The discussion centers on the concept of a "poly crisis" in 2027, a convergence of geopolitical, technological, and economic shocks that could destabilize the global order, and the urgent need for the West to prepare for such a scenario.
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Well, happy new year. And there is much
to be hopeful about in 2026, many say,
and I'm certainly one of them. But this
year is also going to be an important
one with much to be done. Because 2027
has been called the year of the poly
crisis, a scenario where all our
geopolitical fears could align and pose
a mortal threat to our already rocking
world order. So, will we be ready for
it? Welcome to The General and the
Journalist. I'm Tom. and I'm Patrick.
So, those of you who've been listening
for a while might recall that Tom and I
used this expression poly crisis back in
June in our episode on the strategic
defense review where we sketched out
very briefly a nightmare scenario where
we could find ourselves facing war
simultaneously on multiple fronts
against China, against Russia and
possibly Iran and North Korea. And Tom
even then wrote an article about it for
the times. But I sus suspect that
subliminally I must have nicked this
idea from our guest today Sam Olsen
because he's written the definitive
paper on this for Sibilene with his
co-author Justin Crump who also Sam is
an old friend of mine and was very
briefly my tenant. Um we rented our
house to him. Anyway Sam um welcome back
to the pod. It's great to see you again.
>> Great. Thank you very much for having me.
me.
>> Thanks for coming Sam.
>> Um and of course and of course Sam you
and I uh known each other. we served
together in uh in Afghanistan where you
were an intelligence officer. Um and uh
uh and we've seen each other on and off
since then. Um anyway, um last time you
were back on the pod back in the summer,
we you you talked, I thought, very
powerfully about how China effectively
holds all the cards when it comes to
rare earth elements and raw materials.
And this notion that China effectively
has a veto on western or European
rearmorament because it controls not
only what 90% of the supply of refined
rare earth minerals but also
increasingly can dictate the stock piles
as well. Um and that of course matters
enormously um because of our reliance on
you know whether as you said I think in
that episode the four 450 kilograms of
an F-35 that come from rare earths um I
think it's four tons of a nuclear
submarine that come from rare earths. So
what I wanted to talk about today to
sort of or ask you about today was to
take that idea forward and develop this
this notion that you've written about
around a poly crisis you know a series
of geopolitical technological economic
shocks which can converge into a global
crunch year. And you've you've mentioned
you've talked about 2027 as as the first
time this scenario comes about. So I
mean let's accept I think first of all I
think you writed about it that that this
is a scenario. What's the value first of
all in just presenting a scenario in its
own right because you're not predicting
are you?
>> No it's really impossible to predict
because we just there are so many
different elements in play that you
can't say X or Y or Zed is going to
happen. But by laying out a scenario is
should give government and business
planners a real uh kick in the behind to
say look you might not have the five 10
years you think you've got of peace. You
might actually only have 18 months two
years before the balloon goes up and
what are you going to do to prepare for
that? That is a much better position to
be in than just assuming that things
will continue the way that they have
done for many years.
>> Okay. Okay. Well, let's let's I mean,
can you can you sort of very briefly um
because I think we've got a lot to
cover. First of all, just describe the
scenario itself because it's actually
it's a series of interrelated scenarios.
So, just tell us tell us the component
parts of it and then I guess why why 2027.
2027.
>> Okay. So, as briefly as I can because I
could talk about this for a long time.
Um we we've got a series of geopolitical
issues going around the world as we all
know. China and Taiwan, uh, Russia and
Eastern Europe. And then you have the
European and North American uh, domestic
and politic political and social unrest.
