moles in history are Aldrick
Ames. Aldra games was a CIA penetration
that worked for the Russians. Robert
Hansen. Robert Hansen was an FBI
penetration that worked for the
Russians. So these are famous moles in
history. We were essentially being told
that these earthshattering 1990s era moles
moles
were were still relevant, but now in 2010ish,
2010ish,
there was a new one that had made its
way into CIA and and that's a big deal.
So, it was a very exciting reveal for me
because it meant that we were not just
doing something that was relevant and
interesting inside of CIA. We're doing
something that is quite possibly the
most important work that can be done
inside CIA at this moment in time.
>> How did the CIA know there was a mole?
>> There's a lot of complexity there that
is part of why they didn't want us to
write this book. But what they have
allowed us to disclose is that a foreign ally
ally
contacted CIA and said, "We have
collected intelligence that suggests you
have a mole. You have somebody inside
your organization who's a turncoat, a
spy for somebody else." So a foreign
ally warned CIA. Otherwise CIA would
have had no idea.
>> Okay? And foreign allies are people like
the the United Kingdom, >> Canada,
>> Canada, >> Canada,
>> Canada,
>> Australia, Australia,
>> Australia. So you can imagine the
disruption that that would make. Not
only did we did did CIA proper not know
they had a mole. It took an ally to tell
us. And then when the ally told us, we
have to assume that the ally is sharing
as much biographical detail as possible.
So they're telling you the name. Hey,
Bob is a spy in your organization. But
now that CIA officer is an American
citizen protected by American rights and
privileges and CIA obviously has no
information to show that that person's a
spy except for the word of some foreign
ally which is still in the in the eyes
of the US government a foreigner is a
foreigner ally or not. So even if it is
the UK or Canadians telling us so and so
is a spy until we have our own body of
evidence we can't prosecute. That person
can't be fired. That person can't be
discharged. That person can't be sued.
that person can't be arrested. So now
CIA has this mess where they are
actively losing information, actively
losing uh intel
>> because of this mole
>> because of a mole, but they can't take
any action because they have to now
build a legal case against the mole to
prove that that person's actually
breaking the law.
>> So the ally that calls the CIA and says
you've got a mole in your ranks, they
named the person
>> most likely. most likely they would have
never made the the notification without
also sharing the name which is a
courtesy we do to others as well. If we
come across information that we know an
MI6 officer has been compromised or a
Canadian CSIS officer has been
compromised or an ASUS officer in in
Australia, we will share as many
biographical details as possible.
>> And did you share the name? Did when you
were called into the room that day, did
they share the name with you? >> No.
>> No.
It's hard for people to wrap their minds
around the culture at CIA. And I get it
because how do you wrap your mind around
an organization you don't know? And the
only exact the only insight is from
movies. So culturally CIA is a is a
group of people who value secrets. And
that need to know is very important
inside those walls. It's just something
we toss around like movie jargon
outside. But inside CIA need to know is
very very real. And you are only briefed
to the minimum that you need to know. So
inside of this tiny group of of spy
hunters which is known as the the um
counter espionage group CEG inside this
very small group they have the need to
know basically everything and then as
you go out in rings from that group they
reduce the information they share. So
they might know the name but then when
they share it to the next ring they just
say hey there's an officer who's in this
office and then it goes to the next ring
there's an officer in this division and
it goes to the next ring. So the people
talking to us as senior leaders, the
people talking to us knew the minimum we
needed to know was that we were going to
build new operations, but we were also
going to be most likely targeted by a
known threat inside CIA. That was why it
mattered to us. Interestingly, that
decision is why we had a First Amendment
case with this book at all because CIA
was knowingly putting our lives in
danger of a foreign adversary by
intentionally creating operations that
would tempt that mole to disclose our
identities. That was one of the things I
was thinking when I was reading the book
is you knew that you were being sent to
an adversarial country and you also had
the knowledge that working amongst you
was a mole who was revealing secrets
about the CIA and potentially yourselves
to that foreign country. >> Correct.
>> Correct.
>> So that foreign country could have
po could have killed you.
>> Absolutely. And and that's the second
kind of cultural element that people
don't understand about CIA. You don't
really turn down an operation if you're
invited to take part in an operation.
You have the right to say no, but if you
say no, you're committing career suicide.
suicide.
Jihei, and anybody who reads the book
will find this out, Jihei was a stellar
officer on a phenomenal trajectory,
doing incredible things, kind of really
charting the course for what targeters
have become today.
For me, I proved to be a not very good
case officer. And if there was anything
I was really hoping for, it was a second
chance. So, when we were pulled into
this meeting and they said, "Hey, here's
this exciting opportunity. Here's an
operation that we're we're literally
inviting you into this executive suite
to invite you to this operation, and
we're going to put you together, and we
need you to do this." That's not that's
not a situation that I was going to say
no to. I think you considered saying no,
but for me it was it was a they knew me
well enough to know I was not going to
turn that down.
>> Yeah. I mean, I think when you have
anxiety, you consider saying no to
everything. It's like you're always
thinking about the risk. But I think that
that
>> what was the risk that you were thinking
about? It is very real that you can be
disappeared by a foreign adversary, that
you can be, you know, killed by them
with no explanation, that you can be
just put in jail and then you never get
out because the government's not
necessarily going to come to your aid.
And if they do, it might be still might
be 20 years before you're out of their prison.
prison.
>> Every sworn officer has plausible
deniability, meaning the president can
plausibly deny that you don't belong to
whatever organization you are claiming
to belong to. So, a CIA officer arrested
in a Russian prison can can avoid all
questioning and say, "Hold on, guys. I'm
actually CIA. You caught me. Good job.
Now, please send me home. Don't have a
diplomatic incident." The president has
the right to say, "That person is not CIA."
CIA." >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> That person has never worked for me. I
don't know who that person is. uh that
their American passport might be
verified, but but they are legally in
your possession of
>> of um
you know legal requirements. So we we
don't really know who they are. So, so
just to clarify then, you were being
told you were going to be flown, both of
you, to a foreign country,
>> an adversarial foreign country, and you
were told that there was a mole amongst
your your ranks that was feeding
information to the foreign country that
you were being flown to.
>> So, we they actually stationed us in a
neighboring country that was friendly,
but we knew that Andy and anybody we
worked with would have to go into
Falcon. So they flew us to a country
>> Falcon being the adversarial country
>> adversarial country. So we actually
lived in a third country called wolf but
we were operating in both wolf and in
falcon. So the danger was still there
>> and then that's when jih's targeter mind
set in and that's when she started
thinking through well how could our
operation be reverse engineered by
Falcon and actually find us and if we
can think like the enemy we can stay one
step ahead of the enemy. So the whole
idea of going to wolf and building our
team from the very beginning, jihei
started to architect how we could do
that in a way that would foil the foil
our uh aggressors from being able to
even discover our existence.
>> And what was the objective when you so
you've got this subobjective which I
understand which is to find the mole but
the main objective is just to spy as
usual and collect information on this
adversarial country.
>> Yes and no. The main objective was to
collect information, but the spying as
usual is the part that was a no. CIA
specifically told us they didn't want us
to do the standard spy mo.
>> Spying has really been the same since
the days of Egypt, the ancient Egypt,
right? You find somebody who gives you
information about something that they
have access to and that's it. And that's
spying. Then you turn it into a report
and you pass it up to somebody who reads
it and they make a decision. They wanted
a new a new kind of mouse track. They
wanted a new way of doing espionage.
And when they deployed us to the
friendly country, that was their only
request was whatever you do there,
coordinate it with the local leadership
and then don't tell us because we have
to make sure that the mole doesn't learn
what you're doing.
That's going to be how we tempt the mole
to start probing around and asking
questions that are outside of the norm.
That's how we're going to reverse
engineer this and find the mole. So, we
need you to go do something new and we
need it not to be standard.
>> And don't tell us.
>> And don't tell us, but tell your
leadership in the friendly country.
>> Your CA CIA leadership in the French
friendly country. >> Correct.
>> Correct. >> Yes.
>> Yes. >> Okay.
>> Okay.
>> Because the
>> and he's going to tell or she's going to
tell them.
>> No. So, it's completely
compartmentalized. So,
>> need to know,
>> right? Because if we kept all of our operations
operations
um centered in Wolf than in our in our
friendly country, then the mole would
never know what we were doing. So we
would be gathering intelligence which
would then be further compartmentalized
to maybe a specific office where like
one or two people at headquarters might
know about one particular operation and
then one or two people might know about
another operation. But it's because not
all of Falcon House would know, the mole
would not have access to any of these
new, any of these new intelligence
sources. And that's what was really
important. That's why they wanted us to
rebuild because he currently had access
to all of the legacy intelligence
sources. Okay? And so if he wanted to,
you know, pass any information to Falcon
from all of our legacy sources, he
could. But if he doesn't have access to
our new sources, he can't pass any of
that new information on. And now here we
are. We're able to gather more
intelligence and then hopefully if we're
lucky we, you know, we strike gold on
finding out who he is or who he's
working with or other things. But yeah,
compartmentalization was the is the key.
So we were really very um you know uh
kind of siloed in Wolf.
>> I'm trying to understand how you doing
what you were doing was going to help
the CIA discover who the mole was.
One of the things in in
double agent operations, which is what
you're talking about when you talk about
a mole or a penetration, a double agent,
meaning I'm a sworn officer of CIA, but
then I've also agreed to work with the
Russians, the Chinese, the North
Koreans, the Cubans, whatever. That's a
double a double agent. double agent
operations are very difficult to
maintain long term because if my
information isn't relevant to my foreign
adversary anymore if the if I'm
collecting secrets on Cuba but I'm being
paid by the Russians the Russians may
not care that I keep collecting secrets
on Cuba. So they might cut me off and
then all of a sudden I'm a double agent
culpable of crime but without protection
from another country. So when you think
of your Edward Snowdens, when you think
of some of your famous turncoats from
the United States, they flee to the
country that they were working for
ultimately. So if you don't have that
escape path, then it becomes very very
stressful and scary for for a double
agent. So what CIA was counting on is
the mole who was reporting our secrets
to Falcon.
If we could create new operations and
that mole didn't have access to those
new operations, then the mole would
start to stretch. They would start to
make mistakes, ask questions they
shouldn't ask, steal information, try to
hack onto systems they shouldn't get
onto. And that's all stuff that CIA can
use to build a legal case to arrest that
person. But without knowing, without
having something that that person has to
stretch to collect, they're not going to
make a mistake. So our job was to create
something new so that the mole would
make a mistake that CIA could track and
that would build a legal case that would
allow CIA to arrest an American citizen
for espionage.
>> Did the CIA have access to the
information the mole was sending back to
the enemy country?
>> No. That's one of the most dangerous
parts about double agent operations. We
often we have a lot of nicknames, a lot
of inside terminology, but we usually
call it the keys to the kingdom. When
you have a foreign penetration, you have
the keys to everything in that foreign
country's um all of their secrets
because you have access to an
intelligence officer who can pull
anything. So our double agent, our mole
had access to essentially everything
related to Falcon that CIA had. So CIA
didn't know what he was sharing, what he
wasn't sharing, how much he had been
sharing, or even how long he had been
sharing it.
>> But they suspected he was sharing something
something
>> because there was something that our
ally picked up on, something that
allowed them to identify the person and
communicate it back.
>> So you land in this friendly country
next to the enemy country. And do you
have to adopt new aliases, new names,
new new stories? Do you have to pretend
that you're normal people living a
normal life?
>> You do. Um there's different ways that
you can craft it. So um Ji's job as the
targeter was to find our targets in
Falcon. A big part of what we had to do
when we got to Wolf, our friendly
country, was do whatever the leadership
there told us to do. So CIA crafted
everything for us to land in the
friendly country. Once we were in the
friendly country, then we had to start
crafting new identities, new aliases so
that we could travel out of the friendly
country and into Falcon
>> into the enemy country.
>> Mhm. But while living in Falcon, we
were, you know, Ji and Andrew Bamante,
newlywood couple where we worked was
covered, you know.
>> Where did you It's undercover. We still
can't disclose it.
>> Yeah. Like as far as this enemy, did you
like run a when you were in the enemy
country working?
>> Were you like running like a like a
coffee shop or is it
>> Yeah. When going into Falcon, there were
different um you had to have a a
different cover and a different cutout.
>> And we would use what's what you're
referring to is called commercial cover
or commercial activity, meaning we would
act as if we were part of commercial
business going into and out of the country.
country.
>> But you'd use your normal names.
>> No. No. We This is one of the other
things that's really fascinating about
the book and one of the reasons that CIA
push back is we get to disclose whole
new levels of tradecraftraft that have
never been talked about in previous
books. So the trade craft that we use
here is is something that the Brits
actually call um dry cleaning. And what
that means is we would clear our path
before we would go into Falcon. So we're
in a friendly country and we need to go
into a hostile country. In order to go
from the friendly country to the hostile
country, you can't go directly because
if you go directly, the hostile country
can track you back to your friendly
country and then they can send a team to
to hurt you if they need to in the
friendly country. So instead, what you
do is you create a cleansing route. So
you travel from the friendly country to
a neutral country and in that neutral
country you'll change identities and
then travel into your target country. So
now if the hostile country tracks you,
they track you back to a neutral country
and they have no idea that you
originated from a friendly country.
>> But if you go from a friendly country to
a neutral country when you get to the
neutral country, do you need like a new
passport and stuff? Because that neutral
country presumably they don't know that
you're spies. >> Correct.
>> Correct.
>> So do you have to have a new passport to
then get on a plane to fly into the
>> Yes. And it's what we would call a
passport swap. And there's different
ways of doing a swap. You can carry your
own swap. You can have somebody meet you
to do a swap. You can have a cache where
you hide a swap. But that's the benefit
of always using a consistent cleansing
route because you can always go back to
the same neutral country. And from the
hostile country's point of view, every
time they track you, you always go back
to the same place. So they start to
build a pattern of life, what we call a
pattern of life, where they believe
you're originating from this country
when in fact you're not. So you you land
in this friendly country. You're making
your way into the hostile country. What
was your objective? What were you trying
to do in that hostile country?
>> The first thing that we were trying to
do was find targets.
>> And then we knew that as we found
targets and built targets, we would also
need to support the operations against
those targets. And there's a logistical
element to espionage where you need to
have encrypted phones, you need to have
satellite satellite phones or SIM cards,
you need to have money, you need to have
specialized gifts. Like there's there's
a there's a logistical supply chain that
needs to be built.
>> Specialized gifts.
>> So, um, things that are appealing to a
target that they may not be able to get
themselves. gold bullion, high-end
liquors, child pornography,
foreign currency, whatever they need,
your job is to make sure they have a way
of getting it.
>> Child pornography,
>> some some targets, especially in the in
the world of drugs and uh and terrorism
and weapons, they they feed off of the
strangest things. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> So, the C CIA would supply that pornography
pornography
>> in a way. um we would more like
facilitate the transfer. Some other
friendly country might actually be who
acquires it. So for example, Germany
might actually uh have a raid where they
where they carry out a raid against a
pornographer and they have terabytes of
porn, right? And then the UK might have
a case where they need porn to pay an
Iranian. So now they can trade with BND
so that BND can use this cache of porn
and they can give it to the Brits who
give it to the Iranians and that can be
>> Again, morally ambivalent, the goal is
to protect your people at the end of the
day, right? So when it comes down to it,
that's the same way CIA works. If we're
giving gold, if we're giving minted
American gold coins to an evil person in
North Korea, do we really care if it's
keeping Americans safe? There are some
people who would say yes. And there are
other people who would say, "Whatever
the price is, let's keep Americans safe."
safe."
>> So, tell me about what you did then. So,
what was your what did you accomplish
while you were there? And what was the
you talk in the book about using
terrorist tactics to build your
operation there? Can you you run me
through what is it what it is you
accomplished there and the role that
both of you played?
>> So, I'll start it and I'll let you take
it over. But the uh the the book's
title, Shadow Cell, is really about the
cell model and the terrorist cell model
that we recreated in our friendly
country so that we could execute
operations against our hostile country
that mirrored tactics and techniques
that terrorists had used to foil
Americans for the last 20 years in the
global war on terror.
So what Ji and I learned is that CIA was
not very good at beating terrorists.
America was not very good at beating
terrorists. That's why after 20 years of
fighting in Afghanistan, we left and we
gave it back to the same terrorist group
that we went in there to fight. We had
learned a lot from fighting that
adversary. But we were the only country
in the world fighting the global war on
terror. The Russians, the Iranians, the
Chinese, the Cubans, the North Koreans,
none of them engaged in the war on
terror. So everything we had learned
from al-Qaeda, we were the only ones
that learned it. So we found that to be
kind of a competitive advantage. So we
started building our operations,
modeling our operations off of the way
the terrorists structured their cells.
And we called our cell in Wolf the
shadow cell. And we had to find the
people, recruit the people, and train
the people inside our cell, our actual
CIA peers. We had to get them to learn
how to run the same model. That's really
what the book explains is how we built
that and what those people did because
espionage is not about one superhero
overseas. It's about a team of people
doing incredible things.
>> And were those people on the ground in
the friendly country next to the hostile country?
country? >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> And so did you when you recruited these
people to build this team, did you
recruit them from America or were you
recruiting them with inside that
friendly country?
>> Inside of Wolf. Everybody who was in the
cell was already w working in wolf.
>> And the word cell basically means team. >> Team,
>> Team,
>> right? Team.
>> So you built this team in the friendly
country next door to the enemy country.
And this team consisted of how many people,
people,
>> right? So James was our senior most
>> case officer. Tasha, Luke, and Beverly
were our second tour case officer. So
they were more junior. That's why they
were hungry but but still kind of uh
>> flexible. Whereas James was in James was
at a place in his career where if this
didn't work, his career would be tanked.
>> And then Ji and I were not case
officers. We were kind of the I was the
the mission planner, if you will. And
Jihi was the targeter. And then uh Diana
was our linguist. Will was our tech
support. And we had that was our that
was our cell. That was our little group
of people that would sit in the bullpen.
Now, it's important to note that
>> none of them and this was their primary
mission. It was our primary mission
>> for all of them. Helping us was just
something they were doing because they
believed that if we were successful, it
would be good for them. They had primary
missions to do all sorts of other things.
things. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Oh, okay. And were these people locals?
>> They're all Americans and they're all
Americans assigned to Wolf. So, they're
all American CIA officers, all sworn
officers that are assigned to our
friendly country in various different
covers to do various different primary
missions. Okay.
And how did you guys like communicate?
Did you like meet up for like dinner?
Like what's the how does it work?
>> Yeah, I mean all of our communication
and hangouts were in the office because
we couldn't really be seen outside together.
together.
>> We had connect us.
>> We had what's known as a skiff, a
specialized compartmented uh information
facility. So it was a it was a hardened
soundproof office that we could have
meetings in.
>> Couldn't the adversarial country like
watch you walking in there in the
morning? The adversarial country
arguably didn't even know we were in
Wolf because every time they tracked
anybody's travel, it would take them to
a different country.
>> Oh, so you were just people going to an office?
office? >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> So you could be doing anything in there, correct?
correct?
>> Yeah. And it's an office and a large
office building, so we could really be
going anywhere.
>> Okay, fine. So it's hard to track.
>> So what was your what was your first
mission together as a as a team? Like
what were you what were you doing in the
enemy country? What was your objective
to you were finding you were working as
a targeter to find interesting
individuals and then Andrew you were
predominantly trying to make contact
with those individuals
>> sort of my because I couldn't as the
node of the of the cell the node is a
term that we're using to say I was the
piece that was exposed to CIA. So the
mole if the mole went hunting the mole
would find me I was the one that was exposed.
exposed.
>> Okay. So for me, it was important that I
actually didn't meet with any of the
targets that we had in Falcon. My job
was to go to Falcon to start sourcing
the information that she would use to
identify those individuals.
>> Like what does that mean?
>> So uh whether it's something stupid like
a phone book or a thumb drive, uh
whether you're picking up a dead drop
from somebody else. So consider in
Falcon, we would have already had other
case officers carrying out operations. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
So we might have a case officer who was
able to extract information from a
military database and that military
database has all the weapons engineers
for Falcon's Air Force.
>> That case officer >> spy
>> spy
>> that spy
>> that spy can collect the thumb drive
>> and then they can put that thumb drive
in what's known as a dead drop. A dead
drop would be something that you hide
anywhere in the in the country, in a
city, wherever else.
>> Like in a bush.
>> Yeah, like in a bush. I would then go
into Falcon and I would go to that dead
drop site, the bush.
>> So you go into the enemy country, >> right?
>> right?
>> You'd go to the the bush
>> and take the thumb drive and bring it
back by our cleansing route to Wolf,
where I could give it to Jihi. Ji could
then extract the information from the
thumb drive. And now she has a list of
all the engineers who are part of the
enemy country's air force. And then from
there, she has a starting point for her
information to start finding targets.
Now, as she finds targets, that's when
we tap on our case officers, James,
Tasha, Luke, Beverly, and we say,
"Here's somebody that we think would be
susceptible to you because you're a
middle-aged woman, you're an older man,
you're a younger man, you're a younger
woman, right? We think that these people
might be susceptible to your interests,
your backgrounds, your voice, who knows
what. And we need you to target them."
And then we would send those those spies
into Falcon to meet the targets that
Jihi found. >> Okay.
>> Okay.
Okay. Got you.
>> The game of espionage is not an easy
game. It's a fun game, but it's a it's a
chess game, not a checkers game. So,
there's a lot of moving pieces and a lot
of moving parts. And um for me, it was
always very exciting, but I also
understand that it can be very difficult
to to express it. Well,
>> was there ever a time when you felt most
at risk when you were in that hostile country?
country?
