The world has entered a new, concerning nuclear era characterized by the expiration of arms control treaties and revelations of clandestine nuclear testing, necessitating a reassessment of global nuclear strategy and deterrence.
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Last week was full of big news on the
nuclear front. The New START arms
controlled treaty expired. The United
States Department of State accused China
of conducting nuclear tests. These are
big stories that I don't think got a lot
of attention. Certainly not the
attention they deserve. So today we
welcome Matt Cronig back to the show to
help us understand this strange
concerning new nuclear era that humanity
has just entered. Let's get into it.
>> It is a prescription for war. Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.
>> December 7th, 1941.
A date which will live in infamy. The
bloody experience of Vietnam is to end
in a statement. We continue to face the
grave situation in Iran.
>> The people who knock these buildings down.
down.
>> We shall fight on the beaches. We shall
fight on the landing grounds. We shall
fight in the fields and in the streets.
Hi, I'm Aaron Mlan. Thanks for joining
School of War. I am delighted to welcome
back to the show today, Professor Matt
Cronig. He is a professor at Georgetown
where he teaches in the department of
government in the Edund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service. He's also the vice
president and senior director of the
Atlantic Council Skraftoft Center for
Strategy and Security. He is an expert
on nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy,
the author of numerous books on that
subject. And Matt, you are here today to
discuss with us what was a pretty huge
week in uh in nuclear news. Thank you so
much for coming on School of War.
>> Thanks very much for having me, Erin.
It's always a pleasure to be back and
big big week indeed. We have a lot to discuss.
discuss.
>> So, a lot happened. There was um uh
there was a a kind of a barn burner of a
speech from a senior American diplomat
named Thomas Dano um out in Geneva. I
realize you don't you don't hear things
like um senior diplomat and barn burner
of a speech um in combination very
often, but I I actually think it was
like it was it was quite a speech um
about the future of uh of America's
attitude towards arms control and
nuclear weapons. Um you had obviously
the expect expiration of the New START
treaty, which we can talk about what
that was and what that means. But then
the thing that that caught my eye and
what what immediately made me want to
pick up the phone and call you, Matt,
was sort of buried a little bit in all
of that news was, and again, forgive
forgive the expression, but a bombshell
revelation um uh that China uh has been
conducting nuclear tests. And this
really did not get I think the attention
that I think it deserved. I think I saw
it on something like page eight of the
Wall Street Journal print edition. Um
which yes, I do I do subscribe to the
Wall Street Journal print edition. So
you can you can infer from that what you
like. But um we I I want to start us
there and let me just read us I'll read
the paragraph from the speech where Dano
um makes this claim. He says, "Today I
can reveal that the US government is
aware that China has conducted nuclear
explosive tests, including preparing for
tests with designated yields in the
hundreds of tons. The PLA sought to
conceal testing by obfuscating the
nuclear explosions because it recognized
these tests violate testban commitments.
China has used decoupling, a method to
decrease the effectiveness of seismic
monitoring to hide their activities from
the world. China conducted one such
yield producing nuclear test on June
22nd of 2020. Matt, what does all of
this mean?
>> Well, it's a big deal, um, Erin, for a
number of reasons. Uh, first, new start.
um uh expiration. You know, there's been
uh binding bilateral arms control
agreements between the United States and
the Soviet Union and then Russia since
the early 1970s. Uh so this is the first
time in in essentially a half century uh
that there have not been binding arms
control agreements uh between the United
States and Russia. Um I think it's a
good thing on balance and we can talk
about that. Uh but then the uh nuclear
testing um essentially since the end of
the cold war the major nuclear powers uh
have not conducted explosive tests. Uh
you had um North Korea a rogue state
that conducted a series of tests. Uh but
there was a moratorium in place among
the major powers and there has been
speculation over the years that maybe
Russia and China were cheating using
this decoup decoupling method that we
can talk about. Um but what was notable
about Dano's speech is uh he said
publicly for the first time that we know
that China is doing this and really
interesting put an exact date on it
which seems to suggest that we have
pretty good intelligence and put the
Chinese on notice that their efforts to
keep this secret from us are are not
working. Uh so um I think there's a lot
to uh unpack here and we are um you know
I guess bottom line up front is we are
entering a new nuclear uh age um like
we've never experienced before where we
need to deal with two nuclear
superpowers Russia and China at the same time.
time.