Um, and then you have the issue of
technology and the rise of AI and a
bunch of other things that are
happening. And it's a bit like the film
The Perfect Storm, which I'm sure you
saw back in the day. If you've got one
event happening, then most countries,
most Western countries can deal with it.
two things get a bit more difficult but
when you start having three or four
major issues hitting you at the same
time that's when the boat capsizes and I
think that is that is our uh the risk
that we really want to hammer home with
this paper and just quickly go through
them first of all China and Taiwan it is
unbelievably clear to any China watcher
that China is is definite about its
moves on Taiwan now whether it moves
next year or 10 years that is a that's a
point of contention I think but the
question is the question of whether
Xiinping is serious about Taiwan.
Everyone agrees. And uh then we have uh
Russia and Eastern Europe. Again, it's
very clear that Putin has designs in
Eastern Europe. And you both have talked
about this very eloquently. And you
know, your cyber episode recently was
was great looking at this the the gray
zone stuff that's happening. But but
there are also worries about him just
literally sending tanks over. And I
think you, General Patrick, spoke about
this a while ago. you know what's what
is what what is the response if he puts
his tanks 100 yards into Estonian
territory and then sits back behind his
nuclear umbrella and says come on then
what are you going to do so one event
again maybe we can sort of see how
Europe and North America can work
together on for example if you know if
Russia moved on on on uh on Poland or
god forbid any of the other countries
there uh and and China and Taiwan were
were not happening and they were still
sort of just um you know bumbling along
uh but What happens when, and this is
the point of our paper, when China moves
on Taiwan with a big quarantined
operation and really puts America in in
the spotlight in terms of the response
and at the same time uh Russia moves on
uh say Poland, then we've got a very
very significant problem because what
what that would require is both co both
sets of uh issues to be pushed back on
by by a cohesive western response.
And we've already seen as you know we
know that there are problems with
anticipating Trump coming to Europe's
rescue and Europe fully supporting the
US and pushing back on on China. And so
that's that's the big sort of picture.
But it gets even worse because when you
start looking at the things that would
happen around it, for example, a massive
economic shock. So if Taiwan is taken
out of the picture because of a
quarantine and it can't export its
chips, then we would see a huge
calamitous uh drying up of supply chain
uh chips into the supply chain which
would affect things in the UK and Canada
and Australia and everywhere in Europe.
You know 800,000 jobs in the UK for
example rely on on uh car factories and
those car factories simply cannot work
without the chips. If you bring it all
together, you can clearly see at the
economic level, at the military level,
at the political level, at the
blockade/quarantine level in Taiwan, all
these things coming together. How on
earth do countries deal with that
individually? Because I think that the
worry, the final point of this is that
if this does all blow up and it goes the
way of China and Russia, then this is
almost certainly the end of the USWestern
USWestern
order around the world.
>> Okay, great summary. And I still
recommend that anybody who's listening
goes down to the show notes. I'm sure
that we'll embed uh the paper in there.
But could you what you it's you said
poly crisis 2027.
Why 27? Why have you picked on this
particular day? The the first reason is
is more proact which is just that first
of all America uh keeps saying that 2027
is when China will move in Taiwan and
they have done for years and years and
that came out actually because Admiral
Davidson when he was asked about 10
years ago when he thought China would
move on Taiwan guessed it would be about
2027 and that's now become folklore that
it will be 2027. The problem with that
is that China now thinks that America is
planning on doing something in 2027
which means it's a self-reinforcing
uh um sort of assessment which actually
is based on one conversation uh from
from many years ago and that is the
problem with often with conflict and
issues that happen
>> they they not necessarily always planned
through. So that's one issue. Secondly,
uh is that uh we know that Europe is
trying to rearm uh at a pitifully slow
rate as we all would agree uh and that
is not that rearmment process is nowhere
near going to be ready by 2728 but you
can look at 29 2030 and you can see hm
maybe there will be some great strides
happening [snorts] and then we look at Americans
Americans
>> so it's a so it's a window of opportunity
opportunity
>> yes and then and and and Americans
haven't really properly rearmed you know
it's it's assessed that last year 2025
the uh 204 sorry the Americans only made
22 Tomahawk missiles and any missile in
any any missile intensive conflict with
China all the estimates are a minimum of
5,000 Tomahawks would be used in the
first two weeks [snorts] this
>> Sam sorry sorry let me just I want to
hear that one again America manufactured
22 Tomahawk missiles in the last year
>> yes and this is a really important point
here is that our military dependency on
China is now so great from the supply
chain point of view that actually the uh
historian and strategist Philips O'Brien
said this and I going to pinch it off
him because it's it's a very good
observation but he said that the British
and American armies now are are in the
same situation as the German and
Japanese armies were in 1940. In other
words, incredibly good at winning
battles at the tactical and operational
level, but strategically compromised
because the raw materials and the
components and all the inputs for the
supply chains that are needed to keep
those those armies fighting for more
than a few weeks are in the hands of
their uh opponents
>> and that is the that is the reality and
and 2027 2028 uh is the is
[clears throat] basically the window of
opportunity where China and Russia
recognize that we haven't properly
rearmed yet because because we haven't
built out all the supply chain
redundancy that we need to to replace
China and particularly and Russia in
some areas as well.
