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Graham PRIEST: Fictional objects, fictional subjects
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so let me tell you what I want to talk
about let's suppose you read a a work of
fiction then in some undeniable sense
that there's a relationship between the
self that reads the fiction and the
objects of the fiction okay this is not
a high-powered theoretical cave this is
just a sort of common sense claim so
there's a relationship between the
subject and the objects of the fiction
okay now the most obvious thing about
the objects of the fiction is that at
least it would seem some of them don't
exist so Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist
in Puccini's opera butterfly does not
exist so at least prima facie many
objects of fiction do not exist yet many
people especially in the 20th century
many Anglo philosophers mid 20th century
I thought this year is crazy to say that
something doesn't exist we'll come to
why in a minute so the object pole is
problematic what about the subject pole
well whatever you say about the object
pole and you the subject seem to exist
but that's not been everybody's view so
for example a number of well most
Buddhist philosophers think that the
self does not exist so okay if some of
the objects of fiction don't exist
maybe the self that appreciates the
fiction doesn't exist either and we'll
look at that question too so what this
talk is about is a relationship between
the objects of fiction and the self that
appreciates the fiction so the talk has
two parts first of all I'll talk about
fictional objects and secondly I'll talk
about fictional subjects and then those
who read me long sections but the last
section is fairly short we'll put those
two things together and I'll spell out
the bottom line of the talk okay so
that's where we're going so first of all
fictional objects now let me start by
getting one thing straight straight away
some names which occur in works of
fiction if they refer to anything refer
to non-existent objects at least it
would appear so
so Holmes in the Conan Doyle novels
butterfly or cha-cha sang in the Puccini
Opera but many names that occur in
fiction in works of fiction do refer to
things that actually exist so for
example Holmes lives in Baker Street
butterfly live in Nagasaki and Baker
Street and Nagasaki are real places you
may have been to them okay so some names
that occur in a work of fiction actually
refer to real things things that do
exist now some people have doubted this
they think that when a name like Baker
Street occurs in conan doyle's fictions
the name refers not to the real Baker
Street but to some zetz some
doppelganger of Baker Street now this
this is not right look here's an
argument that's often given for why
Conan Doyle's Baker Street
can't be the real Baker Street because
um Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street
and no Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street
Street
now that's certainly true there was
never a short Holmes in Baker Street but
if shark Holmes really lived in Baker
Street then it seems that we have a
contradiction here
so if that's right then these can't be
about the same Baker Street they must be
about different Baker streets okay now
this is an argument that's often used
and it's wrong okay
the it's wrong because um Sherlock
Holmes lived in Baker Street is not true
okay what is true is in Doyle stories
Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street it
must be like that because otherwise you
could not say there is a place in London
such that in Doyle stories Holmes lived
there but no such detective actually
lives in it okay same there same it in
both places the fact that you can say
this and say this truly shows you that
the Baker Street in both of these things
is one in the same and it's also
important that these claims we make
about Sherlock Holmes are not literally
true what is literally true is what you
get when you prefix the sentence with
this operator embroil stories or in
Madame Butterfly or generally in a work
because remember when the Doyle wrote
the Holmes novels or Petrini
wrote Madame Butterfly he wasn't using
the world with a different meaning he
was using a word with exactly the same
meaning that you or I use he didn't
change the meaning so he didn't change
the reference either so Puccini is
talking about the same Nagasaki that was
incinerated by the Americans in 1945
he's just saying things about it with it
which are not literally true but they're
true in his opera okay why
well look there's a story called sylvans
blocks it's about an old friend of mine
Richard silver who died some 20 years
ago now one of the great Australian
philosophers it's a story many of the
things in the story out actually true
for example that Sylvan lived at a
farmhouse outside Canberra but it's a
story things happen in the story which
are not true in fact some of them are
not possible but the story is about
Richard Sylvan how do I know well
because I wrote the story and I was
referring to Richard okay so when names
like Richard Sylvan occur in a work of
fiction they can refer to the actual
person Richard silver if
you have any further doubts just think
of this if names like Baker Street and
Nagasaki changed their referent then you
better hold it that thing's worse than
