0:08 so let me tell you what I want to talk
0:12 about let's suppose you read a a work of
0:16 fiction then in some undeniable sense
0:19 that there's a relationship between the
0:21 self that reads the fiction and the
0:25 objects of the fiction okay this is not
0:27 a high-powered theoretical cave this is
0:31 just a sort of common sense claim so
0:32 there's a relationship between the
0:35 subject and the objects of the fiction
0:38 okay now the most obvious thing about
0:41 the objects of the fiction is that at
0:44 least it would seem some of them don't
0:47 exist so Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist
0:51 in Puccini's opera butterfly does not
0:57 exist so at least prima facie many
1:02 objects of fiction do not exist yet many
1:03 people especially in the 20th century
1:06 many Anglo philosophers mid 20th century
1:08 I thought this year is crazy to say that
1:10 something doesn't exist we'll come to
1:14 why in a minute so the object pole is
1:18 problematic what about the subject pole
1:21 well whatever you say about the object
1:26 pole and you the subject seem to exist
1:32 but that's not been everybody's view so
1:35 for example a number of well most
1:37 Buddhist philosophers think that the
1:42 self does not exist so okay if some of
1:44 the objects of fiction don't exist
1:46 maybe the self that appreciates the
1:49 fiction doesn't exist either and we'll
1:52 look at that question too so what this
1:56 talk is about is a relationship between
1:59 the objects of fiction and the self that
2:02 appreciates the fiction so the talk has
2:04 two parts first of all I'll talk about
2:07 fictional objects and secondly I'll talk
2:10 about fictional subjects and then those
2:13 who read me long sections but the last
2:15 section is fairly short we'll put those
2:18 two things together and I'll spell out
2:22 the bottom line of the talk okay so
2:24 that's where we're going so first of all
2:28 fictional objects now let me start by
2:32 getting one thing straight straight away
2:36 some names which occur in works of
2:40 fiction if they refer to anything refer
2:41 to non-existent objects at least it
2:42 would appear so
2:46 so Holmes in the Conan Doyle novels
2:49 butterfly or cha-cha sang in the Puccini
2:54 Opera but many names that occur in
2:58 fiction in works of fiction do refer to
3:01 things that actually exist so for
3:04 example Holmes lives in Baker Street
3:08 butterfly live in Nagasaki and Baker
3:11 Street and Nagasaki are real places you
3:16 may have been to them okay so some names
3:19 that occur in a work of fiction actually
3:22 refer to real things things that do
3:27 exist now some people have doubted this
3:30 they think that when a name like Baker
3:33 Street occurs in conan doyle's fictions
3:36 the name refers not to the real Baker
3:40 Street but to some zetz some
3:43 doppelganger of Baker Street now this
3:48 this is not right look here's an
3:51 argument that's often given for why
3:53 Conan Doyle's Baker Street
3:55 can't be the real Baker Street because
3:58 um Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street
4:02 and no Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street
4:02 Street
4:05 now that's certainly true there was
4:10 never a short Holmes in Baker Street but
4:12 if shark Holmes really lived in Baker
4:14 Street then it seems that we have a
4:17 contradiction here
4:20 so if that's right then these can't be
4:22 about the same Baker Street they must be
4:24 about different Baker streets okay now
4:26 this is an argument that's often used
4:28 and it's wrong okay
4:33 the it's wrong because um Sherlock
4:35 Holmes lived in Baker Street is not true
4:39 okay what is true is in Doyle stories
4:43 Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street it
4:45 must be like that because otherwise you
4:48 could not say there is a place in London
4:50 such that in Doyle stories Holmes lived
4:54 there but no such detective actually
4:57 lives in it okay same there same it in
5:00 both places the fact that you can say
5:02 this and say this truly shows you that
5:05 the Baker Street in both of these things
5:09 is one in the same and it's also
5:11 important that these claims we make
5:14 about Sherlock Holmes are not literally
5:18 true what is literally true is what you
5:21 get when you prefix the sentence with
5:25 this operator embroil stories or in
5:28 Madame Butterfly or generally in a work
5:36 because remember when the Doyle wrote
5:39 the Holmes novels or Petrini
5:42 wrote Madame Butterfly he wasn't using
5:44 the world with a different meaning he
5:46 was using a word with exactly the same
5:49 meaning that you or I use he didn't
5:51 change the meaning so he didn't change
5:55 the reference either so Puccini is
5:57 talking about the same Nagasaki that was
6:01 incinerated by the Americans in 1945
6:03 he's just saying things about it with it
6:05 which are not literally true but they're
6:11 true in his opera okay why
6:14 well look there's a story called sylvans
6:20 blocks it's about an old friend of mine
6:22 Richard silver who died some 20 years
6:24 ago now one of the great Australian
6:28 philosophers it's a story many of the
6:30 things in the story out actually true
6:32 for example that Sylvan lived at a
6:36 farmhouse outside Canberra but it's a
6:38 story things happen in the story which