>> Which of these um of these scenarios do
you think is the most likely to start to
be the catalyst?
>> The both I would suggest that uh China
is very ready to move now. So if if
Russia did move on Estonia or Poland or
whatever, then quickly quickly rolling
out their ships in quarantine uh would
probably take a matter of hours. So,
it's hard to know which one would start,
but I I would be surprised if one didn't
take advantage of the other if it wasn't
already coordinated.
>> You make a really interesting point that
the the current generation of leadership
across the world are the boomer
generation who were brought up in that
that wonderful era of peace as we look
back on it now after the Second World
War right up to to now and have no
experiences of of of managing massive
existential crises in the West at all.
How much of that plays into this as a
problem? And and I guess
the logical conclusion is obviously
because they don't know about crisis,
they don't know about threat and
existentialism, they haven't properly
prepared for it because they can't see
it as a reality. Is that about right?
Where are you on that?
>> I would agree. I think one of the the
biggest problems for the west is that we
have got so used to being the the world
leaders and not just since 1945 but I
would strongly argue that the world
order we live in now should be termed
the Anglo-American world order and has
basically been uh in place since uh 18
1815 or so. So that's 200 years of
western/ Anglo-American leadership. And
there is also another problem with which
is that uh the Americans especially have
convinced themselves that so much of
what we take for granted as our
political philosophy that the end the
underlying political philosophy for the
west which is democratic freedom um well
freedom generally um and uh and liberal
values they they are universalist values
and as someone that's that's traveled to
75 80 countries speak a number of
languages anguages and I've lived and
worked in, you know, more than a dozen
countries. I can see how the
universalist values that I was taught
when I studied anthropology as an as an
undergraduate, they just aren't there
around the world, especially now because
you have China really ripping up the
rule book and saying, you know, you
don't need to be a democracy to really
make uh to to make your networks or, you
know, to build out your your uh TV
networks or your broadband networks or
whatever it is. um and delivering on
development that many of these countries
want and demand. And so this this this
sort of legitimacy that the west thinks
that it has by being a liberal values uh
block um is is sort of being is being
challenged now and therefore the
universalism of our values is is is
under threat. And that may sound a bit
esoteric and a bit sort of wishy-washy,
but I think it's really important
because if you're sitting there in
London or Berlin or or or Washington,
well, perhaps not Trump, but other
people in Washington, and and you think,
well, it's obvious that the whole world
should be liberal and should be uh
democratic. And these are the
universalist tendencies of mankind and
therefore anyone going against it is a
wrong and bit weird and b is destined to
failure because obviously democracies
always win in the end. I think that this
is a a a state of mind that is still
gripping most western policy makers and
and governments and they and this is
>> it's a failure of imagination.
