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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979 (Documentary)

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The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to support a collapsing communist government, driven by Cold War geopolitical fears and a desire to maintain influence, despite internal dissent and warnings of the potential consequences.

Christmas 1979. Soviet armor pours across the Afghan border towards Kabul as helicopters

secure the mountain passes through the Hindukush mountains. In Moscow,

the Politburo has decided to save Afghanistan’s communist government from collapse. Afghan rebels

have taken up arms against the unpopular regime and control most of the countryside. But the Red

Army leadership doubts it can pacify the country - so why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?

Afghanistan in the 1970s is a country with a long history as a crossroads of empire and internal

instability. After World War Two, there’s a period of relative stability under King Zahir Shah,

whose government introduces moderate reforms to avoid angering conservatives.

He also suppresses those demanding too much change, including Afghan communists

who already have contact with the Soviet KGB. In 1964, King Zahir introduces a more liberal

constitution that allows political parties . At the same time, Kabul universities become a

hotbed of political activity – from moderates to monarchists to Islamists to communists . Campus

communists create the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Among their

founding members are Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, and Nur Muhammad Taraki – all of whom

work with the KGB . They have strong admiration for the Soviet transformation of its Central

Asian republics. They want radical change, but project a more moderate line in public – and

still only attract support from a few urban elites and Soviet-trained army officers.

The few Communists there were also split along ethnic and ideological lines in 1967,

with a more hardline group under Taraki and a more moderate group under Karmal.

While some Afghans look to socialism, others look to political Islam. Not necessarily radical Islam

either – educated Islamist Afghans debate what a modern Islamic society should be like. The King

even encourages Islamist activities to contain Marxist influence. The most important Islamist

group is also founded at a university - Jamiat-e Islami, which preaches a conservative form of

Islam inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood . Afghanistan’s relations with the wider world are

also in flux after 1945. In 1960, Soviet-equipped Afghan forces clash with neighbouring Pakistan

over the status of cross-border territory inhabited by Afghanistan’s biggest ethnic group,

the Pashtuns. Pakistan wants a stable and neutral Afghanistan so it can focus on its

conflict with India . Kabul also looks abroad for humanitarian aid from both sides of the Cold War.

Officially non-aligned, Afghanistan leans heavily on Soviet aid, including for infrastructure – but

engineers and other advisors from the US, West Germany and elsewhere also work in the

country. American scholar Louis Dupree writes of a privileged American-Soviet role in Afghanistan :

“In towns outside Kabul […] where Russians had major projects, their technicians lived as well

as—if not better than—the Americans. [They had] spacious hotel and apartment accommodations,

lavish commissaries, private theatres, Olympic sized swimming pools [...] Many

Soviet technicians genuinely felt disturbed when ordered home after a tour of duty. Like

their American counterparts, they had never had it ‘so good.’” (Dupree, 527)

The modernization program and international aid help create a small urban middle class in

Aghan cities . The countryside accepts new infrastructure but resists social

changes that make some headway in cities, like women’s education and rights. By the 1960s,

Afghanistan’s modernization is falling behind other developing states, and King Zahir is

still reluctant to further democratize the country – partly due to his fear of communism.

In 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan takes power in an army-backed coup. At first he works

with the moderate communist, but soon excludes them and rules as a strongman,

silencing any opposition and purging the civil service and officer corps. Afghan Islamists

oppose Daoud’s progressive policies and harsh rule, and Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI,

provides them training and equipment for armed resistance. After an ISI-supported

Islamist attack against Afghan government buildings in 1975,

Daoud imprisons, executes, or forces them into exile. Many Islamists flee to Pakistan,

where President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government allows them to settle in the hopes of creating a

thorn in Kabul’s side. Former engineering student Mohammed Eshaq remembers the escape to Pakistan:

“We took part in an operation in the Panjshir Valley in 1975 and we were defeated. Then we

had to retreat into the mountains, and it was very dark. [...] we had to stay at the top of

the mountain. We did not have enough clothes because we were coming from a warm area, and I

think I got sick [...]. We could not get warm, but we could not move because of the enemy.” (Grad)

The Islamists are split into several groups based on ideological disagreements,

but they claim legitimacy among hundreds of thousands of Afghans who also flee into Pakistan.

Daoud reaches out to many states for development and military aid,

and asks the US for intel on Soviet intentions even as he strikes an economic deal with Moscow

and starts to improve relations with Pakistan and Iran. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev wants

to maintain decades of Soviet investment and influence in Afghanistan, and advises

Daoud during a Moscow meeting in April 1977: “…some NATO personnel in Northern Afghanistan

who are spies and are a security risk to the USSR should be removed”. (Misdaq 93).

