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What is Real and What is not Real? with Prof Jan Westerhoff

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Right? So take a simple example that

that has doesn't have anything

specifically to do with the theories of

consciousness. Take colors, right? So we

um uh can make a fairly strong case for

the claim that colors aren't there in

the world independent of us because they

only get generated through the

interaction of stuff out there with our

particular visual system and the way our

eyes works and our our brain works and

so on. Right? So there isn't anything

out there in the world that is red. Uh

rather redness is a quality that arises

from the interaction of something out

there in the world say wavelengths of

lights or what have you and our specific

uh perceptual system. Right? So if you

took us and say all perceivers out of

the world then there would be no colors

Yan Westerov is professor of Buddhist

philosophy in the faculty of theology

and religion at the University of

Oxford. He has specific interests in

metaphysics and in the philosophy of

early Indian Buddhist thinkers. He's

written many books including the

non-existence of the real world, 12

examples of illusion and reality. a very

short introduction. So, welcome Jan Wes

to our discussion today. Um, I want to

talk about reality Yan and I want to um

begin if I may with Daycart because I

believe it was Poare

which made the comment that the man in

the street, the ordinary person is a

carteesian dualist. In other words, they

believe and most people believe they've

got a mind and they've got a body.

And my question to you is, what's wrong

with that? Let's call it the naive view.

Yeah. Um,

I don't think there's anything

specifically wrong with that as a first

pass. I would be surprised though if the

majority of people really consider

themselves to be cartisian jewelists

nowadays. I would think most people are

materialists and they think well they

have a body and the brain and somehow

the the the brain generates their mind

and um when when they die and the brain

disappears then they will disappear too

because if you are a cigian dualist then

you have to believe not only that that

is all wrong but that there are two

different kind of substances. There is

your physical body that is the the

physical substance and then there is

another substance which is a mental

substance which is you and in you as a

person these two substances are somehow

conjoined and then of course the

million-dollar question is how they can

interact and I mean that is that is one

of the one of the main problems that the

cases dualist has to solve and if you

you know want to want to start

criticizing that position that is

usually where it starts So you ask

yourself okay so can how's something

that is physical interact with something

that is non-physical because all the

interactions that we see in the physical

world is some physical stuff acting on

other physical stuff.

So that that is really what uh what you

think is unsatisfactory about the the

cartisian position. But uh I think as as

a position on reality I I would be

surprised if we find that many people

who still believe that

inside them is an indestructible

non-physical substance that is their

mind. I would I would think that all the

religious people would think that

certainly and there's what I I saw a

statistic the other day 1.4 billion

Christians and another 1.3 billion

Muslims and many others they would all

probably be I would guess um dualists

because of their religion. Um but

certainly I would say that most philosophers,

philosophers,

most thinkers and most university people

would all be materialists, nearly all of

them. And I wondered um and that

suggests then that everything is made up

of matter. It's made up of particles and

fields, maybe gluons, partons, whatever

they may be. And uh and therefore the

mind is somehow a mere phenomenon that

comes out of this interaction of matter.

Is that a good picture? Does that work? Yeah.

Yeah.

Well, that is a that's a complex

question and um it's on on the one hand

the answer is it it gets us very far

because we can explain a lot about how

the mind works by insight into how the

brain works right so various mental

functions we can explain how they're

generated by the brain and so on. Um now

the question is whether that explanation

gets us all the way and uh allows us to

explain the entirety of consciousness

and that is an entirely different

question and there things get a lot more

murky. So um one uh problem that is I

think interesting to consider in this

context is that you if you cons conceive

of the world and yourself as something

that your brain generates. So that when

you you are basically living in a kind

of simulated reality that is generated

by your brain and of course from input

through the through the physical senses.

Um then you immediately faced with the

problem that the entire setup that

generates that

virtual reality namely the brain and

everything else is also part of the

model or of the virtual reality itself.