>> So I want to I want to kind of take each
piece of the situation that you just
outlined uh and go into more detail on
it but let's let's stick with the
testing for a moment. Um
what are the origins of the moratorum on
nuclear testing? There is a treaty
architecture there, right? But it's not
ratified. What but but even before we
get to the legality of everything like
why why once upon a time did people want
to stop testing nuclear weapons?
>> Well, the um main reason to conduct a
nuclear test is to uh test the design of
your nuclear warhead and the physics
package. uh and during the cold war the
United States and the Soviet Union
conducted uh many tests uh to perfect
their nuclear weapon design and uh try
to make the design more efficient, get
larger yield, uh lighter weight warheads
and and so on. Um by the end of the cold
war, well actually let me go back. Um
and then during the cold war there were
several arms control agreements on the
way limiting uh types of nuclear
testing. So it used to be countries
would uh conduct atmospheric nuclear
testing. Uh and then with the limited
testban treaty after shortly after the
Cuban missile crisis uh the United
States and the Soviet Union agreed to
only do underground testing. Um uh but
by the end of the cold war there was a
sense that the United States and the
Soviet Union had done all the test uh
that they needed to do. Uh the nuclear
era was behind us and there was this
effort to negotiate a comprehensive test
ban treaty uh that would um ban all um
nuclear test above and and below ground.
Um and many of the major powers signed
up for this. Uh the United States and
China never ratified. um Bill Clinton
wanted to ratify, but uh Republicans in
the Senate uh were opposed and in part
precisely because of this issue that's
come to light in the past few days. They
were worried that we wouldn't be able to
verify the agreement that Russia and
China would be able to cheat. Um so the
United States never ratified and
nevertheless the major powers agreed to
respect this uh moratorum uh where they
would not conduct um tests that uh
produced an explosive yield. Um and
again speculation over the years that
Russia and China have been cheating uh
on this moratorum and um just in the
past couple of days it's become clear
that uh yeah China has in fact been been cheating.
cheating.
>> If you wanted to hide a nuclear
explosion I mean I guess burying it
underground is a start but what what is
this decoupling method? You know if you
if you want to do a test and hope the
world doesn't see what are you what are
you um what are you up to?
>> Yes. Uh so the main way uh the
international community uh detects uh
nuclear explosions is through a system
of seismic monitoring. Uh so there's a
comprehensive testban treaty
organization uh that uh operates uh this
system of seismic monitors all over the
world. So it's essentially the same uh
technique you would use to detect an
earthquake. Uh because if you conduct an
underground nuclear test uh that's a big
explosion, the earth shakes and and you
pick it up on uh these seismic monitors.
Um and so um you know to get into the
jargon here, you know, the uh nuclear
explosion is coupled with the
surrounding uh earth that shakes the
earth and it's picked up on these
seismic monitors. uh this decoupling
method that Dano talked about and that
uh you know uh Republican senators
worried about back in the 1990s is well
if you uh dig a big underground cavern
uh and conduct a nuclear explosion it's
possible to decouple that explosion from
the surrounding earth uh so you don't
get the big uh seismic uh waves that
picked up on the detectors and so Dano
said that China has been using that
method to conduct underground explosions
in a way that are not detectable with
this seismic monitoring system.
>> And can we speculate, you know, where
this might have occurred? I mean, do we
know where the Chinese testing
facilities are? Like put some some color
on this uh even if it has to be
speculative to a degree.
>> Yeah. So, the Chinese have had a ma main
nuclear testing area, the Laor testing
area going back to the days of Mao Dong.
Um and um over the years um uh US
government has said uh that given
activity around the LPN test site we
have concerns about whether China is um
abiding by its moratorium on on testing.
Uh so presumably using other technical
means the US government was picking up
activity at the site that they thought
may be uh consistent with um nuclear
testing. Uh and um Dano in his uh speech
just a couple of days ago did mention
this Lopnor um test site. Uh and so you
know United States has a testing range
out in the the west the Nevada uh test
range. Uh and so similar in in China
it's an outlying uh area far away from
major cities uh where you can you know
do things like conduct nuclear
explosions without bothering the
neighbors. roughly when did America um
stop testing its own weapons? When did
that actually come to an end?