But Daoud brushes him off “Afghanistan is a free and independent

country and we will not tolerate anyone telling us who to allow and who not to allow

to work for us!” (Misdaq 93) [Mohammad Daoud] In April 1978, demonstrations break out at the

funeral of a prominent Afghan communist, in response Daoud arrests PDPA leaders.

Now though, the Afghan communists are better organized, have united the rival factions,

and enjoy KGB support – they have infiltrated some state institutions, including the army.

Daoud’s regime has lost support among the middle class, and Communist army officers

rally troops loyal to the PDPA. Tanks roll into Kabul while jet fighters scream overhead,

and PDPA troops kill Daoud and more than 1000 of his followers in fierce fighting.

A 15-year-old Afghan remembers the announcement of the Saur Revolution on April 27, 1978:

"We could hear Radio Afghanistan [...] playing revolutionary songs and [the]

repeated statement ‘…The revolution of 7th Saur has been victorious and the armed forces of the

country are in control. We congratulate the people of Afghanistan.’ The teachers told us to clap and

then go into class. […] After only a few hours, we went home. My father asked why I'd come home early

and I explained it all to him. ‘God bless us', he said. 'The future is not good.’” (Leake 43)

The coup comes as a surprise to both the Soviets and the Americans, and each thinks the other is

behind it. But the Afghan communists have seized power on their own, and under a Revolutionary

Council led by Taraki and Amin they implement a radical program: land reform (including forced

expropriations ) and equal rights for women. They also suppress any opposition with mass

executions, torture, and imprisonments. Publicly Taraki proclaims that the new

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will remain part of the non-aligned movement:

[Original Audio Taraki]: “Our relationship with all the countries, including the Soviet Union,

and all our neighbors, and throughout the world, will be based and will depend on the amount of

their support to our revolutionary government.” But Pakistan is skeptical about the coup,

as it fears another hostile neighbor along with India and the USSR. The Shah’s Iran, Saudi Arabia,

and the US are concerned as well, and all three countries support Pakistan-based training of

various Afghan Islamist groups loosely referred to as Mujahadeen, or those fighting for God.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, cautiously welcomes a Communist Afghanistan and the two

states soon agree to more Soviet advisors and $250 million in military aid. But Taraki and

Amin want more, and the Soviets are concerned about the PDPA’s actions. The party strains

under infighting as the radical faction purges the ranks and exiles moderates like Karmal. It

also struggles with a deeply religious population and traditional social structure. PDPA thinkers

believe clergy and tribal leaders are feudalists holding back progress, but the Soviets advise

them to carefully divide and conquer their class enemies . Taraki, though, maintains a hard line:

“These agents of colonialism who hatch conspiracy under the mask of religion and faith […] have

been plotting for many years against progressive movements in different countries. […] They should

be uprooted like a cancer tumor from the body of a patient…” (Kabul Times) [Nur Muhammad Taraki]

The PDPA launches an all-out offensive, arresting or killing mullahs and their families.

The population turns even more against the Communists, and the Islamists position themselves

as saviours of Islam and the Afghan people . Local uprisings lead to mujahadeen control in

much of the north and east. The PDPA responds with more violence, carried out by the secret police,

the KGB-supported intel agency, and Sarandoy paramilitaries. All the while,

the internal split between Taraki and his ambitious protégé Amin deepens.

The PDPA’s grip further weakens in 1979. In February, unknown militants kidnap US ambassador

Adolph Dubs and hold him in central Kabul. Then Afghan government forces, with KGB involvement,

botch an attempted rescue, Dubs is killed, and the US stops aid programs . In March, a week-long

uprising begins in Herat. An entire army division mutinies after being ordered to quell protests.

Kabul sends in more troops. The protesters then kill those suspected of connections to the PDPA

and lynch Soviet civilian advisors and their families. The government puts down the uprising

at a cost of between 3000 and 25,000 dead. Another revolt in Kunar Province ends

with 640 deaths in Kerala village, witnessed by 16-year-old Mohammad Ashoq:

"My father told me to get up and run. […] and I ran to the mosque. Behind me I heard

the sound of gunfire. From the mosque, I saw soldiers take more men to another

field and shoot them […]" (Leake 200). A worried Taraki asks Moscow to inte

rvene to shore up the Afghan government: "Almost nobody does support the government.

In Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen. […] If Herat falls then the revolution is doomed. […]

Uprisings have emerged throughout the entire country, and the army is too small to be able

to pacify the insurgents everywhere.” (Tomsen) The Politburo, though, is shocked at Kabul’s

brutal reaction to the Herat Uprising: “We gave them everything and what had

come off? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people

for no reason and told us that we also executed people in Lenin’s time. You see

what kind of Marxists we found?” (Dimitrakis 45) Moscow begins to consider military intervention

to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence, but not all agree. Head of the

KGB Yuri Andropov is among the sceptics. He worries that Afghanistan is too underdeveloped

to solve its problems with socialism and only through force could the USSR prevent

a revolution there – a risk he advises against. After the Herat uprising, Amin becomes Prime

Minister, and although he and Taraki are still at odds both request more Soviet aid. Moscow

somewhat reluctantly agrees to send equipment, including T-62 tanks and Mi-24A helicopters,

and more military advisors – but they refuse to send troops. Even so, the Mujahedeen have

already noticed the limited Soviet presence: [ORIGINAL AUDIO] “The Russians have taken part

in the Afghan war now and they have been in Panjshir and Paktia and also in Konar areas;

some of the Russian advisers have been killed.” The Soviets want Amin out since they hold him

responsible for the massacres and policy failures, and are suspicious because he previously studied

in the US. They inform Taraki in September 1979, after which he tries to capture and

probably kill Amin. But Amin escapes and has Taraki murdered with a pillow and takes over.

The insurgency gains momentum quickly. 40% of the Afghan army deserts, leaving it with just

60,000 men, and about 40,000 Afghan men join the Mujahadeen. The insurgents control 4 provinces and

the countryside in a dozen others. Amin reaches out to the US and UK and says he wants to deepen

ties – though both countries are suspicious of his motives. This move, though, inflames Soviet

worries – the KGB even suspects incorrectly that he might be a CIA agent. The Politburo sends more

officers to train Afghan troops, an additional airborne battalion to Bagram airfield and some

troops to Kabul, officially for protection. By early December, Andropov leans toward

intervention: “ […A military]

operation would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April Revolution,

establishing Leninist principles in the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, and securing our

positions in this country.” (Leake 76) On December 12, 1979, the Politburo

secretly decides on regime change: Amin will be toppled and replaced with moderate Afghan

communist Babrak Karmal. To help the new Afghan government, they will also carry out a limited

military deployment against Islamists and possible Iranian or Pakistani intervention.

At the decisive meeting, Soviet Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov warns against it:

"We will alienate the entire Muslim East and suffer political damage globally.”

Andropov though interrupts him: "Focus on military matters. Leave political decisions to us — the

Party and Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev]. ” (Зубок, 380) Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov gives verbal

orders to prepare an invasion force.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be carried out by the newly created Soviet 40th

Army: 2 motor rifle divisions, an air assault regiment, all in all about 52,000 thousand men

in the initial force. Additionally, in Operation Baikal-79 one airborne division,

plus one airborne regiment will directly airlift into Kabul and Bagram airfields, then seize key

buildings in and around the Afghan capital. Military transports will land 7,700 men, 894

vehicles and 1062 tons of ammunition in the first wave. A further 2,000 men are already present in

Kabul and Bagram from earlier deployments. The Red Army incursion is meant as a show

of force for six months, and the new Afghan government is to do most of the fighting.

Soviet ambassador Fikryat Tabeyev tells Amin on December 22 that the USSR will officially

send troops within days – news which Amin welcomes as he has requested them

four times already. Amin is confident: “Comrade Stalin showed us how to build

socialism in a backward country: it's painful to begin with, but afterwards

everything turns out just fine.” (Braithwaite) The Soviet force will enter Afghanistan from the

northwest and northeast, and advance along the ring road connecting the main cities – and which

had been built by the US and USSR years before. On December 25, the first Soviet troops cross

the border. One pincer secures Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and continues towards Kabul. Helicopters

escort the ground troops and drop advanced guards to secure the crucial Salang Pass

tunnel. The other Soviet group sets out on December 27 via Herat, Shindand, and then

to Kandahar. Simultaneously, the airborne forces secure key buildings across Kabul.