Right? So you suddenly through this kind

of neurobiological reduction you are you

seem to be trapped in a loop right where

you say you are that um the world

surrounding you is a is a um is a

simulation of your brain and your brain

is comp is a part of the world and

therefore that is part of the simulation

too. So then of course the question is

to which extent that still is a stable

position and uh um there can be

different views on that. Some people

think it is um but in any case it is far

far from straightforward

straightforward

what position you should then take

regarding the reality of the brain as a

So if you do take that as the view

though, that surely implies that the mind

mind

is really just an illusion. It's a very

clever illusion and we think that we've

got a mind but the reality is that we

haven't. Is that um

yeah to of course that that then depends

on what you mean by illusion. So if by

illusion you mean something that reduces

to something else

then you'd say okay well in that case

the mind is an illusion. If you say an

illusion is something that isn't really

there, that doesn't really exist, then

that doesn't necessarily follow because

the in in that uh setup you still have

the appearance of a mind and that is

presumably doing something and that is

there. So the the the the existence and

the presence of the appearance

uh seems to be pretty um

pretty undoubtable. I mean there there

are people who who who

um worry about that as well and you get

this kind of illusionism about

consciousness where the idea is that

that is that that is simply illusory as

well. But if you for a moment stick to

the to the fact that consciousness at

least appears to you then of course the

the next question that arises is okay so

that might well be reducible to

something else. So that is is reducible

to um

phenomena but that doesn't mean that

it's not there doesn't have anything

specifically to do with the theories of

consciousness take colors right so we um

uh can make a fairly strong case for the

claim that colors aren't there in the

world independent of us because they

only get generated through the

interaction of stuff out there with our

particular visual system and the way our

eyes works and our our brain works and

so on. Right? So there isn't anything

out there in the world that is red. Uh

rather redness is a quality that arises

from the interaction of something out

there in the world say wavelengths of

lights or what have you and our specific

uh perceptual system. Right? So if you

took us and say all perceivers out of

the world then there would be no colors

and there would be no redness right.

Yeah. But that doesn't mean that once

you have a human being say uh nothing is

colored because you still have the

appearance of color and it just reduces

to something else. It is in fact not

some kind of primitive quality but it's

something that only arises as a complic

complex interaction from some stuff that

is outside and from some stuff that is

inside. So to that that extent on the

one hand yes red is illusory in so far

as it reduces to something else but it's

not illusory in so far it is still

appears right let me let me try to

clarify my question a bit when I talk

about something being illusurary and

whether the mind is illusurary I'm

referring really to to the idea of

epifenomenalism which my understanding

and I'm not a philosopher but my

understanding of it is that that matter

produces is the idea of a mind

rather as a kind of a byproduct.

And the way that you can see this quite

clearly is that um if it's merely

epifenomenal, if it's a if it's a

phenomenon of matter, then the mind

doesn't actually cause anything to

happen. Rather, it's the matter which

causes the mind to happen. So if I say

I'm going to make my hands raise in the

air like I just did, I think to myself

was doing that. But the reality is that

the mind doesn't cause anything. It was

determined by some laws of physics maybe

back before the beginning of the world

as it just playing itself out and it was

determined by some laws or other that

that's exactly what would happen at this

particular time. the mind didn't cause

it, but rather the materialism was the

cause of things.

Does that Yeah, that's that's right. So

the so the idea with with phenomenalism

is that you have some sort of underlying

base reality, say material reality here,

and then you've got some other

phenomenon sort of sits on top. So

that's the epiphenomenon, right? And the

important point about that scenario is

that causal relations only go one way,

right? So it's only going up from the

basis to the epiphenomenon. that's

causing the stuff but there's nothing

going down. Yeah. So that's what I meant

by illusion. We we think that it's going

down but it doesn't in reality right.

Yeah. So um uh yeah I'm I'm not sure

whether that is a good uh uh conception

in general to think of things being

illusory because we have many examples

where illusions have causal power.

Right? So just take two two at at

random. Say um assuming you dream of

some kind of imaginary scenario. You're

in a jungle um and being being chased by

a tiger. You lie in your bed sleeping.

What's your dream that? But because of

that dream, your heart heart rate goes

up, right? Because of the stress and the

adrenaline rush being chased by a tiger,

right? Okay. So here you think, well,

what is happening? Well, your mind is is

or your brain is generating the dream,

but then the dream has consequences on

the state of your physical body as

you're lying in bed, right? So, it seems

to be the case that that even though

it's illusory, it has causal powers. Yeah.

Yeah.

Uh take take another example. You see a

mirage in the desert that that is

presumably an illusion. There is no

water there. But the uh the um uh

illusion itself might have all kinds of

causal powers that generates specific

actions. For example, you might walk

into that direction because you see the

water over there rather than in the

other direction. Right. So it's causing

something to happen even though it is

only illusory. Yeah. So the the the

claim that if something is an illusion

then it doesn't do anything or it isn't

involved in causal processes or can't

cause uh any phenomena is perhaps not

the best way of getting to a general

idea of what it means for something to

be not real or something to be illusory.

Okay. So what would you say say the mind

is? I mean how how should we understand

it? As you say, most people take a most

philosophers seem to take a

materialistic point of view. Therefore,

what is the status of the mind

and consciousness correspondingly?

Right. Well, you have um of course two

obvious opposed positions on the table

here. Perhaps three with cartisian

dualism being in the middle. On the one

hand you have the you have the

materialist position where where matter

or the brain generates the mind. Then on

the other hand you've got the idealist

extreme where you say okay it's all

really mental and this then generates

the appearance of matter. Yeah. And then

of course you have you've got sort of

dualist halfway house positions where

you say well there's both material stuff

and there's mental stuff and then you

somehow have to um generate uh some kind

of interaction between the two in order

to see how it works. Right? So I'm

personally I'm I'm I'm not a fan of

either of these three positions. Now in

particular as um they

both of those all three of those assume

some kind of some kind of

foundationalism. They they assume that

you have some sort of base reality that

is really there that is that is is

fundamental and on which everything

rests and then you've got all the other

stuff that is generated from that. Yeah.