>> At some point it my presence in Falcon
in the enemy country became known to the
local government in the enemy country
and they dispatched a surveillance team
to track me. It was a major turning
point in our operation. We kind of went
from a place where we felt like we were
winning to a place where we wondered if
we were losing. We went from a place
where I felt very safe to a place where
I felt like I could immediately be
apprehended. And then all the worst
thoughts start to creep in. Not
necessarily about being shot. Oftentimes
a CIA officer being shot in a foreign
country is a welcome experience because
being shot at least means everything
ends. The worst is being captured and
being interrogated and being used for
diplomatic leverage and being used for
policy leverage and being being forced
to do uh you know into brainwashing and
propaganda videos. Like that's a much
worse experience than than a clean death.
death.
>> You said earlier that it would have been
the mole that was exposed to your
presence and that knew that you were in
this enemy country. So was it the mole
that told the enemy country?
>> That's what we believe. We don't have
the evidence to prove it. Um, but what
CIA's conclusion as well as the
conclusion inside of our own shadow cell
is that our operations had reached the
place where they were significant enough
that the mole took a risk to find out
that I was the exposed member of the
cell and then the mole reported my name
to the hostile country's police force.
So, you're now inside that hostile
country, that enemy country, and they
know that you're a US spy. Was there a
day when you realized that they knew
that you were a spy?
>> Yes. Well, there wasn't a day that I
realized that they were that they knew I
was CIA. There was a day that I realized
they were surveilling me as if I was a
threat. When you travel, when any
business person travels to a hostile
country, they're almost always
surveiled. They're
Hotel rooms can be rifled through.
There's there's people called bumbling
surveillance or watchers who will
usually follow you. Um I'm not sure what
your travel looks like, but I can almost
assure you that if you traveled to
Russia, if you've traveled to China, if
you travel to Cuba, you had a watcher.
You had a surveillance team >> really
>> really
>> that was watching you. >> Me?
>> Me? >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> Why?
>> Why?
>> Because you're wealthy, you're
successful, you're an influencer, you're
of significance. At the very least, they
want to make sure that some petty
criminal doesn't hurt you in their
country cuz that could be a big deal.
>> Thank you. But
>> please continue to surveil me.
>> But at worst, they could also be
scraping your cell phone to pull all of
your contacts off the cell phone so that
they could then reach out to any of the
contacts that you have on your cell
phone. They could scan and duplicate
your hard drive as you go through uh
secondary or go through immigration in a
foreign country.
>> They can scan my hard drive as I go
through immigration.
>> Absolutely. We can do that here in the
United States, too.
>> Well, so if I land in the United States,
they they How do they do how would they
do that? So there's uh there's there's
different authorities that exist for
different agencies. So here inside the
United States, one of the authorities
that we give to our border patrol is the
authority to essentially scrape data off
of all of your electronic devices. So if
you're deemed a target of interest and
if you're moved into what's known as a
secondary screening, they will separate
you from your bags. They'll actually
open your your bags. They might even
tell you to unlock your cell phone or
unlock your laptop. And then from there
with with technology that's proprietary
and technology that's also commercially
available, they can scrape and scan your
hard drive.
>> Because I've been through security
before in various countries and
sometimes when I get to the other end,
there's a letter in my suitcase and the
letter in my suitcase says, "Hey, we had
to go through your bags for some reason."
reason."
>> If you had a technical if you had a
technical device in your bag along with
that letter, there's a good chance that
it was cloned.
But I didn't give them my password.
>> Sometimes they don't need your password. >> Really?
>> Really?
>> Oh, yeah.
>> How are they going to get into my my
laptop without my password?
>> There's ways.
>> So, yeah, there's password generators.
There's password cracking codes. Your
password is the I mean, I have somebody
I could call right now and within about
30 minutes, we would probably have all
of your passwords that you use for all
That's the end of the podcast.
Can I quit the book?
>> And this is a bit of a tangent, but it's
an important one. So, what devices do
you guys use? If you have that knowledge
that it's really easy to break into
devices, do you use the same devices
that I use?
>> Yeah, I mean, for me, I assume that once
you if you become a target of interest,
there's nothing you can do to protect
yourself. So, I use devices that are
actually easy to crack and clone because
I don't want my device to get broken. So
that when the Chinese or the Russians
choose to go through some back door on
my Android system, my Android doesn't
shut down. Whereas there are more
complex systems like a Glacier phone
where if somebody penetrates your
Glacier phone, this the whole phone will
shut down and you'll be without a phone.
>> Is there any phone or device that's safe?
safe?
>> I would argue the answer is no.
>> No, I would say no. Awesome.
>> Because anything that you create that
claims to be safe becomes priority
number one for all the adversaries out
there because they know if they can be
the first ones to crack that phone or
crack that hard drive or crack that
operating system, then they have the
competitive advantage over everybody else.
else.
>> Yeah. It's possible for something to be
safe for a short period of time, but
eventually it's going to get cracked.
They'll find the back door. They'll
figure out how to open it.
>> And it's not just foreign intelligence
that wants to do that. It's also all of
your criminal syndicates. It's all of
your dark web syndicates. Everybody
wants to do it. So whenever I see
anybody come out and promise that they
got the new hardest device,
>> I just I don't believe it. It might be
hard, but that doesn't mean it's impossible.
impossible.
>> Yeah, there are levels of security, but
nothing is 100% secure, at least when it
comes to technology. And so we just
assume that it's not secure. And so you
just treat your device in that way, you
know, with whatever liberal security is
convenient and makes you feel secure.
But knowing that at any point somebody could
could
>> just hack in from, you know, they could
hack in remotely. They could,
>> you know, scrape your drive when you're
going through immigration or if you're
in a hotel room, somebody comes in. I
mean, it's always possible.
>> They can steal your encryption key from
somebody else that you are having an
encrypted chat with.
>> They don't have to target you.
>> Do you use like cold storage? I.e., do
you use like a a hard drive that's not
connected to the internet or something?
>> We will air gap.
>> Air gap. Air gapping is cold storage
like what you're talking about where you
take something off the actual cloud,
take something off the internet and it
just lives in a standalone server
whether that's a we have drives that we
save our information to that are that
are airgapped. They're not connected to
the internet, not connected to a cloud.
They're only connected whenever we
choose to transfer information. Um so
we'll do things like that to keep our
information safe. But the I think the
most important thing is that if you if
you show if you make yourself easy to be hacked,
hacked,
then you'll actually get hacked less
because you're not a risk. They can see
what you have. They understand that
you're not important and they move on to
the next target that's more more uh
clandestine or trying to hide.
>> Okay. So, you you figure out going back
to the story, you figure out that you're
being surveiled. How? Just like the the
whole idea of a cleansing route through
a third country, that's a a piece of
tradecraftraft that has never been
exposed before. I actually get to teach
a number of people. I get to teach in
the story how we do what's known as a
surveillance detection route. So the the
core of surveillance detection is
understanding something that we call
multiple sites. Multiple sightings over
a period of time. So I need to see the
same person, the same vehicle, the same
face, the same profile. profile meaning
you know tall tall caucasian male
mid-50s I need to see the same profile
several times over a period of time
where I'm changing locations.
So what happens inside shadow cell is I
identify one car that follows me through
multiple turns and then falls off only
to come back on later on. That's kind of
my first indicator that there might be
something going on. So then I go through
this route, a predetermined, pre-planned
route through a city. And the only
reason I'm doing that route is so that I
can drag people along with me to see if
they're going to behave like
surveillance. And from that route, I
find that it's not just one car, it's
actually two other cars. And when I get
out of my own vehicle to walk on foot,
there are very specific people who then
follow me on foot. And then in the third
part of the surveillance detection
route, I find that the same people who
are following me on foot are also the
people driving the cars that are
following me inside vehicles. So most
surveillance detection routes are
executed in this very prescribed, very
specific process so that you can see
who's actually following you.
>> And you did that. You discover that
there's multiple people following you in
multiple vehicles.
>> And when you discover that, it's
terrifying. Yeah, I was going to say
>> it's absolutely terrifying, but it's
comforting because you know they're
following you, but they don't know that
you know that yet. So, they still think
that they are discreet. They still think
that that you're operationally active.
Meaning, they're following you because
they expect you to commit espionage.
They're following you because they
expect you to meet with a source, do a
dead drop, acquire some kind of
equipment that you shouldn't have,
right? They're waiting for that. If they
don't see that, then they don't get the
evidence that they need. They don't win.
>> So, you go straight to a strip club or something.
something.
>> Exactly. Right. You go to a strip club,
you go to a library, I went to an arcade
in this book, and you go somewhere to
just waste their time because as long as
I'm collecting their information, when I
come back to my friendly country and I
meet with my shadow cell teammates, I
can now tell them this license plate is
a surveillance vehicle. This profile is
a surveillance vehicle. If you see a
woman or a man wearing these types of
clothing, this is a surveillant, right?
And we can ex and now we can build a
database back in Wolf that shares the
surveillance team members in Falcon.
>> Were you scared when you figured out
that you were being followed?
>> I was terrified. I was terrified because
I had so many thoughts going through my
head from how did I [ __ ] up to what if I
don't go home. I'm trying to think about
what they're going to do as their next
step. How long are they going to follow
me before they just say [ __ ] it and just
wrap me up?
>> Are they even going to wrap me up?
Meaning meaning apprehend me, capture
me? Do they already have evidence that
shows that I'm committing espionage?
Right? I haven't committed espionage on
this trip yet, but have they seen me on
a previous trip doing a dead drop,
retrieving a dead drop, dropping a cell
phone, taking a battery? Like, what what
do they know? I don't know what they
know. And then you've got all this panic
and at the same time you have to recall
three and a half hours of very specific
activity across a city to run an SDR.
>> An SDR,
>> a surveillance detection route. You have
to recall I turn left on Front Street. I
go two blocks. I turn right on 22nd
North and then I turn left on an alley.
You have to recall this thing that you
memorize that you work through at the
same time that you have this spike of
adrenaline and panic.
>> And you were on your own.
>> I was on my own for that operation. So
you you go through this route through
the city that you is predetermined for
you to go down and presumably this
particular route is designed in such a
way where it gives you opportunities to
expose them.
You realize that you are being followed.
What do you do in that exact moment?
That first moment that I realized it was true,
true,
I had this realization, this moment of
fear and vulnerability
vulnerability
where I just it was a very it was a
moment of self-loathing where you just
you realize that you're not as good as
you think you are and you realize that
however this happened,
you're the only one to blame for what
comes next.
In that kind of moment of humility, I
actually called Ji in our alias
identities that we had built for these
operations. We had what's known as a
throwaway phone or a disposable
telecommunications. And I called her and
I gave her a coded message to let her
know that
something was wrong cuz I wanted her to
know that something was wrong so that
she could take it back to the cell so
that they could start their systems on
their end to protect me if I did get
arrested, if I did get wrapped up, if I
did get shot.
>> You gave her a coded message
>> via cell phone.
>> What is that coded message?
>> Um the I think I just called you and
said I'm coming home early.
>> You said you you called her and said I'm
coming home early.
>> Yeah. which is a bad sign because you
would never come home early from an
operation ever. So as soon as I heard he
was coming home early, I knew that
something was wrong.
>> Take me into your world at that time.
The phone rings.
>> I get the call from my burner phone and
which was unusual anyways. I mean I
always had it because that was part of
our like communication plan was for us
to do that when we were apart.
>> So a burner phone is a secondary phone
that you just use for these kind of things.
things.
>> Yeah. Just for this. It's never used for
anything else. it's not connected to a
name. Um, and that's what keeps it
anonymous for us. And so he calls and he
says, you know, hey, I'm coming home
early. And I'm like,
okay. Because you can't like if if the
line's being tapped, you can't be like,
oh my god, what's going on? Like, are
you okay? Because somebody's listening
to it. It has to sound like we knew that
his alias had a fiance. I was the
fiance. So, you know, it was totally
natural for anybody listening in to to
hear him say, "Hey, I'm coming home
early." So, then I had to be like, "Oh,
that's really exciting. That's great.
You know, I can't wait to see you." And
he's like, "Okay, I love you." And then
that's the end of the conversation. And
that's all I get. And so, after that's
all I get from Andy, I go back to the
office. I'm starting to look like scour
all of our cables. I go talk to James
like, "Have you heard anything? Like, is
anything happening?"
>> You started to scour all of your cables.
Yeah. So, you know, we have our all of
our databases, you know, all the CIA
databases. So, you know, there's
reporting that comes in all the time um
that you're, you know, especially
regional reporting that you're privy to.
And so, you know, I talked to James
because he was he had more access than I
did to things all things Falcon. And so,
I was like, have you heard anything? Is
there anything weird going on? And he
said no. And so I started just kind of
looking through all of my stuff to see,
you know, was there any reporting that
was of somebody being captured or
somebody, you know, something going
wrong and there was nothing. Um and so
Andy and I have um we created on our own
just a it's called a combo plan, a
communication plan where you know if
anything ever happens you know whether
natural disaster or you know espionage
faux like we had a system of
communication where you know I wait 8
hours and you know check this fake email
that we share that's not attributable
and then he gives me a sign of life and
then we have these timings 8 hours 12
hours 24 hours, 48 hours where all I
need from him is a sign of life to know
that he's okay. And then that also gives
us the opportunity if it were a natural
disaster, for example, to put, you know,
I meet me at this location.
>> So that that's an email address that
Andy emails. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> It's an email address that we both have
>> It's an email address that we both have a login to and you create a draft email
a login to and you create a draft email inside of it.
inside of it. >> Oh, okay.
>> Oh, okay. >> Also learned from terrorism.
>> Also learned from terrorism. >> Also learned from terrorism. Okay.
>> Also learned from terrorism. Okay. >> Oh, is that what terrorists do?
>> Oh, is that what terrorists do? >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> So they create a draft email, they just
>> So they create a draft email, they just leave it there. Yeah. Someone else logs
leave it there. Yeah. Someone else logs in and looks at it. Correct.
in and looks at it. Correct. >> Yeah. So there's it's never sent so it
>> Yeah. So there's it's never sent so it never goes over the internet. Really?
never goes over the internet. Really? Yeah. So we had this communication plan
Yeah. So we had this communication plan in place. So even though I was concerned
in place. So even though I was concerned and I couldn't find anything to discover
and I couldn't find anything to discover what was happening, I knew we had this
what was happening, I knew we had this communication plan in place. So I knew
communication plan in place. So I knew that at some point he was going to give
that at some point he was going to give me a sign of life and I couldn't do
me a sign of life and I couldn't do anything
anything until that point.
until that point. >> So you're you discover that you've been
>> So you're you discover that you've been discovered by this adversarial country.
discovered by this adversarial country. You call Jihi. You let her know that
You call Jihi. You let her know that you're coming home early. Then what do
you're coming home early. Then what do you do?
you do? >> Then I have to plan my escape. So
>> Then I have to plan my escape. So another thing that people that movies
another thing that people that movies don't show you is that when the first
don't show you is that when the first effort to escape is always self-rescue.
effort to escape is always self-rescue. It's always on the part of the field
It's always on the part of the field officer alone to try to escape. There's
officer alone to try to escape. There's no Navy Seal team. There's no evacuation
no Navy Seal team. There's no evacuation helicopter. There's no high-speed boat
helicopter. There's no high-speed boat or or classy yacht just waiting for you.
or or classy yacht just waiting for you. you have to get yourself across the
you have to get yourself across the country's border yourself before you can
country's border yourself before you can hope for any kind of evac from there or
hope for any kind of evac from there or what we call an Xfill. So, I knew that
what we call an Xfill. So, I knew that it was on me to come up with some
it was on me to come up with some evacuation plan. And I had to come up
evacuation plan. And I had to come up with an evacuation plan that wasn't
with an evacuation plan that wasn't going to let the surveillance team know
going to let the surveillance team know that I knew I was under surveillance.
that I knew I was under surveillance. >> So, you're still in the car at this
>> So, you're still in the car at this point?
point? >> I'm I'm in between the car and on foot.
>> I'm I'm in between the car and on foot. uh depending on where I am in the
uh depending on where I am in the surveillance detection route, right? It
surveillance detection route, right? It was surveillance detection routes
was surveillance detection routes generally break into three phases. It's
generally break into three phases. It's in the first phase that you suspect that
in the first phase that you suspect that you're under surveillance. It's in the
you're under surveillance. It's in the second phase that you confirm it. So,
second phase that you confirm it. So, it's in the second phase when I confirm
it's in the second phase when I confirm I am absolutely under surveillance.
I am absolutely under surveillance. That's when I contact Ji and that's when
That's when I contact Ji and that's when I start coming up with my own
I start coming up with my own self-rescue plan.
self-rescue plan. >> And then the third phase,
>> And then the third phase, >> the third phase is a collection phase.
>> the third phase is a collection phase. You know what? You know that you're
You know what? You know that you're under surveillance. you know that you've
under surveillance. you know that you've communicated to somebody that you're
communicated to somebody that you're under surveillance and now the mission
under surveillance and now the mission becomes collect as much information as
becomes collect as much information as you can about the surveillance team
you can about the surveillance team before they realize that they're being
before they realize that they're being collected against.
collected against. >> So you you see this car behind you,
>> So you you see this car behind you, multiple cars behind you and the same
multiple cars behind you and the same people following you on foot. Are you
people following you on foot. Are you writing this down or are you just trying
writing this down or are you just trying to memorize it?
to memorize it? >> At first it's all memory. Um and we have
>> At first it's all memory. Um and we have a methodology for trying to memorize
a methodology for trying to memorize this stuff. We actually talk about this
this stuff. We actually talk about this in the book as well. you start to come
in the book as well. you start to come up with short codes to describe the
up with short codes to describe the people. Um, and the codes that you come
people. Um, and the codes that you come up with mean something to you, but they
up with mean something to you, but they wouldn't mean anything if they were if
wouldn't mean anything if they were if they came out in an interrogation or if
they came out in an interrogation or if they came out in writing. So, like for
they came out in writing. So, like for you, I might call you black t-shirt. A
you, I might call you black t-shirt. A black t-shirt means something to me. So,
black t-shirt means something to me. So, if I see black t-shirt behind me three
if I see black t-shirt behind me three times in the next 45 minutes in three
times in the next 45 minutes in three different parts of the city, I know that
different parts of the city, I know that I have an image for what black t-shirt
I have an image for what black t-shirt means. But when I write down black
means. But when I write down black t-shirt, nobody else knows what that
t-shirt, nobody else knows what that means. When I see a woman, it was cold.
means. When I see a woman, it was cold. uh the the season that I was carrying
uh the the season that I was carrying out these operations. Um I saw a woman
out these operations. Um I saw a woman in ear muffs, so I would call her ear
in ear muffs, so I would call her ear muffs. I saw a guy in a bomber jacket,
muffs. I saw a guy in a bomber jacket, so I called him bomber jacket. And you
so I called him bomber jacket. And you just recall these people. You rec you
just recall these people. You rec you you blue sedan, yellow SUV, right? White
you blue sedan, yellow SUV, right? White taxi cab. You you start to come up with
taxi cab. You you start to come up with these nicknames that mean something to
these nicknames that mean something to you but don't mean anything to anybody
you but don't mean anything to anybody else. And then when you get back to a
else. And then when you get back to a place where you can document your notes
place where you can document your notes in detail, you have a reference point to
in detail, you have a reference point to document in detail. So, I start by
document in detail. So, I start by memorizing. When I got towards the end
memorizing. When I got towards the end of my third phase of surveillance
of my third phase of surveillance detection, I actually wrote down my
detection, I actually wrote down my notes. In the book, it explains I went
notes. In the book, it explains I went into a like a clothing store and then I
into a like a clothing store and then I started making notes in the clothing
started making notes in the clothing store. Presumably, if somebody came in
store. Presumably, if somebody came in and arrested me at that moment, what
and arrested me at that moment, what they would see is a bunch of notes about
they would see is a bunch of notes about clothing, ear muffs and black t-shirts
clothing, ear muffs and black t-shirts inside of a clothing store. That's not
inside of a clothing store. That's not espionage. But then when I was able to
espionage. But then when I was able to actually get back to uh to Wolf with
actually get back to uh to Wolf with myself, then I was able to deconstruct
myself, then I was able to deconstruct what black t-shirt meant. Black t-shirt
what black t-shirt meant. Black t-shirt meant uh black male with a goatee uh
meant uh black male with a goatee uh approximately
approximately 65 lbs, 5 foot, 11 in, 38 years old.
65 lbs, 5 foot, 11 in, 38 years old. >> So, how did you get from phase two of
>> So, how did you get from phase two of your process of figuring out if you were
your process of figuring out if you were being followed to the arcade? like what
being followed to the arcade? like what was the why did you get to the arcade?
was the why did you get to the arcade? >> So, I went to the arcade because I was
>> So, I went to the arcade because I was trying in a surveillance detection
trying in a surveillance detection route, one of the things that you're
route, one of the things that you're actually trying to do is called bore or
actually trying to do is called bore or lull your surveillance. You never want
lull your surveillance. You never want to in movies, it makes it look like
to in movies, it makes it look like you're trying to to ditch your
you're trying to to ditch your surveillance team. You're trying to lose
surveillance team. You're trying to lose your tail. That's not what professionals
your tail. That's not what professionals do. What professionals do is we drag the
do. What professionals do is we drag the tail. We keep the tail with us for as
tail. We keep the tail with us for as long as possible. And one of the things
long as possible. And one of the things you do is you make yourself very
you do is you make yourself very predictable. You move very slowly. You
predictable. You move very slowly. You hang out in public places which makes it
hang out in public places which makes it very easy for them to observe you. I was
very easy for them to observe you. I was actually going to the arcade to try to
actually going to the arcade to try to collect more information about my
collect more information about my surveillance team. But I was trying to
surveillance team. But I was trying to give them time and space so they could
give them time and space so they could observe me in a public setting. It it
observe me in a public setting. It it backfired because what actually ended up
backfired because what actually ended up happening is that when I went into the
happening is that when I went into the arcade, they lost me. They lost sight of
arcade, they lost me. They lost sight of me, which put them into a position where
me, which put them into a position where they started panicking to try to find me
they started panicking to try to find me even though I was just sitting inside
even though I was just sitting inside the arcade.
the arcade. I mean, it doesn't sound like it
I mean, it doesn't sound like it backfired if they lost you.
backfired if they lost you. >> That's a terrible thing when they lose
>> That's a terrible thing when they lose you because when they lose you, they
you because when they lose you, they start to panic and they start to assume
start to panic and they start to assume either they made a mistake or you're a
either they made a mistake or you're a trained officer. If you're a trained
trained officer. If you're a trained officer, if that's the conclusion that
officer, if that's the conclusion that they make, they can come in and arrest
they make, they can come in and arrest you. If they lose you, then they start
you. If they lose you, then they start to make mistakes. And when a
to make mistakes. And when a surveillance team starts to make
surveillance team starts to make mistakes, it means that they might
mistakes, it means that they might stumble across you. They might have two
stumble across you. They might have two different surveillance people find you
different surveillance people find you at the same time. And for for them
at the same time. And for for them that's a scary thing because for them
that's a scary thing because for them they're trying not to be identified.
they're trying not to be identified. They're trying to be discreet. They're
They're trying to be discreet. They're trying to not be seen. So when they in
trying to not be seen. So when they in this case in in the story that that we
this case in in the story that that we share in Shadow Cell, when the
share in Shadow Cell, when the surveillance team broke into a
surveillance team broke into a starburst, a starburst means they went
starburst, a starburst means they went they broke ranks to try to find me in
they broke ranks to try to find me in the arcade. When they broke ranks to try
the arcade. When they broke ranks to try to find me, they presented themselves to
to find me, they presented themselves to me in the arcade face to face. And it
me in the arcade face to face. And it was in that moment that I realized they
was in that moment that I realized they know that I see them and I know that
know that I see them and I know that they see me and this is bad.
they see me and this is bad. >> You locked eyes with them,
>> You locked eyes with them, >> which you're never supposed to do.