other words change the reference to in
is happy okay this is crazy if those
words change their meaning
then you wouldn't understand the story okay
okay
so words do not change their meaning
April - you're right they do not change
their denotation in words in works of fiction
fiction
so in works of fiction some names refer
to actual objects and some names don't okay
okay
so here's a piece of terminology if a
name occurs in a work of fiction I'll
call it a fictional name and if a
fictional Lane doesn't refer to an
existing object I'll call it purely fictional
so what we're concerned with is the
we want to investigate how they behave
well look a purely fictional name either
refers or it doesn't and if it refers it
refers to something that either exists
or doesn't so we have three
possibilities the first is that it
doesn't refer the second is that it
refers to something existent the third
is that it refers to something
non-existent now I'm going to consider
those three possibilities and spoiler
alert I'm going to argue for the last of
these that the name refers to things
which don't exist okay so let's consider
the first possibility namely that names
and fiction purely fictional names do
think that's right you have a real
problem because we make lots of true
claims which use names which are purely
fictional so um this might be the first
example that occurs two homes lived in
Baker Street that's not true I've
explained that so I'm not talking about
this homes doesn't exist I'm not talking
about that either because there's a way
you can do your logic it's called free
logic in such a way that if this name
does not denote then our homes exist is
false so it's negation is true so these
are some bodies called negative
existential you can hunt on negative x
essentials without assuming that the
name refers okay so I'm not talking
about these what am I talking about well
things like in Doyle stories Holmes
lived in Baker Street that's true in
Greek myths Zeus
how do you account for the truth of
these things if these names do not refer
to anything okay so there's a well-known
problem here about how you understand
truth in fiction so you can understand
by that things like this perhaps the
most popular account is David Lewis's
who said that what makes it the case
that in Doyle stories Holmes lived in
Baker Street well that's true because in
those worlds which realize the Doyle
stories it's true that Holmes lived in
Baker Street and Holmes actually refers
to an object that exists in those worlds
doesn't exist in this world
but exists in those worlds but think
about it if that's your line then the
name Holmes refers to a non-existent
object it exists in other worlds it
doesn't exist in this world so this is
not a case of the name not referring
okay well okay there's a lot to be said
that's not the only example because we
make lots of true statements about using
purely fictional names which don't use
this operator in Doyle stories agree
with objects and so here's a bunch
Holmes is a purely fictional detective
Holmes were smarter than the Inspector Clouseau
Clouseau
Inspector Clouseau is is per the idiot
of a policeman that occurs in the Pink
Panther films these are very old now but
okay they're quite funny um okay so
Holmes is really smart Inspector
Clouseau an idiot okay all right so
Holmes is smarter than expected closer
and the Homeric Greeks worships use okay
so all of these things are true now I
mean how do you normally account for the
truth of a subject predicate sentence or
an atomic census well a subject
predicate sentence is true just if the
subject the grammatical subject refers
to an object the predicate refers to a
property and the object actually has
that property okay if you think that
these are true and if you think that the
names Holmes and Zeus don't refer to
anything you cannot do this
okay so these cannot mean what they say
literally okay now everything I'm
talking about has a big literature and
what many philosophers will try to do at
this point is say well you know you've
got a paraphrase these away they don't
really mean what they say they mean
something else so there might be a bunch
of ways in which you can try to
paraphrase these claims I'm not going to
consider any examples because there
isn't any time let me just put it like
this resorting to paraphrase is always a
strategy that you have to Lou to use
so sometimes you have to but it's better
not to if you don't have to okay so
that's all I'm going to say about the
first case namely that purely fictional
names do not refer so let's move to the
second possibility this is the
possibility that purely fictional names
do refer but they refer to something
existent okay which sounds a bit strange
but some people have suggested this like
Saul Kripke Amy Thomason okay so if
purely fictional names refer to
something that exists what what sorts of
things they refer to well there are two
plausible candidates one is mental
representations and one is abstract
objects so in the Locke lectures for
example so quickly suggest that purely
fictional names wrote may refer to
abstract objects they're abstract
objects that we've brought into
existence by it and a writer or an
author but they're abstract objects the
other possibility which is perhaps the
first one that would occur to you is