>> Yes, [clears throat] it is. And and I
think it's it's a bit of a comfort
blanket because you're like I if if what
I'm saying is true, if our political
philosophy is is right and therefore the
world is eventually going to end up as a
liberal democracy which you know that
famous that famous uh uh paper by
Francis Fukuyama at the end of history
in the in the early 1990s where he said
look the west is one and the whole world
is heading to be a liberal democracy. If
you believe that in your heart, which
most I would argue most uh western
leaders still do, then what China's
doing, what Russia's doing, it's a bit
of an aborance and actually we can just
ride the storm and everyone will go back
revert to the norm and revert to the
universalist values that every the whole
world obviously holds. I disagree that
that is the case. I think that they the
leaders in the west are to be frank
deluded that they don't see that the
world is changing for the first time in
a really big way for 200 years that
China especially but Russia, Iran and
other countries uh that that are working
with it are really in the driving seat
now in terms of changing the world's uh
political philosophies and that means
that western leaders do not have the
luxury of of just of reck of reckoning
that of reckoning that this will just
all pass. Things are changing and they
need to wake up.
>> Patrick, I've got a question for you. Of
the military threats of the poly crisis,
breaking them down, so Russia, China,
North Korea, Iran, as a general, you've
studied these for years and years, which
of those four is the one that worries
you the most?
>> Security begins at home. So, as a
British general, as a NATO general, um
what worries me most, um not least
because I think it's the most acute and
approximate threat is Russia. Um and
we've talked several times on this
podcast and with Sam about how that may
emerge. Um I I also think that Russia is
um is the least rational of the actors
in this in this scenario. And you know,
it's so much of this is driven by
Putin's need to to continue to keep
Russia on a war footing, otherwise he
faces a reckoning at home. Um, but but
that's not to in any way to downplay uh
what would happen in the event of a of a
uh of a Taiwan contingency because the
global impact of a Taiwan contingency
would dwarf um even a potential conflict
in Europe.
So Sam,
we getting to the stage where we all
begin to think now at least the West has
been to talk about this where we weren't
a year or two or three ago. So that's
your experiences. I think that's ours as
well on this podcast talking to various
different people. But what do we need to
do more to prepare for it? Because
talking and recognizing isn't enough,
isn't it? What do we need to do over
this next year to get all our ducks in
in order, us, the liberal west, for the
poly crisis that may or may not hit in
2027? There's there's two main options.
Number one is to have a pol have a
policy a strategy of deterrence. In
other words, stop China moving on Taiwan
and stop Russia moving on Eastern
Europe. The problem with that is that I
think that it's very hard to see with
all those strategic issues in mind why
China would not move on Taiwan. And we
also know that Taiwan is refusing
because of its political um dilemas at
home that basically they can't increase
its defense budget because the
opposition just won't allow it. It can't
can't change its energy mix because the
opposition won't allow it. And this
means that Taiwan is very very
vulnerable to a quarantine. It has about
11 days of LG and about half of the half
of its energy mix comes from LG. It has,
you know, a few months of food, but at
the end of the day, it is really hard to
see Taiwan be able to survive.
>> I get that point, but we're not just
observers of this. You know, we are
powerful nations here in the liberal
west. America, Europe, NATO, you know,
we're not just victims of of fate and
destiny. There is more we can do to
deter a Chinese invasion of of Taiwan, a
Russian invasion of Estonia. Surely.