>> which you're never supposed to do. >> You're never supposed to do.
>> You're never supposed to do. >> You're never supposed to lock eyes with
>> You're never supposed to lock eyes with your surveillance. You're never supposed
your surveillance. You're never supposed to lock eyes with anybody who's a threat
to lock eyes with anybody who's a threat ever because that's threatening
ever because that's threatening behavior, right? That's one of the
behavior, right? That's one of the reasons that people share strong eye
reasons that people share strong eye contact with peers is to it's a show of
contact with peers is to it's a show of trust. Well, whenever you're locking
trust. Well, whenever you're locking eyes with somebody who's a threat, it's
eyes with somebody who's a threat, it's a it's a sign of aggression or
a it's a sign of aggression or dominance. So, whenever you're being
dominance. So, whenever you're being surveiled, you never want to make eye
surveiled, you never want to make eye contact with your surveillance team
contact with your surveillance team because your surveillance team will see
because your surveillance team will see that eye contact as a threat.
that eye contact as a threat. >> When you say you sort of bumped into
>> When you say you sort of bumped into them in that arcade, what's the
them in that arcade, what's the distance?
distance? >> 3T.
>> 3T. >> 3T. And And how long did you lock eyes
>> 3T. And And how long did you lock eyes with each other? It felt like an
with each other? It felt like an eternity. In reality, it was probably
eternity. In reality, it was probably two and a half seconds.
two and a half seconds. >> I mean, two and a half seconds is a long
>> I mean, two and a half seconds is a long time,
time, >> especially when you're trying not to be
>> especially when you're trying not to be seen.
seen. >> So, recreate that moment for me. You're
>> So, recreate that moment for me. You're in the arcade pretending you're playing
in the arcade pretending you're playing with games. You turn a corner.
with games. You turn a corner. >> It's horrible, man. It's a horrible It's
>> It's horrible, man. It's a horrible It's a horrible story. I'm I'm in the arcade.
a horrible story. I'm I'm in the arcade. I I'm I again, I think I'm doing
I I'm I again, I think I'm doing everything right. I'm like, "Oh, I'm in
everything right. I'm like, "Oh, I'm in the arcade. They watched me come in.
the arcade. They watched me come in. This gives They're probably taking a
This gives They're probably taking a smoke break outside. They've got nothing
smoke break outside. They've got nothing to worry about." And I'm kind of going
to worry about." And I'm kind of going from game to game and spending whatever
from game to game and spending whatever credits that I bought in the arcade. And
credits that I bought in the arcade. And I go to this dinosaur hunting shooting
I go to this dinosaur hunting shooting game, right? Almost like Big Buck Hunter
game, right? Almost like Big Buck Hunter or like Jurassic Park. And I pick up a
or like Jurassic Park. And I pick up a rifle and I'm shooting at dinosaurs and
rifle and I'm shooting at dinosaurs and I'm just killing time. And then the
I'm just killing time. And then the [ __ ] surveillant comes around the
[ __ ] surveillant comes around the back of the machine looking for me. He
back of the machine looking for me. He comes around the back of the machine and
comes around the back of the machine and he sees me and I'm holding a [ __ ] gun
he sees me and I'm holding a [ __ ] gun and I look at him and he looks at me and
and I look at him and he looks at me and that's that's when our two and a half
that's that's when our two and a half seconds happen. And I'm sitting there
seconds happen. And I'm sitting there and I'm like, what just happened? Why is
and I'm like, what just happened? Why is why did I just see Bomber Jacket come
why did I just see Bomber Jacket come around my video game console and stare
around my video game console and stare at me in the face. And that's when I
at me in the face. And that's when I kind of realized, oh my gosh, like the
kind of realized, oh my gosh, like the team is in panic. I can see multiple
team is in panic. I can see multiple people in the team. They lost me.
people in the team. They lost me. They're trying to find me. Bomberjacket
They're trying to find me. Bomberjacket just found me. What did Bomberjacket do
just found me. What did Bomberjacket do when he looked at you?
when he looked at you? >> His jaw dropped. He went slack. Like he
>> His jaw dropped. He went slack. Like he looked at me and he knew that he had
looked at me and he knew that he had [ __ ] up too. And I looked at him and
[ __ ] up too. And I looked at him and in my mind's eye, I was just hoping that
in my mind's eye, I was just hoping that I didn't look as stupid as he looked.
I didn't look as stupid as he looked. >> In that moment, is is it true to say
>> In that moment, is is it true to say that you should have just looked back at
that you should have just looked back at the dinosaur game as fast as you
the dinosaur game as fast as you possibly could?
possibly could? >> What I should have done is I should have
>> What I should have done is I should have seen a person come around the corner and
seen a person come around the corner and just kind of stayed in the game. That's
just kind of stayed in the game. That's what anybody else would have done.
what anybody else would have done. Anybody else would have just stayed in
Anybody else would have just stayed in the game. They're focused on the game.
the game. They're focused on the game. They don't even realize there are people
They don't even realize there are people walking around, right? But the fact that
walking around, right? But the fact that I identified I saw him and then looked
I identified I saw him and then looked at him and the fact that he saw me and
at him and the fact that he saw me and looked at me as two professionals on
looked at me as two professionals on opposite sides of the of the playing
opposite sides of the of the playing field, we both made the same mistake. We
field, we both made the same mistake. We both made the mistake of showing our
both made the mistake of showing our recognition to our intended target.
recognition to our intended target. >> And before we continue, you as far as
>> And before we continue, you as far as your alias was in that country, you were
your alias was in that country, you were called Alex Hernandez, right? Correct.
called Alex Hernandez, right? Correct. Correct.
Correct. >> And you were running a business called
>> And you were running a business called Acme Commercial.
Acme Commercial. >> Correct.
>> Correct. >> What was Acme Commercial supposed to be
>> What was Acme Commercial supposed to be doing as a company?
doing as a company? >> Acme Commercial was a company that was
>> Acme Commercial was a company that was built to source new disposable goods
built to source new disposable goods from foreign countries for uh for uh
from foreign countries for uh for uh transport and distribution across
transport and distribution across Western countries.
Western countries. >> And the intelligence services build a
>> And the intelligence services build a lot of fake businesses. You said
lot of fake businesses. You said >> yes. It's a It's the easier it is to
>> yes. It's a It's the easier it is to build a business, the easier it is to
build a business, the easier it is to collect information. So, what we've
collect information. So, what we've discovered is that just as anybody with
discovered is that just as anybody with $127 in their pocket can create an LLC,
$127 in their pocket can create an LLC, that's about how much money it takes to
that's about how much money it takes to start an intelligence operation.
start an intelligence operation. >> It says that um the CIA operates
>> It says that um the CIA operates numerous fake companies.
numerous fake companies. >> The CIA also operates numerous real
>> The CIA also operates numerous real companies, too.
companies, too. >> Not just the CIA. I mean, every intel
>> Not just the CIA. I mean, every intel organization has commercial fronts.
organization has commercial fronts. every Intel organization.
every Intel organization. >> The CIA operates real companies. What
>> The CIA operates real companies. What does that mean?
does that mean? >> There there are real companies out there
>> There there are real companies out there owned and operated by CIA. Inel is one
owned and operated by CIA. Inel is one of those companies. It's a investment
of those companies. It's a investment vehicle where CIA invests money and
vehicle where CIA invests money and invests in new technology and all the
invests in new technology and all the technology that goes through InQel knows
technology that goes through InQel knows that it's going through CIA.
that it's going through CIA. >> Okay. That that's a that's that's public
>> Okay. That that's a that's that's public though, right?
though, right? >> Correct. But the the ones that aren't
>> Correct. But the the ones that aren't public. So the CIO will create a company
public. So the CIO will create a company and then they will use that company to
and then they will use that company to pretend to be doing something in a
pretend to be doing something in a foreign foreign land basically.
foreign foreign land basically. >> But the primary mission is intelligence.
>> But the primary mission is intelligence. This is one of the most fascinating
This is one of the most fascinating things not only about CIA but about all
things not only about CIA but about all of your first world intelligence
of your first world intelligence organizations. You've heard of what's
organizations. You've heard of what's known as the black budget. The black
known as the black budget. The black budget is the budget of of um
budget is the budget of of um discretionary money that can be spent on
discretionary money that can be spent on military and intelligence operations
military and intelligence operations that isn't tied to the taxpayer. So,
that isn't tied to the taxpayer. So, it's a giant pot of money that isn't
it's a giant pot of money that isn't tied to tax money. So, where does that
tied to tax money. So, where does that money come from? Part of that money
money come from? Part of that money comes from anytime law enforcement or
comes from anytime law enforcement or intelligence agencies seize assets.
intelligence agencies seize assets. >> We seize cryptocurrency. We seize drugs.
>> We seize cryptocurrency. We seize drugs. We seize child pornography. Right? When
We seize child pornography. Right? When we seize that money and we use it for
we seize that money and we use it for other operations, that's part of the
other operations, that's part of the black budget. The other part of the
black budget. The other part of the black budget is when an intelligence
black budget is when an intelligence organization creates a business and that
organization creates a business and that business turns a profit. When that
business turns a profit. When that business turns a profit, where does the
business turns a profit, where does the profit go? It can't go to the case
profit go? It can't go to the case officer, that person's being paid on the
officer, that person's being paid on the US payroll. So all that profit goes into
US payroll. So all that profit goes into the black budget.
the black budget. >> Do you think the CIA has some big
>> Do you think the CIA has some big profitable businesses that are set up as
profitable businesses that are set up as fronts that just like went really really
fronts that just like went really really well?
well? >> I know it does.
>> I know it does. >> Really?
>> Really? >> I know it does. The the CIA has
>> I know it does. The the CIA has businesses that it's set up that have
businesses that it's set up that have gone wildly profitable. CIA also has
gone wildly profitable. CIA also has officers that built these businesses
officers that built these businesses that then were like, why the [ __ ] am I
that then were like, why the [ __ ] am I at CIA and then they leave CIA and they
at CIA and then they leave CIA and they go on to run businesses instead.
go on to run businesses instead. >> I mean, a a couple of things popped into
>> I mean, a a couple of things popped into my head as you said that. The first was
my head as you said that. The first was there's obviously a huge conversation at
there's obviously a huge conversation at the moment around Tik Tok because Tik
the moment around Tik Tok because Tik Tok was started in China. become this
Tok was started in China. become this massive global success and I can't think
massive global success and I can't think of a better company to have started than
of a better company to have started than a platform like Tik Tok where
a platform like Tik Tok where everybody's putting their information
everybody's putting their information and data in and it's tracking your
and data in and it's tracking your location. So what is your perspective on
location. So what is your perspective on something like Tik Tok? Do you think Tik
something like Tik Tok? Do you think Tik Tok's was started as a tool to spy?
Tok's was started as a tool to spy? >> I don't believe Tik Tok individually was
>> I don't believe Tik Tok individually was started as a tool to spy. I believe that
started as a tool to spy. I believe that what happened is Tik Tok became wildly
what happened is Tik Tok became wildly popular and the government in China
popular and the government in China realized, hey, everything in China
realized, hey, everything in China belongs to the government anyways. We
belongs to the government anyways. We can step in and take advantage of this.
can step in and take advantage of this. That is also a way that CIA and MI6 do
That is also a way that CIA and MI6 do business as well. When a company does
business as well. When a company does very well and there's an intelligence
very well and there's an intelligence benefit, they will approach the company.
benefit, they will approach the company. In a democracy, they can't force the
In a democracy, they can't force the company to cooperate, but in a country
company to cooperate, but in a country like China, they can. So, do you think
like China, they can. So, do you think the social networks, a lot of the big
the social networks, a lot of the big social networks have been approached by
social networks have been approached by the CIA or the MI6 and asked to give
the CIA or the MI6 and asked to give information to them?
information to them? >> I would go a step further and say that
>> I would go a step further and say that they've all been approached and that the
they've all been approached and that the vast majority of them cooperate.
vast majority of them cooperate. >> Is that a concern for the average
>> Is that a concern for the average person?
person? >> Not for the for the average person
>> Not for the for the average person that's a benefit.
that's a benefit. >> The average person is not being
>> The average person is not being targeted. I promise you like there's
targeted. I promise you like there's zero interest and for the federal
zero interest and for the federal government and for the intelligence
government and for the intelligence community, there's absolutely zero
community, there's absolutely zero interest in the average person,
interest in the average person, >> the person who's cheating on their
>> the person who's cheating on their spouse or avoiding $5,000 in taxes or
spouse or avoiding $5,000 in taxes or who isn't paying their parking bills.
who isn't paying their parking bills. Nobody cares. The federal government
Nobody cares. The federal government doesn't care about that.
doesn't care about that. >> Well, you were doing some of that
>> Well, you were doing some of that targeting, right?
targeting, right? >> Right.
>> Right. >> So, did you ever work with any existing
>> So, did you ever work with any existing company to give you information? So all
company to give you information? So all of my data depending on what country I
of my data depending on what country I was working on had different sources and
was working on had different sources and some some countries had more sources
some some countries had more sources than others but they're all sources I
than others but they're all sources I can't disclose but there's tons and tons
can't disclose but there's tons and tons of data that would come in to me and
of data that would come in to me and then I had I worked on a number of cases
then I had I worked on a number of cases where I had to get FISA requests.
where I had to get FISA requests. >> What's a FISA request? advisor request
>> What's a FISA request? advisor request is when you want to um collect
is when you want to um collect information or take information from
information or take information from somebody who is an American citizen. And
somebody who is an American citizen. And I just want to remind people that
I just want to remind people that American citizen, most people who
American citizen, most people who complain about, oh, they're targeting
complain about, oh, they're targeting American citizens are thinking about
American citizens are thinking about themselves. They're looking at
themselves. They're looking at themselves in the mirror and thinking,
themselves in the mirror and thinking, oh, they're targeting American citizens.
oh, they're targeting American citizens. They're not thinking about the Chinese
They're not thinking about the Chinese person who just came over or
person who just came over or naturalized. They're not thinking about
naturalized. They're not thinking about the, you know, Iranian who's been here
the, you know, Iranian who's been here for a long time and naturalized, right?
for a long time and naturalized, right? like all of those they're not thinking
like all of those they're not thinking about, you know, the
about, you know, the >> the al-Qaeda member who claimed to be a
>> the al-Qaeda member who claimed to be a refugee to get here to get some sort of
refugee to get here to get some sort of green card,
green card, >> right? So, American citizenship, a lot
>> right? So, American citizenship, a lot of people have that and some of those
of people have that and some of those people are doing bad things and some of
people are doing bad things and some of those people are our adversaries who
those people are our adversaries who have infiltrated the United States and
have infiltrated the United States and are here to gather intelligence to get
are here to gather intelligence to get to the our adversaries, you know, or are
to the our adversaries, you know, or are here to do bad things within the
here to do bad things within the country. And so we have to get FISA
country. And so we have to get FISA requests to get the data on them.
requests to get the data on them. >> And what does that mean in in reality? A
>> And what does that mean in in reality? A FISA request, does that mean that you
FISA request, does that mean that you can go into their phone?
can go into their phone? >> It means that you have proven a link
>> It means that you have proven a link from that person to something bad and
from that person to something bad and you've given you've given the court
you've given you've given the court enough evidence to say, hey, look, this
enough evidence to say, hey, look, this person's doing something bad and we need
person's doing something bad and we need to gather more data on them. So it just
to gather more data on them. So it just opens the kind of data that you can get
opens the kind of data that you can get on that person.
on that person. >> What kind of data is that? Hey, you can
>> What kind of data is that? Hey, you can get on their phone. You can get into
get on their phone. You can get into their computer. You can get into their
their computer. You can get into their private Google accounts. You can get
private Google accounts. You can get their private Apple accounts. You can
their private Apple accounts. You can >> kind of data you can get access to. You
>> kind of data you can get access to. You can now use it to target them.
can now use it to target them. >> So, you could get access to their
>> So, you could get access to their private Google accounts, their private
private Google accounts, their private Apple accounts without their passwords.
Apple accounts without their passwords. >> You would hack their passwords or steal
>> You would hack their passwords or steal their passwords or Google retains their
their passwords or Google retains their passwords
passwords >> and Google would give it you the
>> and Google would give it you the password. it for many many for most
password. it for many many for most cases if it comes down to national
cases if it comes down to national security American companies will share
security American companies will share details
details >> and that's what a FISA request does is
>> and that's what a FISA request does is it's a judicial claim it's a judicial
it's a judicial claim it's a judicial warrant essentially to say you will let
warrant essentially to say you will let this service onto that person's account
this service onto that person's account >> you you guys must think that people like
>> you you guys must think that people like me live in a certain state of uh naivity
me live in a certain state of uh naivity and ignorance as to what's actually
and ignorance as to what's actually going on
going on >> I wouldn't say it's ignorance or naivity
>> I wouldn't say it's ignorance or naivity I would say that it's it's conditioned
I would say that it's it's conditioned into You're conditioned to believe that
into You're conditioned to believe that you have privacy.
you have privacy. >> So the reality that we should realize is
>> So the reality that we should realize is that we we don't have privacy.
that we we don't have privacy. >> It's not real.
>> It's not real. >> Privacy is not real.
>> Privacy is not real. >> No.
>> No. >> I mean, you know, there's a level like
>> I mean, you know, there's a level like >> in your when you get undressed in a dark
>> in your when you get undressed in a dark room
room like that's yours.
like that's yours. >> Usually no one's watching.
>> Usually no one's watching. >> There's a good chance that you're not
>> There's a good chance that you're not being watched by the federal government.
being watched by the federal government. If you're getting
If you're getting that's a good chance,
that's a good chance, >> you know, if you're sending, you know,
>> you know, if you're sending, you know, dirty emails to your girlfriend, that's
dirty emails to your girlfriend, that's essentially, I mean, it's private on the
essentially, I mean, it's private on the surface,
surface, >> but not really forever private. Somebody
>> but not really forever private. Somebody could access those. If you write her
could access those. If you write her dirty notes, that's way more private,
dirty notes, that's way more private, >> especially if she throws away or burns
>> especially if she throws away or burns them. Like people just I think people
them. Like people just I think people take put too much confidence in
take put too much confidence in technology and feel too confident in the
technology and feel too confident in the privacy of technology because technology
privacy of technology because technology there's really nothing private about it
there's really nothing private about it to an extent. Yes. But if you think that
to an extent. Yes. But if you think that nobody can ever look at your stuff,
nobody can ever look at your stuff, that's wrong.
that's wrong. >> Do you think the CIA knew you were
>> Do you think the CIA knew you were coming here today?
coming here today? >> I think the CIA knew we were coming on
>> I think the CIA knew we were coming on Diary of a CEO and I think they knew
Diary of a CEO and I think they knew that we were going to talk to you about
that we were going to talk to you about our book.
our book. >> How do you think they knew that? because
>> How do you think they knew that? because we know that CIA as well as other
we know that CIA as well as other intelligence services, as an example,
intelligence services, as an example, the United Arab Emirates, we know that
the United Arab Emirates, we know that they have a dedicated person that sits
they have a dedicated person that sits in their office that watches us.
in their office that watches us. >> So, how would they know you were coming
>> So, how would they know you were coming here today?
here today? >> Our emails, I mean, our emails, our
>> Our emails, I mean, our emails, our publishers emails, um, our own text
publishers emails, um, our own text messages back and forth,
messages back and forth, >> listening in on phone calls, any number
>> listening in on phone calls, any number of things could have happened. Uh, like
of things could have happened. Uh, like we've tried to have a very collaborative
we've tried to have a very collaborative relationship with CIA about this book
relationship with CIA about this book >> because we know how scared they are. We
>> because we know how scared they are. We know how nervous this book makes them.
know how nervous this book makes them. So, we're trying to be extra
So, we're trying to be extra collaborative to to give them peace of
collaborative to to give them peace of mind like, "Hey, we're not about to go
mind like, "Hey, we're not about to go out there and tell the world that you're
out there and tell the world that you're a bunch of animals and and terrible
a bunch of animals and and terrible anything." Um, they've actually read the
anything." Um, they've actually read the book multiple times and and still
book multiple times and and still they're they're afraid that we're going
they're they're afraid that we're going to somehow
to somehow like make them look bad because so many
like make them look bad because so many other officers have come out to become
other officers have come out to become authors who who make CIA look bad.
authors who who make CIA look bad. There was a couple of other things that
There was a couple of other things that we are going to get back to the arcade
we are going to get back to the arcade and what happened next, but there's a
and what happened next, but there's a couple of the things that sprung to mind
couple of the things that sprung to mind when you talked about how people can
when you talked about how people can make real businesses, fake businesses,
make real businesses, fake businesses, have various different covers. The the
have various different covers. The the next one was you mentioned Edward
next one was you mentioned Edward Snowden earlier and in mentioning Edward
Snowden earlier and in mentioning Edward Snowden, you used him as an example of
Snowden, you used him as an example of someone who returns to the country that
someone who returns to the country that they were working for the whole time.
they were working for the whole time. So
So with Snowden in the Snowden case in in
with Snowden in the Snowden case in in specific, right, whenever somebody flees
specific, right, whenever somebody flees their own home country,
their own home country, >> yeah,
>> yeah, >> nobody gives them protection for free.