that purely fictional names refer to
mental representations now I'm ending
answer about one of these because you'll
see that there are real problems I'm not
going to talk about the other because
exactly the same problems arise so once
you've seen the problems with this guy
then you can extrapolate and you can
figure out what the problems for the
other account is so let's consider the
possibility that purely non-existent
names refer to mental representations
okay now there's an obvious problem with
this straight away so suppose that the
name Holmes proposed to a mental
representation okay
Holmes is smarter than any actual
detective let's suppose that's true
okay that's a category mistake mental
representations are not the kinds of
things that can be smarter okay people
are smarter than other people so there's
immediately a problem with this because
you've got a bunch of category mistakes
in the true things that we say okay next problem
problem
ah no one really thinks that Sherlock
Holmes exists okay if you do you have
mistaken a work of fiction for a work
effect so um if Holmes refers to an
existent metal representation Holmes
does exist okay so when you say sherlock
holmes doesn't exist you cannot mean it
doesn't exist you've got to mean
something else
well maybe exists outside the mind so
when I say Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist
because I'm referring to a metal
representation what I'm referring to one
what I mean is that Sherlock Holmes
doesn't exist outside the mind Sherlock
Holmes exists merely in my mind okay but
that doesn't seem to work either
look plato existed but as use does not
that's true so this is a contrast and
what it is that I'm saying of Plato I'm
denying as use so in a bit of logical
notation there's some property such that
Plato hasn't has it and youth doesn't so
when I say that this youth doesn't exist
I mean doesn't exist in the same way
that Plato did exist I don't mean didn't
exist outside the mind um okay
one more argument let's suppose I write
a work of fiction and in it I tell a
I then wonder whether that mental state
actually exists so let's call this the
mental state s okay so I wonder where
that s exists and then I do my research
into the psychological literature and I
find that there's no such thing as yes s
so the word s refers to what mental
representation and I've just discovered
that the mental reputation that mental
representation doesn't exist I doesn't
exist outside the mind but I never
thought it did okay I will talk about a
mental state I never thought that it
existed outside the mind okay so this is
crazy okay so those are objections to
the assumption that purely fictional
names refer to mental representation
once you've seen the arguments you can
sort of Twigg them to get exactly the
same arguments against the view that
purely fictional names refer to abstract
objects so I won't go through that um so
here's another piece of terminology I'm
going to call an object fictional if it
occurs in a work of fiction so before we
talk about names right now I'm talking
about objects so an object it's
fictional if it occurs in a work of
fiction and a fictional object is purely
fictional if it doesn't exist so I told
you there were three possibilities
either purely fictional names do not
refer or they refer to things that exist
or they refer to things that don't exist
so I'm going to consider now that third
possibility and I'm going to call an
object purely fictional if it's causing
the work of fiction and it doesn't exist
now what we've seen is that the first
two possibilities namely that a purely
fictional name doesn't refer or it
refers to something existent are fraught
with problems okay so why would you buy
into those if you can do something much
more sensible and the sensible thing is
to suppose that these names refer they
just refer to non-existent things
then you can say everything you want to
about them you can say for example that
homes are let's say Zeus lived on Mount
Olympus in the Greek myths because Zeus
refers to a particular non-existent
object and in the myths well that's
say that Jesus does not exist it
existence is a perfectly ordinary
property and youth does not have it all
right so you can do just the
philosophy of language in the 20th
century maybe not to other people
however um the story involves this guy
William Van Orman Quine
and Klein published a paper in 1948 on
what there is and he trashed the idea of
non existent objects okay he the paper
is full of rhetoric rather than arguing
but he argued that it was crazy to
suppose there are non existent objects
and I think that view is starting to
so so you know why did Quine save us
well if you read the paper wines and
main argument is an argument by
exclusion so he says well look how do
you express existence
you can't existence you can't use it
with names because you can get rid of
those with Russell's fear of deaf descriptions
descriptions
you can't express existence with a
what's left quantifiers okay so when you
say some what you mean is some existent
that's all you've got left okay now this
is this is crazy okay look um some
things don't exist like father Christmas
serious butterfly this is a perfectly
ordinary sentence of English translation
Italian it's perfectly ordinary Italians
Henderson is true okay oh I've wanted to