But that’s not all that happens in Kabul that day. For weeks, Soviet special forces have assembled in

Kabul preparing to eliminate Amin. The invasion will be portrayed as friendly assistance,

but nothing could be left to chance. GRU Colonel Vasily Kolesnik is in charge

of the plan. Soviet Military intelligence’s Muslim Battalion flew into Kabul on December

10 – supposedly to protect Amin. There are also two KGB teams, Zenit and Grom,

and a company of air assault troops – all in all, about 560 men. Amin and Taraki had suggested the

creation of the Muslim Battalion to allow Soviet troops to keep a lower profile. It consists of

soldiers from Soviet central Asian republics to appear more familiar to locals and wearing

Afghan uniforms to blend in with Afghan troops. The initial plan has to be re-drawn after Amin

moves to the Tajbeg palace on December 16, although since the Soviets are providing part

of his security they get detailed plans of the arrangements at the palace. Still, the Tajbeg

is a tough nut to crack – it’s on a hill, the surrounding area is mined, and there are Afghan

army barracks and three dug-in T-54 tanks nearby. More Afghan troops with tanks and anti-aircraft

guns are in the vicinity as well, bringing the total to 2500 men defending the palace.

The Soviet attack force is split into 12 groups. BG1 will neutralize the emplaced

tanks. BG2 is the main assault force. With six BMPs they will storm the palace via the main

road and take out guard posts along the way. BG3 will outflank the palace from the West.

The other groups will pin down Afghan troops, take out Afghan anti-aircraft guns, and provide fire

support, including with 4 ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" self-propelled, radar-guided anti-aircraft

weapons, and grenade launchers. Command, recovery, and medical teams are also nearby.

Operation Storm-333 begins on December 27 and Amin still believes the Soviets are on his side:

"The Soviet divisions are already on the way here. Paratroopers have landed in Kabul. All

is going well. I am constantly on the telephone communicating with Comrade Gromyko, and we are

discussing the best way to inform the world about this Soviet military assistance." (Grau)

Just after Amin gives this speech, the KGB tries to kill him with poisoned cola, but he survives.

Meanwhile, Soviet teams launch sabotage operations across the city to confuse Afghan forces,

including Soviet advisors removing batteries from tanks, or KGB agents crippling the telephone

network. Still more Soviet units quickly take important government and infrastructure buildings

like a prison, the post office, DRA General Staff building, the TV and radio centre, secret police

headquarters and defence and interior ministries. Colonel Yevgeny Chernyshev records

his impressions in his diary: "[…] the movement of the paratroopers’ convoy

through the city could be tracked by the sound of gunfire. […] As our units approached the targets,

gunfire erupted, and tracer rounds streaked across the sky. The Afghan guards were ready to defend

themselves.” (Yevgeny Chernyshev’s Diary for 1979) At the palace, Kolesnik’s force runs into trouble.

Although Amin believes at first the Soviets are on his side, Afghan forces are on guard

after the failed cola poisoning. BG1 engages but the shooting causes DRA forces to raise a

general alert at 7:15pm, so Kolesnik orders a general assault with fire support. DRA troops

knock out several Soviet BMPs of BG2, so the Red Army troops continue on foot and

reach the palace at 7:40. They storm the lower floor and heavy fighting ensues.

Meanwhile, BG3 takes losses approaching the other side of the palace, but eventually

reaches the palace under cover of the Shilkas. Other groups successfully pin down Afghan units

outside the palace, and two groups help the stalled BG1 to eliminate the dug-in tanks.

Colonel V.G. Salkin remembers the attack: "First, KGB special units stormed the palace,

then some Spetsnaz troops followed. In an attempt to scare the defenders — or perhaps out of

fear — the attackers shouted loudly, mostly profanities. The fighting inside the palace

immediately became fierce and uncompromising. If no one came from a room with their hands raised,

the doors were broken down, grenades were thrown in. Then the attackers opened fire with automatic

weapons indiscriminately.” (Ляховский) BG2 and 3 make it upstairs in the palace,

but they’re down to 50 men. They kill most of Amin’s bodyguards, and find and kill Amin and

his two sons. The whole operations lasts 43 minutes. At least 9 Soviet troops are killed,

though some claim up to 100 and 69 badly wounded, while around 200 Afghans are killed

and hundreds taken prisoner. Military brass decorates nearly all Storm-333 participants,

including Kolesnik, who is made a Hero of the Soviet Union. Storm-333 also leaves a legacy

as a daring and successful special operation. Years later, some in Russia will look at it as

a bright spot in the Afghan war, and it becomes a staple of the Russian airborne officer academy,

including the hybrid combination with sabotage, disinformation, and subversion.

The day after the raid, on December 28, Karmal arrives in Kabul and promises the public he’ll

stop the torture and executions, and unite the PDPA. Not included in the pre-recorded

broadcast message is the ongoing execution of Amin’s closest followers. Many Afghans don’t

believe Karmal’s public reassurances, and 430,000 flee to Pakistan by January 1980.