>> nobody gives them protection for free. Even in the United States, we don't give
Even in the United States, we don't give anybody protection for free. You have to
anybody protection for free. You have to earn it. You have to share some sort of
earn it. You have to share some sort of currency and that currency may not be
currency and that currency may not be cash dollars. That currency might be
cash dollars. That currency might be information.
information. So when Snowden leaked to the Guardian
So when Snowden leaked to the Guardian the operations at NSA that were
the operations at NSA that were collecting against American citizens,
collecting against American citizens, the same American citizens that Gihei
the same American citizens that Gihei was just talking about, right? Nobody
was just talking about, right? Nobody cares about Joe Bob. Everybody cares
cares about Joe Bob. Everybody cares about, you know, the person who's
about, you know, the person who's pretending to be an American citizen,
pretending to be an American citizen, but is in fact a terrorist threat. When
but is in fact a terrorist threat. When Snowden made his escape, his when he
Snowden made his escape, his when he fleed the United States, he was
fleed the United States, he was essentially trading classified
essentially trading classified information, not just the the details of
information, not just the the details of the NSA case that he whistleblow, but
the NSA case that he whistleblow, but other confidential information that he
other confidential information that he collected specifically as currency to
collected specifically as currency to help him basically pay his way through
help him basically pay his way through Hong Kong and into China or into uh into
Hong Kong and into China or into uh into Russia.
Russia. >> And so he lives in Russia now.
>> And so he lives in Russia now. >> He's a Russian citizen. I'm pretty sure
>> He's a Russian citizen. I'm pretty sure he's also received a Russian award for
he's also received a Russian award for heroism. And you think he gave secrets
heroism. And you think he gave secrets to Russia about the United States to to
to Russia about the United States to to get that? I
get that? I >> can almost guarantee you. Yeah. What he
>> can almost guarantee you. Yeah. What he gave, I don't know. But Russia wouldn't
gave, I don't know. But Russia wouldn't give him that status unless he had given
give him that status unless he had given them something in return.
them something in return. >> And the other one who sprung to mind as
>> And the other one who sprung to mind as real business, fake, you know, real
real business, fake, you know, real business becomes successful
business becomes successful is the
is the man on everyone's lips at the moment,
man on everyone's lips at the moment, Jeffrey Epstein. M
Jeffrey Epstein. M so Epste's a fascinating case because
so Epste's a fascinating case because Epstein fits all of the primary pillars
Epstein fits all of the primary pillars of a foreign intelligence asset
of a foreign intelligence asset collecting information on American
collecting information on American citizens, not an American spy
citizens, not an American spy working for someone else. It's funny
working for someone else. It's funny because people keep thinking like CIA
because people keep thinking like CIA killed him or people keep thinking that
killed him or people keep thinking that he somehow worked for CIA or maybe even
he somehow worked for CIA or maybe even worked for for MSAD. What I see is the
worked for for MSAD. What I see is the opposite that he if anything was working
opposite that he if anything was working independently maybe even working for
independently maybe even working for several company or several countries but
several company or several countries but collecting information on US people.
collecting information on US people. >> Is that what you believe?
>> Is that what you believe? >> I think that he could have been that. I
>> I think that he could have been that. I don't know that I necessarily believe
don't know that I necessarily believe that it's true
that it's true >> cuz he was a very successful business
>> cuz he was a very successful business person. He had lots of um successful
person. He had lots of um successful friends. Actually, I was interviewing
friends. Actually, I was interviewing someone the other day and they said that
someone the other day and they said that they met Jeffrey Epstein and Jeffrey
they met Jeffrey Epstein and Jeffrey Epstein was really really interested in
Epstein was really really interested in their physics and science discoveries
their physics and science discoveries and wasn't interested at all in the
and wasn't interested at all in the finance year stuff that he was
finance year stuff that he was pretending to or he was purporting to be
pretending to or he was purporting to be involved in. And um this person said to
involved in. And um this person said to me it was just really bizarre because he
me it was just really bizarre because he was only interested in the the physics
was only interested in the the physics and science discoveries we had at
and science discoveries we had at Harvard. he wasn't particularly
Harvard. he wasn't particularly interested in finance to me and that
interested in finance to me and that person was was like really shocked by
person was was like really shocked by that.
that. >> What I've learned working with wealthy
>> What I've learned working with wealthy people and successful people is that
people and successful people is that they're often very intelligent and
they're often very intelligent and they're often misunderstood and part of
they're often misunderstood and part of the reason that they have grown as
the reason that they have grown as successful as they have grown is because
successful as they have grown is because they don't really fit in anywhere else.
they don't really fit in anywhere else. If they would have fit in somewhere
If they would have fit in somewhere else, they would have been distracted by
else, they would have been distracted by the area where they fit in. Instead,
the area where they fit in. Instead, they had to carve their own interests,
they had to carve their own interests, their own passions, their own their own
their own passions, their own their own drive. In many ways, when I look at
drive. In many ways, when I look at Epstein, that's that's what I see. I've
Epstein, that's that's what I see. I've also worked with many wealthy people who
also worked with many wealthy people who have gone to jail. And when wealthy
have gone to jail. And when wealthy people go to jail, their whole identity
people go to jail, their whole identity crumbles and they start to doubt
crumbles and they start to doubt themselves and they start to have these
themselves and they start to have these irrational thoughts that sound totally
irrational thoughts that sound totally rational to them. I had a client who was
rational to them. I had a client who was very wealthy, who was going to jail
very wealthy, who was going to jail after being found guilty of a crime that
after being found guilty of a crime that that arguably couldn't be proven, but
that arguably couldn't be proven, but the court system was set up in such a
the court system was set up in such a way that he was found guilty. And he
way that he was found guilty. And he literally thought that it would be
literally thought that it would be better if he if he cut off all ties to
better if he if he cut off all ties to his kids and just went to jail and then
his kids and just went to jail and then even when he got out of jail never
even when he got out of jail never talked to his kids again because that
talked to his kids again because that would be better than shaming his
would be better than shaming his children for the rest of their life.
children for the rest of their life. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> With a father who went to jail. So
>> With a father who went to jail. So there's when I think about the Epstein
there's when I think about the Epstein case and I think about a wealthy
case and I think about a wealthy powerful man who was having parties with
powerful man who was having parties with the world's elite and then he goes to
the world's elite and then he goes to jail and he kills himself. To me that's
jail and he kills himself. To me that's not an unbelievable series of events.
not an unbelievable series of events. the whole thing with the island and the
the whole thing with the island and the underage sex and all this stuff, you
underage sex and all this stuff, you know, people just can't seem to shake
know, people just can't seem to shake the idea that he wasn't extracting
the idea that he wasn't extracting information. And then the fact that they
information. And then the fact that they won't release the flight logs
won't release the flight logs >> or a list of the names of people that
>> or a list of the names of people that were frequenting his island or
were frequenting his island or interacting with him also raises another
interacting with him also raises another question mark about why wouldn't the US
question mark about why wouldn't the US government release that? Why isn't Trump
government release that? Why isn't Trump very quick to release that information?
very quick to release that information? >> There are lots of secrets that are kept
>> There are lots of secrets that are kept for lots of reasons. And when we talk
for lots of reasons. And when we talk about like if there's anything that
about like if there's anything that we've learned need to know
we've learned need to know the the need part is the driving part.
the the need part is the driving part. What is the need to know? There's plenty
What is the need to know? There's plenty of secrets the government has that it
of secrets the government has that it tells the American people it doesn't
tells the American people it doesn't know. It's just lying. Of course it
know. It's just lying. Of course it knows. But it's working the common good
knows. But it's working the common good to say if you knew what we knew. It
to say if you knew what we knew. It could cause panic. It could cause chaos.
could cause panic. It could cause chaos. It could cause any number of things. And
It could cause any number of things. And in the United States, that is one of the
in the United States, that is one of the rights and privileges that the federal
rights and privileges that the federal government has.
government has. >> So, what do you both think happened with
>> So, what do you both think happened with the Jeffrey Epstein situation because it
the Jeffrey Epstein situation because it smells fishy to everybody? The fact
smells fishy to everybody? The fact that, you know, Trump and Cash Patel and
that, you know, Trump and Cash Patel and various other White House officials were
various other White House officials were saying we're going to release it the
saying we're going to release it the minute we get in there and then they get
minute we get in there and then they get in there and they say there's nothing to
in there and they say there's nothing to release.
release. >> You you must cuz you understand this
>> You you must cuz you understand this much more than I would. you must see
much more than I would. you must see like fingerprints of what you think is
like fingerprints of what you think is actually going on there or the real
actually going on there or the real reasons they wouldn't release it.
reasons they wouldn't release it. >> When I look at it through a lens of
>> When I look at it through a lens of probabilities,
probabilities, the most probable
the most probable outcome is that somebody in the prison
outcome is that somebody in the prison was hired to hurt Jeffrey Epstein.
was hired to hurt Jeffrey Epstein. That's the most probable outcome that
That's the most probable outcome that somebody outside was watching the
somebody outside was watching the Epstein case and knew that Epstein may
Epstein case and knew that Epstein may or may not have compromising information
or may not have compromising information on them and that wealthy well-connected
on them and that wealthy well-connected person paid to have a hit inside the
person paid to have a hit inside the prison. That's just the to me that's the
prison. That's just the to me that's the most probable result of things
most probable result of things happening. That explains the missing
happening. That explains the missing evidence. That explains the videotapes.
evidence. That explains the videotapes. That explains the stories inside of
That explains the stories inside of prison where nobody can see what's going
prison where nobody can see what's going on. Also, that's the most vulnerable
on. Also, that's the most vulnerable place for Epstein to have been
place for Epstein to have been neutralized. That's how we would have
neutralized. That's how we would have run an operation.
run an operation. >> But why why wouldn't the government
>> But why why wouldn't the government release that? Why wouldn't they say a
release that? Why wouldn't they say a prisoner killed killed him?
prisoner killed killed him? >> The government may not know that cuz if
>> The government may not know that cuz if a if a prisoner was paid to do it, they
a if a prisoner was paid to do it, they may have covered their tracks well
may have covered their tracks well enough. Or they may have paid a prisoner
enough. Or they may have paid a prisoner and the guards to also cover the thing
and the guards to also cover the thing up. Jail's a nasty place. People forget
up. Jail's a nasty place. People forget how nasty a place jail is. And jails are
how nasty a place jail is. And jails are commercial. They're not federal for the
commercial. They're not federal for the most part. So, it's a commercial
most part. So, it's a commercial business that has all sorts of plausible
business that has all sorts of plausible deniability that a federal business or a
deniability that a federal business or a federal organization, federal building
federal organization, federal building doesn't have. So that's to me that's the
doesn't have. So that's to me that's the most probable series of events. There's
most probable series of events. There's still a chance that any number of the
still a chance that any number of the other conspiracies are true. But when I
other conspiracies are true. But when I think of what what I've seen, what my
think of what what I've seen, what my clients have seen, what what I would do
clients have seen, what what I would do if I was in the shoes of a foreign
if I was in the shoes of a foreign adversary or a foreign intelligence
adversary or a foreign intelligence collection operation dealing with a
collection operation dealing with a Jeffrey Epstein type of situation,
Jeffrey Epstein type of situation, that's how we would clean it up. There
that's how we would clean it up. There was a a press conference the other day
was a a press conference the other day where the reporters asked the Trump
where the reporters asked the Trump administration, "Does the Department of
administration, "Does the Department of Justice have any indication that Jeffrey
Justice have any indication that Jeffrey Epstein was working with the US or a
Epstein was working with the US or a foreign intelligence agency or was he a
foreign intelligence agency or was he a spy of some kind?" And Pam Bondi um who
spy of some kind?" And Pam Bondi um who works in the Trump administration said
works in the Trump administration said to him being an agent, "I have no
to him being an agent, "I have no knowledge about that. We can get back to
knowledge about that. We can get back to you on that."
you on that." >> Two really important things here. If
>> Two really important things here. If they did have information on that in an
they did have information on that in an active investigation, she would say, "I
active investigation, she would say, "I have no knowledge on that." She would
have no knowledge on that." She would lie to the American public. That's what
lie to the American public. That's what that's what you have to do if you're
that's what you have to do if you're trying to build a current case. Because
trying to build a current case. Because if they acknowledge, we act we have some
if they acknowledge, we act we have some reason to believe that he might have
reason to believe that he might have been an agent. Now, all of a sudden,
been an agent. Now, all of a sudden, everybody else out there would start
everybody else out there would start destroying evidence and start hiding
destroying evidence and start hiding evidence and start and start making the
evidence and start and start making the case much more difficult. So, if they
case much more difficult. So, if they knew, they would say they don't know.
knew, they would say they don't know. >> Do you think he was an agent?
>> Do you think he was an agent? >> I think he could have been. I think he
>> I think he could have been. I think he fits the model of a very good reporting
fits the model of a very good reporting asset, but I don't have enough evidence
asset, but I don't have enough evidence to say that he was actually one.
to say that he was actually one. >> Do you think he was?
>> Do you think he was? >> I mean,
>> I mean, I think even if he I don't know that it
I think even if he I don't know that it matters is what I think. Like even if he
matters is what I think. Like even if he was, that doesn't mean that it's
was, that doesn't mean that it's connected because he was a lot of
connected because he was a lot of things.
things. >> So
>> So >> I I think I think people are focused on
>> I I think I think people are focused on it because it's interesting. Yeah.
it because it's interesting. Yeah. because it would be interesting if he
because it would be interesting if he was and it would be interesting if there
was and it would be interesting if there was this conspiracy. I think that's why
was this conspiracy. I think that's why people are focused on it, but I don't
people are focused on it, but I don't know that it really matters because in
know that it really matters because in the grand scheme of things,
the grand scheme of things, I mean, it could be a lot of things that
I mean, it could be a lot of things that led, you know,
led, you know, >> why are we talking about a dead guy
>> why are we talking about a dead guy who's not reporting?
who's not reporting? >> I think it's just the allure, right?
>> I think it's just the allure, right? People want answers. Once the curiosity
People want answers. Once the curiosity gap's open, people need to fill it with
gap's open, people need to fill it with something.
something. >> Correct. When when what the intelligence
>> Correct. When when what the intelligence community believes is that in any given
community believes is that in any given moment, there are two penetrations of
moment, there are two penetrations of every intelligence service.
every intelligence service. So, why are we talking about the dead
So, why are we talking about the dead guy that we don't know about when we're
guy that we don't know about when we're not talking about the dozens of arrests
not talking about the dozens of arrests and cases that are made every year of
and cases that are made every year of active moles, active penetrations that
active moles, active penetrations that are inside of our intelligence
are inside of our intelligence community? Every single one of you
community? Every single one of you watching this right now has something to
watching this right now has something to offer, whether it's knowledge or skills
offer, whether it's knowledge or skills or experience. And that means you have
or experience. And that means you have value. Stands, the platform I co-own,
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entrepreneurs just like you have the potential to be on Stanto. These are
potential to be on Stanto. These are people who didn't wait, who heard me
people who didn't wait, who heard me saying things like this, and instead of
saying things like this, and instead of procrastinating, started building, then
procrastinating, started building, then launched something, and now they're
launched something, and now they're getting paid to do it. Stan is
getting paid to do it. Stan is incredibly simple and incredibly easy,
incredibly simple and incredibly easy, and you can link it with a Shopify store
and you can link it with a Shopify store that you're already using if you want
that you're already using if you want to. I'm on it and so is my girlfriend
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and get yours set up within minutes. >> So, take me back to the arcade. You you
>> So, take me back to the arcade. You you lock eyes with this guy, the guy wearing
lock eyes with this guy, the guy wearing the uh what was he wearing?
the uh what was he wearing? >> Bomber jacket.
>> Bomber jacket. >> The bomber jacket.
>> The bomber jacket. >> What happens next?
>> What happens next? >> Once I realized that we had both made
>> Once I realized that we had both made the same mistake, he darted off in one
the same mistake, he darted off in one direction and I felt burned. Burned is
direction and I felt burned. Burned is the term that we use whenever we are
the term that we use whenever we are spotted identified as trained
spotted identified as trained intelligence officers. Um, but I didn't
intelligence officers. Um, but I didn't want to act on being burned right away
want to act on being burned right away because our training says that just just
because our training says that just just because you believe something to be
because you believe something to be true, you can't act on that truth. If
true, you can't act on that truth. If you act on that truth, then you're
you act on that truth, then you're verifying to anybody observing that you
verifying to anybody observing that you already know you screwed up. So, I kind
already know you screwed up. So, I kind of ambled around the arcade and played
of ambled around the arcade and played another couple of games kind of
another couple of games kind of half-handed, half-hearted just to kill
half-handed, half-hearted just to kill some time before I left and finished my
some time before I left and finished my SDR route and finished my collection and
SDR route and finished my collection and went back to my back to my hotel for the
went back to my back to my hotel for the night. The whole process that I go
night. The whole process that I go through during the surveillance
through during the surveillance detection route, the whole process that
detection route, the whole process that I go through to evacuate the country
I go through to evacuate the country safely is all part of the details that
safely is all part of the details that we put inside Shadow Cell. But the
we put inside Shadow Cell. But the feeling that predominated that that
feeling that predominated that that dominated my thought process was just
dominated my thought process was just this feeling of failure. This feeling
this feeling of failure. This feeling like
like I was I was a bad spy. I'm bad at what I
I was I was a bad spy. I'm bad at what I do, bad at what I collect. When I think
do, bad at what I collect. When I think I'm good, I'm not good. It was just this
I'm good, I'm not good. It was just this humiliating and humbling experience. And
humiliating and humbling experience. And it wasn't helped as I went through the
it wasn't helped as I went through the process of writing the book because as
process of writing the book because as when you write a book, it's cathartic in
when you write a book, it's cathartic in a way because it gets all this stuff
a way because it gets all this stuff out. But it's also this black and white
out. But it's also this black and white kind of stark reminder of all the things
kind of stark reminder of all the things that you've done wrong.
that you've done wrong. >> What did you do wrong?
>> What did you do wrong? >> Whatever I did that got caught was
>> Whatever I did that got caught was wrong. If they caught me on my own
wrong. If they caught me on my own behaviors, if the mole was the one that
behaviors, if the mole was the one that identified me to them, then I lost the
identified me to them, then I lost the ability to operate inside a falcon on
ability to operate inside a falcon on that day. I could no longer support the
that day. I could no longer support the rest of the shadow cell. I could no
rest of the shadow cell. I could no longer support my team. I had a a role
longer support my team. I had a a role to play and I couldn't play that role
to play and I couldn't play that role anymore. And
anymore. And I think that's especially powerful to me
I think that's especially powerful to me because
because I mean, I'm not a case officer. I was
I mean, I'm not a case officer. I was supposed to be a case officer, but I'm
supposed to be a case officer, but I'm not because when CIA assessed me for
not because when CIA assessed me for that job, they determined that I
that job, they determined that I wouldn't be good enough.
wouldn't be good enough. >> Okay. So, you already had an insecurity
>> Okay. So, you already had an insecurity there.
there. >> And that was the first year at CIA. So,
>> And that was the first year at CIA. So, even though I built this career and I
even though I built this career and I had a chance to carry out this
had a chance to carry out this operation, I got to do these amazing
operation, I got to do these amazing things. All that plays out in the back
things. All that plays out in the back of my head is I wasn't good enough then,
of my head is I wasn't good enough then, I'm not good enough now.
I'm not good enough now. >> One of the things that the CIA does is
>> One of the things that the CIA does is they teach you how to deal with head
they teach you how to deal with head trash. Mhm.
trash. Mhm. >> What is head trash?
>> What is head trash? >> It's funny actually. So head trash is
>> It's funny actually. So head trash is all the terrible things that you say
all the terrible things that you say about yourself in your head. That's the
about yourself in your head. That's the the colloquial term that we use is head
the colloquial term that we use is head trash. I'm not good enough. I'm ugly.
trash. I'm not good enough. I'm ugly. I'm fat. I wish my smile was better. Um,
I'm fat. I wish my smile was better. Um, you know, my I lost my true love when I
you know, my I lost my true love when I was 14. Whatever, right? My my parents
was 14. Whatever, right? My my parents didn't love me because I wasn't a good
didn't love me because I wasn't a good enough kid. Whatever it was, all those
enough kid. Whatever it was, all those things are head trash. They're they're
things are head trash. They're they're subjective
subjective thoughts that you have because of your
thoughts that you have because of your experience that don't have any basis in
experience that don't have any basis in objective reality. CIA teaches us how to
objective reality. CIA teaches us how to deal with that to a point. They teach us
deal with that to a point. They teach us how to counter that when we are
how to counter that when we are operationally active so that we don't
operationally active so that we don't get distracted by the head trash going
get distracted by the head trash going on. This is what happened whenever I
on. This is what happened whenever I first knew I was under surveillance.
first knew I was under surveillance. They teach you how to handle stress,
They teach you how to handle stress, mitigate uh um cortisol levels in your
mitigate uh um cortisol levels in your bloodstream, lower your heart rate so
bloodstream, lower your heart rate so that you can get back to the task at
that you can get back to the task at hand.
hand. >> How do they do that?