buy you something for Christmas but I
found that it doesn't exist
maybe Sherlock Holmes is a magnifying glass
glass
okay if some made some existent these
will be contradictory patently they're not
so okay what's wrong with Quinn's
argument well as I said it's an argument
by exhaustion can't be mr. quantifier
some now the most obvious thing if you
think about it is that Quine does not
consider in the most natural way of
saying that something exists namely to
use the monadic predicate exists right
so when I say Nagasaki exists and
Lilliput are placing Gulliver's Travels
doesn't exist then I'm referring to
those places and applying the monadic
predicate of existence so why doesn't
Quine consider this possibility which is
the obvious one well I think probably
this is the influence of Russell
so in 1918 Russell published his
lectures on logical atomism
and what are your views in those
lectures is that exists is not a monadic
predicate rather exists is the second
order predicate you can only apply it to
another predicate like cat okay to say
that cats exist is to say that some
things are cats so if it's a predicate
of predicate it makes no sense to apply
two proper names
that's Russell's argument okay this this
view is also crazy look I used to
believe that Holmes exists when I was a
kid and then I learnt that he doesn't
know what I believed on what I learnt
those were meaningless hardly I mean
all right so Russell I mean you know has
his reasons or at least has his
arguments and in the lectures on logical optimism
of arguments as to why existence is a
second order predicate and they are
absolutely frightful okay go read it
paying to make and I'm not going to
defend it here unless you in the book
that Alberto referred to towards not
being there is an analysis of Russell's
arguments and they really are terrible
arguments okay okay
last thing on existence sometimes the
view that existence is not a predicate
is sheeted back to Kant in his remarks
on the ontological argument in the first
critique this is a misreading of Kent
Kent does not say that existence is not
a predicate existence cannot is a
perfectly meaningful monadic predicate
for Kent it has to be because it's one
of these categories namely the category
of reality what can't actually say some
can go away read it is that existence is
not a determining predicate just in
normal so
prayer is a perfectly fine predicate
it's not determining or what he means by
that is that to say that something is a
cat is exactly the same as say if an
existing cat
okay so existence adds nothing new
that's what he means but it's a
perfectly legitimate pretty now when our
existence is merely a determining
predicate well that's another matter
existence is a perfectly meaningful
monadic predicate and you can use it to
that butter you
look at the properties of nonexistent
objects so the sorts of properties that
non existent objects have well there can
be status properties like this Holmes is
a possible object sylvans box is an
impossible object serpent's box is an
object from the story intentional
properties such as use was worshipped by
the Greeks our little Johnny kid next
door three fears golem
but the ones that really interested are
things like this today Holmes lived in
Baker Street that's not true I told you
that okay
but in Doyle stories Holmes lived in
Baker Street
that's a property of Holmes not living
in Baker Street but living in Baker
Street in Doyle stories similarly in
Silver's box priest finds an empty box
that has something in it okay it's not
actually true that priest found a box
was empty and had something in it but
it's true of the empty box has some in
it that priest found it in sylvans story
okay so a very important species of
properties of non existent objects is
precisely that the ones they have in the
work of fiction okay so I'm going to
all right so so much for the first part
purely fictional names do exactly what
naively you think they do they refer to
non-existent objects the existence is a
the fictional purely fictional objects
may or may not have the properties that
they are said to have but and they
certainly have the properties in the
work of fiction
okay so let's turn to the second part of
the talk and this is about not the
object of the fiction but the self that
appreciates the work of fiction so let
me clarify one thing to start with a
person is a biological entity you and I
are people okay a self in the sense that
I'm going to use the word is a part of
the person which exists while the person
exists is constant and defines the
person as that person that's what I mean
okay so yourself is your if you like
your essential you and what I'm going to
argue in this part of the talk is the
self does not exist okay now it
certainly appears that it does we have a
sense of self okay so we certainly seem
to have a sense of something so when you
wake up in the morning so almost a
little voice comes on at the back here
by and say hello back again right it's
me okay this is a sense of self or if
you want to put it in Teutonic terms you
can do it like
okay every thought is accompanied by an
I think if King if zdenka okay which
provides the synthetic unity of a
priority to be experience okay in other
words you know it's a self which kind of
binds on okay so we certainly have a
sense of self but do we have a self well