Within 72 hours the USSR has installed a new Afghan leader even though the invasion

and regime change plans were hatched mere weeks before. More than 40 years later,

historians still debate why exactly the Soviets decided to invade.

Operation Baikal-79 was a gamble, given the Afghanistan’s unstable history and the fact that

the USSR was not militarily, economically, or politically prepared to nation-build.

The Soviets lacked local expertise and language skills, and it’s still unclear exactly how much

influence they really had on the PDPA after the invasion. Soviet leaders knew it would damage

their projected image as allies of anti-colonial movements as well. At a March meeting, Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko made the danger clear: “Who will [the Soviet Army] fight against?

Against the Afghan people first and foremost, and they’ll have to be fired on … Everything that we

created in recent years in terms of detente, arms control, and many other things – all of that will

be thrown back. Of course, it will be a good present for China. All the nonaligned countries

will be against us.” (Radchenko, 480-481) And yet, the Soviets had reasons to be

confident. They had successfully intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ethiopia from 1974,

and Angola from 1975. In Angola, local communists even functioned as “vanguard party” that led the

revolution themselves. Moscow hoped the PDPA would play a similar role in Afghanistan. Even before

the Saur Revolution, Moscow sent thousands of civilian advisors, including Communist

Youth League members to work with young Afghans. Some historians point to the potential influence

of Soviet officials like ambassador to Afghanistan Alexander Puzanov and KGB Lieutenant General

Boris Ivanov, who was long stationed in the country. Both strongly argued for intervention,

and Puzanov was a close friend of Taraki. They and others close to him may have influenced Andropov,

who was initially skeptical of an invasion, but available sources are incomplete.

What is clear is that Amin’s seizure of power tipped the balance. Moscow concluded he was

not loyal to the Soviet Union and planned to shift away from the USSR. In the end,

the Cold War fear of losing Afghanistan to even indirect US influence outweighed the risks.

Back in December 1979, just as Gromyko fears, Moscow’s roll of

the dice in Afghanistan provokes a flurry of international reactions that spell trouble.

The US and UK worry about Soviet control in Afghanistan , and President Jimmy Carter announces

global Soviet expansionism must be stopped . [ORIGINAL AUDIO JIMMY CARTER] “The Soviet Union

is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international

environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will

it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that

power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military

force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.”

Some in the Carter administration hope the conflict might turn into a Soviet Vietnam.

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, though, worries the mujahadeen are too weak and

disorganized , and lack foreign support – unlike North Vietnam. He also thinks the Soviets will

act more decisively than the US did in Vietnam . The US still decides to increase financial and

military support for the mujahadeen, and encourages the Chinese and other Muslim

countries to help them as well. But the biggest change is

US policy towards Pakistan: “We must both reassure Pakistan

and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan,

more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan

cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.” (Coll 51) [Zbigniew Brzezinski]

From now on, the US will be much closer to Pakistan and look the other way on

nuclear weapons and questions of democracy. Pakistan-based CIA agent Howard Hart argues

that the existing support for the Mujahedeen should be expanded to include weapons.

The Pakistanis also strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Head of Saudi intel Turki Al-Faisal

sees Pakistan as the best option to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, and soon provides

the ISI with funds matching US contributions. The UN General Assembly condemns the Soviet

invasion – many voting member-states with a colonial past are uncomfortable with a Great Power

invading a country that claimed to be non-aligned and anti-imperial . Secretary General Kurt

Waldheim, ironically a former Nazi from Austria , tries to negotiate a settlement – but the USSR,

the new Afghan government, and neighbors Pakistan and Revolutionary Iran are not interested.

There will be no quick and easy peace in Afghanistan – Soviet troops have marched

into what will become a longer, costlier and bloodier war than any have imagined.

We hope you enjoyed this breakdown of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. We are going

to cover the entire history of the Soviet Afghan War and the aftermath until the US

invasion in 2001 in a multi-part series. Such ambitious multi-part projects are only possible

because of your ongoing support on Patreon. If you go to patreon.com/realtimehistory you

can contribute a monthly or annual amount and make Real Time History documentaries better for

everyone. Your support means we can spend more time and money on research, footage,

map animations and produced more detailed documentaries.

We want to thank Sofia Shirogorova for her support with this documentary. If you want

to learn more about the Vietnam War check out our almost three hour long documentary. As usual

you can find all the sources for this video in the description below. I am Jesse Alexander and

this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that won’t drink KGB cola.

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YouTube Transcript:Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979 (Documentary)