>> How do they do that? >> Techniques like box breathing.
>> Techniques like box breathing. >> What's that?
>> What's that? >> Uh box breathing is a process that
>> Uh box breathing is a process that that's common in anxiety as well.
that's common in anxiety as well. >> Yeah. Breathe in four counts, hold four
>> Yeah. Breathe in four counts, hold four counts, breathe out four counts, breathe
counts, breathe out four counts, breathe in for, you know, just uh it's breathing
in for, you know, just uh it's breathing various breathing techniques where you
various breathing techniques where you breathe in for a certain amount of time,
breathe in for a certain amount of time, you hold it for a certain amount of
you hold it for a certain amount of time, you release it for a certain
time, you release it for a certain amount of time. And and the goal there
amount of time. And and the goal there is to reduce your heart rate, to reduce
is to reduce your heart rate, to reduce your blood flow, to reduce the speed at
your blood flow, to reduce the speed at which the cortisol that's being released
which the cortisol that's being released from your brain gets spread to the rest
from your brain gets spread to the rest of your body. So you can start to take
of your body. So you can start to take back your physiological
back your physiological movements and actions in a hope that it
movements and actions in a hope that it also brings back your cognitive
also brings back your cognitive functions and capabilities. So the
functions and capabilities. So the visualization process, just like when
visualization process, just like when you're meditating and you visualize a
you're meditating and you visualize a victory if you're a professional athlete
victory if you're a professional athlete or if you visualize a beach if you're
or if you visualize a beach if you're stressing out at work, like you can
stressing out at work, like you can visualize your way through an operation,
visualize your way through an operation, an operational sequence to get yourself
an operational sequence to get yourself back to a place where you're in control.
back to a place where you're in control. So they teach us how to deal with that
So they teach us how to deal with that head trash. But what's really
head trash. But what's really interesting is CIA relies on loyalty in
interesting is CIA relies on loyalty in its people to keep them at CIA. Because
its people to keep them at CIA. Because the worst thing for CIA is for a CIA
the worst thing for CIA is for a CIA officer to realize how capable they
officer to realize how capable they actually are. Because when that officer
actually are. Because when that officer realizes how smart, how capable, how
realizes how smart, how capable, how resilient, how resourceful they really
resilient, how resourceful they really are, that person can leave CIA and go do
are, that person can leave CIA and go do amazing things. So a big part of what
amazing things. So a big part of what CIA does is they they train you to be
CIA does is they they train you to be operationally useful, but then they
operationally useful, but then they still condition you to be like loyal and
still condition you to be like loyal and needy of outside validation specifically
needy of outside validation specifically from them. So it's a very strange
from them. So it's a very strange flywheel that exists.
flywheel that exists. >> A lot of businesses are like that as
>> A lot of businesses are like that as well.
well. >> It's not a healthy relationship, but
>> It's not a healthy relationship, but it's a very effective relationship.
it's a very effective relationship. >> So you get back to your hotel. Are you
>> So you get back to your hotel. Are you not at that point when you're back at
not at that point when you're back at your hotel thinking, "Right, I'm gonna
your hotel thinking, "Right, I'm gonna find like how to get through like the
find like how to get through like the restaurant kitchen door and like out the
restaurant kitchen door and like out the back and I'll cycle back to
back and I'll cycle back to because I'd be up all night thinking
because I'd be up all night thinking about going through that bloody like
about going through that bloody like restaurant kitchen." A big part of that
restaurant kitchen." A big part of that is what you do in the second phase of
is what you do in the second phase of your SDR. And I had those thoughts. I
your SDR. And I had those thoughts. I thought about I could get on a
thought about I could get on a motorcycle. I could ride to a local
motorcycle. I could ride to a local airfield. I could pay in cash for that
airfield. I could pay in cash for that airfield person like a little private
airfield person like a little private pilot to just fly me on a puddle hopper
pilot to just fly me on a puddle hopper puddle jumper somewhere where I walk
puddle jumper somewhere where I walk across on foot and then I can make a
across on foot and then I can make a phone call from another place. Like I
phone call from another place. Like I thought about all that all that [ __ ]
thought about all that all that [ __ ] right? The problem is if you actually
right? The problem is if you actually act on that and you're being watched,
act on that and you're being watched, what sense does that make? The only
what sense does that make? The only person who would do that kind of crazy
person who would do that kind of crazy [ __ ] is somebody who's trying to escape
[ __ ] is somebody who's trying to escape the country.
the country. >> So what did you do?
>> So what did you do? >> I went back to the hotel. My plan was to
>> I went back to the hotel. My plan was to was to literally just leave. Was to walk
was to literally just leave. Was to walk across the border like any other
across the border like any other law-abiding citizen and just evacuate.
law-abiding citizen and just evacuate. >> Walk across the border. fly to to leave
>> Walk across the border. fly to to leave like anybody else would leave and just
like anybody else would leave and just gamble that they're not going to take me
gamble that they're not going to take me down, right? The gamble that I'm going
down, right? The gamble that I'm going to be more boring than they will be
to be more boring than they will be confident and that before they arrest
confident and that before they arrest Alex Hernandez and make some sort of
Alex Hernandez and make some sort of public international incident, they're
public international incident, they're going to think twice and they're going
going to think twice and they're going to let me just leave.
to let me just leave. >> What actually happened?
>> What actually happened? So, what actually happened is um I get
So, what actually happened is um I get back to the hotel. I don't really sleep
back to the hotel. I don't really sleep at all. I try to use sleep techniques to
at all. I try to use sleep techniques to get me to sleep because I am certain
get me to sleep because I am certain that at any given time someone's going
that at any given time someone's going to burst through the door and just take
to burst through the door and just take me down because they already know I'm
me down because they already know I'm changing my flight. They already know
changing my flight. They already know I'm I'm updating my itinerary. I've made
I'm I'm updating my itinerary. I've made all the phone calls. I've worked it
all the phone calls. I've worked it through my company, right, my cover
through my company, right, my cover company to get me home early. So,
company to get me home early. So, I'm just waiting for them to break in.
I'm just waiting for them to break in. They never break in. I go to the airport
They never break in. I go to the airport the next day and uh on the path to the
the next day and uh on the path to the airport, I'm looking for surveillance
airport, I'm looking for surveillance and I'm surveillance free. And I get to
and I'm surveillance free. And I get to the airport first thing in the morning
the airport first thing in the morning and I'm waiting and like every step I'm
and I'm waiting and like every step I'm waiting for someone to jump out of the
waiting for someone to jump out of the dark shadows and take me down and drag
dark shadows and take me down and drag me off to prison. And it just doesn't
me off to prison. And it just doesn't happen until I get to the first entry
happen until I get to the first entry point for the airport. I show my
point for the airport. I show my passport, I show my ticket, and then
passport, I show my ticket, and then they move me into secondary. secondary
they move me into secondary. secondary meaning where you try to leave a country
meaning where you try to leave a country and the border patrol says that you're
and the border patrol says that you're not you can't leave through the main
not you can't leave through the main gate. You have to go through a second
gate. You have to go through a second round of interview. So they pull me off
round of interview. So they pull me off into a secondary room and I go through a
into a secondary room and I go through a light interrogation with two local
light interrogation with two local Falcon officers at like 7:00 in the
Falcon officers at like 7:00 in the morning first first flight out and and
morning first first flight out and and they're testing my story and they're
they're testing my story and they're interrogating me to understand what have
interrogating me to understand what have I been doing in the country? Why did I
I been doing in the country? Why did I change my flight? They're going through
change my flight? They're going through my my cover story. They're going through
my my cover story. They're going through my my uh meetings from the day before.
my my uh meetings from the day before. They're going through everything two and
They're going through everything two and three times, which is an it's an
three times, which is an it's an interrogation technique to see if
interrogation technique to see if somebody's lying. And I'm sitting there
somebody's lying. And I'm sitting there going through this whole process,
going through this whole process, watching what almost feels like
watching what almost feels like like two untrained Border Patrol agents
like two untrained Border Patrol agents trying to crack me. And it's uh it was a
trying to crack me. And it's uh it was a funny feeling because they were so bad
funny feeling because they were so bad at their job that it made me feel
at their job that it made me feel confident in myself again.
confident in myself again. >> Are you trained on how to deal with
>> Are you trained on how to deal with those situations in terms of body
those situations in terms of body language and how you speak and
language and how you speak and >> Absolutely. CIA trains us on how to deal
>> Absolutely. CIA trains us on how to deal with uh interviews, how to deal with
with uh interviews, how to deal with interrogations, and even how to deal
interrogations, and even how to deal with uh actual um capture and and
with uh actual um capture and and strategic almost like enhanced
strategic almost like enhanced interrogation like what you would call
interrogation like what you would call what we do call torture here in the
what we do call torture here in the United States. And so from your
United States. And so from your training, what were you implementing at
training, what were you implementing at that moment in time?
that moment in time? >> Mirroring is a big piece of what you're
>> Mirroring is a big piece of what you're supposed to do in an interrogation. So,
supposed to do in an interrogation. So, so you want to you want to reflect back
so you want to you want to reflect back to the interrogator what they expect to
to the interrogator what they expect to see in a person of innocence. So you try
see in a person of innocence. So you try to keep your you keep yourself from
to keep your you keep yourself from jittering. You you calm your nerves. You
jittering. You you calm your nerves. You try to match their curiosity. So if they
try to match their curiosity. So if they lean forward, you actually want to lean
lean forward, you actually want to lean forward, too. And if they lean back, you
forward, too. And if they lean back, you want to lean back. And if they're using
want to lean back. And if they're using their hands to talk, you want to use
their hands to talk, you want to use your hands to talk because you want to
your hands to talk because you want to show them that you and them are the
show them that you and them are the same, that you're not better or worse or
same, that you're not better or worse or guilty or anything else. So mirroring is
guilty or anything else. So mirroring is one of the techniques that we're using.
one of the techniques that we're using. We also I also used minimum information.
We also I also used minimum information. There's a process called elicitation,
There's a process called elicitation, and you use different elicitation
and you use different elicitation techniques to get individuals to share
techniques to get individuals to share more information than they're supposed
more information than they're supposed to share. One of those elicitation
to share. One of those elicitation techniques is silence. So often times if
techniques is silence. So often times if you want someone to speak, all you have
you want someone to speak, all you have to do is sit there and be quiet because
to do is sit there and be quiet because it will force them to talk. This is
it will force them to talk. This is something that many interviewers use,
something that many interviewers use, especially when they're border patrol
especially when they're border patrol agents or when they're like law
agents or when they're like law enforcement or local law enforcement.
enforcement or local law enforcement. They'll just let somebody kind of admit
They'll just let somebody kind of admit their guilt. So for me, they ask a
their guilt. So for me, they ask a question, I answer their question, and
question, I answer their question, and then we sit there in silence for as long
then we sit there in silence for as long as we need to sit there until they ask
as we need to sit there until they ask their next question. And then we sit
their next question. And then we sit there and and I answer their question,
there and and I answer their question, we sit there in silence again. And
we sit there in silence again. And that's combating elicitation. It's a
that's combating elicitation. It's a technique that we call counter
technique that we call counter elicitation. And that's just one of
elicitation. And that's just one of several elicitation techniques that
several elicitation techniques that interviewers can use.
interviewers can use. >> And that's useful in everyday life, I
>> And that's useful in everyday life, I guess, as well.
guess, as well. >> Absolutely.
>> Absolutely. >> In what context?
>> In what context? >> When you're dealing with a negotiation,
>> When you're dealing with a negotiation, when you're dealing with a hostile
when you're dealing with a hostile employee, when you're dealing with a
employee, when you're dealing with a hard conversation, when you're trying to
hard conversation, when you're trying to find information in a in another person
find information in a in another person who you think is holding information
who you think is holding information back, elicitation techniques are
back, elicitation techniques are incredibly valuable. You can ask them a
incredibly valuable. You can ask them a question. You can ask them the same
question. You can ask them the same question twice. that'll help you
question twice. that'll help you identify whether or not they're lying,
identify whether or not they're lying, if there's a gap in their two answers or
if there's a gap in their two answers or if they answer two different ways. And I
if they answer two different ways. And I mean, I'm sure you've seen it as a you
mean, I'm sure you've seen it as a you you one of the things that makes you
you one of the things that makes you such an effective host in your own house
such an effective host in your own house here is that you use elicitation
here is that you use elicitation techniques all the time. You ask feeling
techniques all the time. You ask feeling based questions. How did you feel about
based questions. How did you feel about this situation? Uh, take me back to that
this situation? Uh, take me back to that moment. How would if you could if you
moment. How would if you could if you could be king for a day, what would you
could be king for a day, what would you do? Right? These are all very advanced
do? Right? These are all very advanced elicitation techniques because it gets
elicitation techniques because it gets people to express more than they thought
people to express more than they thought they would share.
they would share. >> So you're in you're in that room in that
>> So you're in you're in that room in that airport. These two very poorly trained
airport. These two very poorly trained guards are trying to get something out
guards are trying to get something out of you. They don't get it out of you.
of you. They don't get it out of you. >> Correct.
>> Correct. >> So at some point they just let you go.
>> So at some point they just let you go. >> Correct. So what ends up happening is
>> Correct. So what ends up happening is they they're arguing with each other and
they they're arguing with each other and I don't know why they're arguing. It
I don't know why they're arguing. It seems like uh from the from the pigeon
seems like uh from the from the pigeon words that I can pick up, one of them is
words that I can pick up, one of them is talking about being busy and not having
talking about being busy and not having enough time and this doesn't make sense
enough time and this doesn't make sense and the other person's talking about
and the other person's talking about we have to do this, this is required,
we have to do this, this is required, etc., etc. I don't actually know what
etc., etc. I don't actually know what they're saying to each other, but I see
they're saying to each other, but I see that they're aggression with each other
that they're aggression with each other just keeps going up almost like two
just keeps going up almost like two colleagues who are fighting, right? But
colleagues who are fighting, right? But at the end of the day, they couldn't
at the end of the day, they couldn't hold me without either releasing me back
hold me without either releasing me back to my plane or moving me into a place
to my plane or moving me into a place where they were going to retain me long
where they were going to retain me long term. So when faced with that kind of
term. So when faced with that kind of decision, they released me back to my
decision, they released me back to my plane. And then the biggest stress that
plane. And then the biggest stress that I had was not running to my plane
I had was not running to my plane because as soon as they let me out of
because as soon as they let me out of the secondary interview, all I wanted to
the secondary interview, all I wanted to do was like haul ass to my plane, get on
do was like haul ass to my plane, get on my plane, and feel safe. But I had to
my plane, and feel safe. But I had to continue to show that I was not a
continue to show that I was not a trained officer.
trained officer. >> And at this point, Ji, are you how are
>> And at this point, Ji, are you how are you feeling back in the friendly
you feeling back in the friendly country?
country? >> So, at this point, I still have no idea
>> So, at this point, I still have no idea what's happening. Um I by the time I
what's happening. Um I by the time I hear from him, he is in the the cutout
hear from him, he is in the the cutout country on his way back. So, I know he's
country on his way back. So, I know he's left me a voicemail and I know he's out
left me a voicemail and I know he's out of Falcon, the enemy country, which is
of Falcon, the enemy country, which is great, but I know he's in that third
great, but I know he's in that third country. So, I'm like, "Okay, he should
country. So, I'm like, "Okay, he should be on his way home." But until then, I
be on his way home." But until then, I mean, all of this that he was going
mean, all of this that he was going through, I didn't find out until he
through, I didn't find out until he actually returned home. And then I hear
actually returned home. And then I hear this story and I'm like, "What the
this story and I'm like, "What the hell?" Like, like this is absolutely
hell?" Like, like this is absolutely like our worst nightmare, like what we
like our worst nightmare, like what we did not want to happen. And so
did not want to happen. And so immediately we are like, you know, we go
immediately we are like, you know, we go into action like first it's like I'm so
into action like first it's like I'm so happy you're home. And then the next
happy you're home. And then the next thing is how did this happen? and we
thing is how did this happen? and we just start taking action into, you know,
just start taking action into, you know, investigating like, did we do something
investigating like, did we do something wrong? Like, is there any any mistake
wrong? Like, is there any any mistake that we could have made and we have to
that we could have made and we have to research and go back through all of our
research and go back through all of our own stuff? And, you know, and then we
own stuff? And, you know, and then we have to make the assessment of can Andy
have to make the assessment of can Andy ever go back in, you know, was this
ever go back in, you know, was this really what we think it was or, you
really what we think it was or, you know, is he safe to like is his alias
know, is he safe to like is his alias safe, you know, and then we have to
safe, you know, and then we have to >> And what was your assessment? Did you
>> And what was your assessment? Did you think he could go back in?
think he could go back in? >> No, it was too risky. Yeah. We we assess
>> No, it was too risky. Yeah. We we assess that Alex Hernandez was burned.
that Alex Hernandez was burned. >> Was burned. Yeah.
>> Was burned. Yeah. >> And we assume
>> And we assume >> Alex Hernandez being your undercover spy
>> Alex Hernandez being your undercover spy name.
name. >> Correct. The alias the the operating
>> Correct. The alias the the operating alias that we used.
alias that we used. >> Uh and we assume that the cutout
>> Uh and we assume that the cutout country, the third country that Alex was
country, the third country that Alex was traveling through. So anytime Falcon
traveling through. So anytime Falcon wanted to track Alex, they would track
wanted to track Alex, they would track him back to that third country. Alex
him back to that third country. Alex would even use the Falcon airline to fly
would even use the Falcon airline to fly back and forth between the third country
back and forth between the third country and Falcon specifically so that if
and Falcon specifically so that if Falcon intelligence ever suspected Alex,
Falcon intelligence ever suspected Alex, they would feel that much more
they would feel that much more comfortable knowing that they had flight
comfortable knowing that they had flight manifests on him going back to a third
manifests on him going back to a third country. So, we just assumed from our
country. So, we just assumed from our study that Alex was fully burned that
study that Alex was fully burned that that the mole had come across either
that the mole had come across either Alex's operational history or the mole
Alex's operational history or the mole had come across my true name operational
had come across my true name operational history and tied me to Alex. Whichever
history and tied me to Alex. Whichever one it was, Alex was burned. But we also
one it was, Alex was burned. But we also assessed that everybody else who had
assessed that everybody else who had been traveling to Falcon through the
been traveling to Falcon through the cell was still safe.
cell was still safe. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm. >> So you assessed that your shadow cell,
>> So you assessed that your shadow cell, which was your team in the friendly
which was your team in the friendly country, were all fine.
country, were all fine. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> But Alex Hernandez, which was your
>> But Alex Hernandez, which was your alias, was could no longer be used.
alias, was could no longer be used. >> Correct. That and that was how the cell
>> Correct. That and that was how the cell was built. The cell was built where Alex
was built. The cell was built where Alex Hernandez was the trip wire where the
Hernandez was the trip wire where the first person who be compromised would be
first person who be compromised would be Alex and that would be the forewarning
Alex and that would be the forewarning to everybody else so they could start to
to everybody else so they could start to turn up their operational security.
turn up their operational security. >> So does that mean it's it's game over
>> So does that mean it's it's game over for you?
for you? >> For me in Falcon it's game over. I can I
>> For me in Falcon it's game over. I can I can never go back. I can never go back
can never go back. I can never go back in my true name. I can never go back in
in my true name. I can never go back in an alias name. Um all of my biometrics
an alias name. Um all of my biometrics meaning my fingerprints, my eye prints,
meaning my fingerprints, my eye prints, like all of that is most likely
like all of that is most likely compromised. all of Alex Hernandez, uh,
compromised. all of Alex Hernandez, uh, everything that I carried on me, all the
everything that I carried on me, all the digital platforms that I carried on me,
digital platforms that I carried on me, which were all airgapped and isolated to
which were all airgapped and isolated to just Alex, all of those things we have
just Alex, all of those things we have to assume have been collected and and
to assume have been collected and and and um, synthesized and reverse
and um, synthesized and reverse engineered.
engineered. >> And you were running a real fake
>> And you were running a real fake business, right?
business, right? >> Well, yeah, I was I was a middle
>> Well, yeah, I was I was a middle manager. I was a middle manager in the
manager. I was a middle manager in the very fake business.
very fake business. >> Oh, you're a middle manager. And that
>> Oh, you're a middle manager. And that was a business set up by the CIA. Okay.
was a business set up by the CIA. Okay. So, is that in part why you both decided
So, is that in part why you both decided to leave the CIA? Did did the shadow
to leave the CIA? Did did the shadow cell operation end at that moment?
cell operation end at that moment? >> After shortly after Andy was
>> After shortly after Andy was compromised, we found out that we were
compromised, we found out that we were pregnant and we were hoping to be able
pregnant and we were hoping to be able to stay on at Wolf to continue because I
to stay on at Wolf to continue because I could have kept doing everything exactly
could have kept doing everything exactly the same.
the same. >> Wolf being the friendly country.
