0:01 There's a myth about Russia that I've
0:04 been hearing for a very long time and
0:06 it's an aspect of the overall myth of
0:09 Russian invincibility. The idea that
0:12 Russia is an undefeatable nation, that
0:15 Russian people are so resilient, so
0:17 strong in the face of hardship, that
0:19 nothing could ever be bad enough for
0:21 them to actually quit or actually
0:24 surrender or actually demand changes.
0:26 And the aspect of this myth that I want
0:28 to explore today is something that's
0:30 repeated a lot when people say that
0:33 Ukrainian strikes can never actually be
0:34 successful in breaking the will of the
0:36 Russian people or making the Russian
0:39 people frustrated enough to actually
0:40 demand changes from their own
0:42 government. This conversation is very
0:44 important to have today because
0:46 currently Ukraine is actively striking
0:48 Russian infrastructure targets primarily
0:50 energy targets but also other sorts of
0:52 targets trying to make the Russian
0:54 people actually feel the weight of the
0:56 war in a way they never have before.
0:58 Right now there are massive gasoline
0:59 shortages throughout Russia and some
1:01 people are having to wait in line for up
1:04 to 8 hours just to get a 2 L ration of
1:06 gasoline. There are other problems
1:09 across Russia. There are problems with
1:11 air transit as Russian airports are
1:13 constantly being shut down and Russia is
1:15 about to enter the winter where they are
1:17 having massive energy shortages already
1:20 which could create severe problems. What
1:22 we need to examine though is if there's
1:24 even a point to all of this. Can these
1:27 types of attacks actually be successful?
1:29 Can Ukraine successfully change the
1:31 minds of the Russian people and turn
1:33 their attitude away from supporting the
1:36 war and towards demanding an end to the
1:38 war? On the surface, you would think the
1:39 answers to these questions would be
1:41 obvious, especially when you consider
1:42 the scale of the carnage that Ukraine is
1:44 able to inflict upon the Russian
1:46 economy. The fact that that carnage is
1:47 being sustained for a long period of
1:49 time, and the fact that that carnage is
1:52 getting worse, not getting better. Even
1:54 in Western societies, in response to
1:57 very minor things like minor rises in
2:00 gas prices or minor rises in egg prices,
2:02 you will often see people emotionally
2:05 demanding immediate political change.
2:06 And my point is not to say that all of
2:08 those things are completely irrelevant,
2:10 but when you consider the scale of those
2:12 things and how much they impact people's
2:13 lives compared to the scale of things
2:15 that people in Russia are experiencing,
2:17 it would seem obvious that any human
2:20 being would have a strong reaction to
2:22 this kind of pressure. However, in
2:25 Russia's case, people will plead to
2:27 social differences and they will
2:28 actually do something that is called
2:30 special pleading where they will argue
2:33 that Russia's case is special, that
2:35 Russia is not subject to the same
2:37 economic rules or the same psychological
2:39 rules that apply to everybody else
2:41 because Russia has such a history of
2:43 hardship that these things just don't
2:45 apply. However, as you'll see in this
2:47 video, that understanding of Russian
2:50 society is completely wrong. And we can
2:52 know it's completely wrong for several
2:54 reasons. First of all, because the
2:56 Russian government has done everything
2:58 they can to make the Russian people feel
3:00 like they are not actually undergoing
3:03 hardship or if they are, that it's much
3:05 worse in other countries. And second of
3:07 all, we can know that it's not true
3:09 because all of these conclusions are
3:11 based on a very selective understanding
3:13 of Russian history. A lot of people make
3:15 the mistake of looking at Russian
3:17 history and pointing out the hardships,
3:19 but neglecting to point out the
3:21 revolutions that came in response to
3:23 those hardships. For example, people
3:24 will point out that the Russians lived
3:27 under the Zars, who were just absolutely
3:28 brutal. And they'll say, "Well, they're
