0:01 Winston Churchill famously joked about
0:03 his namesake tank. That's the tank they
0:05 named after me when they found out it
0:07 was no damn good. And as it turns out,
0:09 the joke wasn't far from the truth. But
0:11 was the Churchill tank really that
0:13 terrible? Or is there a darker, more
0:15 complex truth behind its heavily armored
0:17 exterior? Let's find out. The story of
0:19 the Churchill tank begins quite with
0:22 chaos. In the late 1930s, British tank
0:23 doctrine was split into three
0:24 categories. light tanks for
0:26 reconnaissance, cruiser tanks for
0:27 exploitation and maneuver, and infantry
0:30 tanks for supporting ground troops. This
0:31 approach stemmed from the British Army's
0:33 experience in World War I, but it
0:35 utterly failed to anticipate the
0:36 requirements of modern mechanized
0:38 warfare. While Germany was developing
0:40 the versatile Panza 3 and 4 series that
0:42 could be adapted to multiple roles,
0:44 Britain was producing specialized
0:45 vehicles that excelled in narrow
0:46 applications, but without any
0:48 flexibility. This strategic era would
0:50 cost countless British lives as the war
0:53 progressed. In February 1940, with the
0:55 European War already underway, a
0:56 contract was issued to develop a new
0:59 heavy infantry tank called the A20.
1:00 Incredibly, this vehicle was designed
1:02 primarily for breaking through fixed
1:04 defenses and trench systems, essentially
1:06 preparing to fight World War I all over
1:09 again. The A20 was to mount either a six
1:11 pounder gun or a French 75mm in the hull
1:14 with preliminary tests using a Matilda 2
1:15 turret fitted with the British 2-pounder
1:18 gun. When France fell in June 1940,
1:19 British military planners finally
1:21 recognized that trench warfare was not
1:23 coming back. The A20 project was
1:25 cancelled, but not before precious
1:27 months had been wasted on an obsolete
1:29 concept during Britain's darkest hour. A
1:31 new project emerged that would inherit
1:32 both the flaws and potential of its
1:35 predecessor, the A22. What could be
1:37 salvaged was kept along with the general
1:38 shape, and what emerged was unlike any
1:40 other tank on the battlefield, and not
1:43 necessarily in a good way. A new A22
1:44 prototype would eventually become the
1:46 infantry tank Mark IV, better known as
1:48 the Churchill. The first production
1:50 model, the Churchill Mark1, rolled off
1:53 the assembly line in June 1941, barely a
1:55 year after development began and with
1:57 minimal testing. The Churchill Mark1
1:59 featured an unusual configuration. A
2:00 two-p pounder gun in the turret and a
2:02 3-in howitzer mounted in the whole
2:04 front. Primarily intended for firing
2:06 smoke shells, the MK2 began production
2:09 in October 1941, replaced the Hull
2:11 howitzer with a better machine gun, but
2:12 retained the already inadequate
2:14 two-pounder main gun. The rush to
2:16 production revealed the dark truth of
2:18 wartime priorities. Political pressure
2:19 and urgent need often trumped proper
2:21 engineering practice. The Churchill
2:23 entered service with so many mechanical
2:24 problems that the commander of the Royal
2:26 Armored Corps called it the worst tank
2:28 we have yet produced. The Churchill's
2:30 notorious unreliability came from
2:32 several critical flaws that would seem
2:33 obvious to someone who does not know
2:35 anything about engineering, let alone
2:37 actual engineers. The Merritt Brown
2:39 transmission, while innovative in
2:41 theory, was rushed into production with
2:43 almost no testing. The engine air intake
2:45 faced downward directly in the path of
2:47 mud and debris thrown up by the tracks.
2:49 The engine itself, the Bedford Twin 6,
2:51 consisted of two six-cylinder luri
2:52 engines combined into a flat 12
2:54 configuration. Literally two truck
2:56 engines bolted together delivering only
2:58 350 horsepower to move a vehicle
3:00 weighing over 40 tons. The result was a
3:03 tank with a top speed of only 18 mph on
3:05 roads and much slower cross country.
3:07 Breakdowns were so common that in early
3:10 1942, entire Churchill units were
3:11 considered non-operational due to
3:13 mechanical failures. Despite these
3:15 crippling problems, the Churchill was
3:17 about to be sent into combat anyway,
3:18 with consequences that would reveal its
3:20 obvious fatal flaws, but also its
3:24 unexpected strengths. August 19th, 1942.
