0:02 The logic of well this is a rich person
0:04 so they don't need it. There's some
0:05 really poor people right now who really
0:08 need more cash. That is a very strong
0:10 logic. We've been walking down that path
0:13 for for decades and it's relatively hard
0:17 to see how you could reverse course.
0:20 Hello and welcome to the IFS Zooms in.
0:21 I'm Helen Miller, director of the
0:23 Institute for Physical Studies. And
0:25 before we start today's episode, I have
0:27 some exciting news, which is that on the
0:29 4th of November, we're going to be
0:31 recording a live episode of the podcast
0:33 at the British Library in London. We're
0:35 going to look at the chancellor's
0:36 options for raising more tax in the
0:38 budget. We'll be joined by our very own
0:40 Stuart Adam and by Dan Needle, who is
0:43 founder of Tax Policy Associates. And
0:44 we'll look at all of the options,
0:47 everything from taxing wealth to whether
0:48 Labour should break one of their
0:51 manifesto pledges. Uh, and you'll have a
0:52 chance to ask us your own questions,
0:54 too. Tickets are free, but spaces are
0:56 limited, so sign up now via the link in
0:58 the description. We look forward to
1:01 seeing you there.
1:03 For today, we are discussing the design
1:05 of the welfare system and specifically
1:07 exploring one of the central questions
1:09 in social security, who should get
1:11 benefits. We'll no doubt talk about the
1:13 benefits that are have been in the news
1:15 recently, including winter fuel payment,
1:16 benefits for children, benefits for
1:18 disabilities, and we'll cover the big
1:21 ones, universal credit, pensions. We'll
1:23 even talk about universal basic income.
1:25 But the aim today is not to get into the
1:28 nitty-gritty of those specific benefits.
1:29 Instead, we're going to look at the big
1:32 design questions. When should benefits
1:34 be universal, meaning that everyone in a
1:36 group gets them? When should they be
1:38 contributo, meaning that you have to put
1:39 something in before you get something
1:41 out? and when should they be means
1:43 tested? Meaning they go to those on low
1:45 incomes but are withdrawn as incomes
1:48 rise. We'll trace the story of Britain's
1:49 social security system from its
1:52 conception in the 1940s as a something
1:54 for something system to the system we
1:56 have today in which contributed benefits
1:58 are few and far between and means
2:01 testing has become ever more prevalent.
2:03 And to explore this area, I'm delighted
2:04 to be joined by Tom Waters, who's an
2:07 associate director here at the IFS, and
2:09 by Nicholas Timonss, who is a senior
2:10 fellow at the Institute for Government
2:12 and at the Kings Fund, and importantly
2:14 is the author of a wonderful book called
2:16 The Five Giants, a biography of the
2:17 welfare state, and is therefore
2:19 perfectly placed to help us with the
2:21 history. Um, welcome to you both.
2:21 Pleasure to be here.
2:22 Thank you.
2:24 Let's start at the beginning. So I think
2:25 I'm right in saying that before the
2:27 Second World War, Britain had some
2:30 health and unemployment schemes, but it
2:32 really was the report written by William
2:36 Beverage and published in 1943 that sets
2:39 out that found Britain's modern welfare
2:41 state. And he explicitly wanted benefits
2:44 that came as a right and without means
2:45 testing. So Nick, you've written tons
2:47 about this. What what was Bever's big vision?
2:48 vision?
2:50 Right. Well, Beverage hated means test.
2:53 He had a visceral dislike of means. Um,
2:55 and he wasn't alone in that because the
2:57 1930s means test was a household means
3:00 test. Uh, and if any money came in, your
3:01 benefit could be reduced. So even the
3:03 child getting a paper round could lead
3:05 to benefit being reduced or a parent
3:07 suddenly acquire a grandparent acquiring
3:10 a pension. And because it was so mean,
3:12 it it generated a lot of snitching. You
3:14 know, if a new coat appear or a new pair
3:16 of shoes and it wasn't even explainable,
3:19 you had the benefit man around. uh and
3:21 and beverage disapproved on other
3:23 grounds too. He felt that it was it
3:25 discouraged thrift. He was very much in
3:27 favor of thrift. Saving money for a
3:29 rainy day. There's not much point in
3:31 saving money for a rainy day if it's
3:32 going to be any money you save is going
3:35 to reduce your benefit level. Uh so his
3:37 his sort of kind of overall view was
3:39 that the the main test of benefit you
3:41 know they were offered only on terms
3:43 which make men unwilling to have
3:46 recourse to them. So he went for a
3:49 national insurance system. Uh so that
3:51 was something for something. I mean he
3:53 Bever was a very arrogant man. He said
3:55 he knew what the British people wanted
3:56 and he said what the British people want
3:58 is a something for something system. So
4:00 you pay in your contributions in the
4:01 good times and you get your benefits as
4:05 of right in the bad times. So he built
4:07 this national insurance system for
4:08 unemployment insurance and industrial
4:10 injuries and what have you uh on the
4:12 principle that no means test could be
4:14 applied to any part of it. And that
4:16 broadly speaking is what got enacted by
4:18 the Labor government in 1946.
4:20 So they had the the something for
4:22 something system, but I think it was
4:23 recognized pretty early on that there
4:25 were some people therefore who hadn't
4:26 got the contributions. They hadn't put
4:28 something in, they wouldn't otherwise
4:30 have got something out, but we might
4:31 still wanted to give them something. So
4:33 even with that kind of clear conception
4:35 of a national insurance system, I think
4:36 I'm saying right from the very start,
4:37 there was something else. There was
4:39 something called national assistance
4:40 which is basically what became income
4:42 support which is in in a sense the means
4:44 set of universal credit is its successor
4:47 many decades down the line. So there was
4:51 a sort of safety net uh of of means
4:53 tested benefit but it was in fact very
4:55 small at the time because you know the
4:57 war had produced full employment. wars
4:58 tend to produce full employment because
5:00 everyone's making munitions or in the
5:02 army or whatever in the air force. Uh
5:04 and so it was very very small initially
5:07 and it was mainly top up for pensioners.
5:10 Uh and that kind of held through into
5:13 the sort of 50s, beginning of the 60s
5:15 and then it all began to go a bit wrong.
5:16 Let's unpack that. Tommy, we're going to
5:18 dig into more of the details, but just
5:20 paint the the kind of broad arc for us.
5:21 So Beverage sets out this national
5:23 insurance system where you put something
5:25 in, you get something out. But if you
5:27 look at the system today, that's not how
5:28 the system today broadly works. So how
5:30 do we how do we get here?
5:32 So maybe a couple of numbers would help
5:33 kind of set the picture. So if you look
5:36 back in the late '7s, all working age
5:38 benefit spending, less than a quarter of
5:41 it, about 23% was means tested. If you
5:44 zoom forward to today, it's 63%. So
5:45 significant majority was means tested.
5:48 So we've really seen very big change. If
5:49 you look at contributory benefits, the
5:51 something for something benefits, back
5:53 in the late '7s, it was 38% of
5:54 contributory. Now it's just 8%. it's
5:57 really small proportion of the system.