3:30 used to living under the Zars. They will
3:32 tolerate just about anything." And
3:34 they'll also say, "Well, the Russians
3:36 lived under the Soviet Union, and they
3:38 experienced so many terrible aspects of
3:40 the Soviet Union. We're talking about
3:44 goologs, famines, disease, political
3:46 repression, and things of that sort. And
3:47 they'll say, because the Russians have
3:49 this in their history, what they
3:52 experience under Vladimir Putin is
3:53 nothing in comparison. And so, why would
3:55 we ever believe the Russians would
3:57 actually stand up? However, the actual
3:59 reality is that there is a pattern to
4:02 Russian history. And Vladimir Putin has
4:03 very much been responding to this
4:05 pattern, and he's very much afraid of
4:07 it. And this pattern is that the
4:10 peasantry does not tolerate abuses from
4:12 their government forever. The peasantry
4:13 has demonstrated several times in
4:15 Russian history that they are willing to
4:18 rise up and demand changes. They are
4:20 willing to overthrow leaders and they
4:23 are willing to commit to social changes
4:26 when things don't go their way. We see
4:28 this because the Russian Empire
4:31 collapsed and the Soviet Union in fact
4:32 collapsed and that went in several
4:36 stages. First, the Soviet Union demanded
4:38 changes from the Stalinist era of purges
4:41 and stuff like that. And they demanded a
4:43 better society and even that was not
4:46 enough. The Soviet Union ultimately
4:48 disintegrated largely because of
4:51 internal economic pressure because the
4:53 people were frustrated with what their
4:55 government was doing and all of the
4:58 individual republics decided to go their
5:00 separate ways because they no longer
5:03 believed in the Soviet system. So the
5:05 idea that people within the Russian or
5:08 the Soviet sphere of the world simply
5:09 never rise up and overthrow their
5:12 governments is completely historically
5:14 false. Now nobody is more aware of the
5:17 fact that this myth is false than the
5:19 Russians themselves and also the
5:22 Ukrainians. And that explains a lot of
5:24 what we have seen from both Russia and
5:26 Ukraine throughout the war. Ukraine is
5:29 attacking Russia's economy, not because
5:31 they don't think it will ever work, but
5:33 because as a post-siet country
5:36 themselves, they understand exactly what
5:38 it feels like to be a citizen under a
5:39 repressive government. And they
5:42 understand exactly what it takes to get
5:44 those citizens to finally stand up,
5:46 revolt, and demand independence or
5:50 demand changes. They themselves again
5:52 have done that. And Russia for their
5:54 part also completely understands that
5:56 this is a massive possibility. And this
5:58 is why they have sought to control their
6:00 society the way they do. As we all know,
6:02 as soon as the war in Ukraine started,
6:05 millions of Russian citizens fled their
6:07 own country. And this is the exact
6:09 opposite of a people who will just lie
6:10 down and take anything that their
6:12 government is going to dish at them.
6:14 These people fled their country for the
6:16 exact reason that they knew pain was
6:19 coming and they actively wanted to avoid
6:21 it. And at that time, leaving the
6:22 country with was the path of least
6:25 resistance to get that. That has since
6:26 gotten harder because Russia actively
6:28 patrols their borders to prevent young
6:31 men from leaving. But it remains the
6:34 same psychology, although the path of
6:36 least resistance has now potentially
6:39 changed. We've also seen Russia respond
6:40 to people wanting to take the path of
6:43 least resistance in several ways. Russia
6:46 has cracked down on free speech since
6:48 they started the war in Ukraine so that
6:50 people cannot talk against the war or
6:52 what they call the special military
6:55 operation. This isn't just denial. It is
6:57 an attempt by Russia to control the
6:58 thinking of the populace. They know they
7:01 cannot control the entire populace, but
7:03 they want to control enough of them to
7:06 prevent a critical mass from forming
7:07 that could actually come out in
7:09 opposition against what they're doing.