>> Yeah, that's a good question. I' I'd
have to um double check, but um you
know, during the Cold War, the United
States conducted a lot. I think in the
hundreds of nuclear tests, first
atmospheric and then below ground. Uh
and and I do think it was up until the
uh near the end of the cold war that the
United States uh conducted um test. And
as again, as long as the arms control or
the uh uh nuclear arms competition was
going on with the the Soviet Union, you
know, having a a modern effective
nuclear force was of course a top
national security priority. And I guess
that's the crux of the issue, isn't it?
is I mean and I'm I'm not an expert in
how you make a nuclear bomb but I expect
that with as with every other kind of
technology even if the basic principle
of nuclear explosions probably hasn't
undergone an enormous amount of
evolution uh in our lifetimes probably a
lot of other things about how you make
these bombs has and so how do you really
know at the end of the day if it's all
going to work as a whole system if you
don't test it and that's the advantage
that the Chinese and I guess we've also
we we We we were under the impression
the Russians as well but but this
particular moment with the Chinese
asserted specifically by the Trump
administration they have this advantage
that they are testing. So they know they
know what's working and what doesn't
work in their own systems that
contributes to their ability to deter
that contributes to their confidence
that should um it come to an exchange
their stuff's going to work. And that's
why I guess the president has said he
wants to he wants to test. What are the
pros and cons of of the United States
embarking on this new testing regime,
which we seem to be about to do?
>> Yeah. Well, first on, uh what the
Chinese gain, you're you're right that
they have more uh confidence that
there's uh work. Um but then also, um if
you want a new warhead design, um if you
want to try something that's a larger
yield or more efficient, um you really
do need to test for that. and and so um
China may have more of a reason to test
than the United States because we do
have more of a test uh record during the
Cold War. They were a little bit later
to the game. Uh and so I suspect that uh
China is doing this not just to make
sure everything works, but because it's
experimenting with new types of uh
weapons designs. Um and so as it relates
to to the United States then uh pros and
cons of a return to testing. Um, you
know, one, all all the uh, you know, I'm
a political scientist, not a uh nuclear
engineer, but all the nuclear engineers
agree that if the United States wanted
new designs, we would have to return to
testing. Now, there's no one calling for
new designs right now. Um, I personally
don't think it's needed, but if we did
want new designs, uh, we'd have to test.
Uh, and so the question then gets to to
yours of can we be sure that everything
works? And here the scientific community
is somewhat, uh, divided. Uh so Lawrence
Slivermore uh has the most advanced
supercomputer in the world or or maybe
they're number two right now. They go
back and forth with the Chinese. Uh but
one of the things they do with that
supercomputer is uh conduct a simulated
nuclear uh explosions using uh test data
from uh from the past. And some of the
scientists I've talked to there say
actually these computer simulations are
even better than real tests because with
real tests you're blowing up some of
what you want to study. Uh, and so, uh,
they say we never need to return to
testing again. Um, other scientists I
talked to, um, elsewhere say, well, no,
of course we'd have to test at some
point. You know, you think your car is
going to start in the morning, but until
you turn the key, you you really can't
um, know. So, I think those are some of
the uh, uh, potential advantages if we
need new warhead designs, just making
sure that it works. There are also cons
as well, potentially, but um, I've been
going on for a while, so I'll pause
there. Well, no, no, no. This is
interesting. So, the I mean I mean these
are these are all what the real
significance of the week is is it
punctuates and emphasizes trends that
have been developing for years now, but
all of a sudden it's just we woke up
last week and it was all just real that
we are in this new age of at this moment
uh unconstrained legally unconstrained
uh nuclear competition with Russia and
China. Um uh and not not to mention the
North Koreans and there there's there's
other factors but the the major players
are the United States, Russia and China.
