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Pakistan's Current Challenges: A Discussion With Najam Sethi

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well let's get started it's uh after 3

uh we have I think uh 90 minutes of funfilled

funfilled uh

discussion the first uh half at least

will be from najam and that we'll then

hopefully have lots of questions and [Music]

[Music]

answers um I don't think I have to IND

introduce najim SE he's uh the founder

and leader of the two best papers in

Pakistan I say that uh just to uh you're

right for one of them so you have to say

know uh and uh but I do want to point

out that um one of them is the Daily

Times which comes out every day the

other one is the Friday times which

obviously comes out every

Friday and uh we have here also with us

his lovely wife jugu who is who runs the

back page of the Friday times and I've

always considered that since I got to

Pakistan all those many years ago as the

best political satire in the English language

language

so you would you just a little bit of

juu now najim is visiting here and we've

been really lucky to get him to the

Wilson Center uh we frankly were almost

po late because we were he was doing

television interviews over at a

television studio and uh we ate lunch on

the run so to speak but we're glad

you're here najim and um I think that uh

at least if I could sort of lay out an

agenda I think most of us here know a

lot about Pakistan's past and even

Pakistan's Pres but what we want to know

is extrapolating from the present if you

can we want to know more about

Pakistan's future

um and

so perhaps maybe you could tell us a

little bit about what's going on

currently politically both with the

military and with the civilian

politicians give us uh give them a grade

if you will of anywhere from a to d

minus and uh then talk about where you

think it's heading and uh cuz my own

view is that Pakistan's probably at a

Tipping Point and it's not clear to me

which way it's going but I would like

for example and I will ask this question

again at the end to know um

what uh you think the agenda of the

government and the Army is with regard

to the different groups of of extremist

Pakistani Taliban Tali uh Afghan Taliban

all those jihadists uh who hang out

mostly in

Punjab and whether or not we can expect

at some point in the future to see most

of them under control or not uh and so

forth and so on and where you might

think we might be going in terms of

governance with respect to the military

civil relation

and you can probably find a lot of other

things to talk about so

um I think you know I should have

introduced myself but uh I'm not going

to because and I'm I should have told

you all about the Wilson Center which

most chairman of who uh hang out at the

Wilson Center are supposed to tell you

about how it's a living Monument to

President Wilson uh created by Congress

and so forth and so on but

I'll do that afterwards if anyone want

anybody wants to ask a question I'm

najim thank you

Bill it's always a pleasure to come to

Washington and of course uh this is not

the first time I'm here at the wison

center uh I have lots of friends here uh

I'm very comfortable uh in Washington

and with all our friends and it's

wonderful to exchange views because this

is of course where it all happens or should

should

happen um bill and I go back a long way

um and in some senses today's uh the

subject of today's talk challenges

facing Pakistan reminds me of a time

exactly 10 years

ago when I read a short paper at the

National Defense college now the

National Defense University in Islamabad

which is the Army uh Think Tank um where

I was commended for talking about the

challenges facing Pakistan I mentioned

six or seven challenges facing Pakistan

and subsequently I made gave the same

lecture at a forum in India on India

Pakistan uh relations and um when I got

back Mr naah Sharif decided to put me

into prison for talking about the

challenges facing Pakistan and Bill

played a major role in leaning on the

the uh then government of Pakistan to

set me free so both the challenges

facing Pakistan and my host today um we

go back a long way challenges facing

Pakistan it's interesting that when

General mushara took over uh shortly

about well about four or five months

after I'd given my lecture on the

challenges facing Pakistan General

mashar took over and in his first or

second speech I think his first major

spe speech to the nation he talked of

the challenges facing Pakistan and the

reform agenda

uh that he had in mind and I was

heartened to know that basically he

summarized exactly what id said 5 months

earlier um so it clearly the Army had a

position and they agreed with my

assessment of it they agreed when I

mentioned it in the uh National Defense

University and then when mushara took

over as well but of course many things

have happened since then and um I was

very depressed and uh uh subsequently

when I felt that mushara had abandoned

on the reform agenda and um uh and then

of course he began to get into his

stride and I I I was hopeful again until

he began messing up uh in 2007 uh

despite loads of good advice that he got

but unfortunately uh he was in not in a

listening mood and uh so if talking

about challenges facing Pakistan got me

into trouble then and got mushara into

trouble uh two years ago he's sitting in

Exile in London I hope today's

discussion of the challenges facing

Pakistan will not get me into trouble

again having said that um I've made no

notes about what I what we're going to

talk about so as Bill said a little bit

about what's going on and a little bit

about what's likely to happen in the

next 12 months or so and then lots of

questions and answers and you know

joined digging in to find out where we

are what's going on well you know we've

just done a review of president

zardari's first year in office uh as

president and as it so happened it you

know he became president about a year

ago and it's coincided his anniversary

within that of 9/11 and in many ways

9/11 is still in a sense running the

agenda uh of Pakistan and of President

zardari uh but I'll come to that in a

minute zardari has not done well in his

first year he's made a lot of mistakes

uh some of which is still clinging to

him and if I can just tick them off uh I

remember in a meeting with zardari after the

the

elections I said to him I said make an

alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League

Q which is the rump Pro the old mushara

party and that was the old agenda that

mashar had in mind and I said you ought

to stick to it because that is what BB

wanted to do uh and that's your that's a

safe bet uh people won't like it uh

because that's a discredited party but

for political reasons you ought to stick

close to it um he said no uh we got to

bury the past we have to work with Naas

Sharif and um that relationship never

got anywhere nawas lent him some

ministers and then pulled them out and

then insisted on uh uh fulfillment of

pledges that Mr zardari had made Vis A

the restoration of the Judiciary and on

implementing a charter of democracy that

he and

uh that na Sharif and bbo had signed in

London two years earlier um and

zardari's discreditation began from day

one uh and by the time U Naas Sharif was

ready to launch a movement for the

restoration of the Judiciary zardari was

really down in the dumps and the tragedy

is that even at that late stage uh when

he could have salvaged the situation um

he did not he allowed the Prime Minister

uh to get the credit for that and the

Army to get the credit for it and

America to get the credit for it instead

of realizing which way the wind was

blowing and backtracking and um

accepting the restoration of the

Judiciary with good face which is to say

that he made the mistake of a wrong

political Alliance he made the mistake

of wasting time he then made the mistake

of riing uh the Pakistan Army um Mumbai

happened and U uh zardari was Keen to

make amends with India and went

overboard in a sense as far as the Army

was concerned in trying to peace he said

some things which the Army didn't like

uh they were quite undiplomatic uh they

were good things but they were

undiplomatic and uh and then he tried to

in a sense get a grip over the isi and

the Army didn't like that either and he

had to beat a retreat on all these

fronts so his relationship with the Army

was a bit troubled from day one um and

then of course having got rid of mushara

uh he had to rebuild a relationship with

General Kanani and I think that that is

still work in progress um and that's the

best that one can say about it zardari's

relationship with the Army is work in

progress the Army has lots of question

marks about Mr zardari's ability to run

government to provide uh and also to

deal with the United States the

Pakistani army thinks that that Mr

zardari is soft on the US and the

Pakistani army would like to take a

harder line Vis A its negotiating

position on Afghanistan and the war on

terror and Mr zardari is more inclined

to look at the money side of it he wants

to uh put money into the budg he wants

money from the United States he wants to

get the economy moving uh but the Army

has other priorities uh so there is this

problem that continues to to to uh Dodge

or dog Mr zardari the second is his

relationship with Naas Sharif it's not

good um Naas Sharif would ideally like

uh to push him over uh to get a midterm

election going he denies it furiously if

you ask him on record uh but the fact of

the matter is that I don't personally

think he's going to be ready to face

another four years in opposition and uh

his strategy has been to uh diminish

zardari drive a wedge between zardari

and his prime minister um and weaken uh

zardari to discredit him as a man with a

corrupt past um to run down his

government uh which is pretty

incompetent and doesn't really need much

running down it helps itself um and so

nawas has succeeded in turning the

public perception and the media against

uh Mr zardari and the People's Party

government um so he's really hemmed in

from all sides he wants to build peace

with India the Army is saying take it

easy and the Indians are not helping uh

the Indians are putting all manner of

preconditions on the resumption of the

composite dialogue and this is not

helping him at all um the second thing

is his relationship with the Army is not

good it's not bad but it's not good

either he has to constantly watch over

his shoulder his relationship with the

media is bad the media does not like him

the media is highly critical of Mr

zardari uh often with good reason but

not always with good reason and of

course the opposition has got the public

on its side so all in all on all these

fronts it's not a good uh um uh

situation having said that you have to

give the man some credit and the credit

is due on the following four areas which

are very important from my point of view

and I think in terms of the challenges

facing Pakistan they're far more

important uh than the earlier negative

points that I've mentioned and one is is

that he rightly thinks that the solution

to many problems will lie in a Revival

of the economy and he desperately wants

to get that going which is why he's

trying to be a little soft towards the

United States and its demands which is

why he wants to build peace with India

and in in fact get on with trading um

and I think so that's one very important

thing he's Keen to get the economy

moving the second important thing is

that he is Keen to redress the Civil

military imbalance and on that he has

Naas Sharif on his side recent recently

many of you will have uh read about

press reports in Pakistan about some

minus one formula uh that is in the

offing meaning somehow diminish zardari

strengthen uh the Prime Minister uh I.E

Pakistan without uh zardari or a weak

zardari this reminds you of the minus

two formula that uh uh was attempted in

Bangladesh uh and which did not work uh

I think there are elements in the ruling

establishment in Army that want to see

zardari weak uh but not necessarily uh

out Naas would like to see him out uh if

he can't just simply weaken him uh but

having said that uh I don't think it's

going to

happen and I tell you it's not going to

happen for two

reasons minus one means um uh zardari

having to voluntarily or under pressure

give up the presidency or become a

puppet president or become a very very

weak president I don't think zardari

would allow that to happen now

especially when there are rumors and

conspiracy theories of foot that uh that

might be used as an attempt to finally

weaken the People's Party he is the

leader of the People's Party The Party

responds to him he sees his value in the

political system and he's insisting that

his son belaval constantly come back

from his holidays in Oxford to come back

and sit with her father to a sin and to

whip up the BTO Factor all over again so

he's is protecting himself by keeping

his son close to him the second thing is

that the Prime Minister does not really

have a constituency uh if and although

there are people who are trying to tell

the Prime Minister that the Army is your

constituency uh uh he's not so stupid as

to realize that the Army uh is his

constituency at the end of the day if

there's a replacement of zardari it will

have to be Naas Sharif it can't be the

Army there is no mood in the country for

an army takeover or for the Army to come

back uh that is not on at all now having

said that the Army also has

apprehensions about Mr Naas Sharif the

Army thinks that Mr zardari is a bit of

a weak man he thinks Army thinks that is

inexperienced uh the Army thinks he's

not to be trusted and so on but WI a

