0:00 in terms of the minutes to flow. So, I'm
0:03 planning to cover three different areas
0:05 that largely focus on the Amazon
0:07 leadership principles. I'm just, you
0:09 know, looking for probably uh somewhere
0:11 between three to five questions is what
0:14 we'll have time to get into. Um, and
0:16 really what I'm looking for is just, you
0:18 know, your individual experience. Um, as
0:21 as we get into the questions, I'm
0:22 looking for really kind of your
0:23 individual contributions, kind of when
0:25 you got into a project, you know, what
0:27 what did you do? um and and then help me
0:29 understand as much as you can with data,
0:32 you know, just what impact your your
0:34 projects had and things like that. Um
0:36 and I try to make these very
0:37 conversational, so I may interrupt you
0:38 at times just to try to get a better
0:40 understanding of of the the examples
0:42 you're providing. Um and um what else
0:47 can I share? And yeah, I'll be I'll be
0:48 taking notes on my end as I'm sure uh
0:50 most folks that you spoke with are
0:52 probably typing on their computer. So
0:54 we're not multitasking. We're just uh
0:56 trying to capture our conversation, you
0:58 know, just uh taking notes. That's what
1:00 we'll be doing on our side. Um and then
1:03 like I said, I'll leave somewhere
1:04 between, you know, 10 to five minutes
1:06 for questions you may have uh at the
1:08 end. So, sound good. Yeah, sounds great.
1:11 Let's go. Excellent. All right. Uh so,
1:14 let's get Actually, if you don't mind,
1:15 I'm going to go off video so I can go
1:17 full screen on my end. Feel free to do
1:19 the same back on video. Yeah. So uh the
1:24 first question is really around
1:27 um uh delivering uh the on projects. I'm
1:32 looking for an example of a time where
1:34 you had significant unanticipated
1:37 obstacles to overcome to achieve a key
1:40 goal or a project milestone. So help me
1:43 understand what made it um you know
1:46 significant and what made it
1:47 unanticipated and then how you dealt
1:49 with it.
1:51 Got it. So project where I had
1:54 significant and un unanticipated goals
1:57 to overcome
1:59 obstacles to overcome to reach a goal.
2:01 Got it. Yeah, sure.
2:04 Um I can um think about a recent
2:07 scenario that happened in my current uh
2:09 role at Philips Healthcare. So I've been
2:12 working on uh I'm a mechanical design
2:14 engineer working on a defibrillator uh a
2:17 medical device and I designed the main
2:22 enclosure uh for this device which is a
2:24 plastic
2:25 component and when I received uh the
2:29 first articles from our
2:31 manufacturer and I built it into an
2:33 assembly and I performed a series of
2:35 hardware tests u to validate its
2:38 functionality and performance and in One
2:41 such test when I did uh when I dropped
2:43 it uh according to a standard drop test
2:45 I noticed that on one of the particular
2:48 corners orientations when it was dropped
2:51 uh the water ingress seal was popping
2:54 out. Uh this was basically like a
2:56 watertight seal uh that um ensures this
2:59 device maintains its uh IPX rating. So
3:03 that was a catastrophic failure if that
3:05 happened in the field. And as the lead
3:09 designer for this uh component, I took
3:12 over the my task here was to perform a
3:16 root uh cause investigation, see what
3:18 why this was happening and how I can
3:21 prevent it while also taking in into
3:24 consideration that we were pretty close
3:26 to a phase gate at that point of time
3:28 and I want to avoid any costly retooling
3:32 and uh deadline derailing u because of
3:35 that.
3:37 So um the way I started off is first uh
3:41 I built u multiple series of these
3:44 encoders because I wanted to replicate
3:46 this issue so that it wasn't just a
3:48 one-off issue and it was happening uh
3:50 was occurring more uh so when I built a
3:54 a few of these and I tested them uh it
3:57 occurred more than a few times. So this
4:00 was definitely uh more of a design flaw
4:03 at that point uh is was my conclusion.
4:06 And actually
4:12 apolog's design that you were testing.
4:14 Uh this was my design. This was your
4:17 design. And then so you said you built a
4:18 few uh additional closure enclosure. You
4:21 just I guess you're trying to understand
4:23 like what's the failure rate, right? How
4:25 many um is it like 50% failure rate or
4:29 or or more or less? Uh can you help me
4:32 understand like what was the failure
4:33 rate in actuality? Like what are you
4:35 running into? Yeah, sure. So, um what I
4:38 figured out is when this particular
4:41 device was dropped on that particular
4:43 orientation after three to four drops is
4:46 when it would the seal would pop out.
4:49 So, it took like three to four drops for
4:50 that section to like weaken out and for
4:53 that action to occur. Okay. Uh, thanks.
4:57 And so, um, yeah, so once I tested
5:00 multiple of them and they all had those
5:01 flaw, uh, it was pretty evident to me
5:03 that it was a design flaw and not a
5:04 manufacturing or material flaw more of.
5:08 Uh, so next I used a high-speed camera
5:12 to capture exactly what was happening at
5:14 the moment of impact.