Um and so let's let's stick with this
question of new designs. I mean this is
you know I I think for a lot of people
the notion that you would need the new I
think a lot of people appreciate the
fact that the development of nuclear
weapons during the Cold War got to the
point where there are weapons that can
level whole cities a single blast. I
mean, if they know a little bit more,
they know that, you know, there are
warheads um uh you know, there there are
missiles that can deliver multiple
warheads. So, it's harder to even if
you're going to attempt to intercept
things, it's hard to intercept. So, the
people are generally aware that we can
kill cities and the Russians can kill
cities. Now, the Chinese can kill cities
if they want to. And so, with that fact
on the table, it might be reasonable to
ask, well, why on earth would you need
more or different? Like, what what what
further um advance as it were? um uh is
necessary when you already have that
capability. And it sounds like you you
sort of agree though maybe for different
reasons. Explain your position why we
don't need design new designs in this
new era of competition, but also give us
a sense of why those who argue that we
do like what what would be useful about
new designs.
>> Yes. Well, and it's important to
distinguish between um the delivery
vehicle and the nuclear warhead and the
explosive package in the warhead. uh and
and so I do think that we need new and
and different kinds of um delivery
vehicles uh for the uh moment we're uh
entering into. And so there is a plan
underway to modernize our strategic
bombers, modernize our intercontinental
ballistic missiles, modernize our
submarines. Um I also think that we need
new um theater-based um nuclear systems.
Um but that's not constrained by this
testing moratorum. We've always been
able to test delivery systems. Uh and so
uh then when it comes to the physics
package as you rightly point out uh you
know during the cold war uh we designed
a a lot of different types of um uh
nuclear warheads um including kind of
dial yield where we could make them very
low yield very high yield. So I just
think when it comes to the the physics
package we don't need anything new there
and and I don't think there's anybody
really calling for new physics packages.
I I think the real debate is over uh
numbers of of warheads and um what kinds
of delivery vehicles they're deployed on
and also where they're deployed. Um do
we need more in Europe and Asia for example?
example?
>> The other part of the news uh from the
week obviously was the expiration of of
new start. There have been um gestures
in the directions in the direction of um
of extending it in some fashion. I mean,
obviously, um, we have the State
Department saying very emphatically,
"This is dead." But I, you know, back
during that round of, um, negotiations
with the Russians over the war in
Ukraine back in whenever that was, one
loses track, November, I think, was this
headline in the in the points of the of
the uh, of the peace terms that leaked
to the press. One of them involved um,
the extension of I think they actually
got the name wrong. I think they meant
new start, but they said they say salt
or something like that. Yeah, but but
they meant new they meant they meant the
extension of new start. Um and then you
hear I it's like every day there's new
new headlines. It's very hard to track,
but you hear, you know, mentions that
no, we're going to continue to enforce
the restrictions as sort of a a
handshake agreement between the United
States and Russia. So say if you would a
few words to eulogize New Start, uh uh
its its its qualities, but also its
warts. um and say a word about where
things actually stand today in terms of
the future of arms control.
>> So first I think there is value uh to
arms control and um there there are a
number of benefits. Um you know US
strategic command commanders have said
that they like the certainty that it
gives them in terms of Russian uh forces
and what they need to plan against. Uh
there are these verification measures
that give us more uh insight into what
the Russians are are doing. um and does
I think um um you know it did uh
constrain um the the uh arms competition
during the cold war. You know at the
peak the United States and the Soviet
Union both had tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons and so putting a cap on
that I think was um helpful. Um but it's
it's now um and I guess a final benefit
when everything else was um rocky in the
USRussia relationship that was one area
where diplomats could get together and
and talk and agree on things. Um but but
I think it has come to the uh end of its
uh useful life and the main reason is
because of China's rapid nuclear
buildup. Uh and um you know I was um
appointed by Congress to a strategic
posture commission a couple of years
ago. Uh and this was the central
question really assigned to us by
Congress is what does China's massive
nuclear buildup mean for American
nuclear strategy? Um and essentially the
conclusion that we came to is that to
deter China and Russia at the same time,
you know, essentially two peer powers
because China is projected to have 1500
nuclear weapons by 2035. Uh so that's
right there with the new start limits.