Naas Sharif they have other problems uh

Naas sharif's track record WI a the Army

is not terribly good uh and the Army has

a long memory and Naas sharif's current

position also un wanting to try mushara

um is something that the Army does not

like and uh uh so a minus one would

really effectively if it were to get

anywhere it would have to be a minus two

uh which means no zardari and no Naas

Sharif I mean that's going to be very

difficult to manipulate and therefore I

think uh that zardari is not going to

allow gilani to get on with it and to

become an independent player uh should

should should he see that something like

that is a foot he will turn the party

against Mr gilani so Mr gilani will have

to watch his shoulder because without

the People's Party Mr gilani is a nobody

similarly Nawaz for for the exit of

nawas Sharif from the equation either

some very drastic physical measures will

have to be taken uh or he will have to

be persuaded and there's no way Naas is

going to be persuaded certainly there's

no way he's going to allow the Muslim

League leadership to fall into the lap

of his younger brother shabas Sharif

whom the Army likes because he's a bit

of a bureaucrat uh but Naas is a popular

man Naas is the populist shabaz is not

so Naas will not allow shabaz to be his

air apparent and zardari will not allow

gilani to do that so no minus one minus

one means min-2 min-2 is impossible very

difficult without all all manner of

physical uh disruption having said

that Naas and zardari both agreed on one

point that the Army has to be pushed

back the Army should play no major role

in political decision- making in the

future but that's easier said than done

especially if nawas Sharif want is in a

hurry to get back into an election

because there's no way Naas can get back

into a new election midterm election

without intervention by the Army to pave

the way as it were for that thing to

happen and uh I don't see that happening

a lot of people may wish for it but it's

not going to happen unless there are

factors that we can't you know think

about right now we can't Factor those in

uh zardari is going to be able to

survive this period uh short of a war

with India uh which could be very

destabilizing for the entire region uh

or an unexpected assassination uh there

is I don't foresee any midterm uh change

in Pakistan the best thing that could

happen to Pakistan of course would be

for a Revival of the economy for a

resolution of its or some of its

problems with India uh in the next three

or four years and for of course a a

movement towards a long-term solution

that satisfies the Pakistani army

and also America's agenda in Afghanistan

and now those are the challenges that

Pakistan is faced with the first

challenge is to make sure that this

government lasts the full term we need

to have a civilian government complete

its full term the last government was a

semi civilian government mhar was still

in charge it did complete its term but

we need to have for the sake of

democracy and for the sake of the Civil

military imbalance to get it the balance

right we need for one civilian

government to complete its term for good

or for bad number one number two we need

to revive the economy without a Revival

of the economy nothing is going to be uh

gained uh there's going to be increasing

impoverishment there's going to be

sources of new terrorism and so on the

third is this business with India uh if

there is another Mumbai and there is no

guarantee that there will not be another

Mumbai uh because many of these former

non-state actors which became state

actors are now also back to their

non-state actor role some of them are

fairly autonomous India's demand that

the composite dialogue cannot be resumed

unless and until there is a Crackdown on

some of these elements is unreasonable

uh it took 30 years to make these uh

non-state actors effective they're not

going to be disbanded and uh

demilitarized overnight uh it will take

a long time and it will take a

transition period in which uh uh India

Indo Pakistan relations have to get into

conflict resolution mode the tragedy is

that you know while we were prepared to

accept India's position before elections

okay conditions you know do this do that

if you don't do this we won't get back

to the composite dialogue it's fairly

inexplicable why India is persisting

with this uh uh position right now it is

hurtful to the cause of democracy in

Pakistan it is hurtful to the cause of

Indo Park relations it is hurtful to the

cause of finding Solutions in

Afghanistan because India Pakistan are

fighting their proxy wars all over the

place and because India has already has

a huge footprint uh in North Afghanistan

uh and the Indian consulates are doing

their bit there therefore uh this is

something that India and Pakistan have

to come to grips with and America has to

weigh in discreetly if necessary uh to

get the dialogue moving again and to get

some conflict resolution done similarly

the other challenge of course is

Afghanistan and with it the whole

challenge of terrorism Afghanistan is a

challenge because the recent elections

in Afghanistan which were supposed to

find Solutions uh have not done so and

the problem seems far more impracticable

now than it did 6 months ago uh and I

think uh a realization is Dawning that

America's attempt to go It Alone with Mr

Kai is not going to bear fruit and um

the signals that are coming from

Washington uh one half of the

administration here is saying we want

our boys back the American public is

saying we want our boys back we don't

want to send in more troops we want

results in the next 12 months before the

Congressional elections another half is

saying the one half that's sitting in

Afghanistan is saying send us more

troops uh and we need to get to grips

with the Taliban the Pakistani Army's

position um is very clear they want a

solution in Afghanistan in which you

have an Afghanistan that is

friendly that is peaceful stable

Democratic but friendly the word

friendly is critical those who talk of

an Afghanistan that is not friendly to

Pakistan I mean are living in a Fool's

Paradise the Pakistani army will never

allow that to happen and they are major

players in that region how what's what

what does the Pakistani army mean when

it says friendly Pakistan uh friendly

Afghanistan I was talking to Rick inder

who's just written a paper on uh the

need for a neutral Afghanistan and

although he hasn't spelled out how we

are going to end up in a neutral

Afghanistan uh I think the problem in

Pakistan is that

um Pakistan now fears that religious

pashon nationalism uh could dismember

could could lead to the new

dismemberment of of Pakistan either that

or it could mean a new attack on on the

state we've just seen how the Taliban

came pretty close to creating enormous

difficulties for the Pakistani State and

how there was enormous confusion both in

the establishment in Parliament in the

media and amongst the people of Pakistan

in terms of what ought to be done and

how do you deal with the Taliban we've

got over that hurdle but at the end of

the day there's not just the Pakistani

Taliban to contend with you have the

jihadis uh who are still there whove

linked up with alqaeda uh you have uh

pockets of uh potential terrorists in

Punjab uh waiting to be recruited you

have uh alqaeda that is still there very

much there in bistan possibly now moving

to the urban centers of Pakistan and uh

and then you have the Afghan um uh uh uh

Taliban uh who need to have

representation and a space uh in Kabul

uh Mr Kay has messed it up for everyone

everyone

uh the idea of a new laa jurga that will

bring in the Taliban uh and give space

to them is going to be even more

difficult now with Kai lacking the

legitimacy and the Taliban having in a

sense uh demonstrated their ability to

derail the whole exercise in in a

Afghanistan and with America in a hurry

results next year they want results it's

not going to

happen and my assessment is you're going

to get no help from the Pakistani army

the Pakistani army has been saying that

the Americans don't have the staying

power a the Americans are looking after

their interests we pakistanis have to

look after our interests and our

interests certainly you know do not are

not helped uh by Mr Kay's insistence on

going it the current way now there are

attempts are underway to bring in the

Taliban the Saudis are in it the

pakistanis are in it but if the Taliban

come in then that is a major concession

to the Pakistani point of view and that

is something the International Community

and America have to contend with and

have to in a sense uh pave the way for

if you're not going to look at the

interest of the Pakistani army and the

National Security establishment in

Pakistan there will be destabilization

in Pakistan us Pakistan relations will

not work Pakistan India relations will

not work nothing will work the Pakistani

Army's point of view in terms of a

friendly Afghanistan if not uh a puppet

Afghanistan has to be taken into account

and my assessment is so far the United

States has not paid adequate attention

to that and my assessment is so far the

Indians have not even thought about it

everybody is thinking of consolidating

their own interests there and after 8

years uh of war in Afghanistan today the

situation is more Bleak than it was uh

after 9/11 and therefore I think this

Regional strategy that Mr Holbrook and

others are working on needs a new new

think after what has happened in

Afghanistan and in terms of the current

uh domestic situation in Pakistan

America needs a long-term engagement

number one in the region uh America also

needs to persuade India uh to work with

Pakistan and in both in India Pakistan

relations and in Afghanistan that's not

happened as yet the third thing is

America needs to look at Pakistan's

interests legitimate geostrategic

interests um uh in Afghanistan that

America has not yet done America has

been demanding do more do more in terms

of America's immediate interests and

you've seen 8 years down the line uh the

Pakistani army has been playing games

and they will continue to play these

games and America will not succeed

Pakistan Army's interests are legitimate

we in terms of Afghanistan the Pakistani

army is no longer interested in a

Taliban regime in Afghanistan uh because

they now know that a pure Taliban regime

which was not prepared to listen to them

in in in 200 one is not going to be

listening to them now if it's going to

be a a Victorious Taliban regime in in

Afghanistan I mean the danger from such

a regime would be forget the Durant line

uh you know my own assessment is that if

you had the Americans walk out of

Afghanistan and uh uh and a and a

resurgent Taliban sitting in Kabul uh

Pakistan's tribal areas would fall

within a year or two at at best the

Taliban would take over and Frontier and

the and peshawa would be immediately

threatened I remember even when the

Taliban were in power and they were

supposed to be the puppets of the Pakistan

Pakistan

Army the Taliban refused to settle the

Duran line even at that time Taliban

spokesmen and ministers would cross over

into the tribal areas and talk openly

about how those lands and those pushon

areas belong to

Afghanistan if and that's a situation

when that government was dependent on

the Pakistani government and Military

for support and there was a Northern

Alliance sitting there contending for

power if the Taliban now sees

Afghanistan there will be no Northern

Alliance the Taliban are already

creating difficulties for the 4,000

German troops up up in the north they're

all over the place now and uh uh and

therefore Pakistan Afghan and um India

and and Iran and and and the United

States have to sit together so in that

sense this Regional strategy which is AF

Park is not making any sense which is

why you now have President zardari

saying what is this afak why are you

hyphenating us with Afghanistan if India

says you can't hyphenate us with

Pakistan well you can't hyphenate us

with Afghanistan I think behind that is

this attempt to tell the United States

of America that hey look you're watching

out for your interests but if you think

that we just going to lie down and take

your money and and and give you your

interest in Afghanistan is not going to

happen and I think uh that is also part

of Mr zardari's dilemma he needs needs

the money to get the economy moving

we've been hearing about American money

now for 2 years the ker Luger bill is at

least a year old uh we still don't see

any money on the table um the pledges

made or non- pledges or commitments or

promises call them what you will made in

the friends of Pakistan meeting uh

almost 6 months ago nowhere in sight

even the money that was meant for the

refugees even half of that only half of

that has been forthcoming uh and now we

have another friends of Pakistan Mot

signed up for next week um it's you know

Zari talks of a martial plan there's no

understanding of the difficulties

Pakistan is facing uh not just on its

eastern border but on its western border

India is not listening K is not

listening the United States is not

listening the Army is an important

factor of Pakistani life but we need the

civilians to get their act together they

can only do so if the regional players

understand the dialectics and help

resolve our national security dilemma

it's a very difficult situation out

there I am not optimistic uh too many

players involved too many interests

involved over here a lot of this has to

give way uh to find a a real solution

and you know the solution to Afghanistan

lies via Islamabad but the solution to

but the road to Islamabad lies via New

Delhi and so we've really got to shift