5:17 And I figured out that because of the
5:20 way that uh this assembly was designed,
5:24 uh one section of that assembly had a
5:28 lot of electronics packed into it and
5:30 the other section was pretty free and it
5:32 was like a hollow shell. And that
5:35 difference in uh assem uh you know
5:38 assembly stiffness was causing the
5:41 hollow end to deflect a lot more than
5:43 the uh stiffer end. uh which respected
5:46 electronics and that difference was
5:48 enough to create enough of a gap at the
5:50 moment of impact for this seal to pop
5:53 out. So
5:56 uh with all of this information u now on
6:00 hand I started getting with some
6:04 uh prototype development I got to making
6:06 some concepts to see how I would
6:08 overcome this. Um I realized that you
6:10 know this was happening because one
6:12 section is hollow. So I had to stiffen
6:15 it out. I printed out some SLA uh
6:17 prototypes too. I had some
6:18 reinforcements in that section to give
6:21 it some extra strength. And then I had
6:24 other uh reinforcements like cupping and
6:27 um stuff to prevent relative motion uh
6:30 between different compons within the
6:32 within the enclosure. So after all of
6:36 these uh reinforcements, I performed
6:39 another drop test on this device. And
6:42 previously when it was popping, the seal
6:44 was popping out after three or four
6:46 drops. This time it was doing it after
6:49 12 to 15 drops. So to me that was within
6:53 the performance spec of what I was
6:54 looking for and I would call that pretty
6:57 much resolved. So I then coordinated
7:00 with our manufacturer because whatever
7:02 reinforcements that I was uh I wanted to
7:05 implement, I had to make sure they did
7:07 not interfere with the existing tooling
7:10 and other manufacturing uh architecture
7:13 that was already built to make these in
7:15 an injection molding press. So I had to
7:18 make sure um that coordination was
7:19 maintained and uh together we came up uh
7:23 with the the final design and we have uh
7:27 since received a new batch of production
7:30 of these parts from the manufacturer
7:31 which I tested and they perform within
7:35 the the mod the expected uh range now 12
7:39 to 15 drops and so yeah that's kind of
7:42 how the whole process went. Um okay so
7:46 this is helpful thank you. Um I'm trying
7:48 to understand so when you kind of look
7:50 at this example right your design you
7:53 get the the sort of prototype back you
7:55 get the failure rate find a way to fix
7:57 it. When you kind of think about that
8:00 example that works backwards.
8:02 Um, was there something you could have
8:06 done differently I guess in the design
8:07 initially or was it more a function of
8:11 the the fact that really you were
8:13 getting a complete assembly back there
8:15 might have been like gaps in kind of
8:17 what you could have designed them for.
8:21 Yeah. I know that makes sense and that
8:22 was actually one of my biggest learning
8:24 from this uh experience too which is uh
8:26 so when I initially designed this part
8:29 uh in isolation I performed an FA
8:32 analysis on it to see how it would
8:34 impact when it you know when it's
8:36 subjected to some kind of mechanical
8:38 stress things like that uh but when it's
8:41 assembled together into a bigger complex
8:44 system there's a whole new level of uh
8:48 comp factors that come into
8:51 uh which is something I should have
8:53 considered at an earlier stage. So yeah,
8:56 that's that was my big learning. Now
8:58 when I'm designing something that
8:59 interfaces with multiple different
9:01 subsystems,
9:02 um I take that knowledge into effect
9:05 before you know I'm shooting off the
9:07 parts to the next level. Sure.
9:11 Um you you mentioned uh you got it to
9:14 sort of 12 to 15 uh kind of drops for
9:18 the failure to occur that you said that
9:20 was good enough. Is
9:22 there something you could have done to
9:24 go beyond that? Right. I mean there's
9:26 there's meeting good enough and then
9:28 there sort of exceeding what's expected
9:30 and there's that's a tricky balance,
9:31 right? Yeah. Or sort of overorrect too
9:33 much. um help me think like help me
9:36 understand sort of why good enough was
9:38 good enough in this case and why not go
9:40 more than that. Yeah, sure. Um so in
9:43 this case what I was actually targeting
9:44 is the the bare minimum requirement was
9:48 that this thing had to survive at least
9:50 uh three drops on one uh edge. So it was
9:54 kind of on the borderline of the bare
9:56 minimum and getting this to so my idea
9:59 was to get it to within a factor of
10:01 safety of at least double the
10:03 requirement which should have been like
10:04 six to seven drops and so when after
10:07 this reinforcements it got pushed to
10:09 like way beyond. So that felt like
10:10 definitely within the comfort zone. It
10:13 could have been made even more secure
10:15 but at that point it's like diminishing
10:17 returns because we would have to add a
10:19 lot more uh material and made it make it
10:22 expensive.
10:24 Got it. Okay. So, you weren't really
10:25 that the three was the the cusp of of
10:29 the failure rate, but the 12 is actually
10:32 quite right quite good. Okay.
10:36 Okay. Um I'll switch directions.
10:39 Um different example, a different
10:42 question. I'm looking for an example of
10:43 a time where you received critical piece
10:46 of feedback or tough or critical piece
10:48 of feedback. um and and how you sort of
10:50 took the feedback and how how you
10:52 adapted it um to improve your um your
10:57 work.
11:10 Oh,
11:15 did you hear me? Yeah. Yeah, I can hear
11:16 you. Sorry, you were cut. Okay. So, did
11:18 you get a question or uh yeah, so I I
11:21 think you cut off at the end. So, like a
11:22 time I got critical feedback and how I
11:25 improved myself based upon that. Yeah.
11:28 Just looking for example of you know
11:30 critical feedback from a peer manager.
11:33 Yeah, of course. And um what did to
11:37 um Yeah, sure. So uh in my current
11:40 position at Philips
11:42 um there were times when uh this was
11:44 pretty early on in my career uh I was
11:46 leading several uh key subasssemblies
11:49 within the defibrillator device and I
11:52 was regularly presenting updates in
11:54 cross functional design reviews with
11:57 teams from different backgrounds like
11:58 electrical usability systems uh project
12:01 management industrial design and um I I
12:06 took uh pride in the technical part of
12:08 that work. Um I went very detailed
12:10 focused on the all the qualitative
12:12 metrics all the CAD FA
12:15 DFM and
12:17 after a few of those meetings um my
12:21 manager pulled me aside and he gave me
12:23 some direct and critical feedback um
12:26 along the lines of your work is
12:29 technically sound uh but your
12:31 presentations are too detailed and too
12:34 technical. um you want you have to
12:37 tailor them to you know like your what
12:40 your audience are looking for and what
12:41 information they really need to do their
12:43 end of their task. So that that was kind
12:47 of u the the feedback that I received
12:50 after one of those
12:51 presentations and so that um hit me
12:55 because my goal was to drive was not
12:57 just to present whatever I had in my
13:00 work. my goal was really to drive
13:02 alignment with these other teams and
13:04 move the program forward. So that that's
13:07 what that you know that's when I got
13:08 like a better understanding of what the
13:10 objective of these presentations were.