5:58 And so I think there's been quite a few
6:00 things that have contributed to that
6:01 change. There's been some kind of
6:04 broader demographic, social, economic
6:07 changes. So um a rise of lone parenthood
6:10 has pushed towards means testing. Um
6:12 we've had, you know, if you if you look
6:13 over the broad sweep of history, you
6:15 have, you know, periods where there's
6:16 higher unemployment following a
6:18 recession. That tends to push up the
6:19 number of people on means testing over
6:22 that period. But then also policy
6:23 changes, some really important policy
6:26 changes. So, a couple perhaps to to pull
6:29 out. One of them is the introduction of
6:30 housing benefit. And so, if you're on
6:33 low income, you get support with your
6:36 rent. And that that the introduction of
6:38 the national system of housing benefit
6:40 at least that led to a big increase in
6:42 number of people getting means tested
6:43 benefits. And you can kind of see why
6:46 that's means tested. It's um it's
6:48 something that is reflecting the fact
6:49 that you have a low income and you've
6:51 got high rent right now. It's kind of a
6:53 it's kind of an ongoing
6:54 ongoing problem. It's not just like a
6:57 short period out of work. And then
7:00 another factor is the sort of slow but
7:02 steady increase in the amount of support
7:05 for um people who are on low income in
7:07 work. So through things like tax credits
7:09 before that family credit before that
7:12 family income support. Um and the that's
7:15 been expanded steadily over time and has
7:17 meant again more and more means testing
7:18 because we're targeting it towards those
7:21 who are on a low income but are in work.
7:22 But I don't if Nick thinks I've missed
7:24 anything uh important there.
7:25 Well, do you think it was always
7:26 inevitable that we would move up towards
7:28 means testing? So in some when you've
7:30 got a smaller benefit system, welfare
7:31 system, social security system, however
7:33 you want to frame it, um the kind of you
7:34 put something in, you get something out
7:36 works for some things. As we said
7:38 earlier, there are always some people
7:40 who haven't put enough in. And the
7:41 people you want to support, whether as
7:43 Tom said, that's lone parents, people
7:44 with high housing, cost with
7:46 disabilities. But the minute you want to
7:48 support them, supporting all of them in
7:50 the country is hugely expensive. And
7:51 then lo and behold, you're back to a
7:53 system where you support them, but only
7:55 those on low incomes and you're into
7:56 means testing. So, was it always
7:58 inevitable that we would effectively get
8:00 to a system of means testing? Do you
8:01 think? I'm not sure it was inevitable,
8:03 but there are quite strong forces, some
8:06 of which you outlined, driving in that
8:08 direction. Uh, and this is something you
8:10 might come to later. It's partly the way
8:11 Beverage designed the system because
8:14 it's a flat rate system. So, you pay a
8:15 flat rate of national insurance
8:17 contributions and you get a flat rate
8:19 benefit out. Whereas most European
8:21 countries, for example, went for an
8:23 earnings related benefit system. So,
8:25 they're better off pay more money in,
8:27 but when they fall out of work, they get
8:28 a higher rate of benefit because they
8:31 contributed more. So the effect in in
8:34 the UK is even if you're better off and
8:37 you lose your job, you fall down to this
8:39 platform of the minimal benefit. You
8:41 come straight down. Whereas in France,
8:43 Germany, your position in society is
8:45 protected for a bit longer by the energy
8:48 element. And I think one effect of that
8:49 was that the middle classes had less of
8:52 a stake in the benefit system than they
8:54 did in health and education. So for
8:56 education didn't have to pay school fees
8:58 anymore. They got health they got their
8:59 healthcare free. they weren't having to
9:02 pay for it or take out insurance. So
9:03 there was huge gains to the middle
9:05 class. There was less of a gain in the
9:07 benefit system to them. So there was
9:10 probably less middle class support for
9:11 the social security system, other parts
9:13 of the welfare state. So I think what
9:14 just say that back to you I think what
9:15 you're basically saying is had we have
9:18 gone for um more of an earnings related
9:20 system where you put something in you
9:22 got something out but actually what you
9:24 got out was linked to how much you'd put
9:26 in maybe the middle classes would have
9:27 been more into that system would have
9:29 kept that for longer. We didn't have
9:32 that and therefore what you saw is just
9:34 an erosion of that system and instead
9:36 the system tilting towards basically
9:38 supporting people on lower incomes and
9:39 then means testing it away
9:40 and I mean as Tom was saying there you
9:41 know there are quite important
9:44 structural reasons for this so you talk
9:46 about housing benefit which has become a
9:47 desperate case of running up and down
9:49 escalator because it just keeps going up
9:50 whatever they do to try and control them
9:52 it does but up until the sort of 70 up
9:55 until the 80s government subsidized
9:57 council house building and indeed um
9:58 social housing
10:00 more generally. So you could build and
10:02 have low rents because the building was
10:05 subsidized. And when you move to
10:08 subsidizing the rent rather than the
10:10 building, you end up with a means tested
10:12 system. Uh because people who can't
10:14 afford it, the rents go up, they can't
10:16 afford it. They need help with rent. And
10:18 so that's a big in, you know, one of the
10:20 big drivers of the increase in means testing.
10:21 testing.
10:22 So maybe we should look at some specific
10:24 examples. Obviously, it's it's easy to
10:25 talk about these things in the concrete.
10:27 And I think it's worth we should
10:29 distinguish between benefits for the
10:31 working age population, for pensioners,
10:33 and for those benefits that are targeted
10:34 at children, disability, and other
10:35 things. Maybe we'll just start with
10:37 unemployment insurance, which is maybe
10:38 kind of where a lot of these social
10:41 security systems start. I think people,
10:43 some people at least, will be surprised
10:44 to hear what you said earlier, Nick,
10:46 about there are countries in which when
10:48 you lose your job, the government
10:50 replaces a very large share of your
10:52 previous earnings. And that feels really
10:54 alien to us here in the UK because it's
10:58 just not how we um we do things. But
11:00 Tom, there are pros and cons to these
11:01 different choices, right? There's not
11:02 there's not one obvious you should
11:03 definitely do it this way and that's
11:05 that's the way that everyone thinks is better.
11:06 better.
11:07 Yeah, I think that's right. I'd say as
11:08 well, it's not just there are some
11:10 countries do this. Like really, it's the
11:12 UK that's pretty much the exception. I
11:13 there's a few other countries, but if
11:15 you look across the OECD, so relatively
11:17 well-off countries, it is it's
11:19 definitely the norm to have some kind of
11:21 higher level of support when you first
11:23 lose your job. Um, so yeah, I'd say, you
11:25 know, there's couple of arguments you
11:27 could give in both directions. I say, so
11:29 starting with means testing, I think the
11:30 real attraction of means testing, and
11:33 perhaps one reason why it's grown is
11:34 you're getting support to the poorest
11:36 people right now. Kind of by definition,
11:38 you're only giving support to people who
11:39 pass the means test who are on a low
11:41 income. And so if you want to deal with
11:43 poverty, you know, you think back to the
11:45 um to the Labor government 1997, they
11:47 had these poverty targets to get poverty
11:49 down. How do you get money towards
11:50 people who are in poverty, the most
11:52 straightforward way to do it by a long
11:55 way is to means test. Um and so I think
11:57 that's a clear point, you know, in favor
11:59 of in favor of means testing. I'd say as
12:00 well, this kind of relates to some of
12:01 the things we've already been talking
12:03 about. I think contributory benefits
12:06 work better if there are periods where
12:08 your income is unusually low. So you're
12:10 unemployed, you're sick for a while,
12:13 even you're retired. And I think where
12:14 it's harder to see how the contributory
12:17 kind of principle could work if it's to
12:19 support people who are just on a low
12:20 wage and that's kind of that's the wage
12:22 they're going to be on for their life
12:23 cuz kind of when could they pay in to
12:26 get the money out if you like. And so a
12:27 lot of as we've been saying a lot of the
12:30 rise in means testing is for in work
12:32 support. Um people who are on low income
12:33 in work and that I think that kind of
12:35 has to be means tested support. it's
12:38 harder to see how you could do it um the
12:38 other way. So that's that's two
12:40 arguments for favor means testing
12:41 contributory benefits. I think there's a
12:43 few things one could say. I think one
12:46 actually perhaps underrated point is it
12:49 one thing we worry about with having um
12:51 taxes when you're in work means test
12:52 benefits when you're out of work is is
12:54 the work incentive effects, right? And
12:56 both on the tax side and on the on the
12:58 benefit side you're kind of blunting
13:00 work incentives. If you have contributo
13:01 benefits, that goes some way to
13:03 offsetting that because you get into
13:06 work now, you you lose some of your
13:08 salary, some of your earnings by having
13:11 to make a a contribution, you know, to
13:13 towards your uh you national insurance
13:15 contribution or whatever, but you're
13:17 kind of gaining a a right um you're
13:19 gaining a right to have higher income
13:20 when you lose your job or when you're
13:22 sick or when you're retired or whatever.