>> Yes, you're right. There is a lot more
that we could do, but where is the
political will to do it? You know, I'm
sure if you're sitting there as a as a
military and as a strategic planner, you
would reinforce Taiwan with, you know,
with Western arms uh armies and you
would uh massively stockpile their
energy and their food and make sure that
they any time that China moved in, then
there would be skin in the game from the
west because people, you know, in the
same way that Britain moved a battalion,
a mild regiment in fact, to Estonia to
make sure that there was skin in the
game there. But we're not going to see
that. No one's willing to put boots on
the ground and to really reinforce
Taiwan. Then we go to Russia. Yes, there
are uh massive things happening. You
know, I saw that Estonia is building
this new wall. Um and people have re or
countries have reinforced
uh uh the military from the front line
there, whether it's a Romania or you
know in the Baltics etc. But again, all
we need is is for Russia to move 100
yards into that territory. I think that
is the issue. How do you actually reduce
the threat to the minute detail and that
is that is hard. So I think that the
deterrent side is is really really
difficult. So the other strategic option
we've got is basically building out
resilience for as and when the balloon
goes up and that is really what was
happening in 193839
you know chamberlain massively increased
aircraft production knowing that it was
very unlikely he was going to be able to
put off Hitler forever. we should be
doing the same and that involves uh a
lot of hard choices. Now you spoke
you've both spoken about the fiscal
choices that need to be made. I would
argue that we need to make those fiscal
choices now and actually prepare
properly for a potential conflict
because the economic and the military
impact will be devastating. But if we
start now and we start stockpiling
critical minerals to make sure that our
submarines can continue to be repaired,
we we start stockpiling properly uh big
amounts of uh at the at the corporate
level, computers and all the other
elements that are needed to keep the the
companies going at times of geopolitical
issue, you know, trauma and and then
working together with our allies to to
reinvent the supply chains of critical
minerals and all these things. In other
words, to have a whole of nation
approach to preparing for this and a
whole of allied uh nation approach as
well. But I don't see either one
happening. Uh even though the the
writing certainly on the wall.
>> All right. Well, that that's that is the
work that needs to be done in this year
2026, isn't it? As as we laid out at the
start. So Sam, let me put you a very
direct question to you. You just said a
really interesting word. He said, "Not
if the bubble goes up, but when the
bubble goes up, we need to be prepared
for it. Are we going to be ready as soon
as 2027 and will a poly crisis hit us
next year?" And if you could possibly
put your money where your mouth is here
and do that thing that all of us
commentators hate doing and and calling it,
it,
>> what's going to happen?
>> Uh yes, it is not a prediction. It is a
scenario. But I see the scenarios uh
that we've discussed very likely rolling
out in 26 27 28. Um now the other
question is you know how can we be
>> so very likely 80% 60% 90%.
>> Oh 80%. >> 80%.
>> 80%.
>> Yeah. I mean from from China and Taiwan
uh I know there are people that disagree
with with with this and and that's good
to have this disagreement because it
forces us to check our analysis more
carefully. But if the AI race and the AGI
AGI
um and a AGI and ASI issues are really
uh coming to the four which they are um
and you see for example AGI being
announced in America which is highly
likely as I'm told by many people next
year then uh it all brings the role of
Taiwan very much into the four in the in
the minds of Beijing's planners and
there are loads of other reasons which
should go into the paper about why we
think China really wants to move about
then but as soon as that happens then
that is that is you know when the poly
crisis starts but then equally it could
be that Russia sees the window of
opportunity and moves on Eastern Europe
in the next few years because all the
things that we've said uh boil down to
this there is a window of opportunity
for both countries in the next few years
to move where before the west is ready
to be able to push back properly and why
would you not take advantage of that
when their strategic aims of both
countries is the undermining of the of
the West and the Western Order.
>> So Sam, I hear you and I also do off my
uneducated journalistic cap to your your
far greater knowledge and strategic
understanding, but I'm not as
pessimistic as you and I think there's a
lot of reasons why actually we can go
into 2026 uh a bit more hopeful that
we're going to be in the right place by
the end of the year to see off this poly
crisis. So for me the poly crisis feels,
you know, 30 40% and there's a there's a
good seven reasons which I've written
about. I won't bore you with all them.
But the biggest for me is Europe, NATO,
we are stepping up. I mean, look at
where we were at the start of 2025. We
were nowhere. The Trump presidency came
along. Everybody panicked. Every started
reinvesting in their militaries. Uh the
German military growing exponentially.