So um I'm more interested in and and

also more convinced by accounts

according to which you have all these

kinds of different things and they

condition one another. Right? So you've

got mental things and you've got

physical things and none of them is

reducible to another thing but they

depend on the on each other in complex

ways. So it is the brain that generates

the mental stuff. But then of course

without the mental stuff we don't have

certainly don't have any epistemic way

to any material. Right? So without um um

without us having a mind there is no way

that the world as it appears to us would

appear to us. Right? So these two seem

to be connected in sort of complex

interactions and and mutual dependence.

And in which case it wouldn't be the

case that you can simply reduce one to

some kind of foundation and then

everything else is sits on top of that

reduction base. So would you say that

there is no

ultimate foundation? We know I was

trained as a physicist and we started

off saying that there were such things

as molecules and then we reduced the

molecules down to atoms and elements and

then we reduced those down to nuclei and

protons and then below those we found

that there might be quarks and there

might be gluons and there may be things

below those as well. But this is rather

like that philosophical answer saying

that everything sits on the back of the

elephant and then the elephant sits on

the back of the turtle and what's below

the turtle and it goes on and on. Maybe

it's turtles all the way down, but you

know, um, or are you saying there isn't

a picture like that? That picture is a

fake or false picture, and we shouldn't

be beguiled by it.

Yeah. You see, there are um

there are basically two alternatives to

the kind of foundationalist picture that

you've that you've just presented. So um

on the foundational system you've got

some sort of rock bottom other material

rock bottom or some kind of mental rock

bottom of stuffs that that is just brute

is just there. There's no further

explanation for it and then everything

sits on top of that. Yeah. So um you've

got some kind of dependence base and

dependence relations all reduced to

that. Um now there are two different

alternatives to that picture. one is the

the one you've just mentioned where it's

dependence all the way down. Right? So

for every base layer you can find a more

fundamental base layer that one depends

on and that one depends on and that one

that one depends on. Right? And um that

is um u if you want to say have a have a

simple model of that you consider the

the um negative natural numbers -1 - 2

-3 and so on. they go all the way back

and for every negative number you can

find another one that is smaller and you

never reach the end of that sequence.

Yeah, but that isn't a problem. I mean,

you don't have to think, well, for all

these negative numbers to be there and

for one of them to be smaller than

another one, there has to be a smallest

negative number that sits at the bottom

of the of at the end of the chain,

right? There isn't. It goes all the way

back. Yeah. So, there in the same way,

you could think, okay, well, it's

dependence all the way around all the

way back. uh and there isn't a a

fundamental dependence level. Okay, so

that is that that is is one possibility.

The other possibility is to say well it

is basically a huge circle, right? So it

goes the dependence relations go all the

way around and so A depends on B and B

depends on C and so on and then you get

a really big arc and in the end it

closes back on itself. Right? Now um if

the if that circle is really big then it

might look to uh your limited

perspective like a line because you

don't actually see the other end and

where it closes back on itself. Um but

it might nevertheless be a kind of

circular dependent structure. Right? So

those are the kind two two main

alternative models that you can um uh

that you can oppose to this kind of

foundationalist system and I think

they're both quite quite interesting um

both intrinsically and also because they

haven't gotten that much air time in

metaphysics and ontology until

relatively recently because people were

often worried and said okay well isn't

there in the case of the of of the

infinite descent isn't that an infinite

regress which is going to lead us to a

contradiction somewhere and the similar

way with a circularity right you think

you'll you'll end up with something uh

that that ends up somewhere in saying

you know a and not a and then you've got

a problem but um I think people are now

fairly clear that this is not the case

and that these structures are all

consistent in the same way in which the

uh foundationalist system is consistent

meaning that you can't derive a

contradiction from them and then the

interesting question is you know which

ones work best in order to explain what

we want to explain, right? And uh then

you can say well if for example you you

consider the example of the body and the

mind then you have these various

foundationalist systems and all of them

come with specific problems and specific

uh difficulties and then you think okay

well perhaps we can we can solve the

issue better by considering

uh other possible structural approaches

in which this could work. So either this

kind of infinite descent of of of

dependence relations or a kind of

circular structure where it's not that

uh um everything depends on some

fundamental basis but where you have a

mutual interdependence of things in a

complex structure and in and in in a

kind of web where where you also get

I mean This has implications for the

whole program really of

theoretical physics of physics itself

because over the past 50 years or so

there's been a great push to obtain what

might be called the grand unified theory

which means to be able to explain

everything in terms of some fundamental elements

elements

particularly to unite gravity and

Einstein's general theory with quantum

mechanics because they don't seem to fit

terribly well together, but they're

looking for a grand theory which will

sit below there and then will it explain

everything. Now, would you say that such

a quest the actual program itself is

doomed to failure even before they the

search begins?