7:10 And this is not something that
7:12 governments do because they are so
7:14 convinced the people will just lie down
7:16 and take whatever they dish. This is
7:17 something that governments do because
7:19 they are terrified that the people will
7:21 actually do exactly the opposite of
7:23 that. There are so many other examples
7:25 that we could cite that show that far
7:28 from having an attitude of bravado and
7:29 fearlessness when it comes to his own
7:32 citizens, Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin
7:34 regime in general are actually very
7:37 paranoid of their own people. We see
7:39 this at a high level just in the fact
7:40 that Russia has so much internal
7:42 propaganda trying to influence the way
7:45 its people think because they know they
7:47 have to do that. They have to try to win
7:48 the people over to their side if
7:50 possible because if the people are
7:53 against them, they can indeed demand and
7:56 they can indeed make changes. We also
7:57 see very clear examples of this in the
7:59 paranoia that is implicit, actually
8:01 probably explicit, whenever a Russian
8:03 elite falls out of a window or meets
8:05 their end in another way. Because you
8:07 don't just send elites to their death
8:09 for no reason. You send elites to their
8:11 death because you are terrified that
8:13 they know too much. They have too much
8:15 power and they can potentially
8:16 accumulate resources or people to
8:19 themselves to challenge you in some way.
8:21 And to ensure that that never happens,
8:23 you take those elites out. Not just to
8:25 take them out, but also to threaten the
8:28 other elites. Again, it is not exactly a
8:29 show of I don't think I could ever be
8:31 overthrown. It actually implies you're
8:34 paranoid of that exact result. And we
8:36 also see this very clearly in the way
8:39 that Vladimir Putin has approached
8:41 filling the Russian military even for
8:43 the war against Ukraine where the last
8:45 thing that he has been willing to rely
8:48 on is patriotism.
8:50 Very notably, very explicitly, Vladimir
8:54 Putin has not relied on conscription or
8:56 mobilization to force young Russian men
8:59 to go to the front lines against their
9:01 will. Instead, he has focused on tactics
9:04 of deceiving people to go to the front
9:06 lines, usually through large military
9:08 paychecks. And they might tell them that
9:09 they're going to rear areas and then
9:11 send them to the front lines. But they
9:13 are very unwilling to grab Russian men
9:15 off the streets and put them on the
9:18 front lines. And this is because they
9:20 know better than we do that if they were
9:23 to do this, the fabric of Russian
9:25 society could unravel far quicker than
9:28 we might even imagine. So instead, they
9:30 have resorted to bribing people with
9:33 large paychecks. Not just to get them to
9:35 go voluntarily and to reduce a lot of
9:36 the effects because a lot of Russians
9:38 will say, "Well, they had it coming to
9:39 them because they got paid a lot of
9:42 money for it." But they also do this to
9:44 put a lot of money into the Russian
9:46 society so that the Russian people
9:48 artificially feel like things are going
9:50 better than they actually are. There are
9:53 constant surveys that show a large
9:54 portion of Russians still support the
9:57 war, which are hard to believe for a lot
9:58 of reasons. Number one, because if you
10:00 said anything else, who knows what the
10:02 government would do to you. But to the
10:04 extent that these surveys are
10:06 legitimate, and to a large degree they
10:07 probably are, there are a lot of
10:09 Russians who want to support the war and
10:11 think it's a good thing, that's because
10:13 the Russians have been tricked into
10:15 thinking that the war has been good for
10:18 them economically. It's very similar to
10:20 how in the United States a lot of people
10:22 kind of jokingly in reference to World
10:23 War II will say, "You know what we
10:25 really need for our economy is another
10:27 war." Because during World War II,
10:29 things were just so good and it kind of
10:30 brought us out of the depression and
10:32 things like that. They didn't realize
10:34 that things weren't actually that good.
10:36 The only reason our economy boomed after
10:39 World War II was because every other
10:41 major economy on Earth was devastated by
10:43 firebombings and things like that. And
10:45 so we had a monopoly on manufacturing
10:47 for quite a while and that caused us to
10:49 rise to the top. That sidebar aside,
10:51 it's similar with the Russian economy
10:54 and the war in Ukraine. Russia has
10:56 worked to create an artificial sense of
10:59 prosperity around this war. That most of
11:00 the Russian people are not connecting
11:03 the dots on. They think somehow that
11:06 their GDP has grown even though their
11:08 country has been heavily sanctioned.
11:10 Therefore, they have lost the majority
11:13 of their revenue through oil and gas.