we know the brain plays tricks okay so
there's the blind spot phenomenon you're
probably familiar with this so
at the back of your eyeball there's a
place where the optic nerve joins the
retina and where that happens there are
no rods no cones no no nerve cells which
ridge the light falling on them so if
light falls on the blind spot you can't
now and if you will work very hard you
can actually manipulate yourself into
seeing the blind spot of not seeing the
blinds by suppose but we don't normally
see the blind spot why not
it's cause the brain is very clever and
the brain fills in gaps so the brain
says oh well I can't really see what's
there but you look so it's going to be
this so it must be that and that's what
you see okay the brains really good at
filling in gaps here's another example
it's called the r5 phenomenon you may
not have heard of this before but it's
what you use to make movie films okay
here's a very simple example sometimes
you see some neon lights maybe the
cinema or a restaurant and in fact
there's what there is is a sequence of
bulbs globes okay and what they do is
they flash each one flashes but they're
flashes there very soon as this one
flashes if you look at this what you
will see is something moving I'm sure you
it's not an argument it's just a
question okay so the thought is this may
be sure you have a sense of self but the
now this view may sound rather strange
the 20th century but in fact it's a very
standard of you in Buddhist philosophy
so Buddhism arises in the fifth century
BCE and it makes two major breaks with
the general Indian culture of the time
Hinduism the first that in Buddhism
there is no God in Hinduism areas the
second is the in Buddhism there is no
self in Hinduism there is so the
Buddhists believe that there is no self
and the Buddhist philosophers were very
smart they gave a number of arguments
for this so let's so let me see what
reasons might you have for supposing
there's our self
well reasons for the existence of
something can be of two kinds
observational I can see it or
inferential I can infer it okay so some
things I know to exist because I can see
them for example you some things I can't
see but I infer that they exist because
that provides a good explanation of the
things that I do see like quarks like
black holes like dark matter so if
there's a good reason for supposing that
the self exists it's got to be one or
other of those and the Buddhists had
argument against both of these
possibilities perhaps the most extensive
discussion is by a Buddhist philosopher
called rasa bando in about the 4th
century I'm going to update it a bit
just to make it a bit more intelligible
so two possibilities observation
inference let's start with observation
can you observe yourself my
introspection okay and the answer was
already given to that by the 18th
century philosopher David Hume sometimes
it's said that Hume has a very similar
view of herself and Buddhists I'm
telling it's probably true
although the Buddhists had it 2,000
years before so this is this is David
Hume there are some philosophers who
imagined that we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call
ourself that we feel its existence and
its continuance in existence and we are
certain beyond the evidence of
demonstration both of its perfect
identity and its simplicity the
strongest sensation the most violent
passions so they instead of distracting
us from this view only fix it them more
intensely and make us consider their
influence on self either by their pain
or their pleasure but from my part when
I enter most intimately into what I call
myself I always stumble on some
particular perception or other a heat or cold
cold
lighter shade love or hatred plain dull
pleasure I can never catch myself at any
time without a perception never can
observe anything but the perception if
anyone upon Sirius and unprejudiced
reflection thinks that he has a
different notion of himself
I must confess I can no longer reason
with him all I can allow him is that he
may be in the right as well as I and
that we are centrally different in this
particular he may perhaps perceive
something simple and continues which he
calls himself though I'm certain there
is no such principle in me um but it
setting aside some meta position of this
kind okay
Humes not serious he doesn't really
think there are other people which
perceives themselves this is just human
irony right
setting aside some medication of meta
vision of this kind I may venture to
affirm of the rest of mankind that's all
of us really that they are nothing but a
bundle or collection of different
perceptions which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidity and are
in perpetual flexion movement so things
like the lights in the five phenomenon
okay well what Hume is pointing out is
that you cannot perceive yourself human
empiricist and he thinks that that gives
you reason suppose itself does exist but
that was the 18th century we know better
now because there's the other
possibility name means that we can infer
herself even though we can't see it so
from what okay well we're postulating
something right like dark matter or
strings in string theory and when we
postulate things what gives us reason to
believe they exist is precisely that
they serve some explanatory function
they can explain something then we can't