some of our priorities uh New Delhi has

to get the it's act together and move

with Pakistan Pakistan and then uh

Afghanistan government have to get their

acts together the Indian and Pakistani

proxy wars are spoiling the terrain

completely and uh there is a mindset in

Pakistan especially in the Pakistani

army uh uh that is that finds this

unacceptable and therefore when we say

we want the composite dialogue with

India to continue to get on with it we

want the back Channel activated we don't

want any conditions uh put on the on the

composite dialogue uh we find it

inexplicable that a congress government

that is flushed With Victory still finds

it difficult to get on with it still is

having to defend its commitments made at

shal sh in Egypt last month and that the

Indian media is not part of the solution

is still part of the problem just as the

Pakistani media was part of the problem

some time ago uh uh the Indian media is

still part of the problem Indian

Nationalism is still coming in the way

the thing is that if America wants

Pakistan to cooperate and find Solutions

within Pakistan on terrorism on domestic

violence on the economy then we need

peace on our borders we can't have peace

in on our borders if the first thought

that comes to India is if there's

another Mumbai if there's another Mumbai

what what then when Mumbai happened I

was a week later I was in India and the

Indians were talking about strikes and I

said to them what are you talking about

you can't have strikes you just got a

lump it this is the way it is you got to

work together and make sure that this

doesn't happen again and they were you

know floundering they were all over the place

place

what could they do you know the nuclear

deterrence is alive and kicking it's in

place and therefore if another Mumbai

happens what does India do nothing India

can't do anything if India does

something we are in very deep trouble

therefore we have to find a s solution

that makes sure a that Mumbai doesn't

happen and if it does because there are

lots of non-state actors out there who

are not listening to the Pakistani

military or or and even less so to the

Pakistani opposition and Pakistani

government what if another Mumbai

happens what will India do will this

dialogue be derailed forever will the

terrorists succeed in driving that wedge

will the terrorist stop the road from

Delhi to Islamabad and the road from

Islamabad to

Kabul and you know the thing is that the

Pakistani army has had temporary success

let's not misunderstand that it's a very

short-term temporary reprieve in um in

swat and in in in the settled areas

those guys have just you know thousand

casualties Taliban is neither here there

nothing doesn't mean anything they just

evaporated where have they evaporated to

they'll come back you got to keep the

Army there for 10 years you've got to

then build that whole infrastructure and

then you have to get the Afghan Taliban

back into Kabul you can't keep them in

vistan so that their alliance with

Al-Qaeda sticks and then they're able to

build the bridges with the Pakistani

Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban with

the Pakistani former

jihadists therefore it is very important

that in terms of the challenges facing

Pakistan Pakistan is the core State here

and if the states of the region Iran

Afghanistan and India do not understand

that everything hinges on the rise and

fall of Pakistan everything for the

whole region hinges on that then we will

all be in very serious trouble therefore

the challenges facing Pakistan are the

challenges facing India the challenges

facing the United States and the

challenges facing

Afghanistan thank you [Applause]

[Applause]

well I see Hands shot up immediately

najim so you provoke some questions well

you know it was a bit rambling but I

thought I didn't think you were too rambling

rambling

actually um and I've got a whole bunch

of questions myself okay but uh I want

to ask uh perhaps the uh God knows the

cataclysmic question perhaps

perhaps

suppose all of these challenges are not

met what really

happens does the military come back at

some point because Pakistan is

ungovernable by

civilians well you know the military can

always come back but for the military to

come back you need a political situation

where there is a demand for the military

to come back Nas Sharif was very

unpopular uh when the military took over

I know uh and mushara took the risk uh

even and even though he knew that he

would be in international paray at that

time the international situation was

certainly not conducive to a military

takeover and yet the domestic situation

allowed them to take over and indeed not

a tear was shed for the fall of the democratic

democratic

system Naas and zardari realized this

but you know the fact is that as you

mentioned in in your book in Bangladesh

the problem with Pakistan and Bangladesh

has been that our politicians have been

playing a suzero game

you know zardari's loss is Naas sharif's

gain and if if that sort of situation

continues then yes the military might

take over now if the military takes over

my own assessment is that uh that will

probably be the last nail in the

coffin because you know the military has

taken over in the past and every time

it's taken over in the past the United

States has been there uh to give it the

economic and Military Cloud it needs for survival

survival

but I think that's not going to happen

now because the military did not want to

move into SWAT until the public opinion

turned and public opinion compelled the

military to move into SW the military is

extremely reluctant to take on uh the

Taliban the military the first thing

General keani did when there was a

civilian dispensation and he's very

proudly tells talks about it he says the

first thing I did within seven days of a

government in Islamabad he went and

garlanded the Prime Minister and said

the war on terror is all yours you give

the orders you are the owners of the war

on terror we are not and the Army was

the one stumbling

factor in the uh you know Mrs zari's

attempt to get an army action in uh SWAT

the Army wanted the peace Accord the

armies always wanted Peace Accords from

2005 onwards the Army's been into Peace

Accords the Army doesn't want its

soldiers who are motivated ated to find

to to fight non-muslims fighting Muslims

and they've had a lot of

problems uh even as we speak uh semi uh

um uh military forces the

kadas which is a sort of a local police

force recruited by the locals are

refusing to fight the Taliban they're

just refusing to fight the Taliban they

laid down their weapons and said we're

going home now those are the sort of

challenges the Army will find uh Army is

not interested Ed in fighting an

internal War the Army wants political

Solutions the problem is that the

political Solutions can only come with the

the

politicians and therefore an army

takeover is going to not is not going to

solve anything for Pakistan and um

considering that in the old days

whenever an army took over there was

always one party outside which was

anti-establishment which was the

People's Party they never had to worry

about the other party the other party

was always the Muslim League which was

the king's party they never had to worry

about that so there was always two

sources of legitimacy one was the United

States of America and the other was the

king's party unfortunately at least one

of those will have is changing now the

king's party is no longer the king's

party there's a small rump that is now

the king's party the main Muslim League

is now the really the anti-establishment

party it is the true people's party

today Naas Sharif is the man who

commands the popular vote Naas Sharif is

the man who says no Army Rule and when

the army takes over it will now have to

contend with the People's Party in

opposition and Naas Sharif in opposition

is going to be a hell of a different

difficult task as I said short of a some

physical uh uh Solutions is going to be

very difficult and a very repressive

regime second this Judiciary is not the

old Judiciary this is a Judiciary that's

born out of a new struggle this is a

highly politicized Judiciary and the

interesting thing is this politicized

Judiciary is not pro executive it is

anti- executive and it is going to be

very very difficult if an army takes

over for the Army to get a whole Cy of

new judges uh to be to sign

proclamations of new orders uh and and

legitimize an army takeover uh this

Judiciary owes a lot to the lawyers

movement and to the people at large so

that's a second factor which is going to

make it difficult for an army regime to

to last and the third factor is the

media this media is an independent media

it's a strong media uh often it is it's

it's interest a misplace but one thing

is absolutely clear this media is not

going to condone an army takeover this

is a strong media it has its own views

it's very Pro democracy it was Pro the

lawyers movement um and if it is anti

zardari it is pro Naas Sharif which is

to say that three new factors have

entered the equation which the Army will

have to contend if it thinks of wanting

to take over the New Media the new

Judiciary and the new opposition which

is the Muslim League led by Naas Sharif

and therefore if an army if the Army if

conditions are created Anarchy is

created and the Army wants to come in it

will still need very strong civilian

representation either by a new election

or by any other means you and I were

speaking of failure a bit

earlier which

is uh can be defined many different ways

are we speaking of a the of A

Dysfunctional slide into

dysfunctionality in the

state the state is dysfunctional

currently the state has never never been

terribly functional it is as

dysfunctional it is more dysfunctional

today than it has ever been having said

that it's still a very strong State and

the fact that it's dysfunctional means

that okay it's not getting out to all

the people so the social contract

doesn't exist but purely in terms of the

force of the state and the might of the

state is still a very strong State and

that was demonstrated when you know the

Army moved in and used aircraft guns

tanks heavy arery against a Guerilla

force and what did they do the Army did

exactly the same thing that America did

in Afghanistan they used their b52s and

their Daisy Cutters to drive the Taliban

out to to to Pakistan they didn't win

the war the Pakistani armies done just

that hundreds of thousands of Civilian

casualties they've just done that and

they've thrown these guys back that's

not a solution so there are no military

solutions to the war on terror it has to

be a political war it has to be a war on

the economic front and of course it

needs peace with India for the Pakistani

army to understand that its former

assets are now accute liabilities which

have to be dismantled step by step over

the next 10 years or so okay I've hogged

the situation now questions uh the lady

here and then Marvin weine bomb in back of

her we've got microphones well that's

the never mind go ahead am I the wrong

lady the three questions and then yeah

yeah we'll go we'll take the three at a

time Daisy Schaefer from

csis Nim you make a very strong case

that others need to take Pakistan's

strategic interest into consideration I

couldn't agree

more but there are two pieces of logic

that escaped me one is under those

circumstances why does it follow that

other countries such as India have to

swallow what they consider to be their

strategic interests and deference to

those of Pakistan I think the same logic

would apply to them as well and

secondly you said it is the Pakistan

Army's interest to have a friendly

Afghanistan you don't really Define

friendly and the implication is that

there's a strong Taliban esque flavor to

that even at a time when the talibans

Pakistani namesakes are actually posing

a danger to the state of Pakistan I

don't get how those compute together you

know no no I'll forget oh you'll forget

okay um the India factor of course India

has to look after its own interests the

point I'm making is is that it is in

India's interest to build peace with

Pakistan because if India doesn't build

peace with Pakistan then we will fall

into the Mumbai

trap then India will have to take action

if India takes action there will be War

if there is war the war on terror will

get lost and the the terrorists will

become part of Pakistan's Arenal against

India we saw a glimpse of that when

Mumbai happened the first thing the

Taliban did was they said we going to

stop the fighting the Pakistani army and

we're going to come to the border and

fight with the Pakistani army against

India in the event of an Indian

strike that is the danger of India not

defining its interest in a particular

way you see the thing is that if India

wants to get on it India certainly can

get on with it but the the fact of the

matter is whether we like it or not

India has not chosen Pakistan as a

neighbor but Pakistan is a neighbor with

all these

problems and we've got to deal with

these problems and the spillover from

these problems is going to hurt India no

less because although physically it may

not hurt India so much you can think of

it you know if there's a war with with

between India and Pakistan India's

economy and that whole the whole notion

of a resurgent India that is going to be

the new emergent power that's all going

to get lost we're talking nuclear

weapons here and there's no way the

Pakistani army is going to allow India

to walk in or even to humiliated the

entire uh political Galaxy of Pakistan

including the people of Pakistan are

going to line up solidly behind the

Pakistani army on this one you know it

took 24 hours [Music]