Um so this is new. uh you know never
before has the United States had to deal
with two peer nuclear superpowers at the
same time. Uh and essentially we
concluded that the uh current and
planned nuclear forces are necessary but
not sufficient. Uh that we are going to
need a larger andor different nuclear
force to deal with Russia and China at
the same time. So that's the first
important starting point. The purpose of
nuclear weapons of course is to deter
nuclear war not to have treaties for its
own sake. And so the experts think that
to deter nuclear war, we need a bigger
nuclear force and new start doesn't
allow us to do that. So it's getting in
the way of our security goals, not
advancing them. We've talked on the show
before about the Chinese nuclear buildup
um and the strategy behind it. We had a
great conversation maybe a year ago now
with Dan Blumenthal and Kyle Balzer who
wrote some really smart stuff on what
China is up to with its nuclear weapons
and how it fits into their non-uclear
um uh strategy for East Asia and the
first island chain and these are these
are essentially in their potential power
um tools of coercion to break the
alliance structure in the first island
chain. It was really fascinating
discussion. Um, I want to get your take
on the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also
I'd like to ask you, you know, what what
does it really mean for us in terms of
the weapons that we need for deterrence?
I mean, and again, keep in mind as
you're as you're answering,
you know, what I what I think is this
widely held question and a reasonable
one. It's like gosh, if if it's true
that between the various countries, we
already have enough nuclear weapons to
effectively destroy the world, which I
think still is true even with the the
New START restrictions more or less, how
is it possible that you need more? How
does the logic of that actually function?
function?
>> Well, first I'd um uh challenge the
premise and and you're right that uh
people often say we have enough nuclear
weapons to destroy the world many times
over. Uh but actually it's not true. In
fact, um, John's Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory did a study several years
back where they calculated how many
nuclear weapons would be required, uh,
to kill 100% of the Russian population.
Uh, not that anybody's arguing we should
do that, but just as a uh, uh, you know,
kind of a thought experiment. And I
think they calculated that something
like 140,000 nuclear weapons would be
required for that. Uh the United States
only has 1500 nuclear weapons today. So
well short of what would be required
even just to destroy all of Russia. Um
so so um they are the most powerful new
weapons ever invented. But I think
people often um in their minds um kind
of overestimate what they're capable of.
Um so then bringing it back to US
nuclear strategy, I think um you know
kind of these ideas of mutually assured
destruction that people learn about in
uh college or or high school classes. it
kind of assumes, okay, we're going to
threaten to kill a bunch of people in
Moscow and Beijing. They're going to
threaten to kill a bunch of people in
Washington, New York, and Los Angeles.
Uh, nobody wants that. And so that's why
deterrence holds. Um, and if that were
our strategy, then, you know, maybe, you
know, how many nuclear weapons do you
need to kill a lot of people in Moscow
and Beijing? You know, maybe two is
enough, maybe four is enough. You know,
certainly a couple hundred would be
enough. Um, but that's not US nuclear
strategy and hasn't been for many
decades. Um and instead um uh the US
government has uh assessed essentially
that Putin and she don't care if their
people die. Um and we see that right now
in Ukraine. Putin has no regard for
Russian life. Um Ma Dong during the Cold
War famously said if a bunch of Chinese
die in a nuclear war, he'll make more
Chinese. Um so so that's not what deters
them. What they care about is their uh
themselves, their regimes, their
militaries, their nuclear forces. Uh and
so deterrence is all about holding at
risk what the adversary values. And so
since they uh value those things, that's
what the United States holds at risk
with its nuclear strategy. Uh we don't
target um population centers for their
own sake. We only target legitimate
military targets, leadership targets,
military command and control, missile
silos, submarine bases, etc. And so uh
when we were calculating numbers for new
start, we said okay how how many nuclear
weapons do we need to hold that set of
targets at risk in Russia and the number
was 1550 uh the new start limit and at
the time China and North Korea had so
few nuclear weapons the assessment was
made yeah that um essentially if we
build for Russia we have enough for
China and North Korea too. Now with
China's massive buildup that changes it
means US targeting uh strategy needs to
change. We can't just hold those targets
at risk in Russia. We now need have a
whole new set of targets we need to hold
at risk. Chinese missile silos,
submarine bases, air bases, leadership,
etc. Uh, and so that's what's putting
upward pressure on the size of our
force. We need more nuclear weapons to
hold at risk that set of targets in both
Russia and now China. Yeah, as you as
you know, Matt, as we've discussed it
before, I'm I'm semi-obsessed with this
early uh nuclear theorist named William
Bordon uh who uh who who to the extent
that anybody knows who he is, they know
him as a as the villain in the movie
Oppenheimer uh who turns over
Oppenheimer's uh uh you know files to
the Senate. Um, but you know, back in
4546 where he wrote his book, There Will
Be No Time, he made an argument then
that's very relevant to what you just
said that has seems to me to be
borderline decisive even if it's been
rejected probably more rejected than not
um in the mainstream community of of
thought on these issues ever since.