The French investing. We're even being
invests here in Britain, but we could go
a lot faster. So, just think where we'll
be at the end of a whole another year of
this now that we have woken up. And that
leaves me uh feeling a lot more positive
than perhaps perhaps you might be. But
the second one is economic and I really
wanted to sort of challenge you on this
one. Russia's economy is going badly
pear-shaped very very quickly. You know
their oil sales and gas sales are down
dramatically. Not because of the
sanctions because all the Ukrainian
missiles piling into Russian oil plants.
They're down 20% 27% yearonear. They're
in real trouble. Inflation rocketing.
people get very upset in in Moscow e
economically and also the Chinese
economy their growth is flatlining their
growth is going to be below 5% we think
by the end of this by the end of 2025
when we get the numbers and certainly
next year the Chinese simply don't need
a global crisis to screw their growth
any further because if they do it's the
one simple thing that's going to stop
their 1.2 2 billion people from keeping
the CCP in power. And my feeling is
they're just not going to want to risk it.
it.
>> And on that, Tom, just to chuck in, um
the US Census Bureau published its uh
its annual report and the projections on
human population, the global population
are really interesting. Um as far as it
concerns, China, China current
population of 1.4 4 billion is projected
by 2100 so less than a century from now
to have to have dropped to 662 million
and the assessment is that no matter
what they do about it that's irreversible.
irreversible.
>> So what's your push back to my push back
if you like on why on earth China would
want to risk destabilizing
the global economy so badly which could
be potentially absolutely cataclysmic to
the survival of the the Chinese
Communist Party. It's a very good
question and it's one that's asked a lot
but this makes the assumption that China
thinks like the west in terms of its of
the position of of its economic uh
strength. We know that if you very
boring but China has 16 different uh
categories of national security and the
top one is in a pyramid shape like a
sort of champagne pyramid and the top
one is political stability and the ones
below it are uh military and economic
stability and they both exist to support
political stability. So in one side you
you could be right. However, I would
bring us back to a man called General
Gueltieri uh from 1982 when the
Argentinian economy was going wrong. He
didn't say, "I'm going to reach out for
Dayton with the West. I'm actually going
to launch an invasion of uh some small
islands just off the coast." And I think
that uh for me understanding
[clears throat] that the the first of
all that uh the economy the an economic
strength is not necessarily something
that she puts a lot of interest in. He's
not an economist. He's much more a
political uh leader. Um but he also
reckons that the economy sits there to
to support the political um ambitions of
him and the rest of of the CCP. And so
if it was considered that actually the
economy [clears throat] um was was less
important than political ambitions then
certainly that's what that's the the
direction they would take and I think
that the political ambitions and the
political imperative of taking Taiwan
would override that and I've already
mentioned those number one is that she
is absolutely determined to win back uh
Taiwan because of his political legacy
and all the other reasons but secondly
and this super important the AI
question. If they don't win the AI race
and the fourth industrial revolution
that that the AI race is a huge part of
and they let America win that, that
means that China cannot achieve its 2049
goals, its political goals of being
basically a great power because America
will win that. And so therefore, that is
why I think that they would be willing
to risk. And if they weren't willing to
put the economy at risk, then why would
they have spent many years now of
developing I think the world's best
economic defenses. They've got two years
of of fuel supplies. They've been
stockpiling things left, right, and
center. They've been really rolling out
export controls to make sure that their
enemies are are not particularly strong
and and innovation mercantile isn't
trying to destroy the ability for other
countries to to compete against them
economically and industrially. So all
these things point to them being ready
to take the hit uh but using but but
making sure that the political side is
more important than the economic side
>> and on on the AI race which absolutely
China and the US are absolutely locked
in now who who can win and dominate
because this is going to be so
important. Your point being China taking
back control of Taiwan would take back
control of all that massive
semiconductor production and make it
extremely hard for anyone else in the
world to develop much further with with
AI, let alone win that AI race. >> Correct.