6:41 are not true in fact some of them are
6:45 not possible but the story is about
6:50 Richard Sylvan how do I know well
6:52 because I wrote the story and I was
6:57 referring to Richard okay so when names
7:00 like Richard Sylvan occur in a work of
7:02 fiction they can refer to the actual
7:07 person Richard silver if
7:09 you have any further doubts just think
7:14 of this if names like Baker Street and
7:19 Nagasaki changed their referent then you
7:21 better hold it that thing's worse than
7:26 other words change the reference to in
7:29 is happy okay this is crazy if those
7:31 words change their meaning
7:33 then you wouldn't understand the story okay
7:34 okay
7:37 so words do not change their meaning
7:39 April - you're right they do not change
7:42 their denotation in words in works of fiction
7:43 fiction
7:49 so in works of fiction some names refer
7:54 to actual objects and some names don't okay
7:55 okay
7:59 so here's a piece of terminology if a
8:01 name occurs in a work of fiction I'll
8:06 call it a fictional name and if a
8:07 fictional Lane doesn't refer to an
8:09 existing object I'll call it purely fictional
8:16 so what we're concerned with is the
8:25 we want to investigate how they behave
8:28 well look a purely fictional name either
8:34 refers or it doesn't and if it refers it
8:36 refers to something that either exists
8:39 or doesn't so we have three
8:42 possibilities the first is that it
8:44 doesn't refer the second is that it
8:48 refers to something existent the third
8:49 is that it refers to something
8:52 non-existent now I'm going to consider
8:56 those three possibilities and spoiler
8:58 alert I'm going to argue for the last of
9:00 these that the name refers to things
9:06 which don't exist okay so let's consider
9:09 the first possibility namely that names
9:12 and fiction purely fictional names do
9:17 think that's right you have a real
9:20 problem because we make lots of true
9:24 claims which use names which are purely
9:28 fictional so um this might be the first
9:30 example that occurs two homes lived in
9:32 Baker Street that's not true I've
9:35 explained that so I'm not talking about
9:40 this homes doesn't exist I'm not talking
9:44 about that either because there's a way
9:46 you can do your logic it's called free
9:48 logic in such a way that if this name
9:53 does not denote then our homes exist is
9:58 false so it's negation is true so these
9:59 are some bodies called negative
10:03 existential you can hunt on negative x
10:05 essentials without assuming that the
10:07 name refers okay so I'm not talking
10:09 about these what am I talking about well
10:12 things like in Doyle stories Holmes
10:15 lived in Baker Street that's true in
10:16 Greek myths Zeus
10:22 how do you account for the truth of
10:27 these things if these names do not refer
10:32 to anything okay so there's a well-known
10:35 problem here about how you understand
10:39 truth in fiction so you can understand
10:44 by that things like this perhaps the
10:46 most popular account is David Lewis's
10:49 who said that what makes it the case
10:52 that in Doyle stories Holmes lived in
10:55 Baker Street well that's true because in
10:58 those worlds which realize the Doyle
11:01 stories it's true that Holmes lived in
11:04 Baker Street and Holmes actually refers
11:07 to an object that exists in those worlds
11:08 doesn't exist in this world
11:13 but exists in those worlds but think
11:16 about it if that's your line then the
11:19 name Holmes refers to a non-existent
11:21 object it exists in other worlds it
11:24 doesn't exist in this world so this is
11:28 not a case of the name not referring
11:32 okay well okay there's a lot to be said
11:39 that's not the only example because we
11:43 make lots of true statements about using
11:45 purely fictional names which don't use
11:47 this operator in Doyle stories agree
11:49 with objects and so here's a bunch
11:52 Holmes is a purely fictional detective
11:54 Holmes were smarter than the Inspector Clouseau
11:54 Clouseau
11:57 Inspector Clouseau is is per the idiot
12:00 of a policeman that occurs in the Pink
12:03 Panther films these are very old now but
12:06 okay they're quite funny um okay so
12:08 Holmes is really smart Inspector
12:10 Clouseau an idiot okay all right so
12:12 Holmes is smarter than expected closer
12:16 and the Homeric Greeks worships use okay
12:20 so all of these things are true now I
12:23 mean how do you normally account for the
12:26 truth of a subject predicate sentence or
12:29 an atomic census well a subject
12:32 predicate sentence is true just if the
12:34 subject the grammatical subject refers
12:37 to an object the predicate refers to a
12:41 property and the object actually has
12:47 that property okay if you think that
12:49 these are true and if you think that the
12:54 names Holmes and Zeus don't refer to
12:56 anything you cannot do this
13:00 okay so these cannot mean what they say
13:04 literally okay now everything I'm
13:07 talking about has a big literature and
13:11 what many philosophers will try to do at
13:13 this point is say well you know you've
13:15 got a paraphrase these away they don't
13:16 really mean what they say they mean
13:20 something else so there might be a bunch
13:21 of ways in which you can try to
13:24 paraphrase these claims I'm not going to