13:13 Uh and you know like I had to like kind
13:14 of slow it down, take it back on track.
13:17 So my task became figuring out how to
13:19 improve my technical communication style
13:21 so that everybody in the room felt
13:23 aligned and not overwhelmed by it.
13:26 So I started um observing how some of
13:30 our senior engineers uh and managers
13:32 structure their updates. I noticed they
13:35 always led with context from a top- down
13:37 approach with the objectives and
13:39 tradeoffs before diving into any
13:41 technical data. So I kind of adopted a
13:44 similar style. Um I switched to a top
13:46 down communication style with a high
13:48 level summary and then going with the
13:50 key decisions and then the rational
13:52 behind it and then supporting data for
13:54 anybody that wants to dive deeper into
13:56 something like that. And I made it a
13:58 point to like uh send out these
14:00 presentations well ahead in time so that
14:02 people uh had enough time if they wanted
14:04 to get into the details of it at the
14:06 review
14:07 meetings. So this uh impact uh it was
14:12 quite observable. Um the meetings after
14:14 that were shorter and they were more
14:17 productive. The discussions became more
14:19 focused and I got um much faster and
14:23 smoother approvals on some of my
14:25 proposals and um and and all I got
14:28 positive feedback from even the nonME
14:31 team members after that and it helped me
14:33 build a level of uh trust and
14:35 communication between our different uh
14:38 teams uh none teams. So yeah, one one
14:43 thing that I really learned from this,
14:44 you know, like
14:46 uh having the technical skills is more
14:49 of just like the gateway to do your
14:51 work, but really to be effective, uh you
14:54 know, it's more about how you can
14:56 translate your ideas across different
14:58 domains and bring people on board. Um so
15:01 yeah, it was a good learning experience.
15:05 That was good feedback from your
15:06 manager. I guess I'm I'm trying to think
15:08 about in that example, did you have
15:11 a prior understanding of what was
15:14 expected. I mean because I could almost
15:16 you know if I were your situation you
15:18 know you go back with the manager and
15:20 say hey no one said that right no one
15:21 told me. So was that expectation set or
15:23 was it just you had kind of taken on
15:26 this role but what was expected was not
15:29 really clearly done. Um I think it was a
15:33 bit of
15:35 uh I you know I I had the the basic
15:40 understanding you know like why we were
15:41 doing this design reviews which is to
15:43 like hey we're making a change in the
15:46 design we just want you guys to know
15:48 this is why it's changing. So I had that
15:50 basic understanding going into it. Uh
15:53 but you know like I really had to go
15:55 through a few of them to get capture the
15:57 sense of you know like these people are
16:00 giving me their time because really what
16:01 they want to know is how it affects them
16:04 and what they have to do. Uh you know
16:07 that relates to what my work is not just
16:11 making a presentation of look at my work
16:13 is what I did. So yeah. Right.
16:17 Okay. And um did you get any feedback
16:20 from peers or others in the meeting
16:24 after you know after you adopted your
16:26 style was any kind of recognition of of
16:29 um the change in style you mentioned a
16:31 few things in terms of it drove me
16:32 faster and um you know kind of it was
16:36 people sort of understood what you were
16:37 trying to get local feedback yeah I
16:40 think um I've had my manager talk about
16:43 it and and some of my me peers talk
16:45 about it but the most uh actionable
16:47 feedback that I noticed is definitely
16:49 how smoother my meetings went uh after I
16:52 started doing that. You know, previously
16:54 we were we were talking spending a lot
16:56 of time on like the minute technical
16:57 details of
16:59 things that didn't really make a lot of
17:02 sense in the bigger essence of the
17:04 picture. But now, you know, it was
17:06 definitely a lot more streamlined uh and
17:08 lesser detours through the course of it.
17:12 So, so it's a good uh good feedback, I
17:15 suppose. Yeah. Yeah. That's kind of how
17:18 I I interpret it.
17:21 Okay. Um, we'll stick with the manager
17:24 as as maybe the the the anchor point,
17:26 but a different question. I'm looking
17:28 for an example of a time when you
17:31 strongly disagree with your manager or
17:33 it could have been a peer manager or
17:35 peer, someone you work with. Um, and the
17:37 disagreement was on something you
17:39 considered very important for the
17:40 business, right? Kind of think of it as
17:42 a fundamental disagreement. Um, help me
17:45 understand the the source of the
17:48 disagreement and how you kind of manage
17:50 or navigate through through the
17:52 disagreement. Right. It's it's you know
17:54 in some cases the person you're
17:55 disagreeing with is right. In some cases
17:58 you're right. Right. So how do you kind
17:59 of you know so help me understand the
18:01 disagreement and then how you navigate
18:02 through it. Yeah sure. Um I think a
18:06 similar situation I have with my manager
18:09 actually. Um so as part of my current u
18:13 role and
18:14 responsibility uh on behalf of the
18:17 mechanical engineering team I was the
18:20 reviewer for some of the system level
18:22 performance documents and uh one such
18:26 document was like a highle u system
18:29 performance doc where which basically
18:31 outlines all the uh require functional
18:34 requirements and that document would
18:36 later trickle down to our me team as
18:38 design requirement.
18:40 documents. So when I was reviewing this
18:43 uh one requirement stated that uh when
18:47 um so we basically use something called
18:49 an infant child key which is like a
18:52 plastic key with a magnet to flip the
18:54 device from adult mode to a child mode.