otherwise explain so the next question
is what is it that the self is supposed
to explain that you can't explain
without postulating the self well I
guess there could be a number of answers
but as cancer it it's the self that
holds all your perceptions together and
provides the unity the a priori
synthetic unity or a perception so in
other words look some mental states hang
together like mine okay like yours the
some mental states like yours and mine
don't hang together so there's something
which holds my mental states together
which doesn't hold yours and mine
together what can that be okay and the
thought is well it's the self the self
is kind of what all the mental states
kind of fixed to and join them together
now exactly how the self does that is
not entirely obvious can't
notwithstanding but the question is can
you explain the unity of thoughts or
experiences without the self and the
answer is yes you can and this is
pointed out by Vasu band oh look the
unity of our experiences is both sync
run synchronic and diachronic okay and diachronic
diachronic
pulls into passed on to orientate in the
future order so let's consider these two
things so synchronic at the same time so
I'm walking down the street and I fear
but motorbike go past and I hear a
motorbike go past so I have a visual
experience and an auditory experience
but these pain together my
phenomenological experience is just of
the one thing okay
in a way that for example if I'm walking
down the street with Alberto and I see
it and he hears it okay but I don't hear
it he doesn't see it
then these don't hang together there's
something about the way my auditory
experience and my visual experience hang
together what is it well you know we
know the answer to that from modern
theories of the brain when I see the motorbike
encountered in the part of my brain that
vision and visual cortex when I hear the
motor bike the information is encoded in
another cortex the auditory cortex and
those two cortices communicate with each
other to produce a multi-sensory
integrated a perception okay this is
what cognitive scientists will tell you now
Thanks
X so you can explain the integration
simply in terms of the cause or
functioning of your brain all right um
okay diachronic so this is over unity
over time so this can be past oriented
our future oriented past oriented and
yesterday I saw the motorbike today I
remember the motorbike okay I think
there's a connection um because there's
no connection for example between
Alberto seeing the motorbike yesterday
and my remembering it today okay
there is a connection between my seing
the motorbike yesterday and my remember
it today but again there's a perfectly
good neurological explanation of this
when I saw the motorbike the information
every name your limbic system and today
limbic system now okay so the
integration is explained by the neural
workings in my brain okay obviously
there's no similar integration between
your seeing the motor bike yesterday and
my remembering it today
okay future-oriented so tonight I go to
the restaurant and I have a drink and I
enjoy the drinks have another drink and
then I have another drink and tomorrow I
wake up with a hangover and a headache
and so on
now there's an obvious connection
between my pain tomorrow and my desire
to drink tonight in a way that there's
no connection between your desire to
drink tonight and any hangover that I
might have tomorrow okay well why so
well you know the answer is obvious okay
when I over drink tonight I drink too
much alcohol poisoning that the alcohol
is broken down in my liver to produce
byproducts which are kind of poisonous
and the body registers this by the
headache and maybe the nausea of this of
the hangover tomorrow so again the
connection between my actions today and
the consequence of tomorrow are
explained precisely by the neurological
connections in my brain so sure there is
a there is a unity that ties my
experiences together in a way that
doesn't tie my experiences in your
experiences together you do not need
itself to explain that it's explained in
purely quarters well if that's the best
you can do by an argument so pospos your
self have some explain for each function
okay stop - doesn't work so if that's
all right then we have no good reason
for believing there is itself and so
that opens right so we're talking like I said
said
there's no reason to believe exist you
shouldn't believe that you have so okay
that's the second of the second one so
the last part is reasonably short pieces
well we have a census of but there's no
self which we made sense self is an
illusion it's like you know the circle
of the moving things you see in the five
form it doesn't exist it's just an
illusion in the same way when you have a
sense of self that's the middle ocean
now delusions be very useful look in the
mirror I see something that's behind me
in front of me that's an illusion it's
something really in front of me but it's
very useful it allows me to see what's
behind me without so in my head so
illusions to be very useful and it may
well be that the illusion self is very
useful for evolutionary reasons it may
well be the creatures with a sense of
self are much more successful in
surviving long enough to pass on their
genes okay that's just a conjecture but
whether that's right or not yourself is