11:15 And even if you believe oil and gas
11:17 revenues are doing better than a lot of
11:20 people say, it would be crazy to argue
11:22 that Russia is actually doing better
11:24 with less revenue than they had prior to
11:27 the war. Nevertheless, a lot of Russians
11:30 believe this because through military
11:32 spending, Vladimir Putin has put a lot
11:35 of money into the Russian economy that
11:37 he saved up over a very long period of
11:39 time prior to the war. And he has also
11:41 funded the war through inflation, a
11:43 mechanism that most Russians don't
11:46 understand, which causes the economics
11:47 to become terrible, but people might
11:50 temporarily feel rather rich. And all of
11:52 this is an attempt to rather than making
11:54 the Russian people feel the cost of the
11:56 war, make the Russian people feel like
11:58 the war is actually improving their
12:01 lives. Because Vladimir Putin knows that
12:03 if the Russian people feel the cost of
12:05 the war, they will almost certainly turn
12:08 against him. All of this though is a
12:11 very big problem for Vladimir Putin
12:13 today because the problem with
12:16 artificial perceptions is you can only
12:18 keep them up for so long. And if you
12:20 don't achieve the goal of the artificial
12:21 perception and you're not able to
12:24 convert the artificial perception into a
12:27 real durable advantage,
12:29 everything will eventually fall out from
12:31 under your feet. And that is what Russia
12:34 is now facing today. Russia is facing a
12:36 crisis on every front, on a military
12:38 front, but primarily on an economic
12:40 front. And they're facing that crisis
12:43 for several reasons. They're facing it
12:44 because the savings account that they
12:47 built up to get them this far has
12:49 largely, if not completely, run out and
12:51 it is only being sustained by massive
12:54 inflation. But they are also in an
12:55 economic crisis because of the pressure
12:58 of Ukraine who I already mentioned at
13:00 the beginning of this video has been
13:01 intentionally ramping up their strikes
13:03 on the Russian economy on Russian
13:05 infrastructure particularly oil and gas
13:07 targets to make the average Russian
13:10 person feel the effects of the war in a
13:12 way that they never have before. The
13:13 timing of that might not be a
13:15 coincidence. Due to all of this,
13:17 Vladimir Putin seems to realize that it
13:19 is going to be increasingly difficult
13:20 for him to keep the Russian people on
13:23 his side and therefore to keep his power
13:25 and potentially even to keep his own
13:27 life. And because of that, we have seen
13:29 a whole lot of changes in Vladimir Putin
13:31 and his tactics domestically over the
13:33 past year or so, but especially ramping
13:36 up over the past several months. We have
13:37 seen, for example, and I've talked about
13:39 it in other videos on this channel, a
13:41 lot of discussions of purges within the
13:43 Russian military, a lot of discussions
13:45 of potential coups, which I have argued
13:48 are an attempt by Vladimir Putin to kind
13:49 of root out disloyal elements because
13:51 these discussions have been so public.
13:53 And all of this looks like an effort for
13:56 Vladimir Putin to try to get control of
13:58 the elites in a way that he has never
14:00 had to, at least up to this point in the
14:02 war. Up to this point in the war, of
14:04 course, he has had people falling out of
14:05 windows and things like that, but we
14:07 have never seen anything this explicit
14:10 that looks this desperate and shows this
14:12 much fear in Vladimir Putin. We have
14:14 also seen Vladimir Putin have to go to
14:16 his people and basically make
14:18 concessions about the war in Ukraine to
14:21 his people, at least publicly. Who knows
14:22 if he will actually make those
14:24 concessions, but he definitely felt
14:26 compelled to promise them. In
14:27 particular, he felt compelled to promise
14:29 his people that the Russian military
14:32 budget would be lowered next year, which
14:35 implies a lot of things. First of all,
14:37 the economy is a real problem despite
14:40 what Russia says. Second of all, the
14:42 Russian people know that the economy is
14:43 a problem and they know that it's
14:46 because of the war. And third of all,
14:48 Vladimir Putin fears that push back
14:50 enough that he felt compelled to throw
14:53 them a bone. Vladimir Putin knows that
14:55 the Russian people will only tolerate so
14:57 much. Unlike a lot of Western
14:59 commentators, Vladimir Putin knows that
15:01 his current country is a
15:03 postrevolutionary state and that they
15:04 have actually gone through several
15:07 revolutions. He knows that when things
15:10 start to impact people in a real way,
15:12 people respond to that. And that
15:13 response might look different than we
15:15 expect in Western countries. it might
15:18 seem to come a little slower, but that's
15:20 because the Russian people are starting
15:23 from a lower baseline and so it is
15:26 harder to hit them hard enough to where
15:28 they feel the impact in a more real way.