18:57 U so this requirement said when this key
19:00 was inserted into the device if it
19:02 breaks uh during a drop uh the part of
19:06 the key within the device must not get
19:08 dislodged in it and it should be able to
19:09 be removed without use of additional
19:12 tools. Uh which made sense to me because
19:14 you know if it gets stuck in the middle
19:16 of a safe people are going to that's
19:17 going to cause delay and potentially
19:19 loss of life. So it made sense to me and
19:21 I signed off on it. And then two months
19:24 later when we received u our parts from
19:28 the manufacturer, I was running a drop
19:31 test uh on this device with the key. And
19:33 then I noticed uh there were multiple
19:36 failures when this key broke. It was
19:39 getting dislodged in the device and
19:41 sometimes I needed foreps to remove it
19:43 uh out of the device. So, I instantly
19:47 flagged this issue with my manager uh
19:50 and I took it up to him and at first uh
19:53 he was a little um hesitant on it. Uh he
19:58 kind of dismissed it saying this is not
20:00 a hard regulatory requirement. This is
20:02 more of a nice to have uh kind of a
20:05 requirement and this could be relaxed
20:07 out over the next revision of this doc.
20:10 Uh
20:12 and at at that point I didn't uh push on
20:15 it. Uh but it didn't quite sit right
20:17 with me uh making
20:20 uh a standard uh requirement change that
20:25 late into the design cycle because of a
20:28 testing convenience. It seemed like a
20:31 slippery slope that would affect uh
20:32 bigger things later down the line. So,
20:36 um, I didn't push back on it right away,
20:38 but I took the opportunity uh at the
20:41 next, uh, weekly one-on-one that I had
20:43 with him, which was the following day.
20:46 And, uh, rather than approaching uh,
20:49 escalating it in an emotional manner,
20:52 uh, I laid out a a constructive proposal
20:55 for him. So first I
20:58 uh you know like gave a transparency
21:01 into like why uh this requirement was in
21:04 effect uh because uh how it could affect
21:08 the safety of a participant during the
21:10 save if it gets dislodged and people
21:11 spend time trying to get it out. Uh and
21:14 once I did that I also outlined
21:18 um a plan um that I would I would I was
21:22 ready to take ownership of this design
21:23 change. I would start conceptualization,
21:26 prototyping, get ready, talk with the uh
21:29 manufacturers and get a fix up within uh
21:32 a month. And I showed him a timeline of
21:35 this and I said I would prioritize and
21:37 get this out. So when I approached it at
21:40 a at that uh that kind of a more
21:43 constructive manner, his stone kind of u
21:46 changed about the whole situation and he
21:48 went like okay so looks like he already
21:50 got a plan ready for it. So then go
21:54 ahead and take the lead on it. And so
21:57 then I I spent the next couple of weeks
21:59 uh redesigning it, testing it. Uh and
22:02 once I felt like I found a good concept
22:04 that was in a good place, I worked with
22:06 my manufacturer to get a fix out. Uh we
22:09 have since received uh first articles of
22:11 these keys again, which I tested and um
22:15 they fare uh much better. uh even if
22:18 they break this time it's easy to remove
22:20 them out of the the of the socket and
22:23 doesn't cause the issue
22:25 anymore. So
22:30 I guess on this question
22:35 um you said that you feedback for the
22:40 manager feedback.
22:45 Um help me sort of think about that
22:49 through data. Right. So you have this
22:51 sort of instinct that says this is a
22:54 bigger issue than the manager is
22:55 understanding. Yeah. Could you have
22:58 proven it with data to the manager?
23:03 Yeah. Um
23:06 so I think um the best way that I took
23:10 at that point of time was um I showed
23:13 him a couple of these samples that I
23:15 that I have broken when I was performing
23:17 a drop test and I actually laid it out
23:21 when I was meeting with him later. I
23:23 laid those in front of him and I showed
23:24 it to him like uh this is not as an easy
23:28 of an issue as we think it is. This is
23:30 actually pretty complicated because when
23:33 it gets broken and stuck in there, you
23:34 need tools to get it out. And imagine an
23:38 EMS uh personnel running across with it
23:41 and it breaks in the field. There is no
23:42 way they're going to be able to perform
23:44 a save with this.
23:45 So, and I also told him that I tested
23:49 about eight or nine samples and this
23:51 problem occurred in more than two of
23:53 them, which is more than enough to cause
23:56 a concern for
23:58 us. So, those were my two metrics.
24:02 Yeah. I guess what I'm trying to
24:03 understand is what was the miss the
24:04 first time around when you manager
24:06 seemed like he's dismissive of it. Why
24:09 do you think that was? I think um it's
24:11 it's a mixture of one uh because on on
24:15 paper this was not a an FDA regulatory
24:18 requirement. Uh this was something that
24:22 u we at Philips u came up with just
24:25 based on a functional usability
24:29 uh kind of u requirement.
24:33 So it wasn't mandatory but it was still
24:37 critical to functioning of the device.
24:39 So the reason why I think um he was
24:42 hesitant on spending more time on this
24:44 was because we were pretty close to a
24:46 design freeze at that stage. We had like
24:48 a two two months to two and a half
24:50 months of a window before we we're
24:52 starting official verification and
24:54 validation on these and a delay like
24:58 this at that stage uh would have
25:01 definitely derailed that timeline.
25:04 So I think yeah, but when I put it in
25:07 front of him like the proper timeline of
25:10 this is how long it will take and this
25:11 is by when I'm going to have it back in
25:13 our hands ready to go. It just made it
25:15 easier for him to make that call. Got
25:18 it. Okay. I think maybe what's still
25:20 missing for me is like understand it's
25:22 not like you you you found the issue,
25:24 you push, you advocated for a change
25:27 with your manager and you were able to
25:29 get it sort of addressed which is great.
25:33 But it seems like there's a process gap
25:35 somewhere upstream from you. Um right
25:38 where these kind of requirements
25:40 potentially mclassified. How do you what
25:42 do you do to fix that? Um so especially
25:46 in this case when we figured out this
25:48 was um a glaring gap in the the
25:51 requirements classification. Um after
25:55 this conversation with my manager um I
25:58 also checked with the systems team to
26:01 say why you know get an understanding of
26:04 why this was only just a baseline level
26:07 requirement but not something more
26:09 critical. And some of this was to do
26:13 with uh uh with just how things are laid
26:16 out in medical tech. If something's been
26:20 uh working and untouched in a
26:22 while, people are hesitant to make
26:24 radical changes. um and some of that
26:28 just got carried on from a legacy uh
26:31 build of what we were following. And
26:34 turns out in the previous case we were
26:36 using a slightly different version of a
26:39 infant child key where this kind of a uh
26:43 problem wasn't very evident.