new of course it can be a very
persistent illusion the fact that you
know something is an illusion doesn't
forget whose evolution this is but what
you have is a bunch of life squares
white brute if you look at this one see
this no because it's a crappy diagram
right and you know it's an illusion
cause you know that this box really
aren't there but in fact um that you see
this is a function of a perfectly
normally operating brain it's an
illusion but you can't help seeing the
damn things so the fact that something
then it doesn't mean that you won't have
the experience of it and in the same way
it's very very hard to get rid of the
experience of a self even if you know it
is so Buddhists have this code of regime
of practices which helps you to sort of
stop having the experience of self we
want to go into that but the self if
that's right is a very persistent
illusion now that does not show that the
because after all when you have an
illogical acquaintance with something
just as well I'm thinking of Sherlock
Holmes I have this phenomenal option
acquaintance with something it's just
that that something does not exist okay
so when you had this experience of self
you have an experience of something
which does not exist so the self is this
object which you can add a
phenomenological acquaintance with just
as you can have a phenomenological
there are a number of content
cognitive scientists who have exactly
this view so perhaps one of the most
influential cognitive scientists of the
last 30 or 40 years is Dan Dennett okay
he has a number of books on
consciousness and this is a quotation
from one where he says exactly this
there is no single definitive stream of
consciousness because there's no central
headquarters no Cartesian theatre where
it all comes together for the perusal of
a central Meanor instead of such a
single stream however wide there are
multiple channels in which specialized
circuits try in parallel pandemonium's
to do their various things creating
multiple drafts okay so this is the loop
this is a reference back to something
you said earlier drafts of the self so
the brain creates a narrative about the
self okay so the brain is busy telling a
story about its experiences so it's not
only having experiences it's actually
telling itself a story about what's
going on and this story has the multiple
drafts you know the brain keeps revising
it so the multiple channels do their
various things creating multiple drafts
of a narrative of the self as they go
most of these fragmentary drafts are a
narrative place short-lived roles in the
modulation of current activity but some
get promoted to further functional roles
in Swift succession by the act so we're
back to the five phenomenon okay by the
activity of a virtual machine in the
brain bla bla bla bla bla okay so what
that it is saying is that the self is
not an illusory object it's not just a
non-existent object it's a fictional
object okay
it's a fictional object in a narrative
so the brain tells itself about itself
so the brain kind of wants to make sense
of what it is going on in the various
parts so it formulates a narrative
which includes the self said the self is
an object in the narrative the brain
tells about itself it's a fictional
object so what does that do to the other
objects of fiction
well look we know there can be fictions
within fictions this is not uncommon in
literature or drama so that in
Shakespeare's play Hamlet there's a
famous scene where Hamlet arranges for a
troop of players to come in and enact a
murder he wants to see how he thinks the
real murder will react so there's a play
within a play in Hamlet and in that play
the leader of the troupe actually plays
someone who's murdered that person is
called Gonzago
so Gonzago is a fictional character in
fact Gonzago is a fiction within a
fiction because already the plays are
fiction in Hamlet and Gonzaga is a
so frictions with infections are very
well known okay so what we've just seen
is that when a self appreciates a work
of fiction
then the are not just fictions they're
fictions within efficient so the brain
is creating a fiction the fiction
contains the self and the self is
reading this novel and in this novel
there are fictional objects
so these purely fictional objects are
fictions within a fiction so the bottom
line of this talk is as follows the self
is a purely fictional object which is
such that in the fiction it can grasp
other purely fictional objects namely
the objects that you and I read about in
works of fiction so remember where I
started the question was um in fiction
you've got these two poles the objects
of the work of fiction
and the self which appreciates these
objects are understands these objects of
grasp these objects what I've been
telling you is that the self is a purely
fictional object in a narrative
constructed by the brain and at least
purely fictional objects are also non
existent objects as is the self so the
self is a non-existent object which
features in a narrative told by the
brain about what's going on and in that
fictional narrative the brain tells
itself the
actually grasps other possibly
non-existent objects okay so you may not
agree with me you probably don't but
that's you can have your chance to you
know say why in a minute that's all I'm
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