13:23 And so there's a way in which that
13:25 actually helps offset some of those
13:27 disincentives to work. And perhaps
13:29 another reason say in favor of uh
13:32 contributory benefits is um kind of
13:34 along the lines of what Nick was saying
13:35 earlier is it might enhance the
13:37 political acceptability of it. There's a
13:38 something for something principle and
13:40 perhaps that makes the system more more
13:41 sustainable. So
13:42 what do you think Nick sticking with the
13:44 unemployment insurance issue for now and
13:45 we'll talk about pensions and children
13:47 in a minute. I mean
13:49 we have a bit of a contribution system
13:49 but not much.
13:51 Not much. Well, no. No, there is a still
13:54 a contributory based job seekers
13:55 allowance and contributed employment
13:56 support allowance. So the government's
14:00 proposing to change both those um so it
14:01 is made I mean Tom's right about you
14:04 can't use contribut
14:08 benefits to deal with low wages I mean
14:09 you know one of the other big reasons
14:13 why I mean Cesi's risen so much is the
14:15 the increase in in work poverty so to
14:17 speak which started off with tiny little
14:19 scheme called family income settlement
14:20 they realized you could be in work but
14:22 you would be better off on benefit in
14:26 the 70s that became family credit which
14:28 got increasingly more generous. But
14:30 there was this moment in the late 1990s,
14:31 early 2000s when both labor and the
14:34 conservatives realized that you know
14:35 unemployment benefit and the like is
14:37 normally given on condition you are not
14:39 working if you see what I mean. And they
14:41 suddenly realized that the globalization
14:43 has squeezed wages down the lower and
14:45 middle end. So it's better to use some
14:47 of the benefit money to support people
14:49 in low paid work rather than to just
14:50 give them money on condition that did
14:52 not work. So that's where you see the
14:56 big rise with tax credits coming in. Uh
14:58 and now universal credit and people tend
14:59 to forget that I think it's something
15:01 like 40% of the people on universal
15:03 credit are actually in work. You know
15:04 people tend to view it as a benefit for
15:06 those out of work and awful lot of
15:08 people are on universal credit and are
15:10 in work and that contributes to the rise
15:12 in means testing because you're paying
15:14 benefits to people who are actually
15:15 working means tested benefits to people
15:17 actually working. But do you think do
15:18 you think we should keep the I mean so
15:20 the one one approach would be to say
15:21 we've been whittling away these
15:23 contribution based benefits let's just
15:24 put the nail in the coffin and get rid
15:28 of them. Um but for all the changes we
15:30 have clung on to like you said the the
15:31 bits that are you know the bits of
15:32 unemployment insurance that are
15:33 effectively related to what you've
15:35 earned in the past I think you would
15:36 cling on to them. Is that right?
15:38 I think that's a good case for actually
15:39 hanging on to what little is left. I
15:41 mean there's certainly certainly some
15:42 people in the department of work and
15:43 pensions would love to get rid of them
15:45 because it much tidier we could just get
15:46 rid of these two little bits that left
15:47 around when we have to run separate
15:50 systems for them but you know if you if
15:54 you get contribution related jobsekers
15:55 allowance uh there are definite
15:58 advantages to it universal credit is a
15:59 household means test so the income of
16:00 the entire household was taken into account
16:02 account
16:04 uh contrary to JSA is an individual
16:06 benefits so if you lose your job but
16:10 your partner is earning and has savings.
16:12 Uh there's no savings rule in
16:15 contributive based JSA whereas there is
16:17 in universal credit. So universal credit
16:18 you've got a lot of savings. You don't
16:20 get it until you run your savings down.
16:22 If you get the contributed JSA there's
16:24 no savings test. So it's a bigger it's
16:26 it's more like it is a bit more like the
16:29 European system. It's more of a cushion
16:31 against unemployment. And people may say
16:33 well does that remove the incentive to
16:34 get a job? Well, I think all the
16:36 evidence is that people who've paid
16:38 enough contributions in and get made
16:40 unemployed actually are highly motivated
16:43 to get another job and so they you so
16:45 it's worth cushioning them a so they
16:47 might find the right job rather than
16:49 just a lower pay job to get them into
16:53 work and b they may also cut their
16:55 expenditure down by less because they
16:56 have this cushion they would otherwise
16:57 and that kind of helps the economy
16:59 turnover very very marginally but it's a
17:01 slight argument in failure so I think
17:02 there's definitely a case for keeping
17:04 them keeping what is there?
17:05 And of course I I framed it as a
17:06 question of should we keep them or get
17:08 rid of them? We could increase them,
17:09 right? I mean and the government is
17:10 thinking about what to do with
17:13 unemployment insurance and
17:16 well I mean the moment what the
17:21 government is proposing is to make JSA
17:25 more generous but at the price of
17:27 reducing the length of time for which
17:29 the this gets very complicated for which
17:30 those in the support group of employment
17:32 support allowance at the moment are not
17:35 required to look for work reducing and
17:36 you can have being on that sort of
17:38 permanently subject of occasional retest.
17:38 retest.
17:40 These are people who are disabled.
17:42 Yeah, exactly. Uh and they're proposing
17:45 to cut that down to 12 months. So, you
17:47 know, they're offering to make the
17:49 unemployment bit more generous, but at
17:52 the expense of people with disabilities
17:55 who will have this support group limited
17:57 to a year before they are required to do
17:59 something in the terms of preparing for
18:00 work or looking for work.
18:01 Yeah. And we've talked elsewhere about
18:02 the kind of shift that the government's
18:04 planning away from maybe people with
18:05 disability and towards other people
18:07 without work. Maybe we'll do a deep dive
18:08 into that another day, but for now, just
18:10 avoid the nitty-gritty. Um, let's work
18:11 pensions because obviously there's been
18:13 a big change in how we do pensions, too.