26:48 Okay.
26:51 Got it. Okay. So
26:52 that's um let's see. We're doing pretty
26:55 good on time, so I'm gonna keep
26:56 peppering you with more questions. Um,
26:59 as kind of going back to the first, uh,
27:01 theme you were talking
27:03 about. I'm looking now for an example of
27:05 a time when you did not meet a goal that
27:09 um, you considered. Um,
27:12 uh, oh, actually, sorry, let me rephrase
27:15 that question. Looking for an example of
27:17 a time where you not only met a goal,
27:19 but exceeded what was expected of you.
27:21 So you kind of you know exceeding
27:23 expectations in this case. Okay. Yeah.
27:29 Um cool. Uh all right. Um I can think
27:33 about a scenario where I was working
27:36 with my electrical engineering team. So
27:39 the electrical engineering team did
27:40 their validation testing for a new
27:43 patient cable assembly. This was a
27:45 critical cable assembly within the
27:47 defibrillator device that transferred
27:49 shock from the battery to the patient.
27:54 So they were uh pretty set on the
27:58 components that they wanted to use for
27:59 it. And it was my task to come up with a
28:02 way to integrate it within the the
28:05 device. You know, do all the wire
28:06 guiding, make sure everything is held in
28:08 place in in uh cases of vibration drop
28:11 and things like that. And on top of
28:14 that, I also had to like uh come up with
28:16 a drawing for this and send it out to
28:19 suppliers to get quotations uh for
28:22 sample builds. So that was the official
28:26 requirement uh from me at that uh stage.
28:29 So I got to that level. I got the I got
28:32 the thing modeled into the defibrillator
28:35 how I wanted it to sit. I got the
28:37 drawing done and then I sent out for
28:39 codes and then I got u some codes from a
28:41 vendor which looked pretty good and we
28:43 approved it. So we wanted these sample
28:47 builds from this uh vendor to come in
28:49 within 3 months because we wanted a we
28:52 had a face gate for a prototype build.
28:55 Um so and that was our timeline and then
28:58 two weeks later this uh assembly uh this
29:02 cable assembly uh supplier he came back
29:05 to me and said uh there was an issue
29:08 with one of the wires that we used in
29:10 our assembly and there was like a six
29:11 month lead time on
29:13 it and that and he proposed an
29:15 alternative to see if we could he could
29:17 use a different one. Um, so me being the
29:21 one uh, you know, like Julia as this
29:24 with the supplier. So I reached back to
29:25 my electrical engineering team to check
29:27 if they would be okay with this new
29:29 cable assembly or if they had any other
29:30 alternatives in mind. And um they came
29:34 back to me and said they had already
29:36 validated um that the wire that they
29:39 wanted to use and they were not in a
29:41 position timeline wise to like run
29:43 through a different series of trials
29:44 with it and they wanted to stick with
29:46 what they were initially wanted to use.
29:50 So I then reached out to our internal
29:53 procurement uh and buying team within
29:55 Phillips to see if they had any contacts
29:59 with the manufacturer of this wire
30:02 directly. And while they did not have
30:05 any direct leads with this manufacturer
30:07 of the wire, what they told me is there
30:10 was a different product division within
30:12 Philips uh the ultrasound uh scanning
30:15 division and their product used the same
30:18 wire from that company.
30:20 So I I got that information and then I
30:23 reached out to the mechanical
30:25 engineering lead for the ultrasonic uh
30:27 scanning uh product and I explained to
30:30 them the situation we were in and I
30:33 asked them if we could use their
30:35 existing leverage with the manufacturer
30:37 to source some of that wire for our
30:40 prototype builds and they were happy to
30:42 help. Uh and then I got the ca the cable
30:48 assembly supplier and this wire
30:50 manufacturer. All of them lined up with
30:53 our procurement team and made sure that
30:56 wire came all the way down from the
30:57 manufacturer to our supplier and then
30:59 they built it into assemblies and send
31:01 it back to us within the 3-month
31:03 timeline that we initially wanted them
31:05 in. And one other thing this also this
31:09 whole thing uh also helped set up is a
31:11 better workflow uh internally within
31:14 flips for teams to uh reach out and you
31:18 know help with resources uh like cases
31:21 like this if they ever happened again
31:22 after that which was something we never
31:25 really did before that we all had our
31:28 own
31:30 good example like how you actually
31:32 operationalize
31:34 you might need for the contracts folks.
31:37 They connected you with that other team
31:39 that could you know that effectively is
31:41 using the same wire so you're able to
31:43 leverage it which is great. How do you
31:45 kind of make that a common practice
31:47 within a company so that you know you
31:49 get the sort of economies of scale that
31:51 fits without you know looking at
31:54 individual projects.
31:57 Yeah. Um I think that was um you know
31:59 one one like one of the hurdles of
32:01 medical healthcare which is uh each
32:04 product wants to individually wet their
32:06 own suppliers and vendors uh and
32:08 manufacturers before they get in
32:10 business with them. Uh but in this
32:13 particular case uh since this was a this
32:17 was more of a prototype and R&D level
32:19 build we were able to like bypass that
32:22 uh and make this connection happen. Uh
32:26 but what this process really set off is
32:28 is the fact that you know like trying to
32:30 start a conversation about
32:33 uh making some of these uh supplier
32:37 and requirements within our own systems
32:40 uh to like smoon them out so that we can
32:43 have more interplay within uh the other
32:45 Philips functional teams. So it's
32:47 something the quality system people are
32:50 working on to make it easier. But at
32:52 least this was an instance where we
32:54 clearly showed to them with proof that
32:57 there are cases where this will help us
33:00 uh uh absolutely if we can you know work
33:03 past this hurdle.