13:27 consider any examples because there
13:31 isn't any time let me just put it like
13:36 this resorting to paraphrase is always a
13:38 strategy that you have to Lou to use
13:47 so sometimes you have to but it's better
13:51 not to if you don't have to okay so
13:53 that's all I'm going to say about the
13:55 first case namely that purely fictional
14:00 names do not refer so let's move to the
14:04 second possibility this is the
14:06 possibility that purely fictional names
14:09 do refer but they refer to something
14:14 existent okay which sounds a bit strange
14:16 but some people have suggested this like
14:21 Saul Kripke Amy Thomason okay so if
14:23 purely fictional names refer to
14:26 something that exists what what sorts of
14:29 things they refer to well there are two
14:32 plausible candidates one is mental
14:34 representations and one is abstract
14:38 objects so in the Locke lectures for
14:42 example so quickly suggest that purely
14:43 fictional names wrote may refer to
14:46 abstract objects they're abstract
14:47 objects that we've brought into
14:51 existence by it and a writer or an
14:54 author but they're abstract objects the
14:56 other possibility which is perhaps the
14:57 first one that would occur to you is
15:00 that purely fictional names refer to
15:04 mental representations now I'm ending
15:06 answer about one of these because you'll
15:09 see that there are real problems I'm not
15:10 going to talk about the other because
15:14 exactly the same problems arise so once
15:15 you've seen the problems with this guy
15:19 then you can extrapolate and you can
15:20 figure out what the problems for the
15:25 other account is so let's consider the
15:29 possibility that purely non-existent
15:32 names refer to mental representations
15:35 okay now there's an obvious problem with
15:41 this straight away so suppose that the
15:43 name Holmes proposed to a mental
15:47 representation okay
15:49 Holmes is smarter than any actual
15:51 detective let's suppose that's true
15:55 okay that's a category mistake mental
15:57 representations are not the kinds of
16:00 things that can be smarter okay people
16:03 are smarter than other people so there's
16:05 immediately a problem with this because
16:08 you've got a bunch of category mistakes
16:15 in the true things that we say okay next problem
16:15 problem
16:18 ah no one really thinks that Sherlock
16:21 Holmes exists okay if you do you have
16:23 mistaken a work of fiction for a work
16:27 effect so um if Holmes refers to an
16:30 existent metal representation Holmes
16:36 does exist okay so when you say sherlock
16:38 holmes doesn't exist you cannot mean it
16:39 doesn't exist you've got to mean
16:41 something else
16:47 well maybe exists outside the mind so
16:49 when I say Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist
16:51 because I'm referring to a metal
16:54 representation what I'm referring to one
16:55 what I mean is that Sherlock Holmes
16:58 doesn't exist outside the mind Sherlock
17:02 Holmes exists merely in my mind okay but
17:03 that doesn't seem to work either
17:07 look plato existed but as use does not
17:12 that's true so this is a contrast and
17:15 what it is that I'm saying of Plato I'm
17:20 denying as use so in a bit of logical
17:23 notation there's some property such that
17:26 Plato hasn't has it and youth doesn't so
17:28 when I say that this youth doesn't exist
17:30 I mean doesn't exist in the same way
17:34 that Plato did exist I don't mean didn't
17:39 exist outside the mind um okay
17:43 one more argument let's suppose I write
17:47 a work of fiction and in it I tell a
17:54 I then wonder whether that mental state
17:56 actually exists so let's call this the
17:59 mental state s okay so I wonder where
18:02 that s exists and then I do my research
18:05 into the psychological literature and I
18:08 find that there's no such thing as yes s
18:17 so the word s refers to what mental
18:21 representation and I've just discovered
18:23 that the mental reputation that mental
18:25 representation doesn't exist I doesn't
18:28 exist outside the mind but I never
18:30 thought it did okay I will talk about a
18:32 mental state I never thought that it
18:35 existed outside the mind okay so this is
18:42 crazy okay so those are objections to
18:45 the assumption that purely fictional
18:47 names refer to mental representation
18:50 once you've seen the arguments you can
18:52 sort of Twigg them to get exactly the
18:56 same arguments against the view that
18:58 purely fictional names refer to abstract
19:02 objects so I won't go through that um so
19:08 here's another piece of terminology I'm
19:11 going to call an object fictional if it
19:15 occurs in a work of fiction so before we
19:17 talk about names right now I'm talking
19:19 about objects so an object it's
19:21 fictional if it occurs in a work of
19:24 fiction and a fictional object is purely
19:29 fictional if it doesn't exist so I told
19:30 you there were three possibilities
19:33 either purely fictional names do not
19:38 refer or they refer to things that exist
19:40 or they refer to things that don't exist
19:43 so I'm going to consider now that third
19:46 possibility and I'm going to call an
19:51 object purely fictional if it's causing
19:53 the work of fiction and it doesn't exist