Well, I I I don't think as a as a

philosopher I really should put about

projects in physics. I mean I could but

I don't think this is this is a very

very sensible route to take. Um look I

mean there are

there are lots of different theoretical

approaches that are explored in physics

in particular when it comes to thinking

about the the very foundations of

reality. Some of which are

foundationalist some of which are

relationist and and so on. And um what

what works in the end only time will

tell. Um

I think what is what is important at at

this stage is to be to be aware of the

variety of different structures that

reality might have. So to make sure that

we at least have a more or less

comprehensive coverage of the way things

could be and that's certainly the the

kind of foundationalist approach which

is in many ways the the the

most natural one where you think okay

well nature is made just like like a

Lego structure out of Legos and all we

have to do is break it down down down

until we reach the smallest bricks and

then we can rebuild up everything from

there. that that is not the only way we

could explain things. Yeah. And then

whether the alternative approaches works

work better and so on is this is of

course a question which is then uh

subject to empirical confirmation not

not not simply armchair theorizing.

So how okay how do we how do we

determine let me put the question this

way. How do we determine or is there a

criterion of demarcation

between what is real and what is not

real? You know, one tends to think

building blocks, whatever they are, they

would be elements of reality as such.

But then the question that you're posing

really is what

is there a difference between the real

and the the unreal? Can we decide you

know what what category something falls

into? This is a category of being in the

real camp and this is a category of of a

notreal thing. Does such a criterion exist?

exist?

Yeah, there there are various in fact

there are various criteria here that you

can appeal to and some of which are of

course more

suitable or useful than others. So um if

you if you start at the at the most

basic level you you could say well um

what is real is

whatever appears to you and that's not

very satisfactory because all kinds of

illusory stuff can appear to you and you

might might uh make that a bit more

rigorous by saying okay so what is real

is what appears to more than one person

right so if I have an hallucination I

can ask my neighbor whether he sees the

same thing that I think when I when I

see a pink elephant floating in the sky

and if they see it too then perhaps I'm

more convinced that there really is a

pink elephant floating in course you're

assuming there is a neighbor as part of

that reality I mean we're really back to

daycart here aren't we you know the the

kito go some I I think therefore that's

the only reality that I can be assured

of the only thing which I can be

confident that really does exist is my

myself because I

Yeah, I I'm I'm not entirely sure

whether uh well whether that is even

getting us all we want to get. I mean

even even quite early on Lenbach made

the point that he thinks well all he can

really get at this stage is that there's

thinking going on right whether there's

a subject that does the thinking is of

course already an inference at least you

can have the you can have some kind of

process but whether the process comes

with a subject um is not so clear um

yeah so I mean I mean getting getting

back to to different ways of defining

this kind of division between the

illusory and and reality. So um inter

subjective agreement is not a very good

demarcation either simply because you

know you can have collective delusions

or collective hallucinations where

people would see the same illusory

thing. So um I think we're getting

somewhat into more interesting territory

when we are thinking of Dr. Johnson's

story and the stone when he you know

tried to tried to refute Barklayan

idealism by kicking a stone and saying I

refute it thus what is meant there is of

course that what is real puts some kind

of um push back to our desires and our

wishes right so we might want to uh be

able to put our hand through the wall

but when we do that we realize there's

obstruction there and that shows her

that the wall is real and not illusory

yeah um that's one of many definitions

of reality that you you provide in your

book reality, don't you? Yes, that is

one this is one way of thinking about

it. It's I I don't think it's it's it's

certainly better than the last two I've

just discussed, but it's uh also not

quite there simply because you uh uh can

be in situations where reality pushes

back and you're still in an illusory

situation. So you might be in a dream or

you might be playing a video game and

manipulating characters and you want to

do something and that doesn't work

because it uh the game is not programmed

that way and so on. So just the fact

that that you've got some sort of push

back doesn't mean that you are not in

some kind of illusory scenario. So I

think the two two main uh criteria that

really work much better are um uh uh one

of which we've we've already talked

about is in terms of dependence chains.

So when we say okay so if if something

depends on another thing for example

like an like an effect depends on its

cause or like an structure that is made

of parts depends on its parts then what

is real is what you get when you go down

the dependence chain. Right? So if you

if you trace back the chain of causes

you get to you the further you go back

the more and more real it get or if you

if you trace a thing back to its parts

then the parts are more real than the

whole. So in putting it a bit more

abstract you would want to say well what

is real is where all these dependence

chains stop right whether these are part

whole dependencies or causal

dependencies and so on you trace them

back to their source and that's that's

what is real and everything else is

really just a construction from that. So

that that is one way of um

of conceiving of of of what is real and

what is me merely appearance. Another

way that I think we've also alluded to

at least um is the uh is mind

independence. Right? So if you imagine

you took all of the observers or humans

or animals want everything that has a

mind out of the universe and then you

ask yourself okay so what would be left

and all of that is left that is real and

everything else is just a mind-made

construct right so to that extent you

would want to say well if you take all

these these perceivers out then

certainly all colors would be gone and

all smells and all tastes and perhaps

moral properties and so on and so on but

that uh presumably still you know electrons

electrons

uh and

atoms and so on. So to that extent you

have really two

criteria I think that that are really

fundamental in this discussion about

what is real and what what is not. One

is mind independence and the second one

is where the dependence chain stops.