33:06 Yeah. What I guess um your last question
33:08 on this one is so you you got the
33:10 initial time from the supplier for six
33:14 months but you're trying to get the
33:15 prototypes done in three months had you
33:17 not got pursued this path
33:20 what would the six months have been
33:22 acceptable within the organization like
33:24 what what would have happened had you
33:26 not and gone about I think um it could
33:29 have gone two different routes um I
33:31 think I don't think six months would
33:32 have been acceptable at that stage more
33:35 likely what we would probably done is
33:37 the electrical team would have had to go
33:39 back to the drawing board work out u
33:42 alternative wires of different require
33:44 different um properties if they could
33:47 use any of that and uh they had to
33:49 validate it and they had to also run
33:52 like a signal noise test an EMCMI
33:55 testing is what they called. So this
33:56 could have led to a series of uh
33:59 additional testing which would have
34:00 costed both time and effort of at least
34:02 up to a month or two to get another
34:06 buyer qualified.
34:09 And this is a team you already gone to,
34:10 right? So they already said no. But
34:12 you're saying that if push came to shut,
34:14 they would have had a choice but to sort
34:16 of qualify the new Yeah, they would have
34:18 had to probably qualify the new wire.
34:21 Got it. Okay. Thank you.
34:25 Um, we'll keep going. So, I'm looking
34:27 for another example of a time when you
34:30 were not um you're not able to meet a
34:33 commitment in this case. So, so this is
34:34 really about um you're working on a
34:37 project, you miss a a commitment and how
34:40 you uh how do you correct that, right?
34:43 How do you sort of um maybe you know
34:46 work with peers working with the manager
34:50 um you know how do you how do you sort
34:52 of prevent it having a bigger impact on
34:55 the organization.
34:58 Um,
35:13 so I can think about a time when so as I
35:18 was the um ME team's reviewer for some
35:21 of these high level performance
35:22 documents, uh, one such document the
35:25 systems team put out was uh they were
35:26 running behind schedule and they were
35:28 trying to rush this document out as soon
35:30 as possible for a necessary phase gate
35:34 deadline and they sent it out to me for
35:37 review on a Wednesday and they scheduled
35:41 the final approval signoff meeting on a
35:44 Friday. Um and with my experience I knew
35:48 this was a pretty complex document. It
35:50 was like 80 to 100 pages long and it
35:51 needed uh very thoughtful input uh
35:55 including coordination from some of my
35:57 other mechanical engineers and I quickly
36:00 realized you know I would not be able to
36:01 meet the expectations of this sign off
36:03 date uh that they're requiring me to do.
36:07 So my task here was to maintain the
36:10 quality of the review while also
36:12 avoiding unnecessary delay to the
36:14 project and I needed to manage
36:16 expectations uh keep my team in aligned
36:19 and also ensure that we didn't just sign
36:21 off on something incomplete or
36:25 inaccurate. Um so something along those
36:28 lines and the way I went about it is uh
36:31 first I reached out to the author of the
36:34 document and I explained to them why I
36:36 would not be able to complete this
36:38 within the given timeline you know
36:40 especially without a full uh teamwide uh
36:45 meeting about this and make you know
36:47 like before all of us got on the same
36:48 page about some of the critical
36:50 components in there. So he pushed back
36:53 initially and escalated it to our uh PM
36:57 and suggested that the Emmy team was
36:59 holding up the progress on this
37:02 document. And then when we had a
37:04 conversation with me, him and the PM, I
37:07 I tried to
37:08 explain why this needed a more thorough
37:11 review and timeline.
37:14 and I was ready to spend um so that was
37:17 a Wednesday and and I told him I was
37:20 going to attend the meeting on a Friday
37:22 uh give my comments but I would not be
37:24 ready to sign it off yet and I was
37:26 willing to spend some more time on it
37:28 over the weekend to catch up reading on
37:30 it and try to comm coordinate with my
37:33 other ME folks meanwhile to get all of
37:35 their inputs and would be ready for a
37:37 sign off early next
37:39 week.
37:41 So after that uh a bit of um back and
37:45 forth discussion uh the author kind of
37:48 agreed and they rescheduled the approval
37:51 meeting to early next week and then we
37:54 used the extra days to align across our
37:56 team in in the ME team and as a result
37:59 we actually ended up um we found some
38:02 critical elements in there which we
38:04 flagged and which had to be corrected.
38:06 uh so it was worth delaying the document
38:10 slightly to ensure the quality of the
38:12 work and I think um yeah um that's
38:17 that's kind of how we went about it. So
38:20 it was about a two-day delay but if had
38:23 we not have caught that at that point of
38:24 time it would have led to a either a
38:27 design issue or a revision issue much
38:31 later down the line. So, um that's
38:33 that's kind of
38:34 how um it went. So, I mean it seems like
38:40 you're not given a whole lot of
38:44 time. Um what was the urgency? What was
38:49 driving occur? And you know, if you look
38:53 at it from that, do they
38:56 have justification for you know asking
39:00 for review?
39:02 Yeah. So their justification for it was
39:04 that um this was a living document that
39:07 has been in draft for u a week or so at
39:11 that point. So they were under the
39:13 understanding that you you've had over a
39:16 week to like start going through it. You
39:19 don't have to like go through it right
39:21 when it's done. Uh was the argument that
39:24 the author was coming up with. But
39:26 really their timeline pressure was that
39:28 um they were underst staffed and they
39:30 were like running behind the clock to
39:31 get this uh over the line. Uh and this
39:34 was tied uh to a phase gate for us uh
39:38 when we had to move from like a PLC to a
39:40 PDC. Uh so this was the team that was
39:44 kind of lacking behind with rest of the
39:47 other teams. So that's kind of their
39:49 push to like get it out of the way as
39:51 soon as possible.
39:53 Got it. Okay. I mean, you know, like
39:56 without being in the situation of just
39:58 judging from the outside, it seems like
40:01 kind of a mess up on their side and
40:03 they're just trying to push it through
40:04 now and make it a bit of your problem
40:06 because if you're reviewing a live
40:08 document, well, the expectation is is
40:10 changing. So, you could have been
40:12 reviewing things that are not complete,
40:14 right? So, you would have been feedback.