19:57 now what we've seen is that the first
20:01 two possibilities namely that a purely
20:04 fictional name doesn't refer or it
20:06 refers to something existent are fraught
20:12 with problems okay so why would you buy
20:13 into those if you can do something much
20:17 more sensible and the sensible thing is
20:20 to suppose that these names refer they
20:24 just refer to non-existent things
20:27 then you can say everything you want to
20:31 about them you can say for example that
20:36 homes are let's say Zeus lived on Mount
20:41 Olympus in the Greek myths because Zeus
20:44 refers to a particular non-existent
20:46 object and in the myths well that's
20:53 say that Jesus does not exist it
20:55 existence is a perfectly ordinary
20:59 property and youth does not have it all
21:01 right so you can do just the
21:14 philosophy of language in the 20th
21:18 century maybe not to other people
21:24 however um the story involves this guy
21:26 William Van Orman Quine
21:34 and Klein published a paper in 1948 on
21:38 what there is and he trashed the idea of
21:42 non existent objects okay he the paper
21:44 is full of rhetoric rather than arguing
21:47 but he argued that it was crazy to
21:49 suppose there are non existent objects
21:52 and I think that view is starting to
22:10 so so you know why did Quine save us
22:14 well if you read the paper wines and
22:17 main argument is an argument by
22:23 exclusion so he says well look how do
22:26 you express existence
22:28 you can't existence you can't use it
22:30 with names because you can get rid of
22:31 those with Russell's fear of deaf descriptions
22:32 descriptions
22:34 you can't express existence with a
22:45 what's left quantifiers okay so when you
22:49 say some what you mean is some existent
22:52 that's all you've got left okay now this
22:59 is this is crazy okay look um some
23:01 things don't exist like father Christmas
23:03 serious butterfly this is a perfectly
23:07 ordinary sentence of English translation
23:09 Italian it's perfectly ordinary Italians
23:13 Henderson is true okay oh I've wanted to
23:14 buy you something for Christmas but I
23:16 found that it doesn't exist
23:19 maybe Sherlock Holmes is a magnifying glass
23:19 glass
23:25 okay if some made some existent these
23:27 will be contradictory patently they're not
23:34 so okay what's wrong with Quinn's
23:37 argument well as I said it's an argument
23:43 by exhaustion can't be mr. quantifier
23:48 some now the most obvious thing if you
23:50 think about it is that Quine does not
23:54 consider in the most natural way of
23:58 saying that something exists namely to
24:02 use the monadic predicate exists right
24:05 so when I say Nagasaki exists and
24:07 Lilliput are placing Gulliver's Travels
24:12 doesn't exist then I'm referring to
24:15 those places and applying the monadic
24:19 predicate of existence so why doesn't
24:23 Quine consider this possibility which is
24:27 the obvious one well I think probably
24:29 this is the influence of Russell
24:34 so in 1918 Russell published his
24:37 lectures on logical atomism
24:40 and what are your views in those
24:43 lectures is that exists is not a monadic
24:49 predicate rather exists is the second
24:52 order predicate you can only apply it to
24:55 another predicate like cat okay to say
24:57 that cats exist is to say that some
25:01 things are cats so if it's a predicate
25:04 of predicate it makes no sense to apply
25:05 two proper names
25:08 that's Russell's argument okay this this
25:13 view is also crazy look I used to
25:15 believe that Holmes exists when I was a
25:17 kid and then I learnt that he doesn't
25:19 know what I believed on what I learnt
25:23 those were meaningless hardly I mean
25:31 all right so Russell I mean you know has
25:33 his reasons or at least has his
25:36 arguments and in the lectures on logical optimism
25:44 of arguments as to why existence is a
25:47 second order predicate and they are
25:51 absolutely frightful okay go read it
25:55 paying to make and I'm not going to
26:01 defend it here unless you in the book
26:05 that Alberto referred to towards not
26:06 being there is an analysis of Russell's
26:08 arguments and they really are terrible
26:12 arguments okay okay
26:17 last thing on existence sometimes the
26:19 view that existence is not a predicate
26:25 is sheeted back to Kant in his remarks
26:27 on the ontological argument in the first
26:31 critique this is a misreading of Kent
26:34 Kent does not say that existence is not
26:39 a predicate existence cannot is a
26:42 perfectly meaningful monadic predicate
26:44 for Kent it has to be because it's one
26:46 of these categories namely the category
26:49 of reality what can't actually say some
26:53 can go away read it is that existence is
26:56 not a determining predicate just in
26:59 normal so
27:00 prayer is a perfectly fine predicate
27:03 it's not determining or what he means by
27:07 that is that to say that something is a
27:10 cat is exactly the same as say if an
27:11 existing cat
27:14 okay so existence adds nothing new
27:17 that's what he means but it's a
27:20 perfectly legitimate pretty now when our
27:22 existence is merely a determining
27:24 predicate well that's another matter
27:37 existence is a perfectly meaningful
27:41 monadic predicate and you can use it to
27:47 that butter you
27:55 look at the properties of nonexistent