18:15 I think there's tons of myths about
18:16 pensions. One of the biggest myths is
18:18 that people think they they pay in their
18:20 national insurance contributions over
18:22 their working life and it goes into some
18:24 kind of pot and at the end they're
18:27 drawing down that pot. And that's not at
18:28 all how it works. So, for it's a pay as
18:30 you earn system. You're not paying into
18:32 any kind of pot. Um, and it's not even
18:35 really a strong contributionbased system
18:37 in the sense that you have to have your
18:39 35 years of contributions to get your
18:41 state pension, but there are lots of
18:42 ways to get those contributions that
18:44 don't actually entail paying tax like
18:47 looking after children. Um, so really
18:50 now the link between between
18:52 contributions and what you get a pension
18:53 is vanishingly small. It's nothing like
18:55 the European style system of you put in
18:57 lots and you get out. So actually
18:59 pensions are looking a bit more
19:00 universal, maybe contingent. everyone in
19:02 the in the old in the kind of old age
19:05 pensioner group gets that benefit. Um so
19:06 we've moved away from the something for
19:08 something but not towards means testing
19:09 so much as towards this kind of more
19:12 contingent benefit. We've kind of
19:15 without keeping it in practice as you've
19:16 spelt it out, we've kind of kept the
19:18 concept of something for something for
19:20 pensions, you know, and they are getting
19:21 a bit closer to being a universal basic
19:23 income because,
19:25 you know, it's it's it will be possible
19:28 in future not to qualify for a full
19:29 basic for full basic state pension, but
19:31 it's going to be quite difficult because
19:32 you can get credited in for all sorts of
19:33 things and you only have to work for a
19:37 bit. So, you know, that so it it sort of
19:38 has survived. Mind you, it's been it's
19:40 been on a roller coaster journey. I mean
19:42 there was a point when it was being you
19:43 because it was being linked only to
19:44 inflation for donkey's years. It was
19:48 just just dis disappearing slowly but
19:50 surely disappearing and it was only um
19:52 the pensions commission in the 2000s
19:54 that kind of rescued it.
19:55 And now of course it's on the other
19:56 direction we have the triple lock and
19:57 now that's um yes
19:58 it's not disappearing now it's
19:59 ratcheting up.
20:01 It it is ratcheting up and at some point
20:03 that will have to come to an end but um
20:04 have to find the government that's
20:05 prepared to do it. I think the sort of
20:08 broad support that we have this basic
20:10 state pension basically it's pretty hard
20:12 to live in the UK for your entire life
20:13 or most of your adult life and not get
20:15 this thing. So it's more like a a
20:17 universal continued benefit. The other
20:18 benefit that's been in the news recently
20:20 is winter fuel payment which was a
20:23 universal benefit for old people um but
20:25 got the government into trouble Tom.
20:27 Indeed. So yes, it used to go so it's
20:29 two or300
20:32 um and it used to go to all essentially
20:35 all pensioners and the government last
20:37 summer is that correct? Summer 24. Yes.
20:39 They um they tied it to you have to get
20:42 pension credit which is a means tested
20:44 benefit. So is essentially means testing
20:45 wind fuel payment. You have to get
20:47 pension credit to get wind fuel payment
20:48 which meant that 90% of pensioners
20:52 wouldn't get it. Um and then this
20:54 summer, this few months ago, um they've
20:57 sort of reversed course most of the way.
20:58 I think we're now back to something like
21:00 75% of pensioners getting it. So it was
21:05 100 then 10% then 75%. Uh and I think
21:07 the kind of the the rationale of the
21:08 original policy of to try to get rid of
21:10 of of means testing it was to say, you
21:12 know, if you're on a higher income, you
21:14 don't need this extra extra bit of
21:16 support. Um, but of course it's
21:17 something that people have, you know,
21:18 quite sort of in one sense quite a
21:20 strong attachment to. It's worth worth
21:22 saying whilst we're here, it has nothing
21:24 to do with fuel. It is just cash. You
21:26 don't have to spend it on fuel. Um, it
21:28 does come in the winter. In that sense,
21:31 the uh the name is correct. Um, but um,
21:33 yeah, I think it's part of that that
21:36 sense of well, this was um, uh,
21:37 something that people had felt like
21:38 they've been getting often, you know,
21:39 often they would have been getting it
21:41 for years or even decades and have it
21:43 taken away. Uh, that caused a lot of a
21:44 lot of difficulty. It's a classic
21:47 example of one of the other reasons why
21:49 contributed benefits have have shrunk
21:50 somewhat is because the argument is
21:52 better off people don't need it. That's
21:53 always been the argument against
21:56 contributed benefits. Um and of course
21:57 Gordon Brown intro when Gordon Brown
21:59 first introduced this thing. You it was
22:01 more generous for people on pension
22:03 credit and the lower income and a
22:05 smaller sum for everybody else. This is
22:07 progressive universalism will give
22:08 something to everybody but more to the
22:12 less welloff. And so we end up where we
22:15 end up. Um you could argue I mean there
22:17 is something slightly paternalistic
22:18 about it, isn't there? I mean you're
22:20 actually saying pensioners can't cope
22:22 with budgeting over the winter even
22:23 though winter comes every year. So we
22:25 have to give them a special lump of
22:27 money in Christmas time. So get them
22:29 through the get them through the winter.
22:33 It's a slightly strange approach to
22:34 benefits. I think you know should should
22:35 we give them should we give them a
22:37 laundry voucher just to make sure they
22:39 do the laundry? It's also odd that we
22:40 have the state pension. Again, it's a
22:42 flat rate for most people. Then this
22:43 other little benefit that's sort of
22:45 wedged on top as opposed to just
22:46 deciding what you want the state pension
22:48 to be and setting that and not having
22:50 this weird little little uh thing on the
22:52 top. I mean, I think actually most
22:54 people would buy the argument that you
22:56 have lots of people who aren't in fuel
22:58 poverty or any other kind of poverty and
22:59 old and don't need this payment. I think
23:01 part of the reason that didn't go
23:02 through for the government is kind of
23:05 the politics of it. They announced it in
23:07 the summer in what felt like out of
23:09 context, what felt like picking on
23:10 pensioners. You know, I think arguably
23:11 had they done that in a more sensible
23:13 way as part of a bigger budget process,
23:14 maybe they'd have got away with their
23:15 original plans because I think I think a
23:17 lot of people understand that it is odd
23:19 to be giving winter fuel payments to
23:20 people who are very well off.
23:22 Well, in a in a way, but as you say,
23:24 it's also just sort of it could just be
23:26 part of the state pension. We give state
23:27 pension to people who are perfectly well
23:29 off. So, in that sense, I'm not so sure
23:30 it is odd. Um,
23:31 the fact that it's build is different to
23:33 the state pension, right? I think you've
23:35 rolled it in. I think the fact it's an
23:37 extra payment that is labeled and it is
23:38 just label. You're absolutely right.
23:39 It's just labeling. You don't actually
23:40 have to spend it on. You could spend it
23:42 on cigarettes or whatever. Um but the
23:44 fact that it's labeled as we're helping
23:46 with your fuel then I think it seems odd
23:48 to some people at least to hear well the
23:50 government why is government helping um
23:51 people you know in this kind of
23:54 situation. Um okay let's talk about
23:57 children. Um because I think there's
23:58 some interesting stuff there. We have I
24:00 mean this is again lots of change has
24:02 happened here. We had for a long time a
24:04 child benefit that was a payment that
24:06 went to families for all of their
24:08 children. And then earlier you mentioned
24:10 Tom Tony Blair trying to tackle poverty.