40:16 So, seems like like an excuse on their
40:18 side. Is that fair? Yeah, that's kind of
40:20 my understanding of it. You I mean, I
40:22 know it's in review. I know it's based
40:23 off of a legacy document,
40:26 so they were under the expectation that,
40:28 you know, I'm not reading this as a
40:31 fresh document from the get- go, but I
40:33 have a I've already been through this.
40:35 But yeah, like you said, you know, like
40:36 if it until it's not done, it's not
40:38 done. Especially something which is so
40:39 critical and which will like dictate how
40:41 design requirements flow down later to
40:43 us.
40:45 Yeah. Yeah. I think last question for
40:48 me. I'm looking for an example where
40:53 um you went along with a group decision
40:57 um even if you disagree with it, right?
40:59 So, you know, often times you can you
41:02 have a you have kind of a fundamental
41:04 point where you're disagreeing with a
41:06 decision that's been made. You can
41:08 vocalize your disagreement, but at some
41:09 point you might decide you're going to
41:11 move ahead with the disagreement. I'm
41:14 looking for an example where you
41:16 disagreed but decided to go along and
41:18 help me understand why.
41:20 Yeah. Um sure.
41:26 Um yeah. Um I can um talk about a time
41:32 when during the early stages of um
41:35 design and conceptualization of a
41:38 defibrator that I was working on. I was
41:40 working with my industrial design team
41:42 on the device outer seal and handle. So
41:46 these were like two prominent features
41:47 uh on the outside of the device. One of
41:49 them was like a water ingress seal that
41:51 ran around the device and one of them
41:52 was a rubber handle. So the ID team u
41:57 they strongly pushed for a unibody
42:00 elasttor design. So they just wanted
42:01 both of these two components to be a
42:03 single body without any witness lines
42:07 separating them.
42:09 um mainly because it looked sleek and
42:11 for like a seamless uh aesthetic, visual
42:14 aesthetic. Uh you know, and it made
42:17 sense when I looked at the renders. It
42:19 looked really good. Um, but that raised
42:22 some concerns for me from a
42:24 manufacturing uh standpoint because the
42:27 seal was about 3 mm thick whereas the
42:30 handle was about 10 to 15 mm thick in
42:33 areas. And that kind of uh difference in
42:36 wall thickness uh usually causes some
42:39 problems for compression molding which
42:42 was the manufacturing approach we were
42:43 going to take for this.
42:45 So my task here was to balance uh the
42:50 ID's uh ID team's design vision along
42:54 with what was manufactur manufactur
42:57 manufacturable in real reality uh and
43:00 also making sure you know that was uh
43:02 delivering the right amount of
43:03 structural performance that we need from
43:06 it without delays uh obviously without u
43:10 you know like pulling things apart in
43:12 too many directions. Um so eventually I
43:15 needed the team support uh you know even
43:18 if we didn't initially align on it. So
43:22 the way I went about it is um at first
43:26 uh I raised my concern to the ID uh
43:29 about why this might be a manufacturing
43:32 issue and then they pushed back on it
43:34 and suggested exploring alternative
43:35 materials or alternative molding
43:38 processes
43:40 um things like that. So instead of
43:43 escalating the conflict at that stage, I
43:45 took a more datadriven approach. Um
43:48 first I reached out to my manufacturer
43:51 uh to validate my concerns about this uh
43:54 design idea and he pretty much he pretty
43:56 much uh confirmed my hypothesis uh that
43:59 this difference in wall thickness would
44:00 cause uh material flow and dimensional
44:04 instability issues.
44:06 So after that I ran an FEA simulation to
44:12 see what would happen if I tried to
44:15 reduce the thickness of the handle and
44:17 match it closer to the seal. Um but what
44:21 that showed is that doing that um the
44:23 handle could no longer support as much
44:25 load as the requirements wanted to in
44:28 terms of real life performance. So that
44:30 would have uh not worked. So with all of
44:34 this information in front of me, I'm I
44:36 set up another meeting with our
44:37 industrial design team and I showed them
44:40 the my initial concept that I went with
44:42 the manufacturer with the manufacturer's
44:44 input on it and then my alternative uh
44:47 concept and why this was not possible
44:49 using the FA analysis.
44:51 So with all of that in front of them,
44:55 um it made that uh conversation a lot
44:58 more uh constructive. You know, instead
45:01 of like just pushing back on each other
45:02 and just stating ideas and opinions, it
45:05 was more of okay, together what kind of
45:07 a workound can we get to uh how can we
45:10 compromise to like meet both ends of
45:13 this.
45:14 So, and then um we worked uh about
45:17 across that and we came up with a a
45:19 clever assembly idea where it wouldn't
45:22 look like it was two different parts if
45:23 you looked at it from a a distance
45:25 unless like you're holding it really
45:26 close to your face. Uh but it still
45:28 served a function that it was two
45:30 different parts. Uh both did not cause
45:32 any manufacturing issues and both were
45:34 performance uh stable.
45:37 So that's kind of how we uh preserved
45:40 both functionality and the goals.
45:53 Um okay, got it. Cool. Um I'm just
45:57 getting through. I don't I think we got
45:59 through all of my questions pretty
46:01 efficiently.
46:02 jump back on video and uh let's see what
46:05 questions of yours I can answer. Um so
46:09 yeah, I'm curious. So you said you work
46:11 on the software side of things. Um so
46:14 you work like in kind of like software
46:16 for the the direct uh robotics that this
46:20 and solutions that this reliability team
46:22 is working on. Not really. So I'm I'm
46:25 from a completely different group
46:26 altogether. Um the way to think about my
46:28 team is that we so we build entire
46:32 robotic systems for our fulfillment
46:34 centers right watch tons of videos on
46:36 how work there's a fair element of human
46:40 decision making that needs to go into
46:41 that right so I think kind of system
46:43 dynamic as opposed to a completely
46:45 closed loop robotic system so my team
46:47 builds the software for our maintenance
46:49 technicians our operators to understand
46:52 kind of how to think about the right
46:54 decisions at the right points so really
46:56 they're We're helping them make
46:57 decisions about how to not constrain the
46:59 system as like a at a macro system level
47:02 as opposed to the individual robots at
47:04 all. I see.