[Music]

that's all it took um for public opinion

to change public opinion after Mumbai in

Pakistan was anti- Taliban and anti-

jihadis I I'm in the media I monitored

the media the media said what has

happened in Mumbai is

terrible and that uh it should not

happen and that it's a great human

tragedy the Indian media was so hawkish

in in terms of wanting

strikes that when the Pakistani media

saw what the Indian media was selling

that week the Pakistani media it took

them 24 hours 48 hours to become

nationalistic and religious and suddenly

the same rhetoric you found the same

rhetoric uh which was oh we didn't do it

who knows the Indians may have done this

themselves you know the irrationality of

the of the response of the Pakistani

media was marked but it it was triggered

uh and I remember telling jnu and I said

look how great our responses in the

Pakistani media uh we're talking

sensibly and two days later we were not

talking sensibly and when we were

monitoring the Indian media and the

Indian media was going hysterical so so

to answer your question I think India

when India talks about its interests

India needs to see resolution of

conflict with Pakistan as part of its

interests if it wants to get on it can

leave things as they are but the net

result of leaving things unresolved is

before you and you know we are not

talking of an army of 100,000 people we

talking of an army and a and a mindset

in Pakistan uh a 60-year-old mindset in

Pakistan a National Security State that

was built on the basis of the enemy

without on the next On the Border that's

not going to change so quickly so if

there is conflict with India it will be

an allout conflict I say that with full

responsibility I don't wish to say it

but I've seen it at very close quarters

how it how the entire media the entire

opposition and even the Taliban suddenly

folded right behind the Pakistan Army on

the mere mention of a threat of war with

India therefore it is in India's

interest also to resolve some of these

disputes build trust with Pakistan give

the new civilian dispensation both nawas

Sharif and ASF zardari the space and the

opportunity to turn some of these things

back they will need space therefore this

government needs space and the best part

of this T is that nawas Sharif is on

board nawas wants peace with India

zardari wants peace with India they want

an end to the Taliban and this you can't

get anything better than this this is

the first time all this is happening

therefore we need to keep Pakistan on

the straight and narrow we need to give

Pakistan the space in which its

interests can be protected uh without

crumbling from

within I think Marvin is next even

though the lady in front of him was nice

enough to pass was very kind of you cuz

I want to ask the question that you

didn't respond to with tasy because it's

exactly the same

question sorry there seemed to me to be

a contradiction here you were saying it

on one hand that uh the Indian army has

to be given its due and we learn that

that due is a essentially a Taliban

regime in Kabal the Pakistan Army I'm

sorry uh uh a a a Pakistani army I'm

sorry uh is a Taliban regime in Kabal

but at the same time you made a very I

think impassioned plea here as to why

the United States cannot simply walk

away away from the region no no I did

not say so please explain that yes what

does uh when say General Kanani says

that we want a an Afghanistan that is

friendly what does he

mean and I buy

that in the old days we used to talk [Music]

[Music]