>> Wolf being the friendly country. >> Exactly. And being in the friendly
>> Exactly. And being in the friendly country, I could have, you know, done
country, I could have, you know, done all my targeting from there, no problem.
all my targeting from there, no problem. And then we could have, you know, Andy
And then we could have, you know, Andy still could have helped. He just
still could have helped. He just couldn't travel into the enemy country
couldn't travel into the enemy country anymore. But headquarters decided that
anymore. But headquarters decided that we had been so successful and we were
we had been so successful and we were continuing to be successful by spreading
continuing to be successful by spreading the cell model to these to the other
the cell model to these to the other locations that they wanted us to come
locations that they wanted us to come home to Washington DC and train
home to Washington DC and train officers, train newer officers back at
officers, train newer officers back at headquarters on how the cell model
headquarters on how the cell model worked and um the new techniques we had
worked and um the new techniques we had come up with. The worst part is we had a
come up with. The worst part is we had a conversation about
conversation about what meant more to us CIA or family.
what meant more to us CIA or family. And without saying it, we were both
And without saying it, we were both landing on CIA. And we start thinking,
landing on CIA. And we start thinking, how do we not give up CIA to have a
how do we not give up CIA to have a family? So we approach the agency and we
family? So we approach the agency and we tell them, you know, that we have this
tell them, you know, that we have this idea. If you'll put us on light duty,
idea. If you'll put us on light duty, just give us some cush job for like four
just give us some cush job for like four years. We'll pump out our second baby.
years. We'll pump out our second baby. We'll get our first one old enough to go
We'll get our first one old enough to go to school. We'll get our second one old
to school. We'll get our second one old enough for a nanny. And then you can
enough for a nanny. And then you can throw us back into the fray. They do
throw us back into the fray. They do that for other officers when they're not
that for other officers when they're not successful officers. But when you're a
successful officers. But when you're a successful officer, they have different
successful officer, they have different plans and they try to just push you and
plans and they try to just push you and push you and push you. So they rejected
push you and push you. So they rejected our offer and they said no to soft duty
our offer and they said no to soft duty and they put us back and they told us,
and they put us back and they told us, you know, gee, he's going to go to this
you know, gee, he's going to go to this office and do this very sensitive thing
office and do this very sensitive thing and you're going to go do this other
and you're going to go do this other very sensitive thing and we don't, your
very sensitive thing and we don't, your family's not our problem. And it was at
family's not our problem. And it was at that moment, I think, that we both
that moment, I think, that we both realized
realized CIA is never going to let us focus on a
CIA is never going to let us focus on a family. We're always going to be focused
family. We're always going to be focused on the mission. That's what their job
on the mission. That's what their job is. That's their number one purpose
is. That's their number one purpose where if if our number one purpose is to
where if if our number one purpose is to be parents, we need to make a change.
be parents, we need to make a change. >> What did the shadow cell accomplish
>> What did the shadow cell accomplish in terms of the information or strategic
in terms of the information or strategic objectives that it accomplished?
objectives that it accomplished? So the shadow cell
So the shadow cell really did do what what we started out
really did do what what we started out you know what what the miss really did
you know what what the miss really did complete the mission that we started out
complete the mission that we started out to do and that was to find new
to do and that was to find new intelligence sources and we were really
intelligence sources and we were really successful in doing that
successful in doing that >> and it accomplished a secondary goal. We
>> and it accomplished a secondary goal. We didn't know the effectiveness that the
didn't know the effectiveness that the shadow cell had in feriting out the mole
shadow cell had in feriting out the mole until after we had left CIA. We found
until after we had left CIA. We found out that the mole that we had been
out that the mole that we had been plagued by was actually arrested by FBI
plagued by was actually arrested by FBI in I think it was 2019.
in I think it was 2019. >> It was later.
>> It was later. >> So, but the case file that had
>> So, but the case file that had identified that mole started all the way
identified that mole started all the way back with our operations. So, it was
back with our operations. So, it was successful in fariting out the mole. It
successful in fariting out the mole. It was successful in building new
was successful in building new intelligence sources inside of Falcon.
intelligence sources inside of Falcon. It was successful in maintaining the
It was successful in maintaining the United States's intelligence advantage
United States's intelligence advantage against this adversary at a time when
against this adversary at a time when all of our other operations were
all of our other operations were compromised by the mole. I think what
compromised by the mole. I think what Ji's talking about is an completely
Ji's talking about is an completely unexpected benefit in that our model
unexpected benefit in that our model seemed to have become the foundation for
seemed to have become the foundation for a massive restructuring at CIA in 2014,
a massive restructuring at CIA in 2014, just two years after our cell model when
just two years after our cell model when I was uh when I escaped Falcon. Two
I was uh when I escaped Falcon. Two years after that, John Brennan, then
years after that, John Brennan, then director of CIA, rolled out a an entire
director of CIA, rolled out a an entire reorganization of CIA that was based off
reorganization of CIA that was based off of the same cell model that we had
of the same cell model that we had built.
built. >> Was this the mole?
>> We cannot confirm or deny anything about the mole.
the mole. >> I will say this that if you if you
>> I will say this that if you if you research the time that that man was
research the time that that man was arrested, you'll find two other people
arrested, you'll find two other people >> who were also CIA moles at the same
>> who were also CIA moles at the same period of time. same period of time.
period of time. same period of time. >> So, the work that you did overseas, um,
>> So, the work that you did overseas, um, you believe helped lead to the capture
you believe helped lead to the capture of this mole?
of this mole? >> The work that we did overseas, we
>> The work that we did overseas, we believe helped capture the mole that
believe helped capture the mole that that Falcon House was out to capture.
that Falcon House was out to capture. >> And do you believe that the mole
>> And do you believe that the mole leaked secrets to the enemy country that
leaked secrets to the enemy country that ended up being the reason why they knew
ended up being the reason why they knew that you were a spy? That was the
that you were a spy? That was the assessment that we reached inside our
assessment that we reached inside our own cell as well as what the counter
own cell as well as what the counter intelligence center which is the covert
intelligence center which is the covert espionage group that Gi was talking
espionage group that Gi was talking about earlier. Their conclusion of the
about earlier. Their conclusion of the facts was the same that we did not make
facts was the same that we did not make any error in our operations. There was
any error in our operations. There was no no uh compromise in my behavior, no
no no uh compromise in my behavior, no compromise in my operations, no
compromise in my operations, no compromise of our systems or our
compromise of our systems or our communication methods. That the only way
communication methods. That the only way that Falcon could have found out about
that Falcon could have found out about me was through a leak from the mole.
me was through a leak from the mole. >> How did the mole get caught in the end?
>> How did the mole get caught in the end? What did they do wrong?
What did they do wrong? >> It's a great question. So, um, FBI
>> It's a great question. So, um, FBI created a sting operation based off of
created a sting operation based off of the intelligence that we were able to
the intelligence that we were able to collect through our operations that that
collect through our operations that that brought the mole out. So, FBI created a
brought the mole out. So, FBI created a series of sting operations where they
series of sting operations where they baited the mole into coming back onto
baited the mole into coming back onto American territory. And when the mole
American territory. And when the mole stepped foot on American territory, they
stepped foot on American territory, they had enough of a legal case that they
had enough of a legal case that they could arrest him at the airport and then
could arrest him at the airport and then prosecute him in a court of law. and
prosecute him in a court of law. and what was discovered about the mole and
what was discovered about the mole and the work that they were doing and how
the work that they were doing and how long they were doing it for and what
long they were doing it for and what they were being paid or given to do to
they were being paid or given to do to snitch on the United States.
snitch on the United States. >> So the details that that I know that I
>> So the details that that I know that I know we can share.
know we can share. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm. >> Um they were paid hundreds of thousands
>> Um they were paid hundreds of thousands of dollars. They were not paid into the
of dollars. They were not paid into the millions, but they were paid hundreds of
millions, but they were paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to provide
thousands of dollars to provide information on operations, officers,
information on operations, officers, assets, locations. They were witting,
assets, locations. They were witting, meaning they knew that they were working
meaning they knew that they were working with a foreign intelligence agency. They
with a foreign intelligence agency. They didn't believe they were working with a
didn't believe they were working with a company. They didn't believe they were
company. They didn't believe they were working for a research institute. They
working for a research institute. They knew they were working with a known
knew they were working with a known foreign intelligence organization. Um,
foreign intelligence organization. Um, and that the original ally who gave us
and that the original ally who gave us the information about the mole, that
the information about the mole, that original ally actually also retained
original ally actually also retained incriminating data on the behaviors of
incriminating data on the behaviors of that person that were shared with the
that person that were shared with the Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. >> And so was this this was an individual
>> And so was this this was an individual who was in the CIA who was approached by
who was in the CIA who was approached by this enemy country and the enemy country
this enemy country and the enemy country said to him, "If you give us secrets on
said to him, "If you give us secrets on what the CIA are doing against us, then
what the CIA are doing against us, then we'll give you hundreds of thousands of
we'll give you hundreds of thousands of dollars. We'll give you something. We'll
dollars. We'll give you something. We'll give you cash at least as part of it. We
give you cash at least as part of it. We may also give you other things. Here's
may also give you other things. Here's the the nasty thing about espionage is
the the nasty thing about espionage is cash is usually only one of several
cash is usually only one of several rewards. There's also operations where
rewards. There's also operations where uh where the cash is there so that when
uh where the cash is there so that when you're arrested, the your country that
you're arrested, the your country that arrests you believe that that's what
arrests you believe that that's what your motivation was while all of your
your motivation was while all of your real money is kept in a separate account
real money is kept in a separate account that's saved within the actual currency
that's saved within the actual currency of the country that you're serving. So
of the country that you're serving. So this person, they were in the CIA
this person, they were in the CIA as a mole, leaking secrets about the
as a mole, leaking secrets about the CIA. They then left at some point and
CIA. They then left at some point and then the FBI set up a trap to get them
then the FBI set up a trap to get them to come back.
to come back. >> Correct.
>> Correct. >> When they left, did they go to the
>> When they left, did they go to the adversarial country?
adversarial country? >> We can't confirm those details because
>> We can't confirm those details because to confirm those details starts to give
to confirm those details starts to give more insight into who the mole was.
more insight into who the mole was. >> Okay. But they they managed to because I
>> Okay. But they they managed to because I was of thinking I was just wondering if
was of thinking I was just wondering if this the other the enemy countries offer
this the other the enemy countries offer them like lifetime protection or
them like lifetime protection or something.
something. >> They do. So your enemy countries will
>> They do. So your enemy countries will offer you lifetime protection. They'll
offer you lifetime protection. They'll offer you multiple generations worth of
offer you multiple generations worth of payment. So even if you're arrested,
payment. So even if you're arrested, don't worry. Your kids will be taken
don't worry. Your kids will be taken care of and their kids will be taken
care of and their kids will be taken care of. Uh you've got citizenship like
care of. Uh you've got citizenship like the case of Edward Snowden who's
the case of Edward Snowden who's received citizenship. Sometimes they
received citizenship. Sometimes they offer uh rewards and accomod and uh
offer uh rewards and accomod and uh accolades in their own home country.
accolades in their own home country. There's a a number of very strange and
There's a a number of very strange and compelling offers that come about from
compelling offers that come about from foreign intelligence services. When you
foreign intelligence services. When you think about a double agent, when you
think about a double agent, when you think about a spy who turns on their own
think about a spy who turns on their own country, it's less about thinking that
country, it's less about thinking that they're paid to do it. Spies aren't
they're paid to do it. Spies aren't motivated usually by money. We weren't
motivated usually by money. We weren't motivated by money. We're motivated by
motivated by money. We're motivated by that that very unhealthy relationship
that that very unhealthy relationship where you have to be validated by
where you have to be validated by somebody else. And that same environment
somebody else. And that same environment that CIA creates where all of its
that CIA creates where all of its internal officers have to be able to
internal officers have to be able to fight their own head trash but still
fight their own head trash but still seek validation from within their
seek validation from within their organization. That unhealthy
organization. That unhealthy relationship is something that can be
relationship is something that can be compromised and a foreign intelligence
compromised and a foreign intelligence service can find an intelligence officer
service can find an intelligence officer and fill that void for them and validate
and fill that void for them and validate for them and say you're talented and
for them and say you're talented and you've got promise and you've got
you've got promise and you've got potential and we see it and your own
potential and we see it and your own home service doesn't understand how
home service doesn't understand how important you are and your own home
important you are and your own home service doesn't understand how valuable
service doesn't understand how valuable you are. If you'll help us with this, we
you are. If you'll help us with this, we can reward you with money. We can reward
can reward you with money. We can reward you with citizenship. We can reward your
you with citizenship. We can reward your children with future residency and with
children with future residency and with college and and we can make you a very
college and and we can make you a very wealthy person. All the things that you
wealthy person. All the things that you worked for that your country would never
worked for that your country would never give you.
give you. >> Did the mole admit that they had been a
>> Did the mole admit that they had been a mole?
mole? >> I do not believe so.
>> I do not believe so. >> I don't believe so.
>> I don't believe so. >> I also believe that that most espionage
>> I also believe that that most espionage cases when they actually go to court,
cases when they actually go to court, >> they're not tried under the Espionage
>> they're not tried under the Espionage Act. they're tried under some gentler
Act. they're tried under some gentler term, some gentler, lesser offense that
term, some gentler, lesser offense that is easier to prove, but also helps the
is easier to prove, but also helps the government protect its reputation
government protect its reputation against being penetrated.
against being penetrated. >> So, this individual, they left the CIA,
>> So, this individual, they left the CIA, flew to this other country, they came
flew to this other country, they came back, and they tried to rejoin the CIA
back, and they tried to rejoin the CIA to get more information. Well, they
to get more information. Well, they tried to rejoin a federal agency and
tried to rejoin a federal agency and that was that was how the FBI was able
that was that was how the FBI was able to to lure them and how they were also
to to lure them and how they were also able to
able to >> for for an interview.
>> for for an interview. >> Yeah. For an interview and how they were
>> Yeah. For an interview and how they were able to get them on American soil.
able to get them on American soil. >> Interesting.
>> Interesting. So I do want to share that that your
So I do want to share that that your curiosity right now is a major issue
curiosity right now is a major issue with CIA because they already know they
with CIA because they already know they already know that very smart people out
already know that very smart people out there are going to know that there's a
there are going to know that there's a way there must be a way to reverse
way there must be a way to reverse engineer the whole story who to find out
engineer the whole story who to find out who is Falcon or to find out where is
who is Falcon or to find out where is Falcon to find out where is Wolf to find
Falcon to find out where is Wolf to find out who is who is the mole right and
out who is who is the mole right and what's going to be what's fascinating is
what's going to be what's fascinating is that We we have put every effort that we
that We we have put every effort that we can into the story to make sure that
can into the story to make sure that it's not traceable because
it's not traceable because CIA had several penetrations at the same
CIA had several penetrations at the same time during our tenure at CIA. And
time during our tenure at CIA. And that's both depressing and encouraging
that's both depressing and encouraging because it's encouraging in that it
because it's encouraging in that it shows that what we were doing was
shows that what we were doing was parallel to what many other officers
parallel to what many other officers were doing. We wrote the book Shadow
were doing. We wrote the book Shadow Cell, but that doesn't mean we were the
Cell, but that doesn't mean we were the only two people that were tapped on the
only two people that were tapped on the shoulder to carry out experimental new
shoulder to carry out experimental new operations.
operations. >> They could have asked five, seven, 12
>> They could have asked five, seven, 12 other people to go carry out new
other people to go carry out new operations to try to far it out this
operations to try to far it out this multi-penetration
multi-penetration of CIA at the time. But it's also
of CIA at the time. But it's also discouraging because it's one of those
discouraging because it's one of those areas that keeps these stories from
areas that keeps these stories from being shared because CIA doesn't want
being shared because CIA doesn't want the world to know that it was penetrated
the world to know that it was penetrated by multiple people. It doesn't want the
by multiple people. It doesn't want the world to know who those people were. If
world to know who those people were. If it did, it would have disclosed this
it did, it would have disclosed this long ago.
long ago. >> Well, obviously my research team tried
>> Well, obviously my research team tried to figure out who it was.
>> And the diary of a CEO research team is not a team to take lightly. So, I'm a
not a team to take lightly. So, I'm a little bit afraid to hear their
little bit afraid to hear their conclusions.
conclusions. >> Well, based on our own research,
>> Well, based on our own research, um, we thought that the mole was likely
um, we thought that the mole was likely Jerry Chung Singh Lee, who spied for
Jerry Chung Singh Lee, who spied for China around the time of the book. Jerry
China around the time of the book. Jerry began spying for China after leaving the
began spying for China after leaving the CIA, then tried to rejoin the agency,
CIA, then tried to rejoin the agency, was allowed to leave the country by the
was allowed to leave the country by the FBI, and was arrested in 2018 at the
FBI, and was arrested in 2018 at the airport when he returned to the USA,
airport when he returned to the USA, just like the mole in the book. But it
just like the mole in the book. But it also says here, Andrew will not comment
also says here, Andrew will not comment on whether he is actually the mole or
on whether he is actually the mole or not. So there's no point asking you if
not. So there's no point asking you if that's
that's if he is the mole.
>> We have you been to China. We are under legal obligation to to
We are under legal obligation to to neither confform neither confirm nor
neither confform neither confirm nor deny uh the results of your research
deny uh the results of your research team but also the results of anybody
team but also the results of anybody else's research if they reach out to us
else's research if they reach out to us and and ask for confirmation on who this
and and ask for confirmation on who this who the mole may or may not be.
who the mole may or may not be. >> Has being in the CIA changed the way
>> Has being in the CIA changed the way that you view reality and human beings?
that you view reality and human beings? >> Oh yeah.
>> Oh yeah. >> In what ways?
>> In what ways? >> Very much so. So
>> Very much so. So >> I love this question and I really want
>> I love this question and I really want you to be honest. Can you please share
you to be honest. Can you please share with Steve how you went from your
with Steve how you went from your college beliefs to your postcia beliefs?
college beliefs to your postcia beliefs? >> So when I worked with refugees that was
>> So when I worked with refugees that was my first big turning point that humans
my first big turning point that humans can be really nasty. Like I grew up
can be really nasty. Like I grew up Buddhist and so it was always like
Buddhist and so it was always like humans have the potential to be amazing
humans have the potential to be amazing and I agree that's true. But when I
and I agree that's true. But when I worked with refugees, I realized that
worked with refugees, I realized that humans can be horrible and your you know
humans can be horrible and your you know I worked with Bosnians and um and I
I worked with Bosnians and um and I worked with uh refugees from Rwanda
worked with uh refugees from Rwanda where you know their neighbors literally
where you know their neighbors literally turned on them. People who they had
turned on them. People who they had grown up with literally the next day
grown up with literally the next day came over with a machete or came over
came over with a machete or came over with a gun and killed their family
with a gun and killed their family members and chased them through forests
members and chased them through forests or through whatever. And that can happen
or through whatever. And that can happen anywhere. That was the first time that I
anywhere. That was the first time that I realized that anytime somebody says that
realized that anytime somebody says that can't happen here, that's a lie. That
can't happen here, that's a lie. That can happen anywhere. None of those
can happen anywhere. None of those people ever thought, "Oh, yeah, that
people ever thought, "Oh, yeah, that could happen here." None of those people
could happen here." None of those people ever thought that. People always think
ever thought that. People always think that can't happen here. My neighbor
that can't happen here. My neighbor would never do that to me. And that's
would never do that to me. And that's not true. And then when I worked for
not true. And then when I worked for CIA, I, you know, that compounded the
CIA, I, you know, that compounded the sense of like the world behind the
sense of like the world behind the scenes is a dangerous place and you
scenes is a dangerous place and you can't fully. I sound horrible saying
can't fully. I sound horrible saying these things. You can't fully trust
these things. You can't fully trust anybody. I mean, the reason I'm with
anybody. I mean, the reason I'm with Andy is because I trust Andy 100%.
Andy is because I trust Andy 100%. But he might be the only person that I
But he might be the only person that I trust everything that comes out of his
trust everything that comes out of his mouth.
mouth. >> Yeah. You only trust me like 98%.
>> Yeah. You only trust me like 98%. >> Well, you know. Yeah. But I know I can
>> Well, you know. Yeah. But I know I can get that other 2% out of you. That's
get that other 2% out of you. That's why. So, you know, you really like you
why. So, you know, you really like you always have to understand that people
always have to understand that people are a combination of good and bad. And
are a combination of good and bad. And while I wish while I would like to think
while I wish while I would like to think that people would always try to heir to
that people would always try to heir to the good, I always have to keep in mind
the good, I always have to keep in mind that people have a bad side to them and
that people have a bad side to them and they and there's any set of
they and there's any set of circumstances that could trigger that.
circumstances that could trigger that. >> Do you think we're in one such moment?
>> Do you think we're in one such moment? >> I think we're always in a moment. I
>> I think we're always in a moment. I think some part of the world is always
think some part of the world is always in that moment.
in that moment. >> What about the United States? cuz I know
>> What about the United States? cuz I know Andy said when we had the conversation
Andy said when we had the conversation the other day that he was going to try
the other day that he was going to try and leave the United States before 2026.
and leave the United States before 2026. >> Well, it's not just me alone leaving.
>> Well, it's not just me alone leaving. >> Yeah. Well, maybe we have different
>> Yeah. Well, maybe we have different motivations. I don't know.
motivations. I don't know. >> Are you staying, Ji? Cuz he says he's
>> Are you staying, Ji? Cuz he says he's leaving.
leaving. >> I've been the one who's been pushing to
>> I've been the one who's been pushing to leave for years.
leave for years. >> Why? How would you sort of summarize the
>> Why? How would you sort of summarize the situation that the like western world
situation that the like western world and the United States are in right now
and the United States are in right now from your perspective with what you
from your perspective with what you know?
know? Are these good times? Jiheis was born in
Are these good times? Jiheis was born in Venezuela. What was Venezuela like in
Venezuela. What was Venezuela like in the 80s?
the 80s? >> Oh, it was nice.
>> Oh, it was nice. >> It was one of the world's best
>> It was one of the world's best economies. It was a thriving democracy.
economies. It was a thriving democracy. It was an excellent place
It was an excellent place >> with a large wealth gap.
>> with a large wealth gap. >> Jihi's parents.