15:31 But once they feel that impact in a real
15:34 way, they respond to that impact. The
15:36 same way we here in America respond to
15:38 the impact of gas prices or rising egg
15:42 prices, Russian people are people, too.
15:44 And when they have impacts that finally
15:47 reach them directly,
15:49 that's when things can hit the fan.
15:51 Putin has again been trying to push this
15:53 off through artificial means as long as
15:55 he could. I mentioned the military
15:57 paychecks, which were largely stimulus
15:59 for the Russian economy. Vladimir Putin
16:01 has also been printing a lot of money to
16:04 fund subsidization of commodity prices
16:07 within Russia to try to keep food prices
16:09 low and to try to keep energy prices low
16:11 to try to keep the costs of all of the
16:12 basics that the average Russian person
16:15 actually buys as low as possible. The
16:16 Russian people don't realize that these
16:19 prices are actually rapidly increasing.
16:21 They're just increasing in the form of
16:23 currency depreciation rather than actual
16:25 price tags. Although sometimes even
16:27 still they are increasing in terms of
16:29 actual price tags too. All these
16:32 artificial means though have a hard
16:34 limit and that hard limit is now being
16:37 approached. The problem that Putin faces
16:39 is immense because the moment the
16:41 sherrod can no longer be kept up as we
16:43 see currently today with rising gas
16:46 prices, the Russian people don't have a
16:48 whole lot of margin to work with. Once
16:50 the Russian people start to feel a real
16:53 impact on their actual budgets, most of
16:55 them do not have enough spending money
16:57 left over after expenses to get
17:00 anything, they are used to that low
17:02 level of spending money. But because it
17:04 is so low, it can also go away rather
17:07 quickly. So as soon as we see food
17:09 prices increase or energy prices
17:11 increase or food prices increase because
17:14 energy prices have increased or any
17:17 other number of things that will very
17:19 quickly thin out Russian budgets to the
17:21 point that is no longer sustainable.
17:23 That then will cause the Russian people
17:25 to actually feel the impact of the war
17:26 for the first time in a way they haven't
17:29 felt it before. And there is no amount
17:30 of money the Russian government can
17:32 print today to make up for that. They've
17:34 already printed basically all that they
17:36 can print. Just for example, in some
17:37 statistics that I found, which are
17:38 always directionally correct, but never
17:41 precisely accurate. In poorer regions of
17:44 Russia, the average monthly income is
17:47 equivalent to only about $400.
17:49 That is a very low income, not a lot of
17:51 margin in it. And under current
17:54 conditions, Russians use about 45% of
17:58 that income to buy food. So about $180.
18:00 They will then use approximately $50 to
18:03 $60 a month on heat, $50 to $60 a month
18:06 on fuel in terms of gasoline, and they
18:08 will spend an additional maybe $40 to
18:11 $60 on rent. And when you add all of
18:13 those things up, you find that the
18:15 average Russian in a poorer region of
18:18 Russia might only have $50 to $100 of
18:21 their income left to work with. This is
18:24 a major problem because in recent days,
18:25 literally this month, it's not yet
18:28 reflected in the data, but we have seen
18:29 gas prices in some regions of Russia
18:32 increase from around $2.40
18:35 to prices that are approaching $3.80,
18:40 approaching $4. That is a huge increase.
18:42 And it's not only a direct increase when
18:43 people buy gasoline, but it also
18:44 increases the cost for everything else
18:47 they buy. That increase alone in those
18:50 regions can eat up all of the tiny
18:52 margin that the Russians living in those
18:54 regions had. And that will quickly cause
18:58 their lifestyle to change drastically.