ofuna the demand for the renaming of the

Northwest Frontier Province as

pakun and neither the Pakistani army nor

the People's Party nor naash sharif's

party was able to deliver on that demand

a simple demand to rename a province in

terms of its secular nationalist ethos

at that time the ethos of the national

Army party was secular

nationalism not able to deliver what is

the situation today the situation today

is that the ethos is for a

religious or pashtunistan and that

demand is going to be the demand of the

Taliban and the that demand is the one

demand that worries the Pakistani

establishment and rightly

so we would like the Afghans the pons in

Afghanistan to look to

Kabul we want the pons of the Northwest

Frontier Province and the tribal areas

to look to

Islamabad the last thing we want is for

our pashun to look to Kabul or for their

pons to look to Islamabad we don't want

that that is why the sort of regime we

want in Afghanistan is a regime that

accepts the legitimacy and validity of

this point of view first of all that is

not to say that it has to be an

exclusive Taliban regime as in the past

perhaps that is no longer possible given

the multi multi Faried interests that

have now cropped up in Afghanistan over

the last 10 years but that is precisely

why when we talk of a regional approach

it should really be a regional approach

it should not be a do more for theed

United States approach in which India is

not part of the region in which Iran is

not part of the region in which Central

Asia is not part of the region the

regional approach should include Iran

and India it should include conflict

resolution with India so that the proxy

was of which Afghanistan is the base

area come to an end you know we are not

threatened with the proxy war in

bistan and of course uh so what we would

like ideally is for the Afghans to sort

out Afghanistan with the help of the

United States the United Nations Iran

India and Pakistan we cannot accept an

unfriendly regime in Afghanistan a

neutral Afghanistan now the real issue

is what is neutrality and what is

friendly towards Pakistan you know the

Taliban were very friendly towards

Pakistan but even the old Taliban regime

never recognized the Duran line the

first thing we want is for the Duran

line to be recognized not just in words

but in deeds and that's what we mean at

the very least when we say we want a

friendly Afghanistan

uh najim this is just a very short

question but I think a pertinent one

which is to understand what your views

are about Nas sharif's um uh perception

about the Taliban in the sense that you

know the feeling that we have as

pakistanis is that whereas the people

party came upfront and said you know

this is not on this terrorism is must be

stemmed uh on the other hand NAD was

very quiet you know he was like sitting

on the wall he was silent and only when

driven to extreme when uh you know this

action happened in Mumbai and later on

you know the public opinion changeed

that did he make any uh you know

expression about uh you know this whole

thing so I just felt that what you

talked about namas as a potential

national leader in the future my again

views are that he's more of a Punjab

leader and that perhaps in the other

provinces he doesn't Eno enjoy that kind

of support the people party does but I

think it's very important to understand

what his views are about the way to

Pakistan should deal with the talibans

what what do you think the thing is

zardari is in the hot seat he's the one

who's having to deal with the Army and

with America and with India Naas doesn't

have to deal with them the popular

opinion in Pakistan was anti-america and pro

pro

Taliban so nawas was cautious the

Americans asked him time and again to

support zardari zardari was seen as an

extension of B remember benir became

very unpopular when she said you know

she's anti- Taliban she was seen to be

very Pro America you know this was our

war pakistanis thought this was not our

war this was America's War but that has

changed now because what the situation

now is that we say yes this is our war

and you know there's another reason for

that we can go into that but Naas is far

more comfortable now openly coming out

and saying that the Taliban is the

internal existential threat facing

Pakistan but nawas cannot say in so many

words that the that only the military

force should be used against them

because at the end of the day when you

use military for civilians get killed

the third thing is the aami national

party which is a party on on the ground

in that region doesn't want military

force to be used they were the biggest

obstacle to the use of the military

there that was at a time when zardari

wanted to use the military the Americans

were pushing for a military solution uh

Naas was silent and uh uh um the awami

national party was opposed to a military

solution today you have a situation in

which the awami National Party realizes

that a long-term military presence is

going to be needed for the re of the

political process in those regions nawas

sees the validity of the internal

existential threat which is why he

pushing for the peace process with India

he knows that without consolidating

peace with India you cannot really begin

to tackle your internal problems so I

think nawas is fully on board he has to

watch out for public perceptions and

media perceptions but at the at the

bottom line is he's fully on

board lots of questions uh Stanley cobra

with the KO Institute could you say

something about the relationship between

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and in this

regard also about foreign infiltration

the number of foreigners who are coming

in I read something in the Daily Times

recently about 5,000

USCS so that as well you know those two

questions uh what alqaeda and the

Taliban and foreign infiltration foreign

involvement with the Taliban well you

know um the al-Qaeda was separate from

the Taliban then Al-Qaeda and the

Taliban have an alliance under the

Taliban regime then Al-Qaeda and Taliban

became one when they were all in

vistan uh and then suddenly you had the

growth of the Pakistani Taliban and then

you had the growth of the full-fledged

Nexus Network the Jihadi organizations

that mushara had banned uh the Pakistani

Taliban which were criminalized elements

that were suddenly got up and acquired

power um and then they linked up with

the Afghan Taliban and of course the

afan Taliban were linked with Al-Qaeda

so it all became a a network the

interesting thing is that when 9911

happened um the perception in the

Pakistani military was that there's such

a thing as alqaeda and there's such a

thing as Pakistan Afghan Taliban but

there's no such thing as Pakistani

Taliban and as far as the jihadis are

concerned they're not part of the Nexus

they're a separate category altogether

and uh you know you need to treat treat

them differently because at that time

they were still part of the assets that

to be used against India it only dawned

on mhar M later maybe two years down the

line that actually it had all developed

into into a network and that you could

not separate the jihadis from the

Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani

Taliban from the Afghan Taliban and

Al-Qaeda at the back of it all that is

the current situation it's one network

alqaeda comprises people from 17 18

countries I don't know how many USBS

there are but there's no doubt about it

uh that there are large foreigners from

Central Asia sitting up in vistan that

is what the Americans tell us that is

what the Army tells us um and the fact

that whenever you see pictures of

Taliban you see people who covered their

faces and their heads whereas others are

you know you can see who they are so and

often uh when the drones strike you do

know that um Central Nai were killed or

Arabs were killed uh that sort of

information we were able to get from the

local ground uh what is their actual

strength we don't know where is Osama we

don't know my own hunch is that the

drones have actually pushed out

many uh alqaeda people from vistan into

the settled areas and many afan Taliban

from uh those areas into settled areas

also uh which is why you're finding it

more and more difficult uh to actually

get good drone strikes um which take out

a lot of uh Al-Qaeda people uh so you

know it's anybody's guess what sort of

numbers you are playing with there was a

time when we thought bah masud had

30,000 men underarms we still don't know

what the real strength is uh you know

they say they've killed 1200 1500

Taliban in this military

offensive my own hunch is many less you

know what happens is when a drone uh

strikes an area in vistan and uh four

people are killed uh the media says 17

people killed in one Taliban and 16

civilians but when uh the military goes

and flattens a settlement because there

are two Taliban snipers from there 17

civilians are killed two Taliban are

killed we said two civilians killed 17

Taliban killed so so that's what is

happening so there is a POS of real data

um and figures on the ground we don't

know we've been pretty heavily waited on

the right for questions is anybody on

the left I don't mean ideologically I

mean otherwise want to ask a question

there's a hand up I guess I want to go

back to one of the things you raised at

the beginning you're talking the economy

and I want to ask how can you really get

a sustained Improvement in the economy

without radical reforms in the education

system well you know the thing is the

reforms in the education system is a

long-term issue you can't press a button

and have uh effective reforms that start

delivering uh in a year but elections

happen every 3 years or four years and

you need short-term measures to get the

economy moving again that's the most

important thing right now we down to a

3% rate of growth uh nearly the first

quarter is over uh we're still

negotiating with the IMF is still

waiting uh for American money to come in

we're still debating whether this money

will come into the government's coffers

and be used as part of the budget to be

dispensed according to the government's

requirements for monetary policy fiscal

policy all the rest of it or whether the

Americans will you know fine tune this

and say okay this money will go here and

we'll go here and we'll go here we still

disputing all that that's the debate

that's going on in Islamabad part of the

reason when you when you have 300 people

working under Robin Rafael in Islamabad

trying to set up a system whereby all

this money that is going to come in in

the next 5 years where it has to go and

how it has to be monitored and how it

has to be accounted

for uh you know poverty is increasing

there's no money for anything and if

there is a new war scenario with India

then we've really had it so we really

need a quick injection and we need to

get the economy moving that can only

happen if the threat of and conflict of

with India that threat evaporates or

diminishes so that we get foreign

investment and of course if we get the

economy revived again on the basis of

large doses of uh foreign aid and

assistance which is not happening right

now so you know there is no real

incentive even for Mr assis zardari uh

to say okay you know we'll do what you

uh I'm Kash H with the ran Corporation

thank you Naim for another very explosive presentation uh my question is

explosive presentation uh my question is a little on the non-traditional threat

a little on the non-traditional threat uh to security for like the water issue

uh to security for like the water issue in Pakistan If You Can Shed uh some

in Pakistan If You Can Shed uh some light on that especially Vis A V India

light on that especially Vis A V India and some internal Water Resource

and some internal Water Resource Management problems and if you can just

Management problems and if you can just join it with food and energy crisis we

join it with food and energy crisis we are facing especially in the southern

are facing especially in the southern part of Pakistan that is

part of Pakistan that is Karachi you know the most common refrain

Karachi you know the most common refrain these days in Pakistan is that uh uh

these days in Pakistan is that uh uh we're going to have water

we're going to have water wars uh we're going to have water wars

wars uh we're going to have water wars with India we're going to have water

with India we're going to have water wars within Pakistan and um um this is a

wars within Pakistan and um um this is a very very critical factor it's a

very very critical factor it's a long-term Factor uh in the short term

long-term Factor uh in the short term you know you do get by you get a good

you know you do get by you get a good crop and a bad crop the headline in um

crop and a bad crop the headline in um story on the front page of my paper

story on the front page of my paper today in in uh uh Pakistan is about

today in in uh uh Pakistan is about India and Pakistan building two dams

India and Pakistan building two dams each trying to build it faster than the

each trying to build it faster than the other on the same river uh because under

other on the same river uh because under the terms of the Indus water Accord um

the terms of the Indus water Accord um the whoever does it first will get

the whoever does it first will get certain benefits and so on and um the

certain benefits and so on and um the rhetoric on water is is is getting more

rhetoric on water is is is getting more and more bitter and um acute and um for

and more bitter and um acute and um for two years we've been talking to trying

two years we've been talking to trying to talk to India in terms of a

to talk to India in terms of a resolution to this conflict over the

resolution to this conflict over the over the building of an Indian Dam over

over the building of an Indian Dam over jalm and uh now the kashmiris are

jalm and uh now the kashmiris are getting into the ACT first it was India

getting into the ACT first it was India Pakistan now the third party is come in

Pakistan now the third party is come in and said hey India Pakistan is fine we

and said hey India Pakistan is fine we Kashmir is in Kashmir we need to be a

Kashmir is in Kashmir we need to be a party to this conflict also this is our

party to this conflict also this is our water it's getting more complicated

water it's getting more complicated which is to say that the kashmiris in

which is to say that the kashmiris in India are no longer you know they're not

India are no longer you know they're not pro India and they're not pro Pakistan

pro India and they're not pro Pakistan anymore they're more for aadi which is

anymore they're more for aadi which is to say even the old pro-india parties

to say even the old pro-india parties are now having to take a very

are now having to take a very independent position uh on some of these

independent position uh on some of these issues in including water so water is

issues in including water so water is going to become a very major issue uh in

going to become a very major issue uh in the next three or four years um and if

the next three or four years um and if we don't solve some of the more

we don't solve some of the more outstanding issues and create the trust

outstanding issues and create the trust that is needed to either get the World

that is needed to either get the World Bank in at the first opportunity or not

Bank in at the first opportunity or not get the World Bank in at all and do it

get the World Bank in at all and do it ourselves but neither of that is

ourselves but neither of that is happening currently so that's a very

happening currently so that's a very very critical area second of course is

very critical area second of course is because you know the threat is oh we're

because you know the threat is oh we're going to die without water I mean that

going to die without water I mean that is something far more powerful than all

is something far more powerful than all the rhetoric about mumbay and this that

the rhetoric about mumbay and this that and the other and you know the upper

and the other and you know the upper iian versus the low lower Iberian you

iian versus the low lower Iberian you have the same problem inside Pakistan we

have the same problem inside Pakistan we want to build a dam we can't build a dam

want to build a dam we can't build a dam why because the lower Iberian Sy says

why because the lower Iberian Sy says nothing doing they they don't trust

nothing doing they they don't trust Punjab Province Pakistan doesn't trust

Punjab Province Pakistan doesn't trust India India doesn't trust Pakistan and

India India doesn't trust Pakistan and water is the life lifeblood of Pakistan

water is the life lifeblood of Pakistan much more than it is that of India and

much more than it is that of India and because you know this the land of the

because you know this the land of the Five Rivers Punjab that is The Granary

Five Rivers Punjab that is The Granary and uh uh uh so I think you know we are

and uh uh uh so I think you know we are having internal problems over

having internal problems over distribution of resources the National

distribution of resources the National Finance commission award can't get our

Finance commission award can't get our act together the provinces are fighting

act together the provinces are fighting over resources over sales tax proceeds

over resources over sales tax proceeds over the measure of autonomy that we

over the measure of autonomy that we need that's another challenge that we

need that's another challenge that we face I didn't talk about it but I'm glad

face I didn't talk about it but I'm glad you pointed it out and then of course if

you pointed it out and then of course if you link that whole process of regional

you link that whole process of regional autonomy including resources command

autonomy including resources command over resour es the Northwest Frontier

over resour es the Northwest Frontier province is asking for royalties 200

province is asking for royalties 200 billion rupees they're asking for

billion rupees they're asking for royalties in uh past supplies of water

royalties in uh past supplies of water and

and hydroelectricity the government doesn't

hydroelectricity the government doesn't have money to import oil and pay its oil

have money to import oil and pay its oil companies so that we can get back to you

companies so that we can get back to you know 2 hours of power outages instead of

know 2 hours of power outages instead of 12 and the Northwest Frontier province

12 and the Northwest Frontier province is asking for 200 billion rupees there's

is asking for 200 billion rupees there's no money and so you know this is the

no money and so you know this is the problem we when we want to build a dam

problem we when we want to build a dam when the International Community and

when the International Community and others want to give us money for

others want to give us money for projects such as the

projects such as the there's no domestic consensus and on top

there's no domestic consensus and on top of that you have the Indo Park problem

of that you have the Indo Park problem where there is no consensus either so

where there is no consensus either so this is a very critical area it could

this is a very critical area it could override many other issues uh in the

override many other issues uh in the next two or three

next two or three years first hand up was over here this

years first hand up was over here this lady

lady here yeah the one that one the one with

here yeah the one that one the one with a smile on her

a smile on her face I Natalie park with the century

face I Natalie park with the century Foundation um I'm wondering if you can

Foundation um I'm wondering if you can speak a little bit about the situation

speak a little bit about the situation in the swab valy for the displaced and

in the swab valy for the displaced and and returning citizens um and also from

and returning citizens um and also from a media perspective can you speak a

a media perspective can you speak a little bit about whether you think the

little bit about whether you think the information is that's coming out is

information is that's coming out is accurate and adequate um and if not what

accurate and adequate um and if not what do you think the ramifications of that

do you think the ramifications of that are well very quickly um we thought the

are well very quickly um we thought the refugee problem the displacement problem

refugee problem the displacement problem was going to be really huge everybody

was going to be really huge everybody thought that in the event it hasn't

thought that in the event it hasn't turned out to be so huge

turned out to be so huge um I think the writing on the wall was

um I think the writing on the wall was that a the Army might not move against

that a the Army might not move against the Taliban in which case it would

the Taliban in which case it would become huge but the Army did move and

become huge but the Army did move and the refugees did decide to go back and

the refugees did decide to go back and the Army is now making commitments that

the Army is now making commitments that it's there forever it's not going to go

it's there forever it's not going to go away it's going to build contonment and

away it's going to build contonment and it's going to stay there and protect the

it's going to stay there and protect the people so the RIT of the state is back

people so the RIT of the state is back for the first time actually it's not

for the first time actually it's not back it's there for the first time so

back it's there for the first time so that's a good thing which is you know

that's a good thing which is you know part of the solution to the refugee

part of the solution to the refugee problem the second thing is that the

problem the second thing is that the money didn't come you know what 550

money didn't come you know what 550 million were pledged uh as immediate

million were pledged uh as immediate assistance out of which only a couple of

assistance out of which only a couple of hundred million have come and that to

hundred million have come and that to only from the United States and pittance

only from the United States and pittance you know pittances from here and there

you know pittances from here and there uh most of the refugees were taken care

uh most of the refugees were taken care of by uh you know fellow pakistanis they

of by uh you know fellow pakistanis they ended up in homes and uh now with the

ended up in homes and uh now with the weather becoming better their condition

weather becoming better their condition is getting better uh the government also

is getting better uh the government also put out originally it said it was giving

put out originally it said it was giving them 5 billion now it's gone up to maybe