There's a there's a third element there

because I think Barkley would have said

that even if you take all the humans out

that there is no mind to perceive

there's still the mind of God which

maintains everything in the background. Yeah.

Yeah.

But I'm not sure if that's a red herring

on this this particular Well, I mean,

you see that that is that that was

essential for Barklayan idealism because

if you reduce everything to ideas in

minds, then uh you might not want to

reduce it just to ideas in my mind and

in your mind, but you need something

more fundamental or less subjective and

even less interubjective than that and

that is the mind of God for in in in the

Bian system right other than other than

of course the idea that if you if you

take that to its logical extreme then

you end up with what's called solivism

don't you that's the idea that only

minds exist but really only my mind

exists and there is nothing else in the

entire universe other than me. Mhm.

You've written about about that. What's

your what's your view of solitism as a

as a coherent philosophical view?

Yeah, that is that's quite interesting.

I mean, this is of course the the the um

uh logical extreme of an idealist

position, right? So you first of all you

start with a world with stuff in it and

then you reduce it all to mind and then

you ask yourself okay well but other

people of course like you know you and

and and and so on they are external

objects as well and if I got rid of the

table and the chair and say that's just

mental then you are just mental too but

you're just mental in my mind right and

so then everything gets shrunk together

into um uh into one mind and um then you

have then you say might say to yourself,

okay, so the only thing that's really

real is me and my ideas and and stuff

that's happening in my mind and then

you've got the solidist conception.

Yeah. Now um uh of course this is

usually not regarded as a very plausible

or attractive philosophical position. So

apparently there are no philosophers who

take this view apparently. Um so well I

mean there should only be one of course

there should only be one but we don't

know who it is a figment of their

imagination I suppose. Apparently, one

person according to John Zo wrote to um

wrote to uh um Bertrram Russell and said

that I am a soypist I've discovered and

I'm so happy about and I don't know why

more people aren't that way inclined but

um join the soypist society.

Uh yeah. So I mean take take into

account though that um um when we think

about our arguments for why there are

actually other minds than our own minds

um we usually use an argument from

analogy. Right? So how do I know that

you have a mind? Well I see that you

have a body and that you carry out

certain behavior and say you speak and

you raise your hand and and things like

that. And then I think okay so probably

you are more or less like me and so when

I raise my hand there is be just before

that there's some stuff going on in my

mind my intention to raise my hand so I

think when you are raising your hand

it's probably the case that there's

something happening in your mind as well

because I don't make you raise your

hands I just see your hand going up so I

assume by analogy you being more or less

like me that there's also some something

going on in your mind. Yeah. So that's

that's usually the the the argument how

we can infer that other people around us

are not zombies but that they actually

have minds. Yeah. Now this inferential

rule is of course open to the soypist

right. I mean he or she can also think

that well by analogy I assume that there

are other people with other minds

precisely on the basis of the same data

that we get as well. Right? So um even

if we think on in in for various reasons

that that solypism is an unsatisfactory

position it's still the case that we

don't have direct access to anybody's

mind either right I can't look into your

mind and see that you have one I can

only infer it and the way I infer it

would be exactly the same mechanism that

a soypist would use in order to infer

that they are the minds yeah So um the

so the the the existence of other minds

is really something which uh is it comes

at the end of a chain of inference. It's

not a piece of data that we could just

take. So solypism cannot be refuted is

what you're saying. Whatever evidence is

presented nothing can actually refute

it. You simply have to either believe it

or not I suppose. Um yeah, I mean it's

the the question is of course whether

that's usually the way you pick or

decide between different philosophical

positions, right? So, and there's there

was a there's an interesting passage in

in in in Robert Nosik where where he's

wondering about that and says okay so um

so what what does it actually take to

refute a philosophical argument and um

of course you know few philosophers are

convinced by arguments that try to

refute what they believe and you think

okay well the best thing would be a kind

of you know philosophical argument that

if somebody who

if you present the proof to them and

they they don't see they don't agree

agree to is then their mind explodes.