27:59 objects so the sorts of properties that
28:01 non existent objects have well there can
28:03 be status properties like this Holmes is
28:06 a possible object sylvans box is an
28:08 impossible object serpent's box is an
28:11 object from the story intentional
28:13 properties such as use was worshipped by
28:16 the Greeks our little Johnny kid next
28:18 door three fears golem
28:20 but the ones that really interested are
28:23 things like this today Holmes lived in
28:25 Baker Street that's not true I told you
28:26 that okay
28:30 but in Doyle stories Holmes lived in
28:30 Baker Street
28:34 that's a property of Holmes not living
28:36 in Baker Street but living in Baker
28:40 Street in Doyle stories similarly in
28:42 Silver's box priest finds an empty box
28:46 that has something in it okay it's not
28:47 actually true that priest found a box
28:49 was empty and had something in it but
28:54 it's true of the empty box has some in
28:57 it that priest found it in sylvans story
29:04 okay so a very important species of
29:07 properties of non existent objects is
29:10 precisely that the ones they have in the
29:14 work of fiction okay so I'm going to
29:22 all right so so much for the first part
29:32 purely fictional names do exactly what
29:36 naively you think they do they refer to
29:40 non-existent objects the existence is a
29:48 the fictional purely fictional objects
29:50 may or may not have the properties that
29:54 they are said to have but and they
29:56 certainly have the properties in the
29:57 work of fiction
30:01 okay so let's turn to the second part of
30:04 the talk and this is about not the
30:06 object of the fiction but the self that
30:11 appreciates the work of fiction so let
30:16 me clarify one thing to start with a
30:19 person is a biological entity you and I
30:24 are people okay a self in the sense that
30:28 I'm going to use the word is a part of
30:32 the person which exists while the person
30:35 exists is constant and defines the
30:39 person as that person that's what I mean
30:48 okay so yourself is your if you like
30:55 your essential you and what I'm going to
30:59 argue in this part of the talk is the
31:07 self does not exist okay now it
31:11 certainly appears that it does we have a
31:15 sense of self okay so we certainly seem
31:19 to have a sense of something so when you
31:22 wake up in the morning so almost a
31:24 little voice comes on at the back here
31:26 by and say hello back again right it's
31:30 me okay this is a sense of self or if
31:33 you want to put it in Teutonic terms you
31:34 can do it like
31:37 okay every thought is accompanied by an
31:40 I think if King if zdenka okay which
31:45 provides the synthetic unity of a
31:48 priority to be experience okay in other
31:50 words you know it's a self which kind of
31:56 binds on okay so we certainly have a
32:02 sense of self but do we have a self well
32:08 we know the brain plays tricks okay so
32:12 there's the blind spot phenomenon you're
32:15 probably familiar with this so
32:18 at the back of your eyeball there's a
32:21 place where the optic nerve joins the
32:25 retina and where that happens there are
32:28 no rods no cones no no nerve cells which
32:32 ridge the light falling on them so if
32:34 light falls on the blind spot you can't
32:41 now and if you will work very hard you
32:43 can actually manipulate yourself into
32:45 seeing the blind spot of not seeing the
32:48 blinds by suppose but we don't normally
32:50 see the blind spot why not
32:53 it's cause the brain is very clever and
32:58 the brain fills in gaps so the brain
33:00 says oh well I can't really see what's
33:01 there but you look so it's going to be
33:03 this so it must be that and that's what
33:06 you see okay the brains really good at
33:08 filling in gaps here's another example
33:12 it's called the r5 phenomenon you may
33:14 not have heard of this before but it's
33:17 what you use to make movie films okay
33:20 here's a very simple example sometimes
33:22 you see some neon lights maybe the
33:25 cinema or a restaurant and in fact
33:30 there's what there is is a sequence of
33:34 bulbs globes okay and what they do is
33:37 they flash each one flashes but they're
33:45 flashes there very soon as this one
33:47 flashes if you look at this what you
33:52 will see is something moving I'm sure you
34:25 it's not an argument it's just a
34:29 question okay so the thought is this may
34:33 be sure you have a sense of self but the
34:46 now this view may sound rather strange
34:49 the 20th century but in fact it's a very
34:52 standard of you in Buddhist philosophy
34:55 so Buddhism arises in the fifth century
34:59 BCE and it makes two major breaks with
35:02 the general Indian culture of the time
35:05 Hinduism the first that in Buddhism
35:09 there is no God in Hinduism areas the
35:11 second is the in Buddhism there is no
35:14 self in Hinduism there is so the
35:17 Buddhists believe that there is no self
35:21 and the Buddhist philosophers were very
35:24 smart they gave a number of arguments
35:33 for this so let's so let me see what
35:36 reasons might you have for supposing
35:38 there's our self
35:42 well reasons for the existence of
35:44 something can be of two kinds
35:46 observational I can see it or
35:51 inferential I can infer it okay so some