24:11 I think I'm right and say at that point
24:13 he added it in a means tested benefit
24:14 for the reasons you said in order to
24:16 target support at those on the lower
24:19 income. Um so we had that means testing
24:21 and now child benefit itself has been
24:23 means tested and now the child of
24:24 universal credit has been capped. So we
24:27 we started off with this concept of I
24:28 guess children add cost will have a
24:30 benefit but over time we've been moving
24:34 towards more means to maybe Tom talk us
24:35 through like the effects of that and
24:36 what it means.
24:37 So I think there's there's a kind of a
24:40 rationale saying look if you have two
24:42 families who have the same income but
24:44 one of them's got several children the
24:45 other one doesn't have any children
24:47 overall taking into account all tax and
24:48 benefits do we want the system to be
24:50 treating the two of those families
24:51 exactly the same? I think there's a
24:52 rationale for saying well no the one
24:54 with kids have got higher costs and so
24:57 we want to um want them to pay on net to
25:00 pay less tax and so that it strikes me
25:02 that that that's a a sort of a a
25:03 coherent justification for having a
25:05 universal child benefit which as you say
25:07 we had for a long time I mean I think in
25:09 its current form child benefit started
25:11 in the late 1970s and all the way until
25:14 2013 it was universal and then I think
25:16 this connects what we were just saying a
25:18 minute ago this sort of feeling of well
25:20 rich people don't don't need it um and
25:23 So we can means test it. And we had this
25:25 quite we have this quite strange means
25:26 test based on
25:27 that's very generous. It's a very
25:28 strange means test.
25:31 Unbelievably clunky.
25:33 Yeah. Exactly. So the higher earning
25:36 partner is the only one that matters of
25:38 the of the parents. And uh
25:39 for this particular test
25:41 for this particular test than not for
25:45 literally any other. Um and um if you
25:46 yeah if you if your your income is over
25:48 £80,000 you don't get any child benefit
25:50 at all.
25:53 um which whereas for universal credit or
25:55 for child tax credit before it it's a
25:56 household means test. So we're trying to
25:57 target resources towards those
25:59 households that on a on a low income. So
26:01 we're in this sort of slightly strange
26:04 middle middle position between full
26:07 universality and sort of proper means
26:09 testing. We have this kind of slightly
26:10 weird means test.
26:12 It is for a long time there was a clear
26:13 sto like you were saying to a clear
26:15 story about child benefit. And I think
26:17 you can see of all the cases where you
26:19 might argue for a universal benefit um
26:20 well I keep saying universal I think
26:22 really I mean contingent on being in a
26:24 state so on having a child it's not
26:25 literally everybody in the country it's
26:27 once you have a child because you can
26:29 make a clear case for there's an extra
26:31 cost associated with having a child and
26:32 maybe the government wants to support
26:34 that. I think disability has some of
26:35 that flavor too and we'll come back to
26:37 that. Um yeah now we have this funny
26:40 hodgepodge where for lots of people it
26:41 is kind of universal. You get these
26:43 benefits but there's also big big means
26:45 testing. I mean, do you think we're just
26:46 confused about what we're trying to do
26:47 with child benefit?
26:48 I suppose we are a bit confused. Yes. I
26:50 mean, you know, there's the argument you
26:52 put there's also kind there's also a
26:53 kind of argument, you know, that that
26:54 society as a whole has a stake in its
26:56 children and therefore is interested in
26:58 looking after all children because it's
27:00 the interest of society as a whole.
27:02 That's not popular. It's not an argument
27:04 you hear spelled out very often these
27:05 days, but it it was certainly one of the
27:07 arguments behind child benefit when
27:10 child benefit came in. Um, and I think
27:12 there's validity in that and you know
27:14 the fact that some people may be
27:15 sufficiently well off to spend it on a
27:16 better bottle of wine. Well, kind of
27:19 that's a price you pay maybe for for
27:20 ensuring there's no stigma about
27:22 receiving child benefit. There's no and
27:23 we haven't talked about stigma but there
27:25 is a stigma attached to receiving means
27:27 tested benefits rightly or wrongly that
27:29 people do perceive that. Um so I think
27:32 it's it's it you know it has a real
27:35 advantage in being a universal in that
27:37 sense benefit and I can the same applies
27:39 to the state basic state pension. I mean
27:41 if you you know why do we not means test
27:44 the basic state pension we tax it so the
27:46 better off pay back a good chunk of what
27:47 they get certain if they're higher rate
27:50 taxpayers but we do it because it gives
27:52 you a platform of a minimum income on
27:55 which you can then build your savings
27:57 knowing that you will see the benefit of
28:00 having done the saving if you mean test
28:01 basic state pension then you don't know
28:03 whether how much you know you don't know
28:05 whether any of yours you don't the
28:06 initial bit of your savings actually be
28:08 worth anything because you might just
28:09 get means tested away. So you don't
28:10 actually see any benefit of having done
28:12 it. So having that that you know there's
28:14 another reason why it's a good good
28:16 reason for there being a universal basic
28:16 state pension.
28:17 Just back to the children limit. It's
28:19 worth pointing out isn't it that sort of
28:21 flavors of this debate are raging right
28:23 now around the two child limit. So
28:24 within universal credit it used to be
28:26 the case that you got an extra payment
28:27 for each child. Now you only get an
28:29 extra payment for the first two children
28:31 and not for the third child. So that's
28:33 that's within a means tested benefit. So
28:35 that gets means tested away. But now
28:36 there's this contingent element where it
28:39 depends on which child it is. And some
28:40 people people are talking now about the
28:42 fact that removing that policy would uh
28:44 reduce child poverty. It would be very
28:46 well targeted in a means tested kind of
28:48 way towards low-inccome people. But the
28:49 supporters of that policy say well
28:52 actually you need you know we need
28:54 incentives across families to line up.
28:55 So those families who don't get mean to
28:57 benefit and have a child have to face
29:00 financial incentives and those who have
29:01 benefits should face that incentives. In
29:02 some ways there is some trade-offs here
29:04 right that you can't really get round.
29:06 and you're trying to think about who to
29:08 target benefits to, how to preserve work
29:09 incentives, how to treat different
29:11 families in similar ways when actually
29:12 they're often quite different. I mean,
29:14 it's just kind of tricky, right, Tom?
29:15 Yeah, exactly. I mean, I think there is
29:17 a question the government should, you
29:20 know, does the government want to sub or
29:21 to what extent I should say, does the
29:22 government want to subsidize or
29:24 incentivize people having children?
29:26 Isn't it saying that society has an
29:28 interest in the raising of children and
29:29 indeed the, you know, the the
29:32 propagation of uh of society? And so
29:33 that I think there's a legitimate
29:35 question there, you know, how how much
29:38 should the the state be supporting in
29:39 cash cash form or other form be
29:41 supporting having kids? I suppose it
29:44 seems to me with um with a two child
29:47 limit that part of the Yeah, that that
29:48 sort of rationale as you say is exactly
29:50 what that what I said is we want to have
29:51 we want the people on benefits to have
29:54 face the same um uh financial
29:56 constraints that those who aren't on
29:58 benefits face when they're having a kid.
30:00 But but obviously in one sense we don't
30:02 we don't have that anyway. You know, you
30:03 you if you have your first or second
30:05 child when you're on uh universal
30:08 credit, you get uh you get an extra
30:09 extra cash. If you're on uh if you get
30:11 housing support, you can often at least
30:14 get extra cash for having more children.