Right? So this is you know the ultimate

reputation. So if you don't if if you

don't agree to the argument then you die

now that that is of course not how it

works in philosophy and I certainly

haven't come across an argument that

would be that powerful. Usually what you

say is you have various philosophical

views um that can explain certain

certain phenomena and all of them come

with explanatory benefits things they

can explain and they come with with

costs. So there's certain assumptions

you have to make in order to get the

theory to go right and what you do is

usually you try to do some kind of

weighing between the things you need to

accept. So the the philosophical costs

of the view and the what it delivers the

the benefits what it can explain. Yeah.

And then you you will find uh a lot of

people saying well I mean with with kind

of soypism it's just not such an

attractive position. Right. You uh uh

I'm just not willing to make the kinds

of assumptions that you need to make in

order to take these positions. And I

think I wouldn't really

um assume that it's a particularly um e

either interesting or explanatory

position to take on reality to thinkers

will just spinning out of my mind. Yeah.

So that's one way in which you can say

you you refute the position but not

because you find some kind of you know

logical flaw in it and say it reduces to

a contradiction or because you say well

if you don't believe in that then your

mind is going to explode but simply by

saying look um there there are costs

benefits in in theoretical terms to this

view and I think in in the balance it

doesn't come out as strong as others and

I'd rather uh believe in the existence

of other minds than not. I I've always

felt that the difference between philosophy

philosophy

and science, if we take if we take

Popper's definition of science for the

moment, that it's that which is

falsifiable, potentially falsifiable

statements. Philosophy doesn't contain

any potentially falsifiable statements.

It's not refutable in that sense. You

can only test it through its logical

consistency, not through reputation or

falsifiability in the scientific sense.

And that could be a in my view a de a

demarcation between philosophy and

science. Would you go along with that?

No, I don't think so. I mean the the um

the difficulty is that um the uh the way

um evidence and beliefs are linked up

with one another is I think a lot more a

lot more complex. So the the the Quin

has has the metaphor there of the web of

belief, right? So the the idea is that

our our beliefs and what we what we take

to be true about the world and our um

beliefs about what we perceive and so

on. So they are they are interconnected

in a complex web of confirmation and and

disisconfirmation. Yeah. And um usually

if you say okay so if you get some uh

evidence coming in that contradicts your

predictions. You you think you the

experiment should say that but in fact

it says something else. Then you're

going to adjust your beliefs. Right?

This is kind of a falsification route.

You make the assumption first and then

you falsify it. you assume the opposite

of it and then you continue. Uh why do

you do that? Well, in order to make the

system consistent again, right? So you

you it predicted a and then you get the

get the data not a. Um if you take that

on as a belief, then you believe in a

and not a that's obviously problematic

because you want to be consistent. So

because you can't change um uh you can't

change the input, you're changing the

beliefs that you have. So that is

basically the falsificationist position.

However, what makes it more complicated

is in order to ensure consistency in the

system, there are all kinds of changes

you can make, right? One change you can

make is of course you say, okay, well,

it looks as if the the experimental

results says that, but I actually don't

think that that device you're using here

is quite reliable. That's a bug

actually. It shouldn't be saying that,

right? So, we we restore consistency by

saying, well, that thing is actually a

bit dodgy. We need another apparatus. We

try that again, right?

or there are other places within the web

of belief that you can tweak in order to

restore consistency. Some of these will

be extremely eccentric and unattractive.

And the the ex the the extreme that you

can see in this in this conception is

say if you look at con conspiracy

theories, right? Whatever evidence you

produce, there is a way of immunizing

the the theory against that stuff,

right? So um so to that extent you can

you can restore consistency no matter

what comes in as an information. That is

of course not a um not a general

cognitive strategy either. I mean what

you want is kind of a good good balance

between uh taking account of the

evidence but also being aware of the

fact that the evidence might be

deceptive and that there might be a bug

in the apparatus or you might have set

up the experiment in a in in a dodgy way

and that you therefore want to hold on

to your theory a little bit longer and

don't just ditch it at the first

recalculant piece of data. Right? So to

that extent it's um uh the I mean the

the whole question of of of whether you

regard some data as fortificatory or not

is not simply coming

from the data saying okay so we've got

you because you've got that data you you

have to change your beliefs but you

rather want to say okay so how do I

balance the entire web of my beliefs in

in a way that it's both consistent but

also presents the best explanation of

the data that are coming in. Yeah, we're

moving here away from Papa towards

Thomas aren't we? Because he talks

about this whole structure, this this

web which which a bit like a paradigm

which which predisposes your your views

of the world in a particular way and it

takes a huge shift sometimes a

generational shift to move away from one

one picture one set of beliefs to

another set of beliefs. It can be quite

revolutionary. Yeah, that's right.