35:54 things I know to exist because I can see
35:58 them for example you some things I can't
36:01 see but I infer that they exist because
36:03 that provides a good explanation of the
36:08 things that I do see like quarks like
36:12 black holes like dark matter so if
36:14 there's a good reason for supposing that
36:16 the self exists it's got to be one or
36:20 other of those and the Buddhists had
36:22 argument against both of these
36:25 possibilities perhaps the most extensive
36:28 discussion is by a Buddhist philosopher
36:30 called rasa bando in about the 4th
36:33 century I'm going to update it a bit
36:36 just to make it a bit more intelligible
36:38 so two possibilities observation
36:42 inference let's start with observation
36:45 can you observe yourself my
36:48 introspection okay and the answer was
36:53 already given to that by the 18th
36:56 century philosopher David Hume sometimes
36:58 it's said that Hume has a very similar
37:00 view of herself and Buddhists I'm
37:01 telling it's probably true
37:03 although the Buddhists had it 2,000
37:07 years before so this is this is David
37:09 Hume there are some philosophers who
37:12 imagined that we are every moment
37:15 intimately conscious of what we call
37:19 ourself that we feel its existence and
37:22 its continuance in existence and we are
37:24 certain beyond the evidence of
37:26 demonstration both of its perfect
37:30 identity and its simplicity the
37:33 strongest sensation the most violent
37:36 passions so they instead of distracting
37:38 us from this view only fix it them more
37:41 intensely and make us consider their
37:44 influence on self either by their pain
37:50 or their pleasure but from my part when
37:52 I enter most intimately into what I call
37:55 myself I always stumble on some
37:58 particular perception or other a heat or cold
37:59 cold
38:01 lighter shade love or hatred plain dull
38:04 pleasure I can never catch myself at any
38:07 time without a perception never can
38:10 observe anything but the perception if
38:13 anyone upon Sirius and unprejudiced
38:15 reflection thinks that he has a
38:17 different notion of himself
38:19 I must confess I can no longer reason
38:23 with him all I can allow him is that he
38:25 may be in the right as well as I and
38:27 that we are centrally different in this
38:30 particular he may perhaps perceive
38:32 something simple and continues which he
38:35 calls himself though I'm certain there
38:38 is no such principle in me um but it
38:40 setting aside some meta position of this
38:41 kind okay
38:44 Humes not serious he doesn't really
38:45 think there are other people which
38:47 perceives themselves this is just human
38:49 irony right
38:52 setting aside some medication of meta
38:54 vision of this kind I may venture to
38:56 affirm of the rest of mankind that's all
38:58 of us really that they are nothing but a
39:00 bundle or collection of different
39:03 perceptions which succeed each other
39:07 with an inconceivable rapidity and are
39:09 in perpetual flexion movement so things
39:12 like the lights in the five phenomenon
39:17 okay well what Hume is pointing out is
39:21 that you cannot perceive yourself human
39:23 empiricist and he thinks that that gives
39:25 you reason suppose itself does exist but
39:27 that was the 18th century we know better
39:28 now because there's the other
39:30 possibility name means that we can infer
39:35 herself even though we can't see it so
39:44 from what okay well we're postulating
39:48 something right like dark matter or
39:51 strings in string theory and when we
39:54 postulate things what gives us reason to
39:56 believe they exist is precisely that
39:58 they serve some explanatory function
40:01 they can explain something then we can't
40:06 otherwise explain so the next question
40:11 is what is it that the self is supposed
40:13 to explain that you can't explain
40:16 without postulating the self well I
40:18 guess there could be a number of answers
40:25 but as cancer it it's the self that
40:28 holds all your perceptions together and
40:31 provides the unity the a priori
40:34 synthetic unity or a perception so in
40:38 other words look some mental states hang
40:42 together like mine okay like yours the
40:44 some mental states like yours and mine
40:48 don't hang together so there's something
40:51 which holds my mental states together
40:54 which doesn't hold yours and mine
40:58 together what can that be okay and the
41:00 thought is well it's the self the self
41:02 is kind of what all the mental states
41:06 kind of fixed to and join them together
41:09 now exactly how the self does that is
41:11 not entirely obvious can't
41:15 notwithstanding but the question is can
41:18 you explain the unity of thoughts or
41:21 experiences without the self and the
41:23 answer is yes you can and this is
41:29 pointed out by Vasu band oh look the
41:32 unity of our experiences is both sync
41:35 run synchronic and diachronic okay and diachronic
41:36 diachronic
41:38 pulls into passed on to orientate in the
41:40 future order so let's consider these two
41:44 things so synchronic at the same time so
41:49 I'm walking down the street and I fear
41:52 but motorbike go past and I hear a
41:55 motorbike go past so I have a visual
41:58 experience and an auditory experience
42:01 but these pain together my