>> Jihi's parents. >> Her father came from a wealthy family,
>> Her father came from a wealthy family, >> a wealthy Venezuelan family. That's how
>> a wealthy Venezuelan family. That's how they moved to Japan. It's not easy to
they moved to Japan. It's not easy to pick up and move a family of four to
pick up and move a family of four to Japan or family of three and then have a
Japan or family of three and then have a child in Japan, right? All of that
child in Japan, right? All of that wealth that they had in 1980 when Ji was
wealth that they had in 1980 when Ji was born was gone in 19
born was gone in 19 >> just a few years later. Yeah. I think 80
>> just a few years later. Yeah. I think 80 85 maybe
85 maybe >> five years. And Venezuela went from
>> five years. And Venezuela went from being one of the most successful
being one of the most successful thriving democracies with a strong
thriving democracies with a strong economy. It went from that to what it is
economy. It went from that to what it is now. There is no shaking that reality
now. There is no shaking that reality from Jihei or from her family. M
from Jihei or from her family. M >> so if there's anybody in the United
>> so if there's anybody in the United States right now who is acutely aware of
States right now who is acutely aware of how fast everything can go sour, it's my
how fast everything can go sour, it's my wife. And that's why what I certainly
wife. And that's why what I certainly find is this uncompromising commitment
find is this uncompromising commitment to moving in large part because you
to moving in large part because you can't wed yourself to any one system
can't wed yourself to any one system >> unless you want to be available to the
>> unless you want to be available to the detriment of that system.
detriment of that system. >> Yeah, I believe in being mobile.
>> Yeah, I believe in being mobile. [Laughter]
[Laughter] >> We rent. We don't buy.
>> As you might have been able to tell, I'm absolutely fascinated by the psychology
absolutely fascinated by the psychology behind high performing sports teams. I
behind high performing sports teams. I think it started with my love for Sir
think it started with my love for Sir Alex Ferguson as a Manchester United
Alex Ferguson as a Manchester United fan. So, when I was told about a new
fan. So, when I was told about a new Netflix series that covers the rise of
Netflix series that covers the rise of the Dallas Cowboys, it immediately
the Dallas Cowboys, it immediately piqued my interest. And this isn't
piqued my interest. And this isn't because I'm mad about American football.
because I'm mad about American football. I'm not. I don't even watch it. But I do
I'm not. I don't even watch it. But I do know about the Dallas Cowboys. And for a
know about the Dallas Cowboys. And for a lot of Texans, they're much more than a
lot of Texans, they're much more than a sports team. I watched this series and
sports team. I watched this series and it is absolutely
it is absolutely brilliant. It centers on Jerry Jones, an
brilliant. It centers on Jerry Jones, an oil businessman with no football
oil businessman with no football background who bought the Cowboys in the
background who bought the Cowboys in the late 80s and transformed them into the
late 80s and transformed them into the most valuable sports franchise in the
most valuable sports franchise in the world. It's all about how one guy
world. It's all about how one guy assembled a powerhouse team in the 1990s
assembled a powerhouse team in the 1990s made up of legendary players and coaches
made up of legendary players and coaches and through fearless decision-making led
and through fearless decision-making led his team to three Super Bowl victories.
his team to three Super Bowl victories. And I really enjoyed it and I think you
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And I'm so honored that once again a company I own can sponsor my podcast.
company I own can sponsor my podcast. Are there any particular skills that
Are there any particular skills that people who are trying to be successful
people who are trying to be successful in their average life, because this is
in their average life, because this is called the D of a CEO,
called the D of a CEO, >> that you learned through your time at
>> that you learned through your time at the CIA that you think are most useful
the CIA that you think are most useful for people to be successful, however you
for people to be successful, however you define that, in their day-to-day lives.
define that, in their day-to-day lives. >> The first thing I want to say is that
>> The first thing I want to say is that our book Shadow Cell talks not
our book Shadow Cell talks not necessarily about awesome spies. It
necessarily about awesome spies. It talks about how we went back to the
talks about how we went back to the basics. We went back to foundational
basics. We went back to foundational espionage, what we call at CIA, sticks
espionage, what we call at CIA, sticks and bricks. We gave up all the
and bricks. We gave up all the technology. We gave up all the fancy
technology. We gave up all the fancy satellites. We gave up all the drones.
satellites. We gave up all the drones. And we went back to build off of strong
And we went back to build off of strong foundations. And we didn't do that
foundations. And we didn't do that because we're smart. We did that because
because we're smart. We did that because the terrorist groups that won the global
the terrorist groups that won the global war on terror were using bricks and
war on terror were using bricks and stones and sticks.
stones and sticks. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm. >> And they were winning over an American
>> And they were winning over an American Department of Defense that had a $900
Department of Defense that had a $900 billion budget every year. We spent $8
billion budget every year. We spent $8 trillion in the global war on terror
trillion in the global war on terror only to evacuate Afghanistan. All of
only to evacuate Afghanistan. All of that happened because they were using
that happened because they were using foundational tools that we couldn't
foundational tools that we couldn't crack. And in the shadow cell, that's
crack. And in the shadow cell, that's all we did. We used foundational tools
all we did. We used foundational tools that proved to dominate time after time.
that proved to dominate time after time. And there's so much in everyday life.
And there's so much in everyday life. And there's so much in business from
And there's so much in business from marketing to sales to budgeting to
marketing to sales to budgeting to hiring practices to, you know, annual
hiring practices to, you know, annual and semiannual reviews. There's so much
and semiannual reviews. There's so much that businesses can take from this basic
that businesses can take from this basic idea of never let go of the foundations.
idea of never let go of the foundations. Never let go of your sticks and bricks.
Never let go of your sticks and bricks. >> What advice would you give to the
>> What advice would you give to the average person in generally just
average person in generally just generally in their life, you know, about
generally in their life, you know, about how to live a good life based on what
how to live a good life based on what you've seen, what you know now, and how
you've seen, what you know now, and how you look at the world.
you look at the world. >> For me, a good life is a life spent
>> For me, a good life is a life spent doing the things you want to do, the
doing the things you want to do, the things that bring you joy when you have
things that bring you joy when you have the age and the energy to do them. It
the age and the energy to do them. It makes me super sad whenever I meet
makes me super sad whenever I meet people who wait until their 60s and they
people who wait until their 60s and they retire to be free to try and travel and
retire to be free to try and travel and and that's when they focus on learning
and that's when they focus on learning the guitar and that's when they focus on
the guitar and that's when they focus on art and their body just can't keep up
art and their body just can't keep up with them. Their body can't travel like
with them. Their body can't travel like it used to travel. They have a shake in
it used to travel. They have a shake in their hand. They can't paint anymore but
their hand. They can't paint anymore but they they believed for 30 years that it
they they believed for 30 years that it would be better when they retire instead
would be better when they retire instead of acting on it right now. And
of acting on it right now. And for me, it's it's all about finding joy
for me, it's it's all about finding joy in the moment today. My son is 12. He
in the moment today. My son is 12. He plays chess now. He wants to play video
plays chess now. He wants to play video games with me now. He wants to go deep
games with me now. He wants to go deep into details about his favorite manga
into details about his favorite manga comics right now. All of that could be
comics right now. All of that could be different in 5 days. My daughter is
different in 5 days. My daughter is seven doing handstands and doing
seven doing handstands and doing cartwheels and all she wants is for
cartwheels and all she wants is for daddy to to give her a shoulder massage
daddy to to give her a shoulder massage at night and tell embarrassing stories
at night and tell embarrassing stories about my childhood to her while she
about my childhood to her while she falls asleep. That's what she wants now.
falls asleep. That's what she wants now. All that could be gone and never come
All that could be gone and never come back in 6 months. I have to do it now.
back in 6 months. I have to do it now. If I don't do it now, it'll never
If I don't do it now, it'll never happen. I won't be able to wait until
happen. I won't be able to wait until I'm wealthy. I won't be able to wait
I'm wealthy. I won't be able to wait until I sell a company. I won't be able
until I sell a company. I won't be able to wait until I retire and then try to
to wait until I retire and then try to get these moments back now. So, what can
get these moments back now. So, what can I do? I ask myself every day, what can I
I do? I ask myself every day, what can I do right now to maximize the joy that I
do right now to maximize the joy that I get right now? Because it's not just my
get right now? Because it's not just my joy that's happening. It's also the joy
joy that's happening. It's also the joy that I'm giving to the people who want
that I'm giving to the people who want my time and space. My wife, my kids, my
my time and space. My wife, my kids, my peers, my clients. What can I do to
peers, my clients. What can I do to bring joy to myself will bring joy to
bring joy to myself will bring joy to others.
others. >> Why does that matter so much? I can see
>> Why does that matter so much? I can see it in I can see it in your face.
it in I can see it in your face. >> My life is filled with people who failed
>> My life is filled with people who failed to figure that out. My life is filled
to figure that out. My life is filled with a with a mother who kept waiting to
with a with a mother who kept waiting to to do the things that she wanted to do
to do the things that she wanted to do and now she still doesn't get to do it.
and now she still doesn't get to do it. And grandparents who retired poor and
And grandparents who retired poor and family members who retired poor and
family members who retired poor and people who died early and people who got
people who died early and people who got hurt and can't walk and
hurt and can't walk and >> you know I called your mother.
>> you know I called your mother. >> We spoke to your mother.
>> We spoke to your mother. >> Did you call my mom?
>> Did you call my mom? >> Yeah. And when I asked her this question
>> Yeah. And when I asked her this question I said to I said to your mother I said
I said to I said to your mother I said um what's your relationship like with
um what's your relationship like with Andy? And she burst into tears. Did she
Andy? And she burst into tears. Did she really?
really? >> She went on to say how proud she was of
>> She went on to say how proud she was of you, but it was telling that she she
you, but it was telling that she she burst into tears when she was asked that
burst into tears when she was asked that particular question.
particular question. >> That's awesome. I'm I'm glad that you
>> That's awesome. I'm I'm glad that you called her. I I I talked to Ji about
called her. I I I talked to Ji about this often because I don't I never had a
this often because I don't I never had a relationship with my father and my
relationship with my father and my relationship with my stepfather was very
relationship with my stepfather was very bad. I go into some of that in the book
bad. I go into some of that in the book as well. And uh I as an adult only
as well. And uh I as an adult only project
project negative assumptions on what they must
negative assumptions on what they must have intended because that's what I was
have intended because that's what I was shaped to believe as a child. I can't
shaped to believe as a child. I can't confidently project positive
confidently project positive expectations on them because as a child
expectations on them because as a child I never believed they were doing
I never believed they were doing anything positively. I believed my mom
anything positively. I believed my mom was career focused and I believed that
was career focused and I believed that my mom didn't really want to be a mom. I
my mom didn't really want to be a mom. I believed that my mom didn't really want
believed that my mom didn't really want to be married to the man she was married
to be married to the man she was married to. And that's what I believed as a kid.
to. And that's what I believed as a kid. So now as an adult, that's my
So now as an adult, that's my foundation. Ji's foundation with her
foundation. Ji's foundation with her parents is completely different. Like
parents is completely different. Like it's incredible now because like the the
it's incredible now because like the the disparity between my negative thoughts
disparity between my negative thoughts of my youth and Jihi's positive memories
of my youth and Jihi's positive memories from her youth are starkly contrasted.
from her youth are starkly contrasted. And that's why I want to give my
And that's why I want to give my children something like my what my wife
children something like my what my wife had.
had. >> And what's your answer to that jih in
>> And what's your answer to that jih in terms of what you want next?
terms of what you want next? So when I was younger, I was brought up
So when I was younger, I was brought up with this idea of a destination. So I
with this idea of a destination. So I did everything I was supposed to do. Got
did everything I was supposed to do. Got good grades in school, went to college,
good grades in school, went to college, went to grad school, got a career with
went to grad school, got a career with the federal government. It was really
the federal government. It was really good. And then we left CIA. And I was
good. And then we left CIA. And I was like, but I had made it. Like I had I
like, but I had made it. Like I had I rode that train. I did everything I was
rode that train. I did everything I was supposed to do and I made it. So what
supposed to do and I made it. So what are we doing now? And it was a really
are we doing now? And it was a really hard transition for me. But now that,
hard transition for me. But now that, you know, we have the kids and we have
you know, we have the kids and we have our business, you know, and I've gone
our business, you know, and I've gone through a lot of therapy,
through a lot of therapy, you know, I realize that Andy has been
you know, I realize that Andy has been right all along. It really is. You never
right all along. It really is. You never know what the next moment is going to
know what the next moment is going to bring. And so, you have to enjoy every
bring. And so, you have to enjoy every moment that you have right now. You
moment that you have right now. You know, don't put off that trip until next
know, don't put off that trip until next year. Do it as soon as you can. Don't,
year. Do it as soon as you can. Don't, you know, like those dishes don't need
you know, like those dishes don't need to get washed right now. if your kid
to get washed right now. if your kid wants to read a book with you, like you
wants to read a book with you, like you can just put that off for a little bit.
can just put that off for a little bit. Um, so I've it's taken me a long time,
Um, so I've it's taken me a long time, but Andy and I are now aligned on the
but Andy and I are now aligned on the like live every moment with as much joy
like live every moment with as much joy as you can because and to my other
as you can because and to my other point, like you you never know when
point, like you you never know when shit's going to hit the fan. So enjoy it
shit's going to hit the fan. So enjoy it now because you never know when you
now because you never know when you might have to, you know, flee your house
might have to, you know, flee your house cuz you're, you know, it catches fire or
cuz you're, you know, it catches fire or flee the country because a war breaks
flee the country because a war breaks out or, you know,
out or, you know, >> getting arrested in a foreign country.
>> getting arrested in a foreign country. >> Yeah. Getting arrested in a foreign
>> Yeah. Getting arrested in a foreign country. And I'm a big believer of
country. And I'm a big believer of seeing the the writing on the wall. I
seeing the the writing on the wall. I don't think that, you know, my advice to
don't think that, you know, my advice to people is don't be complacent. Just like
people is don't be complacent. Just like Andy said, you know, don't be complacent
Andy said, you know, don't be complacent in your business, but don't be
in your business, but don't be complacent in your life either. Like
complacent in your life either. Like when be as before World War II kicked
when be as before World War II kicked off, there was tons of writing on the
off, there was tons of writing on the wall of what was coming and people just
wall of what was coming and people just kept thinking to themselves that can't
kept thinking to themselves that can't happen here. It can't get that bad, can
happen here. It can't get that bad, can it?
it? >> You're trying to tell me something.
>> You're trying to tell me something. >> So the writing on the wall for Americans
>> So the writing on the wall for Americans is that we are transitioning into
is that we are transitioning into something new. We will never go back to
something new. We will never go back to what we were. And so you either need to
what we were. And so you either need to be a part of creating the new America
be a part of creating the new America >> or you need to start thinking about
>> or you need to start thinking about where else you're going to go because
where else you're going to go because the America we knew before no longer
the America we knew before no longer exists and it will never come back.
exists and it will never come back. >> This is new America now. So you either
>> This is new America now. So you either take part in it or you leave.
take part in it or you leave. >> Okay. So what is old America under your
>> Okay. So what is old America under your definition?
definition? >> So old America, you know, and I'm I'm
>> So old America, you know, and I'm I'm not that old. So, you know, old America
not that old. So, you know, old America in my lifetime has been a series of
in my lifetime has been a series of uh you know, the the government
uh you know, the the government appearing to work together, you know,
appearing to work together, you know, the appearing to do things, you know, to
the appearing to do things, you know, to improve the lives of people, but also I
improve the lives of people, but also I think becoming complacent over time.
think becoming complacent over time. Like the last several terms, we've had a
Like the last several terms, we've had a strong executive that has slowly become
strong executive that has slowly become stronger, which I don't think is the way
stronger, which I don't think is the way that we should be going, but that's
that we should be going, but that's what's happened. and a Congress who is
what's happened. and a Congress who is constantly in deadlock. So nothing is
constantly in deadlock. So nothing is happening. And so we continue like I
happening. And so we continue like I mean the the immigration problem. Why is
mean the the immigration problem. Why is the immigration problem a problem? This
the immigration problem a problem? This could have been fixed decades ago
could have been fixed decades ago honestly. Like decide what you want for
honestly. Like decide what you want for immigration. Decide what you want your
immigration. Decide what you want your policy to be. Right? And the policy
policy to be. Right? And the policy clearly I think most people agree isn't
clearly I think most people agree isn't open doors. So if it's not open doors,
open doors. So if it's not open doors, what do you want? and then make that
what do you want? and then make that policy happen. So, you know, I think I
policy happen. So, you know, I think I think we've had a history now of an
think we've had a history now of an executive getting stronger. For some
executive getting stronger. For some reason, the American people want a
reason, the American people want a strong man.
strong man. >> So, when you say the executive,
>> So, when you say the executive, >> you mean the president?
>> you mean the president? >> The president. Yeah.
>> The president. Yeah. >> The president's getting more power to do
>> The president's getting more power to do things.
things. >> Yes. Because
>> Yes. Because >> for a period of time, it was because
>> for a period of time, it was because Congress didn't want to make their own
Congress didn't want to make their own decision. So, they pushed the power to
decision. So, they pushed the power to the president. And then in probably the
the president. And then in probably the last 16 years, we've seen the president
last 16 years, we've seen the president take more power, execute more executive
take more power, execute more executive orders. So whether you like it or not,
orders. So whether you like it or not, we're in a period now where there's a
we're in a period now where there's a strong executive. When anybody gets
strong executive. When anybody gets power, it's very unlikely they're going
power, it's very unlikely they're going to let it go.
to let it go. >> So do you think Trump's not going to go
>> So do you think Trump's not going to go anywhere?
anywhere? >> I think the executive Trump is the
>> I think the executive Trump is the current executive, whoever the next
current executive, whoever the next executive and the executive after that,
executive and the executive after that, they will continue to retain their
they will continue to retain their executive powers.
executive powers. >> Yeah. this doesn't benefit them to let
>> Yeah. this doesn't benefit them to let go of the office of the executives
go of the office of the executives powers.
powers. >> So jih if that's the old America where
>> So jih if that's the old America where it it got slightly more complacent,
it it got slightly more complacent, there was more power and increasingly
there was more power and increasingly more power given to the president.
more power given to the president. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm. >> You're saying we're in a transitional
>> You're saying we're in a transitional moment now.
moment now. >> What does that new America look like on
>> What does that new America look like on the end of that transition in your view?
the end of that transition in your view? >> So I don't think we have a good idea of
>> So I don't think we have a good idea of what it's going to look like. I think
what it's going to look like. I think the current administration is taking a
the current administration is taking a lot of risks that I find interesting.
lot of risks that I find interesting. >> Interesting is a very
>> Interesting is a very neuting
neuting [Music]
is the real word because I think that he's taking a lot of risks that really
he's taking a lot of risks that really break down
break down how how things have been for a long
how how things have been for a long time. So, you know, getting rid of uh,
time. So, you know, getting rid of uh, you know, pulling money from Medicaid
you know, pulling money from Medicaid and Medicare, getting rid of USA ID, you
and Medicare, getting rid of USA ID, you know, transitioning from soft power to
know, transitioning from soft power to hard power.
hard power. >> Hard power being dropping bombs on Iran.
>> Hard power being dropping bombs on Iran. >> Yes. So, we're giving more money to
>> Yes. So, we're giving more money to military and we're taking money away
military and we're taking money away from, you know, aid basically. So, we're
from, you know, aid basically. So, we're making that shift. We're making, you
making that shift. We're making, you know, various economic shifts,
know, various economic shifts, immigration shifts, and I don't think we
immigration shifts, and I don't think we I think there's a lot of unnecessary
I think there's a lot of unnecessary panic about all of it because whether I
panic about all of it because whether I agree with his methods or not, I think
agree with his methods or not, I think that that we just have to wait for
that that we just have to wait for things to settle out. And if something
things to settle out. And if something doesn't work, you know, I think he's the
doesn't work, you know, I think he's the type of guy that's going to take another
type of guy that's going to take another risk and see if he can fix it or that if
risk and see if he can fix it or that if it doesn't work by the time the next
it doesn't work by the time the next administration comes in, they'll have to
administration comes in, they'll have to do something with it. you know, like
do something with it. you know, like there nothing stops. Everything keeps
there nothing stops. Everything keeps going. So, you know, I I don't know that
going. So, you know, I I don't know that this I don't know that America is
this I don't know that America is heading for a future that I want to be a
heading for a future that I want to be a part of. I think that's for me. I think
part of. I think that's for me. I think that's a true statement.
that's a true statement. But I think there's a lot of Americans
But I think there's a lot of Americans out there who this is the path that they
out there who this is the path that they want to take.
want to take. >> What is your perspective on everything
>> What is your perspective on everything Jihi just said? The transition that's
Jihi just said? The transition that's happening right now is a transition
happening right now is a transition where we where the American people have
where we where the American people have to decide how much they want to get
to decide how much they want to get involved and how much they want to let
involved and how much they want to let other people just do it for them. And
other people just do it for them. And Donald Trump is a I'll do it for you
Donald Trump is a I'll do it for you kind of guy. And Joe Biden was also an
kind of guy. And Joe Biden was also an I'll do it for you kind of guy. And
I'll do it for you kind of guy. And Obama was an I'll do it for you kind of
Obama was an I'll do it for you kind of guy. And we are electing people who will
guy. And we are electing people who will do it for us.
do it for us. >> Do what for us? Whatever whatever nasty
>> Do what for us? Whatever whatever nasty thing we don't want to deal with,
thing we don't want to deal with, budgeting,
budgeting, currencies, hard work, foreign trade,
currencies, hard work, foreign trade, foreign relations, wars, we don't. We
foreign relations, wars, we don't. We want to be able to just talk about it
want to be able to just talk about it without having any blood on our hands.
without having any blood on our hands. So, we push that responsibility to our
So, we push that responsibility to our government when in fact our founding
government when in fact our founding fathers were the opposite. Our found our
fathers were the opposite. Our found our founding fathers were, "Hey, the blood
founding fathers were, "Hey, the blood is on all of your hands. You tell us
is on all of your hands. You tell us what you want us to do. Do you want a
what you want us to do. Do you want a revolution? Then let's go fight a
revolution? Then let's go fight a revolution together. Do you want to
revolution together. Do you want to build a new government? Then we'll build
build a new government? Then we'll build a new government together. That's that's
a new government together. That's that's how our country was supposed to be
how our country was supposed to be formed.