them 5 billion now it's gone up to maybe 15 billion so the Pakistani population

15 billion so the Pakistani population the government of Pakistan the Pakistani

the government of Pakistan the Pakistani Army's action the hospitality of the

Army's action the hospitality of the Pakistani people all have served to in a

Pakistani people all have served to in a sense diminish the refugee problem but

sense diminish the refugee problem but it's still there it's still a big

it's still there it's still a big problem and winter uh is going to be

problem and winter uh is going to be another uh problem because if there is a

another uh problem because if there is a Resurgence of Taliban activity in the

Resurgence of Taliban activity in the winter then there could be really huge

problems uh I'll get to Y how in a minute

thanks my name is R faad I'm a freelance journalist uh najim sa I have attended

journalist uh najim sa I have attended many many thing Tang functions here

many many thing Tang functions here Pakistan related I haven't seen a single

Pakistan related I haven't seen a single Pakistani visitor from Dr hudai to

Pakistani visitor from Dr hudai to Sherpa who didn't say that drone attacks

Sherpa who didn't say that drone attacks in Pakistan are

in Pakistan are counterproductive what is your opinion

counterproductive what is your opinion on

on that first of

that first of all the Pakistani army the Pakistani

all the Pakistani army the Pakistani government and the United States have a

government and the United States have a policy on these drone attacks the policy

policy on these drone attacks the policy is that the pakistanis will protest but

is that the pakistanis will protest but they welcome these attacks because they

they welcome these attacks because they do take out valuable Targets number one

do take out valuable Targets number one uh number two uh officially the

uh number two uh officially the Americans don't say that they're sending

Americans don't say that they're sending the drones into uh areas that are

the drones into uh areas that are Pakistani sovereignty uh as far as the

Pakistani sovereignty uh as far as the people of Pakistan are concerned and the

people of Pakistan are concerned and the media of Pakistan is concerned they're

media of Pakistan is concerned they're anti- drones genuinely so because there

anti- drones genuinely so because there the question is of Honor there the

the question is of Honor there the question is of sovereignty there

question is of sovereignty there abstract issues are important they're

abstract issues are important they're not important to the government of

not important to the government of Pakistan or to the Pakistani army which

Pakistan or to the Pakistani army which is facing a situation on the ground of

is facing a situation on the ground of course governments use public opinion

course governments use public opinion and media opinion uh to try and extract

and media opinion uh to try and extract concessions and to that extent when you

concessions and to that extent when you hear Mr zardari and the Pakistani army

hear Mr zardari and the Pakistani army say that hey give us the drones let us

say that hey give us the drones let us press the buttons makes sense okay but

press the buttons makes sense okay but they know it's not going to happen they

they know it's not going to happen they know the drone strikes are going to

know the drone strikes are going to continue and now even the Pakistani

continue and now even the Pakistani public is becoming a little cynical of

public is becoming a little cynical of the whole thing especially since it was

the whole thing especially since it was an American drone that took out bah

an American drone that took out bah masud and you know the whole theory that

masud and you know the whole theory that bah was an American agent or an Indian

bah was an American agent or an Indian agent and the Americans were not helping

agent and the Americans were not helping all that has been blown blown away now

all that has been blown blown away now uh the media does talk about drone

uh the media does talk about drone attacks but it's not with the same

attacks but it's not with the same insistence and emotionalism that they

insistence and emotionalism that they did earlier the cynicism has set in and

did earlier the cynicism has set in and people now be have accepted the fact

people now be have accepted the fact that this is a going to happen it's

that this is a going to happen it's going to be selective but it's going to

going to be selective but it's going to happen and the Pakistani army and

happen and the Pakistani army and government of complicity in

government of complicity in it hoe I said I promised you the next uh

turn uh I'm Howard cha of Georgetown University uh Naim you've talked a great

University uh Naim you've talked a great deal about the importance of conflict

deal about the importance of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan as

resolution between India and Pakistan as an

an ingredient for uh better handling of the

ingredient for uh better handling of the regional

regional issue but I'd like

issue but I'd like to get some speculation on your your

to get some speculation on your your part uh as to what that means on what

part uh as to what that means on what basis uh would uh relations be

basis uh would uh relations be improved uh conflicts are resolved do

improved uh conflicts are resolved do you have anything in mind other than

you have anything in mind other than getting the Indians off your back on

getting the Indians off your back on post Mumbai what are you going to do

post Mumbai what are you going to do about uh big issues uh What uh can a

about uh big issues uh What uh can a Pakistan government admittedly quite a

Pakistan government admittedly quite a weak Pakistan government do by way of

weak Pakistan government do by way of offering concessions which it would have

offering concessions which it would have to do uh in any meaningful conflict

to do uh in any meaningful conflict resolution how the thing is that I think

resolution how the thing is that I think the Pakistani government opposition and

the Pakistani government opposition and Military establishment has already made

Military establishment has already made the biggest historical concession it

the biggest historical concession it could make to conflict resolution with

could make to conflict resolution with India and I dated back

India and I dated back to the 99 Summit with between Naas

to the 99 Summit with between Naas Sharif and vajpai when they they started

Sharif and vajpai when they they started talking about the chinab formula on

talking about the chinab formula on Kashmir which was very far removed from

Kashmir which was very far removed from the UN resolution idea mushara denied it

the UN resolution idea mushara denied it to begin with and then went back on it

to begin with and then went back on it and is out of the box thinking led to

and is out of the box thinking led to another back channel that came very

another back channel that came very close to the same sort of thing ending

close to the same sort of thing ending in a joint mechanism uh the areas that

in a joint mechanism uh the areas that are part of Pakistan became become part

are part of Pakistan became become part of Pakistan those that are part of

of Pakistan those that are part of current Kashmir excluding the valley uh

current Kashmir excluding the valley uh become part of India some adjustments

become part of India some adjustments along the river chanab on on the west

along the river chanab on on the west and on the East uh as it so happens uh

and on the East uh as it so happens uh the Muslims are on One bank and the

the Muslims are on One bank and the Hindus are majority on the other bank so

Hindus are majority on the other bank so India doesn't even have to say that this

India doesn't even have to say that this this took place on the basis of religion

this took place on the basis of religion uh because as it so happens the

uh because as it so happens the geography is

geography is such what more I mean can could India

such what more I mean can could India ask for this is exactly what India has

ask for this is exactly what India has always wanted to sort out Kashmir

always wanted to sort out Kashmir internally and today the whole notion

internally and today the whole notion the kashmiris have made it absolutely

the kashmiris have made it absolutely clear that they don't want to be part of

clear that they don't want to be part of Pakistan and the what zardari has done

Pakistan and the what zardari has done in the Northern areas is the first step

in the Northern areas is the first step in that direction which is why the

in that direction which is why the kashmiris in Kashmir the Hardline

kashmiris in Kashmir the Hardline Kashmir in Indian Kashmir are angry

Kashmir in Indian Kashmir are angry Yasin Malik just gave a statement how

Yasin Malik just gave a statement how that he's totally opposed to what

that he's totally opposed to what zardari is done by incorporating the

zardari is done by incorporating the northern and giving the Northern areas a

northern and giving the Northern areas a degree of autonomy this is the first

degree of autonomy this is the first step to incorporating it as a province

step to incorporating it as a province of Pakistan or and aad Kashmir as a

of Pakistan or and aad Kashmir as a province of uh Pakistan and if not then

province of uh Pakistan and if not then the whole notion of Kashmir with a joint

the whole notion of Kashmir with a joint mechanism which is what the five points

mechanism which is what the five points are all about uh which you're aware of I

are all about uh which you're aware of I mean all India you know you can see and

mean all India you know you can see and sign this in uh in a year's time

sign this in uh in a year's time provided provided the the the you know

provided provided the the the you know and both Congress and the BJP were on

and both Congress and the BJP were on board half the back Channel took place

board half the back Channel took place under one regime and half the back

under one regime and half the back Channel under another regime in Pakistan

Channel under another regime in Pakistan half the back Channel under Naas and

half the back Channel under Naas and half the back Channel under mush zardari

half the back Channel under mush zardari wants to get on with it zardari is Keen

wants to get on with it zardari is Keen to keep the same back channels he

to keep the same back channels he doesn't mind he's asked Tark aiz to

doesn't mind he's asked Tark aiz to carry on Tark aiz isort of Heming and

carry on Tark aiz isort of Heming and haing but on the Indian side you have Mr

haing but on the Indian side you have Mr lamba and uh you have the new National

lamba and uh you have the new National Security advisor who's part of it so it

Security advisor who's part of it so it it it doesn't require much to get back

it it doesn't require much to get back on track which is the whole point

on track which is the whole point Kashmir is nearer to a solution today

Kashmir is nearer to a solution today than it ever was ever was the question

than it ever was ever was the question is India has to take that initiative the

is India has to take that initiative the kashmiris are ready for it I was in

kashmiris are ready for it I was in Kashmir last year and I was struck by

Kashmir last year and I was struck by the enormous support in Sirin nagar and

the enormous support in Sirin nagar and its environs for

its environs for mushara I was shocked I said what they

mushara I was shocked I said what they said we hope he has a long life I said

said we hope he has a long life I said what are you saying he said yeah he's

what are you saying he said yeah he's given us breathing space this war has

given us breathing space this war has been terrible we don't want to be part

been terrible we don't want to be part of Pakistan Mash's out of the box

of Pakistan Mash's out of the box thinking is right so Naas wants that he

thinking is right so Naas wants that he initiated that process and the People's

initiated that process and the People's Party initiated it or thought about it

Party initiated it or thought about it in 1989 so what more does India want the

in 1989 so what more does India want the fact that the UN is out of the loop the

fact that the UN is out of the loop the fact that ladak can now become an Indian

fact that ladak can now become an Indian State the fact that Jammu can now become

State the fact that Jammu can now become an Indian State and the valley in

an Indian State and the valley in certain areas of aad Kashmir you have

certain areas of aad Kashmir you have joint mechanism for an X period of time

joint mechanism for an X period of time without diluting sovereignty India

without diluting sovereignty India sovereignty or Pakistan sovereignty I

sovereignty or Pakistan sovereignty I think the solution is there so my the

think the solution is there so my the point I'm making is this we need to get

point I'm making is this we need to get back on that track we need to solve the

back on that track we need to solve the water problem I mean the water problem

water problem I mean the water problem we brought in the World Bank the World

we brought in the World Bank the World Bank gave a judgment India and Pakistan

Bank gave a judgment India and Pakistan are about dragging their feet over it

are about dragging their feet over it because the ball in India's Court okay

because the ball in India's Court okay you know what about cin we all know the

you know what about cin we all know the deal is is done but cin won't happen

deal is is done but cin won't happen until the rest of the things happened

until the rest of the things happened now in the old days siin was first on

now in the old days siin was first on the agenda now it's not first on the

the agenda now it's not first on the agenda my own assessment is in a

agenda my own assessment is in a perverse sort of way the item that was

perverse sort of way the item that was supposed to be last on the agenda which

supposed to be last on the agenda which is Kashmir from India's point of view

is Kashmir from India's point of view from India's point of view it should be

from India's point of view it should be first on the agenda now Pakistan has

first on the agenda now Pakistan has conceded more that it could conceivably

conceded more that it could conceivably have in very difficult circumstances and

have in very difficult circumstances and there's a consensus in Pakistan Sharif

there's a consensus in Pakistan Sharif Asif zardari Peres mashar the army they

Asif zardari Peres mashar the army they all want this settlement on these lines

all want this settlement on these lines what more in India does India

corner Mr Siti I'm an Indian Muslim and you have been talking a lot about India

you have been talking a lot about India uh you gave a very Bleak picture of

uh you gave a very Bleak picture of Pakistan and I wonder how I I don't wish

Pakistan and I wonder how I I don't wish to offend you or other pakistanis or

to offend you or other pakistanis or anyone else here that the Indian Muslims

anyone else here that the Indian Muslims decided at least my parents decided to

decided at least my parents decided to stay in India and considering what

stay in India and considering what Pakistan has conducted itself in the

Pakistan has conducted itself in the past 60 years we are in a way happy to

past 60 years we are in a way happy to be in India rather than Pakistan my

be in India rather than Pakistan my question to you that you have not said a

question to you that you have not said a word about the mahajer party what is

word about the mahajer party what is their role there is a lot of internal

their role there is a lot of internal strife within Pakistan you have talked a

strife within Pakistan you have talked a lot about the external threats but what

lot about the external threats but what about the threats within the ethnic

about the threats within the ethnic strives or the treatment of the mahaj by

strives or the treatment of the mahaj by the punjabis or the CIS would you throw

the punjabis or the CIS would you throw some light on that yeah but with due

some light on that yeah but with due respect and I don't want to get into a

respect and I don't want to get into a debate here with due respect I'm not

debate here with due respect I'm not sure whether your point of view of the

sure whether your point of view of the state of the Indian Muslims is the point

state of the Indian Muslims is the point of view of a majority of the Indian

of view of a majority of the Indian Muslims um and I can only refer to a

Muslims um and I can only refer to a government report published recently in

government report published recently in India that says that the state of Indian

India that says that the state of Indian Muslims is terrible it's as bad as that

Muslims is terrible it's as bad as that of the lower costs and that is certainly

of the lower costs and that is certainly not the uh fate that should have

not the uh fate that should have befallen a community that is at least 5%

befallen a community that is at least 5% of the Indian population so I don't want