47:09 And um so I was going to ask you, so I
47:13 mean I'm I'm speaking with a lot of
47:15 Amazon personnel obviously in this
47:16 interviews and everything and they've
47:18 been telling me good things about it,
47:19 but I have a question. So what is
47:22 something that you wish Amazon, you
47:24 know, like in your workplace you did
47:25 differently or something you can improve
47:27 on?
47:28 Yeah, I think what's happened I've been
47:31 here a long time. So I think one of the
47:32 things I see is that uh you know
47:35 generally we operate like a startup and
47:38 a lot of what positive things you hear I
47:40 think are very true. Unfortunately, what
47:41 happens as that organization gets bigger
47:44 um and you know there's issues that
47:48 people are trying to fix. Sometimes we
47:50 introduce too much process and sometimes
47:51 we introduce almost we overcorrect for
47:54 things um and so the amount of
47:56 administrative burden can get out of
47:58 control, right? And each thing in
48:00 isolation makes sense, right? Have a
48:03 problem that you run into when they're
48:05 like, "All right, fix this. who are
48:06 going to have a review every time you
48:08 create this kind of a a document or
48:10 create this type of a process and in
48:12 isolation they make sense but in
48:14 aggregate they don't make sense. So
48:16 sometimes you know you kind of you
48:18 there's a tendency to almost overcorrect
48:20 on things without taking a step back and
48:22 asking questions of like how often does
48:24 this actually happen and how much
48:26 process do you need to place you know in
48:28 some cases and I think that's just a
48:30 function of how big we have become and
48:33 how many people we have and how many
48:35 things come up ad hoc right so um I
48:39 think I personally would like to see us
48:41 get back more agile
48:43 uh scrappy as opposed to like overly
48:46 processor oriented and it's a function
48:48 of I think we bring a lot of people from
48:50 big industry you know big companies that
48:52 that come in and they're like hey you
48:54 guys are doing it all wrong you know
48:55 when I was at such and such company we
48:58 had all these processes that would
48:59 prevent this from happening and I think
49:01 what those folks miss is that we work at
49:04 such a high speed compared to other
49:06 teams other organizations that something
49:09 that we build within you know a 9 to 18
49:12 month period would take 5 to seven years
49:14 in industry
49:15 So as when you start to introduce those
49:17 processes and they make sense, yeah, you
49:19 sort of lose the forest for the trees
49:21 because now too much time is being added
49:23 to the projects, you know. So that's the
49:25 the thing that I think I would like to
49:27 maybe see improve is not overburdening
49:30 us with administrative work because
49:33 we're trying to correct too many
49:34 problems at scale. Got it. Yeah, that
49:36 that makes sense. I can share your
49:38 sentiment on that. uh but from a
49:41 slightly different setting you know like
49:42 uh we have a medical device company but
49:45 we uh it's being led by non-medical
49:49 device uh management
49:51 sure and you know that often times can
49:55 cause some mismatch in expectations
49:57 timelines uh things like that so yeah I
50:01 can feel that it would be nice to you
50:03 know like to have everybody aligned on
50:05 and you know set up in a streamlined
50:07 manner. Yeah. And you know, you have to
50:10 strike a balance, right? Like there are
50:12 times when process makes sense. There
50:14 are times when we can do things better.
50:15 And I fully acknowledge and I think we
50:17 should all acknowledge that you want
50:19 continuous improvement,
50:22 but then you also want to know when you
50:23 reach the point of diminishing return.
50:26 Want to go beyond that. And I think
50:27 sometimes like that
50:30 uh that line is not always clear to
50:32 folks. So it's just the reality of a
50:35 growing growing organization. were much
50:37 bigger than we were 10 years ago. Got
50:39 it. No. Yeah, that makes perfect sense.
50:44 Yeah.
50:45 Um I know you got you got anything else
50:47 for me? I think those are No, I think
50:50 we're good. I think you gave me some
50:51 good examples and I think that you know
50:53 I always look for consistent patterns
50:54 and I see uh I see those in your
50:57 example. So I think uh I think I got
50:59 everything I needed. Um and uh yeah. No,
51:02 I think uh I think you still have a
51:04 couple more interviews. Yeah, I do.
51:06 Yeah. Yeah. Two more. Excellent. Um,
51:09 yeah. Let me see who else you're meeting
51:11 with just
51:16 sort of what to expect. So, you already
51:18 met with Patrick. I have. Yeah. Good
51:19 morning. Patrick and I used to share an
51:22 office many months ago. So, you still
51:24 have I think uh let's see three
51:26 interviews still. So, uh I think the
51:29 last person you're speaking speaking is
51:30 Sabi. He's the only one I know in the
51:32 group that you're meeting with. But uh
51:34 should be should be a lot of fun. Uh I
51:36 wish you all the best with the rest of
51:38 the interviews. Good luck and uh we'll
51:40 get back in touch after you've met with
51:42 everyone and we've had a chance to Yeah,
51:44 absolutely. Of course. Yeah. Thank you
51:46 so much, S. This has been a really nice
51:48 fruitful conversation. I think turning
51:50 off the camera kind of helped in a way.
51:52 I don't know. This felt like a more
51:54 peaceful setting like I was just talking
51:56 to myself.
51:58 Yeah, it's sometimes I leave the camera
52:00 on. I do find sometimes it can be
52:01 distracting for the the interview. So
52:04 glad that worked out. Yeah. No, I think
52:07 you know we're trying to multitask here.
52:09 I was taking notes and I sometimes like
52:11 looking all over the place. So I find
52:12 myself looking weird on camera doing
52:14 that. So but yeah, good luck with the
52:17 process and uh we'll be in touch. All
52:20 right. Thank you so much. You have a
52:21 great rest of your days later. Bye. Bye.
52:24 Bye.