30:16 And um if we were really were to go the
30:18 whole hog and say we want to have the
30:21 same incentives for for rich and poor to
30:22 have more kids that would you know that
30:24 would imply not having any means tested
30:26 uh benefits for for families with
30:27 children which would be um which would
30:29 be a very very very severe change from
30:30 where we are now. So it seemed a little
30:31 bit odd to me but
30:32 I think it's a good point. A lot of
30:33 these benefits having multiple effects
30:34 right we often you know they're often
30:37 affecting uh things like work incentives
30:39 but also the incentives to save to
30:40 change jobs about whether to have
30:41 children in the first place and all
30:42 sorts of other things. So I think what
30:43 makes this area complicated is that
30:46 there are just lots of things going on.
30:47 Well, as you said, I mean, the whole of
30:48 social security is riddled with
30:50 trade-offs. They're all trade-offs.
30:51 Working senses versus the poor versus
30:53 universality, and everything's a trade-off.
30:53 trade-off.
30:55 Yeah. Let's say disability, cuz that's
30:57 another big one that's been raging in
30:58 the in the press, partly because there's
31:01 been this huge increase in disabilities.
31:02 Maybe Tom, you fills in on the
31:04 background about why it's become more of
31:05 an issue and the fact that we actually
31:07 have two types of benefits for disabled people.
31:08 people.
31:11 If you're working age, you can get uh an
31:12 incapacity kind of benefit, which is
31:14 mostly a higher element of universal
31:17 credit. Um so that's means tested. If
31:18 you're uh that's and that's targeted
31:22 those who are unable to work. If you um
31:24 have higher living costs broadly
31:26 associated with your disability, then
31:27 you can get another benefit, personal
31:29 dependence payment, and that's not means
31:31 tested at all. Uh so that's kind of more
31:32 in the spirit of, you know, some of the
31:33 things we've been talking about with
31:35 child benefit or or or the state
31:37 pension. And it's certainly been in the
31:39 news a lot because there's been this
31:41 very significant increase in the number
31:43 of people getting these benefits since
31:46 the pandemic. So a kind of a one way of
31:47 thinking about it before the pandemic
31:49 about 20,000 people began a claim for
31:52 one of these benefits every month and
31:56 since about mid 2021 mid 2022 around
31:58 then that number's been about 40,000. So
32:00 we doubled the kind of the inflows into
32:01 these benefits.
32:02 That's huge. Let's just put let's
32:04 underline that that is a huge change in
32:07 in the number of people flowing onto
32:08 it's a huge change because it's
32:11 persisted and when this first happened
32:13 you know we thought you know maybe this
32:14 is just kind of a postco thing and it
32:15 will just like there'll be this little
32:17 hump and it will go back down but
32:19 actually it's still the case it's just
32:21 continued still 40 or 50,000 a month
32:24 starting um starting claims so um it
32:26 it's it is a very important change it
32:28 means that over this decade as a whole
32:30 government spending on health layer
32:32 benefits is set to grow by about30
32:33 billion pounds. So, you know, really
32:35 significant sum. It's worth saying that
32:37 the rest of the working age benefit
32:40 system uh if anything is is has been
32:41 shrinking over time. So, when you look
32:42 at the thing as a whole all spending on
32:45 working age benefits, it's not the case
32:46 that you know we're we're at a
32:49 historically high level. Um but this
32:52 part of it certainly has been um has has
32:54 experienced quite a shocking rise. And
32:55 thinking back to the kind of beverage
32:57 stuff, do you think disability is one of
32:59 those things that just wasn't really
33:00 it wasn't really in the initial
33:02 conception of the welfare state at least
33:04 to the degree to which it is now?
33:05 That is true. I mean there was an
33:06 industrial injuries scheme and there was
33:08 a war disability scheme and that was it
33:12 at the beginning. Um so what changed
33:15 over time was well one was one was
33:16 medical advance which meant that
33:18 actually some people were kept alive
33:20 with disabilities who would otherwise
33:21 have died in the early days. So then
33:23 then you start saying what do we do what
33:26 we do for them? Uh and you know slowly
33:29 but surely growing
33:31 awareness in society of the costs of
33:34 disability. Uh so you know you know if
33:36 you get multiple scerosis or some other
33:38 debilitating disease it's not your
33:41 fault. It's not insurable. Society
33:43 increasingly took the view we should do
33:45 something to support these people. So
33:47 you do get a big big big growth over the
33:50 70s and 80s of disability benefits of
33:53 one form or another. Uh since when it's
33:55 been as you know from the 2000s on it's
33:56 been a bit of a battle to try and
33:57 contain the bill.
33:58 I think you can see the tradeoffs we've
34:00 been talking about today playing out in
34:02 the debate. Right. So the government you
34:03 know had some measures which have now
34:04 been reversed but you have these two
34:06 benefits that you set out Tom. One it's
34:08 basically a payment to all people deemed
34:10 to have a disability. So a contingent
34:12 benefit if you like another part of the
34:15 system which is means tested. Um of
34:17 course if you move away from a means if
34:18 you a means best tested system only goes
34:20 to those on low incomes but there are
34:21 some people on higher incomes with
34:23 disability but if you support everyone
34:24 with a disability then you have to
34:27 decide who it goes to and you know if
34:28 you're not using income you use some
34:30 other criteria. So you use the how
34:31 disabled are you or what kind of
34:34 disability you have and that's um that's
34:35 kind of where the debate is going to
34:36 play out in the next few years, right?
34:38 It's really all about who's going to get
34:40 benefits and for what reason.
34:42 Yeah. Well, I think we we'll have to see
34:43 how it how it does play out because is
34:45 you know obviously it's no secret the
34:47 government struggled to um to pass much
34:50 reform in this area and so we'll have to
34:51 we'll have to see what what they do with
34:52 it. But one, you know, one thing that
34:55 was in the in the waters is being was
34:56 being considered before the bill came
34:58 out was what we could means test
35:01 personal independence payments and that
35:03 ended up not not making it into the into
35:04 the bill. Don't I don't I don't have any
35:05 inside knowledge. I don't know how
35:07 seriously that was being taken, but you
35:08 could imagine a world where the
35:10 government says, well, we want to we
35:12 want to make a saving from this bill.
35:14 What's the kind of easiest way to do it
35:16 that's going to potentially, you know,
35:19 cause the least difficulty? Um well if
35:21 we means test it we'll say you know you
35:23 can be a millionaires can get person
35:24 payment at the moment we we'll take that
35:27 away and you could you could imagine
35:29 that that kind of argument going through
35:31 um but it it and it you know this comes
35:32 back to exactly the kind of things we've
35:34 been talking about people can kind of
35:35 say well you know rich people rich
35:36 people don't need it
35:37 one of the other things that will help
35:39 you correct me if I'm wrong but we don't
35:41 really understand why there has been
35:45 this big increase in claims and you know
35:46 if one could work out why this is
35:48 happening and then do something about
35:49 why it is happening. That might be a
35:50 better way to constrain the bills and
35:52 saying how do we take money away from people.
35:52 people.
35:54 Yeah, that would certainly be preferable
35:56 to get the underlying demand down.
35:58 Basically, we do know Tom that that some
36:00 of the conditions that are rising are
36:02 sort of mental health conditions for
36:03 example. So, they're not all some of the
36:04 physical conditions you might think
36:06 people have that are just just
36:08 stationary across life. Once you've got
36:10 a life, you know, a chronic disease of
36:11 some sort, that's just it's a fixed
36:13 characteristic now of that person.