>> Correct.
>> Okay, that's not a bad argument. I I
still cannot see any leader in the world
wanting to commit or can possibly regime
suicide by by doing that. But
>> but it would be suicide. It wouldn't be
rich. So let's but but Sam it would be
if the Chinese people rise up those 1.1
billion Chinese
>> they wouldn't do it. So
>> well they don't have a vote if they if
they don't get their cars and their
growth they're going to be unhappy
bunnies and they're going to start
challenging authority.
>> So [clears throat] Tom we first of all
we already see thousands and thousands
of protests in China every year and so
this is something that they're used to.
Secondly, the Communist Party by all
accounts is incredibly incredibly
popular because it's giving them back
what they what the Chinese Communist
Party have told the people they want and
the people generally do want because and
have wanted for thousands of years which
is to see China at the center of the
world and [clears throat] living
standards have increased massively over
over you know last few decades and yes
there will be people chering in the
middle classes and people saying that
they don't particularly you know like
the way things are going and we see that
from some of the polling in the last few
years. But at the end of the day, that's
all very well, but the a they don't have
a vote and b the domestic surveillance
and domestic security apparatus of China
is the biggest in the world. And they
spend far more on their domestic
security than they do even on their on
their normal defense budget and their
defense budget almost probably probably
almost the same as the American defense
budget. So if you look if you really go
into the details. So therefore uh it is
incredibly hard to see how this would
happen. Now there may be an argument
that if she screws this up then they
would uh probably get rid of him in a
palace coup because that's happened
before in in China. But this is the this
is why I think that a quarantine is far
more likely than invasion because a
quarantine you could have your cake and
eat it. They would basically they'd put
out the coast guards to to around the
six to eight or so main ports of Taiwan
and basically uh then it would have to
be the Americans or the uh the the
Japanese as well having to basically
break that that quarantine and all our
analysis shows that strategically
America cannot win a war against China
for more than last more than a week or
two simply because America's military
supply chain relies on China and and
therefore China would emerge the
strategic winner and therefore this is
this is something that would be you know
given to the people as a victory
>> and so yes they would have a few issues
about you know economic hardship but
this is something they've been through
and they're being prepared for now by
years and years of telling them that
their hardship is fine if we emerge
victorious at the end and that's what we
think that they would do if America fell
into their trap.
>> Patrick, I'm really tempted to get you
to give a percentage. I've gone for I'm
going to elevate my poly crisis
percentage chances from 30% to 45% with
Sam's excellent push backs. What are
your percentage chances of a poly crisis
and us being ready for it come 2027? I
struggle slightly with the time frame
and I buy all of Sam's arguments. Um I I
don't think it undermines Sam's central
point or indeed the validity of the
scenarios. I just think that time is a
bit more elastic. So, I think we're
looking at a decade of living
dangerously between 2027, which I think
is when it starts um and uh and around
about 2035 is the period of maximum
danger. And and that's what we've got to
negotiate. But I do agree with Sam's
analysis that, you know, if you were
Russia or China and you were thinking
strategically as opposed to
opportunistically, you would not wait
for Europe to rearm. Um and so the
faster we move >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> the the safer we're going to be in terms
of deterring uh conflict. Um so
percentage wise um I I think that in
within that decade I think it's a sort
of 60 70% chance that we're going to
fight face one or more of these scenarios.
scenarios.