18:59 Because when you go from being able to
19:02 buy a few luxuries to being able to buy
19:06 zero luxuries, that is a much bigger
19:08 difference than for example in America
19:11 when we go from being able to buy a huge
19:13 number of luxuries to a somewhat smaller
19:16 selection of luxuries. Now, $50 to $100
19:18 of spending money a month is a very
19:20 small margin. Not all of Russia has the
19:21 same margins. For example, in Moscow,
19:23 people make a lot more money per month,
19:26 but the costs are also a little higher.
19:28 They also have thin margins. Their
19:30 margins are more in the hundreds of
19:32 dollars per month, not in the tens of
19:34 dollars per month. But those margins are
19:38 still small enough that relatively small
19:40 impacts into the Russian economy can
19:42 have a major impact on people's
19:45 lifestyles. And that is really what
19:47 needs to be measured when it comes to
19:49 Russian people's resilience. You need to
19:51 measure things not in dollar amounts,
19:53 but you need to actually measure things
19:55 in hard impacts on people's lifestyle.
19:57 This is what a lot of people don't
19:59 realize. Russia has been working very
20:01 hard throughout the entire war to make
20:04 sure that Russian lifestyles don't
20:06 experience a large impact. And they've
20:08 been able to do this through a large
20:10 number of economic tricks. Because the
20:13 Russian baseline is so low, it doesn't
20:15 require a ton of money to keep the
20:17 average Russian's lifestyle consistent
20:20 with what they've always experienced.
20:21 Russia, though, is now running out of
20:23 these economic tricks. The average
20:25 Russian will now start to feel not just
20:27 a financial difference, but they will
20:29 start to feel a lifestyle difference.
20:31 And when you start measuring things in
20:32 terms of how long does it take me to get
20:35 a liter of gasoline that lasts me like 5
20:37 minutes, takes me 8 hours to get 5
20:40 minutes worth of gasoline. then you
20:42 start to realize the serious impacts
20:44 that could actually cause the Russian
20:46 people to start demanding some changes.
20:48 It is within this context that Ukraine
20:51 is continuing to ramp up the pressure on
20:53 the Russian economy through long range
20:55 strikes and where they have also just
20:56 recently introduced longrange strike
20:58 capabilities, the Flamingo missile,
21:00 which can take out more targets
21:02 directly, but also spread Russian air
21:04 defenses more thinly, meaning that
21:06 Ukraine will do an incrementally and
21:09 exponentially better job at damaging the
21:11 Russian economy. Not only this, while
21:13 this is happening, Russia is now
21:15 entering into the winter months, which
21:17 is also going to make things worse in
21:19 and of itself. And you can see how bad
21:21 things can really become. Now, in my
21:23 videos, I never really give a sense of
21:25 timing, and that's intentional cuz I
21:27 don't know the timing. I can only see
21:29 how things are directionally going, and
21:31 we'll see how things play out logically
21:34 over time, but we will never know
21:37 exactly what time the climax might come
21:39 and some big event might come. But as
21:42 you can see directionally, everything
21:45 lines up. Things are looking really bad
21:46 for Russia. Things are looking really
21:48 bad for the Russian economy. And
21:49 therefore, things are looking really bad
21:52 for Vladimir Putin. And this is in a
21:55 country that has experienced not just
21:58 one revolution, but several major
22:02 revolutions within the last century.
22:04 Things really could change. We need to
22:06 stop believing in the myth of Russian
22:08 invincibility. We need to remember that
22:11 Russian people are people, too. That
22:14 matters from every perspective possible,
22:17 including their ability to stand up to
22:19 immense pressure. If you watched this
22:20 far into the video, I hope it's not
22:22 presumptuous to say that you probably
22:24 got something of value out of it. Maybe
22:26 you heard new information. Maybe you
22:28 heard dots connected in a way that you
22:30 hadn't heard them connected before.
22:31 Maybe you heard things explained in a
22:33 way that made everything finally click.
22:35 Whatever the reason, if you got
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22:56 You guys really do make it possible for
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