Right. So this is K is Thomas K is one

example and Paul fire is another

philosopher of science who uh were not

convinced by this falsificationist

picture. I think in in general um uh if

you take this kind of web of belief uh

account on board then you get much

closer in sort of structured uh to what

when you compare philosophical theories

and and um um scientific theories

because in kind of philosophical

theories you there are also particular

problems and puzzles you want to solve

right so you want to you know you've got

something like the ship of thesis you

know is the is still the same same ship

if you replace all the planks or you've

got the question you know are moral

values out there or is it just what I

find disagreeable or or agreeable and so

on so you've got these kind of puzzles

or problems and then you tend to try to

come up with a theory that explains them

and gives you an answer in one way or

another and does that in a sort of

systematic way and usually there are

various theories that that that can do

that and they often contradict each

other and then how do you pick well The

best way of picking is by saying okay so

for this theory to work you have to

assume a b and c and for that other

theory you to work you have to assume d

and e and f and which one do you think

is the more attractive package to uh to

accept in terms of the theoretical costs

that you run by making these assumptions

and the explanatory power you gain by

solving the puzzles. Right? And then

it's the the the question is just not

what refutes what but what overall

presents the best deal. And of course

that doesn't mean that there are not a

lot of approaches that are ruled out in

this way because often you can say well

that approach is definitely not as good

as that one so we're not going to take

that but then we have two others here

and that might then be a draw. Yeah.

Yeah. So that in that in that way the

the the the discussion is a lot more

holistic than just saying okay which

argument is refuted by which other

argument. Okay. Now I know that you've

studied Buddhist teachings quite

extensively. I just wonder how has that study

study

informed your view of reality or or

affected your view of reality?

Right. Well, of course, in in in

Buddhist philosophy and also in Buddhist

philosophy in India, which is is ma

mainly what what I've I've worked on in

the past, you get all sorts of different

views of reality, right? So, they don't

even though they are all Buddhists, they

don't all have the same philosophical

position. Yeah. So you have um uh people

who believe that there basically a kind

of fundament kind of foundationalism is

true that there basic objects out of

which everything is made. Then you've

got others who believe that everything

is mental only and everything is only a

mental construction. And then you've got

a third group of of of philosophers who

think that um mind isn't fundamentally

real either. But in fact, you've got

this kind of complex uh web of things

one one thing dependent on another. And

so there is actually nothing that is uh

um um substantial or independent, but

you've got sort of one one complex web

of things depending on each other. So um

I mean in my in my uh study of these

systems I I was you know first of all

interested in

connecting them up with much of the

discussion that we find in in

contemporary metaphysics and

epistemology and so on because it it

struck struck me certainly as when when

I studied started studying these

materials that they were often treated

very much in in isolation or were were

studied primarily arily from a uh from a

philological uh point of view or from

from a religious studies point of view

um but not so much taking them uh taking

them seriously philosophically and

asking yourself okay so what are the

arguments that these people present and

are the arguments actually good ones and

does the does the conclusion follow from

the premises and so on. So this is what

what what what um interested me in in in

working in these materials in in the

first place, seeing so so how how uh

there is actually potential for

developing that um systematically and um

I then got particularly interested in um

certain ideas of basically non

non-foundationalist ontology. which

which are developed quite extensively in

Indian um philosophical Indian Buddhist

philosophical materials and and and

their later Asian successes.

And um whilst that is whilst these

constitute ideas that you do find to

some extent in the western philosophical

tradition, it was never very prominent

there. Yeah. And then I thought okay so

this is quite interesting in in in terms

of developing philosophical positions of

course we we we want to you know explore

all the kind of theoretical

possibilities and see okay so if if if

something doesn't work what else could

be working and as such it struck me that

this presents a really interesting

alternative way of thinking about um

phenomena and something that could well

be developed in a purely systematic

manner and so this is what partly what

I've been trying to to do in this uh

book the non-existence of the real world

which is really taking some ideas from

uh the the Indian philosophical uh

tradition so in particular a school a

school called Madyamaka and trying to

develop that in a purely systematic

manner so saying so so saying not the

the justification is that it says

something in the text but you say okay

we'll start with specific fundamental

ideas and then see how we can develop

systematic developments of these kinds

of conclusions and can you summarize the

the teaching of that miamaka is it um

yeah so the the I think the fundamental

idea of of madamaka is um a kind of anti-foundationalism

anti-foundationalism

right so they argue against the position

that there are any entities that exist

with intrinsic nature so things that

have their existence their being their essence

essence

just by themselves without depending on

other things. Right? So this is

relatively close to what in the western

conception you uh associate with certain

ideas of substance. Right? So substance

start to to stand beyond. So it's that

kind of stuff which sits at the bottom

and then everything all the accidents

all the properties and so on and then

build on top of that. Yeah. So if you

say there are no substances then of

course you get back to the very problem

that we had earlier on. So whether it's

either turtles all the way down or it's

some kind of some kind of big loop and

um so the so the developing the further

consequences of this idea that you don't

have a foundation

within reality and you don't have a

foundation in in epistemology either. So

you don't have uh fundamental or basic

beliefs that are not grounded in

anything else either. Trying to develop

the consequences of that is basically a

a large part of the systematic

development of of madamaka thought.