>> I think what we all agree is that 2026
is going to be a hell of a year. It's
going to be the start or the
continuation at least of this big
buildup for us to prepare ourselves for
or deter and an awful lot's going to
happen. But to arm ourselves a little
bit better for getting through this this
absolutely fascinating next year, what
have you guys read over the Grimbo
holidays that you found particularly
enlightening or helpful for listeners to
get us through the next sort of year or
so on this sort of thinking? Sam, what
would you recommend
>> from a non-fiction point of view? If you
want to have a bit more of an
understanding of the realities of where
we are, how the war was won by Philips
O'Brien is incredibly good analysis of
the Second World War and talks about a
lot of the things that are relevant to
today because of the focus on industrial
capabilities and things that we need to
get to to grips with. So, I I certainly
recommend that. But I I think that uh on
a fiction side, I think often in in dark
days, we need to turn to fiction to be
able to really escape and go into a
different world. And anyone that hasn't
read the Slow Horses books really needs
to go into those because they are such a
bit of an escapism. Uh make you smile
and make you realize that actually uh
there is there can be other things on
your mind rather than just geopolitical problems.
problems.
>> Well, you're talking to two slow horses
fans here. That's for sure. Patrick,
what can you say? I'm going to go I'm
going to go with three. I'm going to go
with uh two fiction and one uh one
non-fiction. So the non-fiction which is
uh I guess the most important book, the
one that actually I keep coming back to
over the last I've read over the last
three or four years is called the
lessons of tragedy by Charles Adel and
Hal Brand. And it's a brilliant analysis
of of the the the sense of contemporary
amnesia and the the lack of awareness of
what could befall us, what could happen,
and seeks to draw on Greek tragedy as a
means of of of unpacking um how you go
about reawakening populations as to how
to avert tragedy. Um so that one uh on
thriller, the best I recommend this to
everybody. The best thriller I've ever
read is called Kolinsky Heights by
Lionel Davidson. It's an absolute
brilliant uh brilliant book. And then uh
for uh for a laugh, you could do no
better than uh than PG Woodhouse. Well,
my list is tiny because by the time
everyone's got through those two
wonderful long lists, uh it'll be the
summer holidays. Anyway, uh on
geopolitics, I would massively recommend
the essay Alexander Stub wrote for the
Foreign Affairs magazine in November. uh
Stub is of course president of Finland
just a beautifully eloquent exposition
of where we are and what we need to do
uh and his basic argument was much as
we've been talking about the world for
the next 50 to 100 years is going to be
defined in the next 5 years for fiction
and light relief and also a bit of
optimism and a little bit of jingoism
every now and then although he may be uh
not quite too PC anymore I would always
turn to Flashman and surely you two
would agree with that
>> yeah I'm giving I'm giving Flashman to
all my godchildren this year.
>> When you went into uh the Afghan
intelligence center that we created
during the Afghan campaign um that as
you walked in there was a copy of the
original flashman book. So the first one
which is all about Afghanistan and it's
framed behind a bake glass case and it
says break in in case of emergency. [laughter]
[laughter] [snorts]
[snorts]
Well, that's it for this week and uh
Sam, thank you so much for joining us
for a second time and I'm sure that
we'll be asking you to come back on
again. And for anybody who hasn't read
it, do go to the Sam's excellent
Substack um called States of Play and
also his uh Poly Crisis 2027 paper from
Cibilion. They are well worth the read.
Sam, if I don't see you again, I
probably won't uh because you're in
Wiltshire and I'm about to be in
Australia. Happy New Year, Sam.
>> And happy new year to you all. and I
wish you a good 2026.
>> Uh, absolutely. Happy New Year, Sam, and
I hope things go a little bit better
than you explently, brilliantly
described. Well, that is it for this
week. As always, please send us your
questions and comments. Anything you
want to tell us that's always enormously
useful to receive. The email is general andjournalistthes.co.uk.
andjournalistthes.co.uk.
That's generalistthe
times.co.uk. And one final thing we want
to say is a very very heartfelt and sad
goodbye to our absolutely fantastic
producer Sophie who's been with us
almost from the start. Uh the rock of
the podcast uh and is moving to uh
different clims within time hours. But
Sophie been absolutely wonderful. Thank you.
you.
>> Thank you Sophie. We're going to miss
you more than I can say.
>> So until next week. Bye Patrick. Bye
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