36:15 Whereas with other things and maybe more
36:17 likely that other other other
36:18 interventions you know talking therapies
36:20 to people with mental health for example
36:22 uh could help those people too. I think
36:23 there are other policy options in this
36:25 in this sphere. There's one more thing I
36:26 want to talk about before we sort of try
36:28 and draw some lessons from all of this
36:30 which is universal basic income. We
36:32 don't have a universal basic income um
36:36 but it's an idea that knocks around and
36:38 that you know from time to time gets uh
36:40 people get excited about. I think the
36:42 people like the idea really like the
36:45 idea. Um so so let's talk about why why
36:46 don't we just do that. So I think by
36:48 universal basic income most proponents
36:50 of that have in mind everyone in the
36:52 country just gets sent a check or a bank
36:55 transfer for some amount of money. We
36:56 all get the same amount of money and
36:57 it's enough money and this is quite
37:00 important. It's enough money that it's
37:02 it's a good platform upon which you
37:03 could build a life. You could sort of
37:05 live on on that money. Um, I should give
37:06 the listeners a spoiler that I think
37:08 we're all going to rubbish the idea.
37:10 But, um, you have a crack first, Nick.
37:12 What's what what's to love or loathe
37:13 about a universal basic income?
37:15 Well, I think I think there there are
37:19 essentially two problems. One is uh if
37:21 if if it's it has to be enough to live
37:22 on, right? If it's not enough to live
37:24 on, it's not a universal basic income.
37:26 So some people suggest quite small ones
37:28 but it's got to be something serious
37:29 kind of something like the level at
37:31 which we pay the basic estate pension
37:33 which we view as just about enough for a
37:35 retired person to live on. The levels of
37:37 taxation you would need to pay that to
37:39 everybody would be absolutely
37:42 astronomic. Uh and what's also missing
37:44 from that is we have as we have
37:46 discussed have lots of other contingent
37:49 benefits like children and disability.
37:50 So, are we going to wipe all those away
37:53 and just have one benefit for everybody
37:55 with no allowance for your particular
37:57 circumstances? Well, I can't see that
37:58 happening. So, the bill is going to be
37:59 even bigger because we're going to have
38:01 to retain some bits of the contingency
38:05 at the same time as we have a UBI. So, I
38:06 think it's kind of pie in the sky.
38:09 I mean, I do do agree with that, but um
38:11 let let me give let me give what maybe
38:13 kind of the best gloss for it or a a
38:15 good gloss for it. So, um you could
38:17 imagine so so this kind of connects to
38:19 what Nick's saying. We give more cash to
38:21 people who are in particular
38:22 circumstances. Obviously on low income
38:24 we talk about that a lot. But also in
38:26 virtue of having ill health, in virtue
38:27 of having kids, in virtue of having high
38:29 rent, all those things contribute
38:32 towards uh greater uh benefit um
38:36 receipt. And if you just had a pure UBI,
38:38 you would be flattening all of those
38:39 distinctions. So it doesn't matter
38:40 whether you're a renter, doesn't matter
38:41 how many kids you got, you you know,
38:43 everyone gets the same. And so that
38:45 would mean for lots of people who get a
38:47 lot of cash because their their needs is
38:50 is assessed in this way are really high
38:52 um they would lose out um to a very
38:54 large degree. you I think the best you
38:56 can put in it is well if you want to do
38:59 redistribution towards people who have
39:01 kids towards people who have higher rent
39:03 towards people who have incapacity you
39:04 could use the benefit system which is
39:07 what we do you could use the tax system
39:09 and so I think the other way of thinking
39:12 about it is well if we made that it
39:14 require a complete rewrite of the way
39:16 the tax system works which I can see you
39:17 already appalled by um
39:19 oh no a rewrite just going in that direction
39:21 direction
39:24 um and um uh uh but in principle that
39:26 could be the means by which we do
39:28 redistribution on these different
39:30 margins. We have historically at certain
39:32 points in time had higher tax allowances
39:33 for those with kids. You could do
39:36 something along those lines for example.
39:38 Um and perhaps one argument in favor of
39:39 that is so so that that kind of strategy
39:42 would be like we get the benefit uh in a
39:44 flat way and then we use the tax system
39:47 to do the means testing. Um, one reason
39:50 for doing that, I think, which could be
39:52 pref preferable, is you get rid of all
39:53 some of the problems we've been talking
39:55 about with stigma. So rather than it
39:57 being a problem of needing to get people
39:59 to take up the benefit, it's just a
40:01 problem of tax collection, which is
40:02 perhaps something we're got bit of a
40:05 better idea about how to how to handle.
40:07 So I'm not I'm not saying I'm all
40:08 convinced by um by my own argument, but
40:10 I think that that if if you want to do
40:12 redistribution to these different
40:14 characteristics, you do have in
40:15 principle have these two different tools
40:16 available to you.
40:18 Yeah. So I I agree with that, but it is
40:19 worth I think underlying Nick's point
40:21 here about just like the numbers here,
40:23 right? So you know most people I think
40:25 you talk about the UBI have in mind that
40:28 it is sufficient to really support it's
40:30 not just like you know5 a week. It's
40:31 enough that you actually do something
40:32 with it. You could live off it
40:35 potentially. But then if you want to and
40:37 it's a good rule of thumb if you want to
40:39 take I don't know average earnings and
40:40 say we're going to give everyone in the
40:42 country we'll pick some number 30% of
40:44 average earnings. you've got to raise
40:47 30% of national income to give to
40:49 people. So that's yeah we we currently
40:51 raise something like 37% of national
40:53 income in tax. You could look at another
40:55 30% of tax to to raise money to
40:57 redistribute and you say okay that's
40:58 that's a bit crazy. So then we'll say
41:00 well let's just 10% of national income
41:02 will redistribute. That's still quite a
41:04 lot of money. Um but for each individual
41:06 it wouldn't be enough to live on. So, in
41:07 that sense, you're not going to you're
41:11 not going to be able to get around um
41:12 you're not going to be able to get
41:13 around these trade-offs that if you want
41:17 to give people enough money to live on,
41:19 then if you give it to everybody, that's
41:21 really expensive. And if you know some
41:23 people, you got to take it away somehow.
41:25 And you either take it away through some
41:27 kind of means test or by only giving it
41:29 to some people based on some characters
41:30 in the first place. And UBI doesn't
41:32 really get around that, right?
41:33 Yeah. Exactly. So, I I'd like to think
41:36 of it as a three-way tradeoff. So you're
41:39 trading off between giving um enough
41:42 sports people on low income total cost
41:46 and work incentives. And UBI basically
41:49 just takes two of those very you could
41:50 depending how what the level of UBI you
41:52 could have a high UBI which says
41:54 actually the work incentives look pretty
41:55 good at least before you start worrying
41:56 about how we're going to have to pay for
41:58 the thing. The working centers look
41:59 pretty good because you don't just as
42:01 small issue um because once you get into
42:03 work you don't lose any of your benefit
42:06 and um uh and we can provide enough
42:08 support for people on low income. That's
42:09 one way of doing it. But obviously it
42:11 costs absolutely tons of money or you
42:13 give a really low UBI and then it
42:14 doesn't cost tons of money. You still
42:16 have a working incentive advantage but
42:17 you're not actually really supporting
42:19 people who are um who are on low income.