Though not interestingly enough, as you
as you point out, in the military and
the people actually doing the targeting,
they're the ones who are sort of
orthodox Bordonites whether they know it
or not. Bordon's case was we can talk
about, you know, using these new
weapons, these new atom bombs mounted on
V2s is the way he put it, um, to
destroy, you know, London or Berlin, but
the reality is when the war actually
starts, no one's actually going to do
that because it would be insane. Not
because of humanitarian reasons, but
because everyone's first instinct is
going to be to try to destroy the other
person's super weapon. And so the
inevitable logic of the war is going to
be you need to destroy the other guy's
super weapons before he can destroy your
super weapons because the the guy left
standing with super weapons when the
other guy doesn't have super weapons
wins because that guy gets to dictate
terms. And that's just the inescapable
logic of the whole thing. Um, and it
seems from what you're saying that the
Pentagon proceeds on that planning
assumption. one because there's this
cultural analysis that the of of all
countries the Russians and the Chinese
perhaps least of all would be um
deterred by the threat to their
populations but also just for the fact
that barring you know scenarios where
obviously we can't really reject the
possibility that there's a you know a
terrorist or a madman who's taken over a
country and just has plain murder on
their minds. The truth is a a war will
have goals and and and goals will be
pursued with strategies and having super
weapons um and your enemy not having
super weapons. That logic will build
into it and you'll have this exchange
based on that logic. And so we can we
can talk all we want about oh maybe 50
weapons would be enough but the truth is
if the other guy then has 60 it's not
enough. It's not enough and that's the
unfortunate logic we're trapped in.
>> Yes, you're absolutely right. Uh so one
of the benefits of uh this counterforce
so-called counterforce strategy is
because we think that's what the
adversaries care about. But the second
one, you're you're absolutely right. God
forbid if deterrence fails and the
adversary starts using nuclear weapons,
you know, a US president's not going to
want to go and give a national press
conference and say now we accept our
mutually assured destruction. you know,
he's going to want to be able or she's
going to want to be able to do whatever
they can uh to destroy the adversaries
nuclear weapons before they can be used.
And so that's another benefit of a
counterforce approach. Uh the other one
is is just law of armed conflict. The
United States are the good guys. As
people know, it's illegal to
intentionally target innocent civilians
in warfare. Uh only legitimate military
uh targets are are legitimate. And so
the United States tries to do that. um
comply with the law of armed conflict
even when it comes to nuclear strategy.
And Darren, I love how you keep coming
back to this foundational nuclear
strategist. You and I should really uh
write something on on him at some point.
>> I'm all for it. I'm all for it. And as
you as you and this is kind of the in
way the the ongoing premise of the whole
show is the first time arguments are
expressed, the first time problems are
confronted often time oftentimes that's
when you see them in their purest form.
Uh uh but we can we can philosophize
about that um some other time. Um so
okay so it's by the way every time Matt
you and I do an episode or I do any
episode on nuclear strategy for that
matter I get all kinds of um anguished
notes from people who with some justice
by the way because here you and I are
discussing dispassionately and with even
with your um uh you know important
comments about the law on conflict and
and everything else there is a way
inescapably in which what we are talking
about is a kind of mass murder um and
you you can you can reject that if you
like but that that'll be my point of
view I mean there's there's no way to
fight a large-scale nuclear war. Um, uh,
you know, even once the tactical nukes
are being employed on land as opposed to
to against naval targets, like we're
starting to talk about casualty levels,
civilian casualty levels that are are
going to be likely quite substantial.
So, I get these notes saying, you know,
what are you crazy people talking about?
This is insane. Like, you you sound like
a rational, logical person, but actually
what you're saying is complete madness.