I have only come across one physicist in

in my own physics background who took

eastern or let's say um that kind of

approach seriously and that was when I

did my PhD which was with David Bow in

college he used to have lots of

discussions with um Krishna Mertie and

and others too and seeking to find some

kind of um unity of thought between the

two or or at least one side informing

the other. Would you say that that um

the philosophy the Buddhist philosophy

that you've been thinking has something

specific to add to western thought that

we should take particular notice of?

Uh yeah. So I mean there has has been a

lot more interested in these uh uh

connection since the times of of David B

and and the tower physics and all of

these kind of um um earlier works. I

mean one um

example I've got that right here is in

Carlo Roi you know Helgoland I've got

that book. You've got that book and then

did a brief review of it on on YouTube.

Exactly. Okay. And then you'll realize

that um um in uh chapter five there is a

section called without foundations

Nagarajuna. Naggina is of course the the

founder of the school of Madyamaka that

we've just been talking about. And so

Ralli is is looking at the the extent to

which this kind of relationism

uh um uh which he is interested in in in

quantum physics can be related to

Negarina's idea that you don't have any

substances. Right? So there you have a

um an interesting dialogue there. That

is of course not that not to say that

you know they've they've already

discovered um quantum physics in second

century India. That would be absurd. The

idea is rather that we are looking for

theoretical models in order to explain

stuff that we want to explain now by

looking at intellectual traditions. And

this is this is this is what he's doing

there. Um another good example where

where these uh um connections are

explored is is a French physicist called

Michelle Bitbull. um he's published

mainly in French, not so much much in

English, but um he has al also um

presented quite a lot of interesting

material in in in looking at the

interconnection between these Madiama

ideas that um uh we've been talking

about and and and quantum physics. So

again, I think why this is interesting

is not some kind of philosophy science

vindication where you say okay well the

scientists say it too and therefore the

philosophy must be true. It's rather the

idea that you get specific philosophical

perspectives in these text that might

help you in order to generate a kind of

theoretical framework to explain what

you want to explain. Yeah. And that is I

think is interesting and if it's done in

a responsible way also quite

illuminating. Well, we're we're coming

to to the end of our time together.

Yeah. But I wanted to ask you if I may

one one last question which is more more

focused on your particular thoughts

having having studied

many of these different ideas. Now what

what is Yan Wester's view of conception

of reality as close as you can you can

define it.

Right. I I I put you on the spot a

little bit. No, no, no, no. I I think

the the of course the the short answer

it's it's a lot more complicated than we

have thought. Um I mean I don't I I

don't want to pretend that I've figured

it all out already and I that would be a

little bit boring perhaps because then

what else am I going to do with the rest

of my life? Um so um I mean what I what

I think has emerged from this from um

the discussion that we had so far is

that um there are a lot more theoretical

options out there about what kind of

structure reality could have. And some

of them are really underexplored and uh

deserve a lot more airtime in seeing how

they might be able to solve the

theoretical puzzles that we are

interested in. Yes. But but let me pin

you down further. What what of those

particular models would you choose if

you were forced to make a choice as to

this is what I think reality is really

at? It's either all mind or it's all

materialism or it's neither one or the

other or it's interactionism between the

two or it's I I don't know what would

you say is your closest understanding of

what reality really comes down to. Okay.

So there such a thing. Yeah. No. Okay.

This is I think the the um the there are

two two parts to the answer of this

question. So the first is of course that

you that if you assume that there are no

ultimately real objects then there's

also a good case to be made that there

are no ultimate truth either right and

so to that extent if you the the

question you know what what do you think

is really real or what what's the final

answer or what is the ultimate truth of

the onlogical structure of reality also

presupposes that there is such a thing

and that they specific facts about those

and if you deny that then the whole

question is uh is unfounded. Okay, so

that was the first part. Now the second

part is however if you think okay so

taking that into account and without

assuming that any of these um uh of

these models are reflective of the way

reality is fundamentally.

Um which one do you think is the best in

terms of comparison with all the others?

And uh there I would say well remember

we we talked about the the the tri of

foundationalism dependence all the way

down and the circular system is the the

what I'd be most interested in and I

think has has the the most theoretical

potential is the final one is is the the

circular structure where you have an

ontology of entities that are

interconnected in a web of dependence

and where they depend on one one another

where not necessarily everything depends

on everything else But everything

depends on some other thing. Yeah. So

that that is what my best bet would be.

That's a kind of bootstrap argument that

everything pulls itself up into reality.

That's right. Yan Weserov, thank you

very much indeed for your time today and

uh a probing into what reality may or

may not be, but thank you very much

indeed. Well, thank you very much,

Philip, to for inviting me. I really

enjoyed the conversation. [Music]

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YouTube Transcript:What is Real and What is not Real? with Prof Jan Westerhoff

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What is Real and What is not Real? with Prof Jan Westerhoff