42:03 phenomenological experience is just of
42:05 the one thing okay
42:07 in a way that for example if I'm walking
42:10 down the street with Alberto and I see
42:13 it and he hears it okay but I don't hear
42:14 it he doesn't see it
42:17 then these don't hang together there's
42:19 something about the way my auditory
42:22 experience and my visual experience hang
42:24 together what is it well you know we
42:27 know the answer to that from modern
42:30 theories of the brain when I see the motorbike
42:36 encountered in the part of my brain that
42:39 vision and visual cortex when I hear the
42:42 motor bike the information is encoded in
42:45 another cortex the auditory cortex and
42:47 those two cortices communicate with each
42:50 other to produce a multi-sensory
42:52 integrated a perception okay this is
42:54 what cognitive scientists will tell you now
43:06 Thanks
43:09 X so you can explain the integration
43:11 simply in terms of the cause or
43:14 functioning of your brain all right um
43:17 okay diachronic so this is over unity
43:20 over time so this can be past oriented
43:27 our future oriented past oriented and
43:31 yesterday I saw the motorbike today I
43:33 remember the motorbike okay I think
43:37 there's a connection um because there's
43:38 no connection for example between
43:40 Alberto seeing the motorbike yesterday
43:42 and my remembering it today okay
43:44 there is a connection between my seing
43:46 the motorbike yesterday and my remember
43:49 it today but again there's a perfectly
43:51 good neurological explanation of this
43:55 when I saw the motorbike the information
44:04 every name your limbic system and today
44:14 limbic system now okay so the
44:17 integration is explained by the neural
44:20 workings in my brain okay obviously
44:22 there's no similar integration between
44:24 your seeing the motor bike yesterday and
44:27 my remembering it today
44:31 okay future-oriented so tonight I go to
44:34 the restaurant and I have a drink and I
44:36 enjoy the drinks have another drink and
44:39 then I have another drink and tomorrow I
44:40 wake up with a hangover and a headache
44:42 and so on
44:45 now there's an obvious connection
44:47 between my pain tomorrow and my desire
44:52 to drink tonight in a way that there's
44:55 no connection between your desire to
44:57 drink tonight and any hangover that I
45:02 might have tomorrow okay well why so
45:04 well you know the answer is obvious okay
45:08 when I over drink tonight I drink too
45:11 much alcohol poisoning that the alcohol
45:13 is broken down in my liver to produce
45:15 byproducts which are kind of poisonous
45:19 and the body registers this by the
45:21 headache and maybe the nausea of this of
45:25 the hangover tomorrow so again the
45:29 connection between my actions today and
45:31 the consequence of tomorrow are
45:36 explained precisely by the neurological
45:40 connections in my brain so sure there is
45:43 a there is a unity that ties my
45:46 experiences together in a way that
45:48 doesn't tie my experiences in your
45:50 experiences together you do not need
45:53 itself to explain that it's explained in
45:57 purely quarters well if that's the best
46:01 you can do by an argument so pospos your
46:04 self have some explain for each function
46:09 okay stop - doesn't work so if that's
46:16 all right then we have no good reason
46:19 for believing there is itself and so
46:21 that opens right so we're talking like I said
46:21 said
46:24 there's no reason to believe exist you
46:26 shouldn't believe that you have so okay
46:31 that's the second of the second one so
46:35 the last part is reasonably short pieces
46:58 well we have a census of but there's no
47:02 self which we made sense self is an
47:04 illusion it's like you know the circle
47:07 of the moving things you see in the five
47:12 form it doesn't exist it's just an
47:16 illusion in the same way when you have a
47:19 sense of self that's the middle ocean
47:25 now delusions be very useful look in the
47:28 mirror I see something that's behind me
47:30 in front of me that's an illusion it's
47:32 something really in front of me but it's
47:35 very useful it allows me to see what's
47:38 behind me without so in my head so
47:42 illusions to be very useful and it may
47:46 well be that the illusion self is very
47:49 useful for evolutionary reasons it may
47:51 well be the creatures with a sense of
47:56 self are much more successful in
47:58 surviving long enough to pass on their
48:01 genes okay that's just a conjecture but
48:04 whether that's right or not yourself is
48:06 new of course it can be a very
48:09 persistent illusion the fact that you
48:11 know something is an illusion doesn't
48:27 forget whose evolution this is but what
48:33 you have is a bunch of life squares
48:39 white brute if you look at this one see
48:41 this no because it's a crappy diagram
48:53 right and you know it's an illusion
48:55 cause you know that this box really
48:58 aren't there but in fact um that you see
49:00 this is a function of a perfectly
49:03 normally operating brain it's an
49:05 illusion but you can't help seeing the
49:09 damn things so the fact that something
49:17 then it doesn't mean that you won't have
49:20 the experience of it and in the same way
49:23 it's very very hard to get rid of the
49:26 experience of a self even if you know it