of the Indian population so I don't want to go beyond that I'm just quoting

to go beyond that I'm just quoting throwing back at you what the Indian

throwing back at you what the Indian government's report says about the

government's report says about the status of Indians Muslims and how in in

status of Indians Muslims and how in in a sense if Pakistan's ideology has

a sense if Pakistan's ideology has disproven the need for partition the

disproven the need for partition the state of the Indian Muslims today is is

state of the Indian Muslims today is is evidence to the contrary so having said

evidence to the contrary so having said that if if you'll allow me to talk now a

that if if you'll allow me to talk now a little bit about um um the mahaj well

little bit about um um the mahaj well you know Karachi is the mahajer city and

you know Karachi is the mahajer city and Karachi is not split three ways and Sy

Karachi is not split three ways and Sy is split three ways you have the mahaj

is split three ways you have the mahaj you have the sindhis and now you have a

you have the sindhis and now you have a huge patan influx pashun influx and

huge patan influx pashun influx and onethird of Karachi is now pashun in an

onethird of Karachi is now pashun in an interesting way so that is a cultural

interesting way so that is a cultural mix that is both good from one point of

mix that is both good from one point of view and potentially dangerous in the

view and potentially dangerous in the case of if there is ethnic strike Strife

case of if there is ethnic strike Strife uh so you know beyond that what can one

uh so you know beyond that what can one say about Karachi it is still the Hub of

say about Karachi it is still the Hub of Pakistan's industrial growth uh there is

Pakistan's industrial growth uh there is peace there is an attempt for the first

peace there is an attempt for the first time between these three ethnic

time between these three ethnic communities that have been Waring with

communities that have been Waring with each other uh to to build peace and to

each other uh to to build peace and to build the rules of the game in that City

build the rules of the game in that City and um uh that has been demonstrated

and um uh that has been demonstrated reason reasonably well the city has been

reason reasonably well the city has been free of ethnic conflict for a long time

free of ethnic conflict for a long time now terrorism bombs going off occasional

now terrorism bombs going off occasional this that and the other that happens all

this that and the other that happens all the time but the sort of ethnic conflict

the time but the sort of ethnic conflict that we saw in the '90s uh that is

that we saw in the '90s uh that is certainly not there anymore

oh we got some more questions on the left my name is VJ sasal I'm from Indo

left my name is VJ sasal I'm from Indo American Kashmir Forum born and raised

American Kashmir Forum born and raised in Kashmir uh but my question is more

in Kashmir uh but my question is more general actually it's more of a comment

general actually it's more of a comment uh say I've heard you uh over the years

uh say I've heard you uh over the years coming over here sometimes with jigu and

coming over here sometimes with jigu and all that always enjoyed your your

all that always enjoyed your your presentations but today I'm really both

presentations but today I'm really both surprised and disappointed I have never

surprised and disappointed I have never seen you as an apologist for the the

seen you as an apologist for the the Pakistani government as I see you today

Pakistani government as I see you today I I'm sorry but I'm giving you my Frank

I I'm sorry but I'm giving you my Frank assessment you are I don't see a

assessment you are I don't see a difference one bit between the official

difference one bit between the official Pakistani spokesman and you would you

Pakistani spokesman and you would you comment on that please thank you the

comment on that please thank you the official Pakistani spokesman will not

official Pakistani spokesman will not say Mr Zari in his first year has been a

say Mr Zari in his first year has been a total

total disappointment that the official

disappointment that the official spokesman will not say not keep his job

spokesman will not say not keep his job the official Pakistani Position will

the official Pakistani Position will probably rubbish Naas Sharif which I

probably rubbish Naas Sharif which I have not done I've talked about Pakistan

have not done I've talked about Pakistan national

national interests the thing is it is in

interests the thing is it is in Pakistan's National interest to keep the

Pakistan's National interest to keep the Army out the Army I mean you know I've

Army out the Army I mean you know I've always said that and you will bear me

always said that and you will bear me out I've today made a very forceful case

out I've today made a very forceful case for keeping the Army out the fact that I

for keeping the Army out the fact that I have focused a little bit on India I

have focused a little bit on India I don't think you like that but

don't think you like that but unfortunately I've always said that it

unfortunately I've always said that it takes two hands to clap I said to India

takes two hands to clap I said to India in 99 that nawas Sharif is your best bet

in 99 that nawas Sharif is your best bet to build peace because of the The Summit

to build peace because of the The Summit I was having difficulties with Naas

I was having difficulties with Naas Sharif in in Pakistan cuz I was trying

Sharif in in Pakistan cuz I was trying to expose his corruption but I went to

to expose his corruption but I went to New Delhi and I said in New Delhi that

New Delhi and I said in New Delhi that India's best beted is to get this law

India's best beted is to get this law Summit moving Naas is your best beted

Summit moving Naas is your best beted that is the same Naas who promoted the

that is the same Naas who promoted the Jihad and had been an army spokesman I

Jihad and had been an army spokesman I said that at that time I say it today

said that at that time I say it today your best bet is the civilians of

your best bet is the civilians of Pakistan but you know you can't have it

Pakistan but you know you can't have it all your way at the end of the day there

all your way at the end of the day there is a public opinion there is a

is a public opinion there is a historical memory religion politics and

historical memory religion politics and the fact that we are neighbors is

the fact that we are neighbors is important and you know if you really

important and you know if you really want to be a big brother you got to act

want to be a big brother you got to act like

like one there was a hand up whale in the

one there was a hand up whale in the back there and then I who else ja John

back there and then I who else ja John John Lawrence uh one Regional power that

John Lawrence uh one Regional power that you haven't mentioned which had

you haven't mentioned which had historical associations with Pakistan

historical associations with Pakistan and I'd be interested to hear your views

and I'd be interested to hear your views about their current activities is China

about their current activities is China and I wonder if you might comment a

and I wonder if you might comment a little bit about their current influence

little bit about their current influence in Pakistan and their role if they have

in Pakistan and their role if they have one well very briefly um in

one well very briefly um in 1996 the Chinese pres the the then

1996 the Chinese pres the the then president of China came to

president of China came to Pakistan and uh in a conversation with

Pakistan and uh in a conversation with the then president of Pakistan Mr Faruk

the then president of Pakistan Mr Faruk lagari to which I was privy I happen to

lagari to which I was privy I happen to be a member of that interim Arrangement

be a member of that interim Arrangement the Chinese president categorically and

the Chinese president categorically and clearly told the Pakistani president hey

clearly told the Pakistani president hey settle your disputes with India

settle your disputes with India Kashmir is a border issue settle it as a

Kashmir is a border issue settle it as a border issue like we've settled all our

border issue like we've settled all our issues you couldn't get clearer than

issues you couldn't get clearer than that the Chinese have always been very

that the Chinese have always been very pragmatic the Chinese don't give

pragmatic the Chinese don't give Pakistan money but they do help in

Pakistan money but they do help in projects they do help in transfer of uh

projects they do help in transfer of uh technology including military technology

technology including military technology um but the Chinese have also built a

um but the Chinese have also built a strategic relationship with India and

strategic relationship with India and Pakistan is not unaware of that uh the

Pakistan is not unaware of that uh the Chinese are Pakistan's preferred trading

Chinese are Pakistan's preferred trading partner partners because India is not if

partner partners because India is not if India were then the CH then the Chinese

India were then the CH then the Chinese would be at a disadvantage purely

would be at a disadvantage purely because of the geographic distance

because of the geographic distance because some Indian goods are cheaper or

because some Indian goods are cheaper or as cheap as Chinese Goods right now

as cheap as Chinese Goods right now Indian Goods don't come into Pakistan

Indian Goods don't come into Pakistan for various reasons and the Chinese have

for various reasons and the Chinese have taken over the market in a strange way

taken over the market in a strange way something very interesting is going on

something very interesting is going on uh one when the Chinese come in and bid

uh one when the Chinese come in and bid for Pakistani

for Pakistani projects the media is extremely

projects the media is extremely reluctant to point the finger of of on

reluctant to point the finger of of on corruption cuz the Chinese are not

corruption cuz the Chinese are not averse to the usual business practices

averse to the usual business practices but the media will not talk about

but the media will not talk about Chinese

Chinese Kickbacks the media will not talk about

Kickbacks the media will not talk about non-transparent Arrangements between the

non-transparent Arrangements between the government of Pakistan and the

government of Pakistan and the government of China on private power on

government of China on private power on on on projects so the Chinese in a sense

on on projects so the Chinese in a sense always have the advantage of jumping the

always have the advantage of jumping the queue and if the Americans or the

queue and if the Americans or the Japanese or anybody else is competing

Japanese or anybody else is competing for a tender all other things being

for a tender all other things being equal the Chinese are going to get it so

equal the Chinese are going to get it so that's the advantage China has number

that's the advantage China has number two the Chinese are the only ones who've

two the Chinese are the only ones who've actually thrown in physically manpower

actually thrown in physically manpower to help build some of these projects at

to help build some of these projects at times and in areas where there's

times and in areas where there's conflict going on the Chinese have been

conflict going on the Chinese have been kidnapped held for ransom the Chinese

kidnapped held for ransom the Chinese are in taking huge risks in doing this

are in taking huge risks in doing this and to that extent the government of

and to that extent the government of Pakistan is very responsive to them the

Pakistan is very responsive to them the third thing is that the Chinese are very

third thing is that the Chinese are very big with projects they come in with

big with projects they come in with projects build operate and so on and

projects build operate and so on and then now uh they're talking to the

then now uh they're talking to the pakistanis on power projects Mr the our

pakistanis on power projects Mr the our president has been to China um to the

president has been to China um to the Three Gorges talking to those companies

Three Gorges talking to those companies to come in and build a string of dams

to come in and build a string of dams small dams in Pakistan uh that sort of

small dams in Pakistan uh that sort of money that sort of commitment is not

money that sort of commitment is not coming from any other country in the

coming from any other country in the world and so therefore I think China

world and so therefore I think China retains a special Edge uh in terms of

retains a special Edge uh in terms of Pakistan's Economic Development and

Pakistan's Economic Development and Military

Military security but in a perverse sort of

security but in a perverse sort of strange sort of way Saudi Arabia

strange sort of way Saudi Arabia maintains a very strong uh influence uh

maintains a very strong uh influence uh in Pakistan politically even though

in Pakistan politically even though Saudi Arabia does very gives very little

Saudi Arabia does very gives very little economic assistance compared to say the

economic assistance compared to say the United States yet Saudi Arabia maintains

United States yet Saudi Arabia maintains a very very significant clout in in

a very very significant clout in in Pakistan and now especially the Saudis

Pakistan and now especially the Saudis are pushing for a solution in

are pushing for a solution in Afghanistan sometimes in conflict with

Afghanistan sometimes in conflict with that of Pakistani national interests and

that of Pakistani national interests and yet it's difficult to to twart the

yet it's difficult to to twart the Chinese know Chinese are anti- Taliban

Chinese know Chinese are anti- Taliban and anti- Al-Qaeda for obvious reasons

and anti- Al-Qaeda for obvious reasons uh and the pakistanis are playing you

uh and the pakistanis are playing you know have to play a far more delicate

know have to play a far more delicate game over here they're anti uh alqaeda

game over here they're anti uh alqaeda but not necessarily anti- afan Taliban

but not necessarily anti- afan Taliban so there are sources of conflict built

so there are sources of conflict built into the Pakistan Saudi relationship but

into the Pakistan Saudi relationship but at the end of the day the Pakistani is a