42:21 So that that three-way tradeoff I think
42:22 is like absolutely fundamental. You
42:24 can't get around it. You just have to
42:27 pick one. and UBI is just kind of one
42:30 kind of corner of the available choices
42:31 and and and we don't really know what it
42:33 would do to work incentives. I mean I
42:34 mean there have been some small
42:36 experiments around the world, haven't
42:38 they, with UB, but they are very small
42:39 and I don't think the answer from them
42:40 is very clear. I mean if you know if
42:42 people have enough to live on will this
42:45 encourage them to do more work as or or
42:46 will they say well that's all right I
42:47 can live on this I don't want to do
42:49 anything and we don't we really don't
42:51 know what the impact
42:53 won't neffect the incentive to earn a
42:55 marginal pound but the incentive of
42:56 which job to take maybe you'll be more
42:57 entrepreneurial because you've got some
42:59 say so or maybe actually your thing
42:59 actually I'm going to just stay at home
43:02 and not do my rubbish job um before
43:04 before we uh uh just wrap up Tom as as
43:07 now the most um as the person who's
43:08 happiest about the idea of a UPI at
43:10 least in this in this room. I mean, some
43:12 people will be shouting as as they were,
43:13 what about the administrative costs that
43:15 actually we've described an immensely
43:18 complicated system. UBI really simple.
43:19 Wouldn't it just be so much better? You
43:20 say, "Well, administrative costs that
43:22 that just gives you some free money."
43:24 I think the administrative costs
43:27 involved running the B system are very
43:30 small relative to the direct amount of
43:32 cash that goes out the door. And the
43:34 reason why we have these admin costs is
43:37 precisely because um we think that
43:39 there's good reasons to distribute more
43:41 cash to um to people in virtue of some
43:43 characteristics than others. So I think
43:44 I mean I think the amount of savings I
43:46 don't I don't know the exact number. I
43:47 think the amount of savings you would
43:48 get from that would be absolutely
43:51 trivial compared to uh you know we spent
43:53 whatever whatever 120 billion on working
43:54 age welfare. I don't think we'd be
43:56 looking at much of a saving relative to that.
43:56 that.
43:58 Yeah. All right. We we should wrap up in
43:59 a minute. I mean lesson to the future.
44:00 Nick, what do you I mean, you've been
44:02 studying the history of this for a very
44:05 long time. Do you think we should be
44:07 trying to reverse this drift towards
44:08 means testing? Should we just accept it
44:10 and and run with it? I mean, where's
44:11 system doing great and where's it
44:13 where's it going wrong, do you think?
44:14 Well, I mean, I've already said I think
44:16 the bits we've got, we we still retain
44:18 should be retained because they do bring
44:21 advantages. Um, I genuinely think it's
44:23 very difficult to try and rebuild uh
44:25 national insurance system. I think it's
44:27 kind of one of those things when you
44:28 start losing it, it's very difficult to
44:30 get it back. uh and the reason we don't
44:32 you know and and we don't have it
44:34 because an earnings related system is
44:36 much more expensive uh I mean if you
44:39 look at you know this is big broad
44:42 truism but if you look at the rates of
44:44 shares of GDP that European countries
44:47 spend on on public you know all public
44:49 services it's normally about two or
44:51 three percentage points GDP higher than
44:54 is here and what drives that is the
44:56 expenditure on earnings related benefits
44:58 and health and those are the two things
45:01 that take it up above. So if you wanted to
45:02 to
45:04 we know we're not an unulated one
45:07 because it's the British people do not
45:09 appear I sound like beverage don't I but
45:11 yeah the British people do not appear to
45:12 be willing by that sort of level of
45:14 taxation to achieve it and even we try
45:16 to rebuild it it would be more expensive
45:18 and at the moment we're don't for a long
45:20 time now we've not been in the world of
45:23 trying to make public services public
45:24 service including benefits more expensive.
45:25 expensive.
45:26 Yes. What do you think? What lessons do
45:27 you draw from all this time for the
45:29 future of benefits and welfare? And
45:31 I agree. I think it's it's much easier
45:33 to go in one direction than the other.
45:37 The the logic of um well, this is a rich
45:38 person, so they don't need it. Uh
45:40 there's some really poor people right
45:42 now who really need more cash. That is a
45:45 very strong logic which uh has put us,
45:47 you know, which we've been walking down
45:50 that path for for decades. And it's
45:52 relatively hard to see how you could
45:57 reverse course. I think in so far as um
45:59 we still have I guess well in we still
46:01 have the sort of the universal more
46:02 universal components things like child
46:06 benefit semi universal I guess and um
46:08 and the state pension. I do think it is
46:10 worth faith if if the governments want
46:11 if governments want to think about
46:13 reforming it is to think well what
46:16 actually is the the overall goal here if
46:20 we um you know if we simply want to like
46:22 take some money off rich people the most
46:24 straightforward way to do it is through
46:27 the income tax system um and it probably
46:29 isn't to do some you know horrible means
46:32 test on child benefit or um or for that
46:34 matter on the on the state pension. So I
46:35 think you got to keep in mind what the
46:39 goal is and and think about the overall
46:41 shape of the system uh rather than
46:43 worrying too much about this particular
46:45 benefit going to this person or that person.
46:46 person.
46:47 Great. So we should we should wrap up
46:50 there for this episode of the IFS zooms
46:52 in. Um we've talked about how the UK's
46:54 welfare state began with a vision of a
46:56 contributory social security insurance
46:57 you know beverages something for
46:59 something system but over time we've
47:02 moved to a means system. um in fact one
47:03 of the most mainetive systems in the
47:05 developed world and I think you can
47:07 really see how that has happened. We had
47:08 a desire to support people who hadn't
47:11 contributed to give to groups. Then you
47:13 give to groups without contribution and
47:14 you have to decide which groups to give
47:16 to and you either make them contingent
47:17 benefits. So you give them to people
47:19 with children or who are in old age or
47:20 you give them to people on low income
47:22 and then you means test it as income uh
47:25 has arisen. And if there's one message I
47:26 would take from all of our discussion
47:28 today, it's that there are trade-offs.
47:29 There are these three things we can't
47:31 get around. We are trying to balance the
47:32 cost of a system and not wanting it to
47:35 balloon. the desire to get support to
47:37 those who need it most and incentives in
47:40 a particular work incentives and you
47:41 know there's no way to do all those
47:43 three things uh at once necessarily so I
47:46 suspect we'll keep a mix of both
47:48 contingent and more universal benefits
47:50 and means tested benefits and therefore
47:52 we should expect expect to have some
47:55 complexity in our system but of course
47:57 not all complexity is good we've had
47:58 some examples today where complexity
48:01 seems um unnecessary but the lesson for
48:03 I think for policy makers is they should
48:04 keep thinking clearly about these
48:06 trade-offs, about the cost of policies,
48:08 how well targeted they are at different
48:10 outcomes, and about what they do to work
48:12 savings and other uh and other
48:14 incentives. And I at least would say for
48:17 now a big no to universal basic income
48:19 on the basic that on on the notion
48:20 numbers just don't add up. To make it
48:22 big enough to be really a basic income,
48:24 you would have to be uh really reshaping
48:26 the state. Most importantly, it doesn't
48:28 get around the trade-offs. You still
48:30 have trade-offs even with uh with a UBI.
48:32 But for now, let me say a huge thanks uh
48:34 to my guests uh Tom Waters and Nick
48:37 Timmons. Um and thank you to you for
48:38 listening. And if you've enjoyed this
48:40 episode, please do subscribe to the IFS
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48:50 in the episode description. We'll see