49:29 is so Buddhists have this code of regime
49:32 of practices which helps you to sort of
49:35 stop having the experience of self we
49:38 want to go into that but the self if
49:41 that's right is a very persistent
49:47 illusion now that does not show that the
49:55 because after all when you have an
50:03 illogical acquaintance with something
50:05 just as well I'm thinking of Sherlock
50:07 Holmes I have this phenomenal option
50:09 acquaintance with something it's just
50:13 that that something does not exist okay
50:15 so when you had this experience of self
50:18 you have an experience of something
50:22 which does not exist so the self is this
50:25 object which you can add a
50:27 phenomenological acquaintance with just
50:28 as you can have a phenomenological
50:43 there are a number of content
50:46 cognitive scientists who have exactly
50:48 this view so perhaps one of the most
50:51 influential cognitive scientists of the
50:54 last 30 or 40 years is Dan Dennett okay
50:56 he has a number of books on
50:59 consciousness and this is a quotation
51:01 from one where he says exactly this
51:05 there is no single definitive stream of
51:07 consciousness because there's no central
51:10 headquarters no Cartesian theatre where
51:13 it all comes together for the perusal of
51:16 a central Meanor instead of such a
51:18 single stream however wide there are
51:20 multiple channels in which specialized
51:23 circuits try in parallel pandemonium's
51:26 to do their various things creating
51:30 multiple drafts okay so this is the loop
51:31 this is a reference back to something
51:34 you said earlier drafts of the self so
51:38 the brain creates a narrative about the
51:41 self okay so the brain is busy telling a
51:46 story about its experiences so it's not
51:48 only having experiences it's actually
51:49 telling itself a story about what's
51:53 going on and this story has the multiple
51:55 drafts you know the brain keeps revising
52:03 it so the multiple channels do their
52:05 various things creating multiple drafts
52:08 of a narrative of the self as they go
52:10 most of these fragmentary drafts are a
52:12 narrative place short-lived roles in the
52:15 modulation of current activity but some
52:17 get promoted to further functional roles
52:20 in Swift succession by the act so we're
52:23 back to the five phenomenon okay by the
52:25 activity of a virtual machine in the
52:31 brain bla bla bla bla bla okay so what
52:37 that it is saying is that the self is
52:39 not an illusory object it's not just a
52:41 non-existent object it's a fictional
52:42 object okay
52:46 it's a fictional object in a narrative
52:49 so the brain tells itself about itself
52:52 so the brain kind of wants to make sense
52:53 of what it is going on in the various
52:57 parts so it formulates a narrative
53:03 which includes the self said the self is
53:07 an object in the narrative the brain
53:10 tells about itself it's a fictional
53:17 object so what does that do to the other
53:18 objects of fiction
53:24 well look we know there can be fictions
53:28 within fictions this is not uncommon in
53:31 literature or drama so that in
53:35 Shakespeare's play Hamlet there's a
53:39 famous scene where Hamlet arranges for a
53:42 troop of players to come in and enact a
53:46 murder he wants to see how he thinks the
53:50 real murder will react so there's a play
53:55 within a play in Hamlet and in that play
53:59 the leader of the troupe actually plays
54:01 someone who's murdered that person is
54:03 called Gonzago
54:07 so Gonzago is a fictional character in
54:10 fact Gonzago is a fiction within a
54:14 fiction because already the plays are
54:18 fiction in Hamlet and Gonzaga is a
54:25 so frictions with infections are very
54:31 well known okay so what we've just seen
54:38 is that when a self appreciates a work
54:39 of fiction
54:47 then the are not just fictions they're
54:51 fictions within efficient so the brain
54:54 is creating a fiction the fiction
54:57 contains the self and the self is
54:59 reading this novel and in this novel
55:01 there are fictional objects
55:05 so these purely fictional objects are
55:13 fictions within a fiction so the bottom
55:16 line of this talk is as follows the self
55:21 is a purely fictional object which is
55:25 such that in the fiction it can grasp
55:28 other purely fictional objects namely
55:30 the objects that you and I read about in
55:36 works of fiction so remember where I
55:40 started the question was um in fiction
55:43 you've got these two poles the objects
55:44 of the work of fiction
55:48 and the self which appreciates these
55:50 objects are understands these objects of
55:54 grasp these objects what I've been
55:57 telling you is that the self is a purely
55:59 fictional object in a narrative
56:04 constructed by the brain and at least
56:07 purely fictional objects are also non
56:13 existent objects as is the self so the
56:15 self is a non-existent object which
56:19 features in a narrative told by the
56:22 brain about what's going on and in that
56:24 fictional narrative the brain tells
56:29 itself the
56:33 actually grasps other possibly
56:38 non-existent objects okay so you may not
56:40 agree with me you probably don't but
56:42 that's you can have your chance to you
56:44 know say why in a minute that's all I'm