at the end of the day the Pakistani is a very sensitive to what Saudi Arabia says

very sensitive to what Saudi Arabia says or does just as it is on China China

or does just as it is on China China does not meddle in Pakistan's Internal

does not meddle in Pakistan's Internal Affairs the United States does Saudi

Affairs the United States does Saudi Arabia does in a perverse way in terms

Arabia does in a perverse way in terms of the proxy wars so does India but

of the proxy wars so does India but China doesn't do that so China only

China doesn't do that so China only enjoys a great deal of

enjoys a great deal of Goodwill uh John you had a question uh

Goodwill uh John you had a question uh yes John Schmidt George Washington

yes John Schmidt George Washington University there was a very uh

University there was a very uh interesting uh editorial in the Daily

interesting uh editorial in the Daily Times on September 4th about how

Times on September 4th about how dangerous uh it had become uh in Islam

dangerous uh it had become uh in Islam Abad uh and uh one uh sentence will

Abad uh and uh one uh sentence will suffice uh the truth is that the city

suffice uh the truth is that the city has become Taliban ised among the lower

has become Taliban ised among the lower classes that outnumber the rest of its

classes that outnumber the rest of its population I wonder if you could comment

population I wonder if you could comment on what the significance of this

on what the significance of this phenomenon is uh whether it exists uh

phenomenon is uh whether it exists uh elsewhere in uh Punjab and related to

elsewhere in uh Punjab and related to the growth of radical mosques and

the growth of radical mosques and madrasas throughout Punjab and then add

madrasas throughout Punjab and then add in the influence and Potential Threat uh

in the influence and Potential Threat uh added by groups like The lashgari Tiba

added by groups like The lashgari Tiba which I note in a New York Times article

which I note in a New York Times article about a month ago uh quoted um an isi uh

about a month ago uh quoted um an isi uh official saying that it was 150,000

official saying that it was 150,000 strong now and they were really afraid

strong now and they were really afraid to move against it other groups like The

to move against it other groups like The J Muhammad what is basically uh the the

J Muhammad what is basically uh the the threat to the state posed by this

threat to the state posed by this phenomenon in Punjab itself well you

phenomenon in Punjab itself well you know John um Islamabad became in a sense

know John um Islamabad became in a sense a Transit stopping point uh for Punjab

a Transit stopping point uh for Punjab Taliban and the tribal Taliban which is

Taliban and the tribal Taliban which is what the red mosque was all about it

what the red mosque was all about it happened under the watch of the isi so

happened under the watch of the isi so the isi and the military can't escape

the isi and the military can't escape responsibility for it uh the people who

responsibility for it uh the people who were in The Red mosque were known to the

were in The Red mosque were known to the isi had been their agents had been their

isi had been their agents had been their assets um and every government uh had

assets um and every government uh had been soft not wanting to take on a

been soft not wanting to take on a hornet nest that's been the philosophy

hornet nest that's been the philosophy that's still the philosophy Vis the

that's still the philosophy Vis the Taliban Taliban ised elements of madrasa

Taliban Taliban ised elements of madrasa elements who potential recruits for the

elements who potential recruits for the Taliban in southern Punjab it's a Hest

Taliban in southern Punjab it's a Hest Nest we don't have the security operatus

Nest we don't have the security operatus to deal with it so to deal with these

to deal with it so to deal with these these these these so-called former

these these these so-called former assets who are now liabilities nothing

assets who are now liabilities nothing less than a full-fledged military will

less than a full-fledged military will be needed and you saw what happened in

be needed and you saw what happened in in the L in the L in the red mosque the

in the L in the L in the red mosque the use of the military antagonized the

use of the military antagonized the population of Islamabad it antagonized

population of Islamabad it antagonized the population of Pakistan it

the population of Pakistan it antagonized the

antagonized the media and last mjid that symbol the red

media and last mjid that symbol the red mosque became a symbol of the downfall

mosque became a symbol of the downfall of the Muslim League that was then the

of the Muslim League that was then the government it became a millstone around

government it became a millstone around their neck when the elections took place

their neck when the elections took place the red mosque and the opposition used

the red mosque and the opposition used it to Great Advantage pointing out

it to Great Advantage pointing out constantly that this party is the

constantly that this party is the murderer this is the party that did the

murderer this is the party that did the red mosque so yes I mean you know there

red mosque so yes I mean you know there could be close to

could be close to 152,000 uh madrasa students uh in and

152,000 uh madrasa students uh in and around the environs of uh uh Islamabad

around the environs of uh uh Islamabad with total sympathies with uh uh the red

with total sympathies with uh uh the red mosque folk that's a very dangerous

mosque folk that's a very dangerous thing uh I

thing uh I remember uh an

remember uh an occasion when um maybe a few hundred uh

occasion when um maybe a few hundred uh armed uh

armed uh miscreant uh created havoc in the city

miscreant uh created havoc in the city of laor uh and the police could not do

of laor uh and the police could not do anything uh some something had happened

anything uh some something had happened and uh I forget now what the the Danish

and uh I forget now what the the Danish cartoons and uh uh uh we knew that these

cartoons and uh uh uh we knew that these were madrasa students Jama islami and

were madrasa students Jama islami and other Jihadi forces few hundred people

other Jihadi forces few hundred people and laar was like a ghost town the

and laar was like a ghost town the police was nowhere in sight cuz they're

police was nowhere in sight cuz they're better armed they better

better armed they better motivated and um and they're

motivated and um and they're ferocious so the security the police and

ferocious so the security the police and the local Security Forces not equipped

the local Security Forces not equipped to deal with these people which is why

to deal with these people which is why you know when India says go for the

you know when India says go for the lashara now I tell you John I've been to

lashara now I tell you John I've been to the lashar

the lashar headquarters and it is the most

headquarters and it is the most formidably scary site I mean it's a

formidably scary site I mean it's a nightmare frankly I mean and you know I

nightmare frankly I mean and you know I don't want to tell a long story but I

don't want to tell a long story but I got into trouble with the lashar we

got into trouble with the lashar we wrote something and you quoted something

wrote something and you quoted something you could well have quoted out of an

you could well have quoted out of an earlier Daily Times editorial on the

earlier Daily Times editorial on the lashar and they basically said that they

lashar and they basically said that they were going to get us so we had to go and

were going to get us so we had to go and and meet H said uh to

and meet H said uh to apologize and neither the government of

apologize and neither the government of the day nor the side nobody was prepared

the day nor the side nobody was prepared to mediate on not going to touch it you

to mediate on not going to touch it you guys go and make your peace the chief

guys go and make your peace the chief minister said I'm not in touch with them

minister said I'm not in touch with them and the chief minister wanted to help me

and the chief minister wanted to help me so we had to find ways and means of

so we had to find ways and means of getting in touch with these guys and go

getting in touch with these guys and go and apologize and you

know that whole complex is built like the mosque in

the mosque in Medina and the folk there are out of

Medina and the folk there are out of another

another world and if 5,000 of those folk decided

world and if 5,000 of those folk decided to come out tomorrow in defense of the

to come out tomorrow in defense of the lashar TBA okay there would be no

lashar TBA okay there would be no police nowhere

police nowhere inside they could take over the

inside they could take over the city lashar has to be dealt with in

city lashar has to be dealt with in terms of a long-term

terms of a long-term solution many steps part disbanding them

solution many steps part disbanding them and reorienting them partly bribing them

and reorienting them partly bribing them giving them jobs

giving them jobs partly crushing them and selectively

partly crushing them and selectively picking up their leaders and it's going

picking up their leaders and it's going to be a long drawn out process

to be a long drawn out process dismantling the lashar it's not going to

dismantling the lashar it's not going to happen overnight and the Pakistani army

happen overnight and the Pakistani army is not equipped right now what with the

is not equipped right now what with the eastern border worries about another

eastern border worries about another Mumbai uh the internal problems on its

Mumbai uh the internal problems on its Western borders Pakistani army is the

Western borders Pakistani army is the last force that is now going to say okay

last force that is now going to say okay we're going to finger the lashar we're

we're going to finger the lashar we're going to go after them no way it's not

going to go after them no way it's not going to happen therefore when India

going to happen therefore when India says act against H say it's asking for

says act against H say it's asking for something in the that is not possible in

something in the that is not possible in the short term it's a long-term issue

the short term it's a long-term issue which is why we need to build the trust

which is why we need to build the trust and conf confidence that enables the

and conf confidence that enables the Pakistan security agencies to move in

Pakistan security agencies to move in terms of the long-term

perspective well ladies and gentlemen it's after 4:30 and we promise to end

it's after 4:30 and we promise to end the meeting at 4:30 I'm willing to stay

the meeting at 4:30 I'm willing to stay for another 3 hours if everybody wants

for another 3 hours if everybody wants to but uh I'm sure that there are a

to but uh I'm sure that there are a number of you who probably

number of you who probably despite this wonderful uh hour and a

despite this wonderful uh hour and a half we've had probably wouldn't stay

half we've had probably wouldn't stay for that that long so uh do you want any

for that that long so uh do you want any more questions or are you tired is there

more questions or are you tired is there anybody who feels that they have to ask

anybody who feels that they have to ask a question before we draw this to a

a question before we draw this to a close today becomes ask question today

close today becomes ask question today yeah I mean you know it might turn out

yeah I mean you know it might turn out to be oh yeah jugu you are the preferred

to be oh yeah jugu you are the preferred questioner of all time I keep asking you

questioner of all time I keep asking you this

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Pakistan's Current Challenges: A Discussion With Najam Sethi