formed. So when Ji says that we're in a
So when Ji says that we're in a transition and she doesn't know where
transition and she doesn't know where it's going, she is accurate. We don't
it's going, she is accurate. We don't know what the future holds. Except we
know what the future holds. Except we know the future holds more pain for sure
know the future holds more pain for sure >> because we will either come out of this
>> because we will either come out of this through a painful transition that makes
through a painful transition that makes us better or we will come out of this
us better or we will come out of this through a less painful transition that
through a less painful transition that leaves us in a position that none of us
leaves us in a position that none of us want to be in and then we're going to
want to be in and then we're going to have to put in more pain to fix it all
have to put in more pain to fix it all again.
again. >> And how do you think the transition
>> And how do you think the transition levels out? Where do you think we end up
levels out? Where do you think we end up if you had to guess?
if you had to guess? >> I think that we have a solid 60/40 right
>> I think that we have a solid 60/40 right now. I think there's a 60% chance that
now. I think there's a 60% chance that we don't like where the transition ends
we don't like where the transition ends and then we spend 15 to 25 years fixing
and then we spend 15 to 25 years fixing it again. Fixing our economy, fixing our
relations, fixing our fixing our trust of our own government. I think there's a
of our own government. I think there's a 40% chance that the the decisive action
40% chance that the the decisive action Donald Trump is taking right now is
Donald Trump is taking right now is adopted widescale and we actually
adopted widescale and we actually stimulate our economy, get people back
stimulate our economy, get people back on the same page and and move forward in
on the same page and and move forward in a way that keeps us one step ahead of
a way that keeps us one step ahead of our of the threats that we see from
our of the threats that we see from China, the disaster that we see
China, the disaster that we see continuing to unfold in the Middle East,
continuing to unfold in the Middle East, the the precipice that we have come up
the the precipice that we have come up against in terms of geopolitics. There's
against in terms of geopolitics. There's a chance that we come out of that, but I
a chance that we come out of that, but I think the dominant chance is that we
think the dominant chance is that we don't. And I I would say that that's not
don't. And I I would say that that's not just my opinion. That's the opinion of
just my opinion. That's the opinion of economists of of economists. That's the
economists of of economists. That's the opinion of foreign uh foreign relation
opinion of foreign uh foreign relation experts. There are multiple people out
experts. There are multiple people out there who are all saying that our
there who are all saying that our budgetary decisions, our foreign policy
budgetary decisions, our foreign policy decisions, our military infrastructure
decisions, our military infrastructure decisions, our economic decisions are
decisions, our economic decisions are risky. risky means there's a chance
risky. risky means there's a chance they'll work, but it's a low probability
they'll work, but it's a low probability chance, not a high probability chance.
chance, not a high probability chance. >> In such a scenario, then the economy
>> In such a scenario, then the economy would would be hurt and then there'd be
would would be hurt and then there'd be more wars presumably because if we're if
more wars presumably because if we're if the society becomes more individualistic
the society becomes more individualistic and focused on themsel and
and focused on themsel and nationalistic, then they become more of
nationalistic, then they become more of an island. People get more paranoid.
an island. People get more paranoid. They start building, I know Trump said
They start building, I know Trump said he's building like the he's calling it
he's building like the he's calling it the Golden Dome over the United States
the Golden Dome over the United States so that he can fire any rockets out of
so that he can fire any rockets out of the air if anyone attacks. And then you
the air if anyone attacks. And then you kind of have to unravel that and try and
kind of have to unravel that and try and go the other way potentially. Is that
go the other way potentially. Is that kind of what you're saying?
kind of what you're saying? >> I try to do as much reading as I can.
>> I try to do as much reading as I can. I'm sure you're the same way. And uh one
I'm sure you're the same way. And uh one of my gifts to myself is when I read
of my gifts to myself is when I read fiction and I'm reading a book called
fiction and I'm reading a book called the the left hand of darkness by a
the the left hand of darkness by a sci-fi legend named Ursa Din. And it's a
sci-fi legend named Ursa Din. And it's a book from the 70s. And I'm reading this
book from the 70s. And I'm reading this book and in it she has this quote where
book and in it she has this quote where she talks about nationalism inside the
she talks about nationalism inside the the world of the science fiction planet
the world of the science fiction planet that she's on, right? And the the quote
that she's on, right? And the the quote is something like nationalism is not a
is something like nationalism is not a product of pride. It's a product of
product of pride. It's a product of fear.
fear. >> People aren't nationalistic because
>> People aren't nationalistic because they're proud of what they have. They're
they're proud of what they have. They're nationalistic because they're afraid
nationalistic because they're afraid that something might take away what they
that something might take away what they have. And anytime you are driven by
have. And anytime you are driven by fear, you don't have the chance for true
fear, you don't have the chance for true happiness. And what I found in that that
happiness. And what I found in that that passage from the sci-fi book was really
passage from the sci-fi book was really very insightful to what I see happening
very insightful to what I see happening across the United States. We're all
across the United States. We're all nationalistic, left and right, gay and
nationalistic, left and right, gay and straight. Whether you whether you are
straight. Whether you whether you are old or young, we're all nationalistic.
old or young, we're all nationalistic. We all love our country. But the things
We all love our country. But the things that's driving so much of our
that's driving so much of our nationalism is this fear of the other
nationalism is this fear of the other side. Not a fear of the collapse of our
side. Not a fear of the collapse of our society, not the fear of some rising
society, not the fear of some rising power across the ocean. But for some
power across the ocean. But for some reason, we're more afraid of our
reason, we're more afraid of our neighbor than we are afraid of the real
neighbor than we are afraid of the real threats that are out there. Because at
threats that are out there. Because at the end of the day, there California and
the end of the day, there California and Mississippi have much more in common
Mississippi have much more in common than the United States and China. But
than the United States and China. But for whatever reason, we get so
for whatever reason, we get so distracted and so confused with our own
distracted and so confused with our own infighting, that we don't realize that
infighting, that we don't realize that infighting is exactly what all of our
infighting is exactly what all of our adversaries from Russia to North Korea
adversaries from Russia to North Korea to Cuba to even even uh you know,
to Cuba to even even uh you know, Bulgaria, which is a NATO country that's
Bulgaria, which is a NATO country that's pro-Russia, our infighting just helps
pro-Russia, our infighting just helps them.
them. >> And and what's the potential worst case
>> And and what's the potential worst case scenario of that infighting? Because
scenario of that infighting? Because people think, okay, it just means people
people think, okay, it just means people are going to pop off each other on on X
are going to pop off each other on on X and Twitter and social media and they're
and Twitter and social media and they're going to scream at each other and then
going to scream at each other and then >> gridlock is the biggest challenge. I I
>> gridlock is the biggest challenge. I I don't believe that we're going to be
don't believe that we're going to be going into any kind of civil war in the
going into any kind of civil war in the United States. We're not going to shoot
United States. We're not going to shoot each other. We're not going to go
each other. We're not going to go machete our neighbors. Not now. But
machete our neighbors. Not now. But gridlock is going to lead to economic
gridlock is going to lead to economic collapse. economic collapse is going to
collapse. economic collapse is going to lead to very real individuals having
lead to very real individuals having very real problems which is going to
very real problems which is going to lead to an increase in criminal
lead to an increase in criminal activity. People will steal from each
activity. People will steal from each other. People steal from from stores.
other. People steal from from stores. People will you know lie and hurt each
People will you know lie and hurt each other to try to take care of their own.
other to try to take care of their own. And as that society starts to collapse
And as that society starts to collapse and we become more and more tribal again
and we become more and more tribal again all very predictable all all case
all very predictable all all case studies that we've seen all over the
studies that we've seen all over the world. As we become more and more
world. As we become more and more tribal, then we will become fed upon by
tribal, then we will become fed upon by our adversaries who don't have the same
our adversaries who don't have the same problem.
problem. >> When you said gridlock is the the first
>> When you said gridlock is the the first sort of domino that falls there. What is
sort of domino that falls there. What is gridlock?
gridlock? >> I see gridlock is policy gridlock. We
>> I see gridlock is policy gridlock. We don't know how to move forward with
don't know how to move forward with Israel. We don't know how to move
Israel. We don't know how to move forward with the budget. We don't know
forward with the budget. We don't know how to move forward with whether or not
how to move forward with whether or not we ratify these election results. Right?
we ratify these election results. Right? And in the p in the time that we don't
And in the p in the time that we don't know how to move forward, it creates an
know how to move forward, it creates an opportunity for somebody else to bypass
opportunity for somebody else to bypass the democratic process and just dictate
the democratic process and just dictate the outcome. And that series of
the outcome. And that series of dictations makes it so that the outcome
dictations makes it so that the outcome is less collaborative, less well thought
is less collaborative, less well thought out, less well defined, less palatable
out, less well defined, less palatable for more people. And then that distrust
for more people. And then that distrust kind of continues on. We do live in a
kind of continues on. We do live in a moment now where the distrust for
moment now where the distrust for government is higher than it's been in a
government is higher than it's been in a long time. We see the we see the largest
long time. We see the we see the largest decline in American currency that we've
decline in American currency that we've seen in decades and in century in a in
seen in decades and in century in a in the better part of a century. We see a
the better part of a century. We see a lack of public trust. We see consistent
lack of public trust. We see consistent presidential approval ratings below 50
presidential approval ratings below 50 for every president that comes through.
for every president that comes through. We we are in a place where the people
We we are in a place where the people just don't trust their own government.
just don't trust their own government. And I would say that that's not such a
And I would say that that's not such a big deal except that we are the
big deal except that we are the wealthiest country in the world. We are
wealthiest country in the world. We are the largest
the largest military in the world. We are the
military in the world. We are the largest producer of financial tools and
largest producer of financial tools and the largest producer of weapons. We are
the largest producer of weapons. We are a big [ __ ] deal to not have our [ __ ]
a big [ __ ] deal to not have our [ __ ] together.
together. Welcome to the United States.
Welcome to the United States. >> Shadow Cell, an insiders account of
>> Shadow Cell, an insiders account of America's new spy wall by Andrew
America's new spy wall by Andrew Bustamante and Jihei Bustamante.
Bustamante and Jihei Bustamante. It is a fascinating book because usually
It is a fascinating book because usually the public doesn't get to read books
the public doesn't get to read books like this and for the reasons you said
like this and for the reasons you said because they're so highly scrutinized
because they're so highly scrutinized and then
and then ultimately decided to be confidential by
ultimately decided to be confidential by the CIA. But this one managed to get
the CIA. But this one managed to get through. So I highly recommend everybody
through. So I highly recommend everybody reads it. We've touched on some of the
reads it. We've touched on some of the surface level elements of this, but if
surface level elements of this, but if you want the details of what happened,
you want the details of what happened, then this is a book good book to read.
then this is a book good book to read. But it also just gives you a window into
But it also just gives you a window into a world that most of us live in
a world that most of us live in ignorance to cuz we don't we don't
ignorance to cuz we don't we don't realize these things happen. It's
realize these things happen. It's actually from doing this podcast that I
actually from doing this podcast that I that things that I thought were
that things that I thought were conspiracy theories became not
conspiracy theories became not conspiracy theories, you know.
conspiracy theories, you know. >> Yes.
>> Yes. >> Because before I started this podcast
>> Because before I started this podcast and started to speak to people like you
and started to speak to people like you and other guests that I've had, I
and other guests that I've had, I thought that well, I was watching
thought that well, I was watching podcasts and thinking, "No, that's
podcasts and thinking, "No, that's [ __ ] No, that's [ __ ] That
[ __ ] No, that's [ __ ] That doesn't happen. There's these like spies
doesn't happen. There's these like spies that that's not going to happen. There's
that that's not going to happen. There's no way that like one country spies on
no way that like one country spies on another. There's no way that like, you
another. There's no way that like, you know, people go undercover into
know, people go undercover into countries and get secrets and do all
countries and get secrets and do all these crazy things." I thought that was
these crazy things." I thought that was movies, but actually that happens and
movies, but actually that happens and all countries are doing it to each
all countries are doing it to each other. And I imagine even the United
other. And I imagine even the United States is doing it to some of their
States is doing it to some of their allies. Like I imagine the United States
allies. Like I imagine the United States probably has spies in the UK, for
probably has spies in the UK, for example.
example. >> The the United States doesn't claim to
>> The the United States doesn't claim to spy on the Five Eyes countries, and the
spy on the Five Eyes countries, and the Five Eyes have all claimed not to spy on
Five Eyes have all claimed not to spy on each other. Um, but that's just a claim.
each other. Um, but that's just a claim. >> We have a closing tradition on this
>> We have a closing tradition on this podcast where the last guest leaves a
podcast where the last guest leaves a question for the next guest, not knowing
question for the next guest, not knowing who they're leaving it for. And the
who they're leaving it for. And the question left for both of you to answer
question left for both of you to answer individually is how did a mistake you
individually is how did a mistake you made shift the trajectory of your life
made shift the trajectory of your life in a way you could not have predicted?
in a way you could not have predicted? >> I would say that the mistake I made that
>> I would say that the mistake I made that shifted the tra that truly shifted the
shifted the tra that truly shifted the trajectory of my life was staying with
trajectory of my life was staying with my ex-boyfriend for so long. Um because
my ex-boyfriend for so long. Um because I we'd been together a year and
I we'd been together a year and I knew it then the relationship was
I knew it then the relationship was already troubled and I was applying to
already troubled and I was applying to the Peace Corps right out of college.
the Peace Corps right out of college. But I also knew that if I joined the
But I also knew that if I joined the Peace Corps and I went overseas, the
Peace Corps and I went overseas, the relationship wouldn't survive. And for
relationship wouldn't survive. And for some reason, I chose the relationship
some reason, I chose the relationship over PeaceCore. And because I chose the
over PeaceCore. And because I chose the relationship over the Peace Corps, I
relationship over the Peace Corps, I ended up going to grad school. so I
ended up going to grad school. so I could stay with him. And then because I
could stay with him. And then because I went to grad school and the relationship
went to grad school and the relationship drained me of all of my money, I ended
drained me of all of my money, I ended up applying to the CIA. And if I hadn't
up applying to the CIA. And if I hadn't been in that relationship, I never would
been in that relationship, I never would have joined the CIA ever. I never would
have joined the CIA ever. I never would have met Andy. I wouldn't have the kids
have met Andy. I wouldn't have the kids I have right now. I wouldn't have the
I have right now. I wouldn't have the life I have right now. So, arguably a
life I have right now. So, arguably a mistake to stay in a bad relationship
mistake to stay in a bad relationship for seven years, but I wouldn't be where
for seven years, but I wouldn't be where I am today without that.
I am today without that. It's hard for me to answer the question
It's hard for me to answer the question because I I keep finding myself coming
because I I keep finding myself coming to the same conclusion that Ji came to
to the same conclusion that Ji came to that all of the mistakes that I think
that all of the mistakes that I think about making all led to a sequence of
about making all led to a sequence of events that brings me to where I am now.
events that brings me to where I am now. So I'll actually give a more recent
So I'll actually give a more recent example that is changing the course of
example that is changing the course of my life right now. In 202
I hired the first executive into my company, the first kind of equal
company, the first kind of equal executive to me as a CEO. And I hired
executive to me as a CEO. And I hired that person because they came well
that person because they came well recommended. I hired that person because
recommended. I hired that person because they had a a long track record of
they had a a long track record of success. I hired that person because
success. I hired that person because they seemed to understand a lot of
they seemed to understand a lot of things about business that I didn't
things about business that I didn't understand and it was time for for me to
understand and it was time for for me to scale and it was an important thing to
scale and it was an important thing to for me as a CEO to lead the charge by
for me as a CEO to lead the charge by hiring the right people and then in the
hiring the right people and then in the following 16 months that person
following 16 months that person lost the company individually
lost the company individually a half a million dollars and then put us
a half a million dollars and then put us into debt almost another $215,000.
into debt almost another $215,000. So, a giant $730ish,000
So, a giant $730ish,000 mistake in one 16-month period of time.
mistake in one 16-month period of time. And throughout that whole time, I I saw
And throughout that whole time, I I saw the mistakes. I saw the errors. And I
the mistakes. I saw the errors. And I kept convincing myself not to take
kept convincing myself not to take action. I kept thinking, "This is just
action. I kept thinking, "This is just what scaling must look like. This person
what scaling must look like. This person must know what they're doing." Like, you
must know what they're doing." Like, you have to spend money to make money. Uh we
have to spend money to make money. Uh we have to we have to prepare for the
have to we have to prepare for the future. Like, I kept rationalizing every
future. Like, I kept rationalizing every step. Oh, this was just a
step. Oh, this was just a misunderstanding. Oh, this was just a
misunderstanding. Oh, this was just a this was something that will pay off 6
this was something that will pay off 6 months from now. And then, you know,
months from now. And then, you know, that 16 months kind of ended in March of
that 16 months kind of ended in March of this year.
this year. And I'm staring at a healthy company
And I'm staring at a healthy company that has zero dollars in its checking
that has zero dollars in its checking account that's carrying hundreds of
account that's carrying hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt. And I
thousands of dollars in debt. And I realized I can't let somebody else try
realized I can't let somebody else try to do this because nobody cares as much
to do this because nobody cares as much as I do. I'm the owner. I'm the CEO. The
as I do. I'm the owner. I'm the CEO. The company was built because of my passion
company was built because of my passion for the lessons and my passion for the
for the lessons and my passion for the people that we serve. We are co-owners
people that we serve. We are co-owners of the company together. Gi believes in
of the company together. Gi believes in me and she trusts me and I can't violate
me and she trusts me and I can't violate that trust by continuing to think that
that trust by continuing to think that somebody else can do it better. So I
somebody else can do it better. So I remove that person from their position.
remove that person from their position. I radically change the company and
I radically change the company and within 3 months we are back into a
within 3 months we are back into a profitable statement. We are months away
profitable statement. We are months away from being able to pay off all the debt
from being able to pay off all the debt that we had gathered. We'll never get
that we had gathered. We'll never get back the money that we lost and all the
back the money that we lost and all the failed investments, but we are on a
failed investments, but we are on a trajectory to go in a completely
trajectory to go in a completely different direction because I took hold
different direction because I took hold of my company and made it my company
of my company and made it my company again. Instead of thinking that I wasn't
again. Instead of thinking that I wasn't qualified or wasn't capable or wasn't
qualified or wasn't capable or wasn't good enough to be the CEO that built the
good enough to be the CEO that built the company, why wouldn't I be good enough
company, why wouldn't I be good enough to be the CEO that grows the company?
to be the CEO that grows the company? >> I think a lot of um young founders can
>> I think a lot of um young founders can relate to that. I hear that story so
relate to that. I hear that story so often. I hear that story all the time.
often. I hear that story all the time. I've heard it for many, many years of
I've heard it for many, many years of the founder that starts a business and
the founder that starts a business and then basically gets like gaslighted by,
then basically gets like gaslighted by, oh, this person's an executive, they've
oh, this person's an executive, they've done it for 26 years, so they must know
done it for 26 years, so they must know what they're doing. I'll give them a
what they're doing. I'll give them a massive salary. I'll give them control.
massive salary. I'll give them control. And then they make a set of decisions
And then they make a set of decisions which because you, you know, you've not
which because you, you know, you've not walked that path before, you're unable
walked that path before, you're unable to have high conviction as to whether
to have high conviction as to whether those decisions are good. But because
those decisions are good. But because they are so expensive and their
they are so expensive and their decisions are so expensive, you kind of
decisions are so expensive, you kind of have to go with it. And then eventually
have to go with it. And then eventually you realize at some point that just
you realize at some point that just because someone has
because someone has worked in some interesting places or had
worked in some interesting places or had some previous interesting job titles
some previous interesting job titles doesn't equip them for this challenge.
doesn't equip them for this challenge. And especially when it's a small this is
And especially when it's a small this is actually the paradox of it as well like
actually the paradox of it as well like the mentality of success in like big
the mentality of success in like big scale businesses is not the mentality of
scale businesses is not the mentality of success in like a high growth startup
success in like a high growth startup >> you know where you're like penny
>> you know where you're like penny pinching.
pinching. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> Thank you so much. I super enjoyable
>> Thank you so much. I super enjoyable hearing the story. It was actually much
hearing the story. It was actually much more captivating reading your book than
more captivating reading your book than I assumed it would be. Um, and I think
I assumed it would be. Um, and I think that's because of the level of detail
that's because of the level of detail you go into in the book, which you just
you go into in the book, which you just wouldn't have come across before. So, I
wouldn't have come across before. So, I really recommend everybody goes and read
really recommend everybody goes and read it. And thank you again for coming back
it. And thank you again for coming back here, and it's wonderful to meet you,
here, and it's wonderful to meet you, Ji, cuz I've heard about you before, but
Ji, cuz I've heard about you before, but putting a face to the name is is always
putting a face to the name is is always useful. So, thank you so much for being
useful. So, thank you so much for being here and continue doing what you're
here and continue doing what you're doing because you're opening our eyes to
doing because you're opening our eyes to a world that we would otherwise not be
a world that we would otherwise not be able to see. So, thank you both.
able to see. So, thank you both. >> Thank you, sir.
>> Thank you, sir. >> Thank you.
>> Thank you. >> This has always blown my mind a little
>> This has always blown my mind a little bit. 53% of you that listen to the show
bit. 53% of you that listen to the show regularly haven't yet subscribed to the
regularly haven't yet subscribed to the show. So, could I ask you for a favor?
show. So, could I ask you for a favor? If you like the show and you like what
If you like the show and you like what we do here and you want to support us,
we do here and you want to support us, the free simple way that you can do just
the free simple way that you can do just that is by hitting the subscribe button.
that is by hitting the subscribe button. And my commitment to you is if you do
And my commitment to you is if you do that, then I'll do everything in my
that, then I'll do everything in my power, me and my team, to make sure that
power, me and my team, to make sure that this show is better for you every single
this show is better for you every single week. We'll listen to your feedback.
week. We'll listen to your feedback. We'll find the guests that you want me
We'll find the guests that you want me to speak to and we'll continue to do
to speak to and we'll continue to do what we do. Thank you so much.
what we do. Thank you so much. Heat. Heat. N.
Heat. Heat. [Music]
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