And look, there's a way in which you
could respond to the events of the last
week with something like that attitude.
The last vestage of uh of you know, cold
war arms control is now dead. The
Chinese are here and they are uh at
breakneck pace building up their
arsenal. Here you have the president of
the United States saying we need to test
nuclear weapons and um uh a lot of
support in the United States for
modernization perhaps expansion. You can
you can share more detail on that of our
arsenal. what are the limits? What you
know is this just going to be you know I
think that the concern would run
something like now we are just in an
arms race um uh trapped in this um crazy
counterforce logic of matching warhead
for warhead. Um what are going to
constrain what's going to constrain this
new world? Um what would the shape of
new arms control agreements look like?
What are the natural constraints? That
is to say, how do we even calculate what
we need given the nature of the Russian,
Chinese, etc. arsenals? Just help us
understand what the limits of the new
world are going to be, if any.
>> At first, and maybe I should have
started the show with this to those uh
people sending you those notes who are
understandably concerned. I I think I
would say that US nuclear weapons have
been one of the greatest forces for good
in uh human history. uh you know before
uh 1945 we saw Europe and and Asia uh
consistently consumed with warfare.
Millions of people died. Um after 1945
uh the United States um built these
strong alliances in Europe and Asia and
um uniquely um the United States doesn't
use its nuclear weapons just to defend
itself. You know that's what India and
China and other countries do. Instead
the United States extends its nuclear
umbrella over the entire free world. Uh
so our 30 formal treaty allies, 30 plus
formal treaty allies in Europe and Asia.
Uh we go to them and make a deal and say
don't build your own nuclear weapons,
you can rely on our nuclear weapons. Uh
and that extended nuclear umbrella has
deterred major war in Europe and Asia
for 80 years and counting and has
stopped our um allies from building
their own independent nuclear arsenals.
So a strong uh US nuclear arsenal is a
is a good thing for the free world. Um,
and then this gets to the the question
of um, you know, then does this lead to
an arms race? Um, and I I guess I would
say maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. Uh,
you know, it's not easy for Russia and
China to just snap their fingers and and
build more um, nuclear weapons. Uh, we
saw the United States consistently out
compete the Soviet Union um, during the
Cold War in this area. I think um, you
know, given Russia's sorry state of its
economy and everything else, we're well
positioned to out compete them again.
and I think China too. Um u but um uh
you know we don't want an arms race but
the the first purpose is to have what we
need for nuclear deterrence and does
that lead to an arms race or not? What
are the arms control agreements? Those
are secondary considerations. You know
we can't choose an arms control
agreement that undermines uh deterrence.
Deterrence has to come first. Um so uh
let's get what we need for deterrence.
Maybe that leads to an arms race and and
then yes, let's try to constrain that
with arms control agreements. What we
would need is a trilateral arms control
agreement that constrains both Russian
and Chinese forces consistent with our
deterrent requirements. And there are
possibilities. is in fact the Atlantic
Council where uh I work had a paper
published a few years ago that we should
probably refresh laying out kind of five
or six possible arrangements for
trilateral arms control that would
advance US national security interests.
Uh the big problem right now, final
point on this, the big problem right now
though is not the United States. Uh it's
Russia and China. Uh Russia's cheated on
almost every arms control agreement it's
been a part of and China refuses to even
seriously talk about arms control. So I
think that realistically there's not
going to be another arms control
agreement uh in the uh near future and
so the United States needs to build the
forces uh required to uh protect itself
and protect its allies.
>> Well Matt, this has been a bracing start
to a Monday morning. Uh thanks for
spreading good cheer uh wherever you go.
Um but it has actually been quite
fascinating and important. That's that's
why I I wanted to do this with you
quickly because it just struck me that
last week was packed with um uh you know
glo world world altering um potentially
world altering level significance news
um uh that was getting very little
attention because it's kind of technical
and this Chinese nuclear test happened
years ago uh the one that we asserted
the state department asserted and um I I
I think this is something that um you
know informs citizens ought to pay
attention to and and have informed views
about. And Matt, I'm grateful to you for
for helping us form those views.
>> Thanks very much for having me and it's
always a pleasure and uh congrats on the
great work you're doing on the podcast.
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