3:26 The Churchill's combat debut came during
3:28 Operation Jubilee, the ill- fated raid
3:30 on DEP. The operation deployed 29
3:32 Churchill tanks from the 14th Canadian
3:34 Army Tank Regiment. What followed was a
3:35 cascading series of failures that
3:37 exposed the dark truth about rushing
3:39 equipment into combat before resolving
3:41 fundamental design flaws. Two tanks were
3:42 lost while launching from their landing
3:44 craft. Of the 27 that made it to the
3:46 water, only 15 made it up the rocky
3:48 beach, while the rest became immobilized
3:50 as stones jammed their tracks and
3:51 suspension systems. The remainder was
3:53 stopped by the concrete anti-tank
3:55 obstacles. By the end of the operation,
3:56 not a single Churchill tank made it back
3:59 to England. The Germans captured several
4:00 intact Churchills and conducted a
4:02 thorough technical evaluation. They
4:04 found the Churchills to be undergunded,
4:05 mechanically unreliable, and with
4:07 several exploitable weaknesses in the
4:09 armor configuration. However, they did
4:10 note its impressive climbing ability and
4:12 the thickness of its frontal armor.
4:14 British analysis of the DEP failure led
4:16 to two crucial conclusions. First, the
4:18 Churchill needed significant mechanical
4:20 improvements. Second, specialized
4:21 engineering variants would be needed to
4:23 overcome beach obstacles in future
4:25 amphibious operations. Both insights
4:27 would prove vital to Allied success in
4:29 later campaigns. As the DEP catastrophe
4:31 was being analyzed, the Churchill was
4:32 about to see an entirely different
4:35 battlefield. In October 1942, during the
4:37 second battle of Elamagne, a special
4:39 unit deployed six improved Churchill
4:41 Mark IIIs equipped with the new six
4:43 pounder gun. The results surprised
4:44 everyone. The Churchill's thick armor
4:46 proved remarkably resistant to German
4:49 anti-tank fire. Some of the Churchills
4:51 received multiple direct hits from 50
4:53 and 75 mm armor-piercing rounds, none of
4:55 which penetrated. This promising
4:57 performance triggered a comprehensive
4:59 rework program for existing Churchills,
5:00 one of the most extensive upgrade
5:02 initiatives for any tank in the war.
5:03 Production of new tanks was actually
5:05 halted to focus on fixing numerous
5:07 problems in the existing Churchills. By
5:10 February 1943, these improvements began
5:12 to prove their worth in North Africa.
5:14 Two Churchill Mark IIIs did something
5:15 that would have been unthinkable just
5:18 months earlier. They charged across 1500
5:20 yds of open ground under fire, knocked
5:23 out an 88 mm anti-tank gun, climbed a
5:25 steep hill deemed impassible to tanks,
5:26 and proceeded to destroy four more
5:29 anti-tank guns, two Panzer 3s, and 25
5:31 other German vehicles. As production
5:33 shifted to improved models, and the tank
5:34 proved its worth, the Churchill was
5:36 about to find its ideal battlefield, one
5:38 where other tanks simply could not go.
5:40 The Churchill truly found its calling in
5:42 the mountainous terrain of Italy, where
5:43 conventional wisdom held that tanks
5:45 would be of limited use. The Churchill
5:47 Mark III and MarkV were joined by the
5:50 Mark 5 with the 95mm closeup support
5:53 howitzer and the Mark 6 with the 75mm
5:54 gun, giving tank commanders flexibility
5:56 to handle different threats. But it was
5:58 the Churchill's unique mobility
6:00 characteristics that proved decisive.
6:02 With its distinctive track and
6:03 suspension system wrapping around the
6:05 entire hull, the Churchill had
6:07 exceptional climbing ability, able to go
6:09 up slopes of up to 40°, they went
6:11 through terrain that the Germans had
6:12 left unguarded, believing no tank could
6:14 possibly approach from those directions.
6:16 During the assault on the Gothic line in
6:18 late 1944, some Churchills reached
6:20 positions so remote they could only be
6:22 resupplied by mules. The Churchill's
6:24 slow speed now proved largely irrelevant
6:26 in the mountain passes and narrow
6:28 Italian streets. An often overlooked
6:30 feature is that Churchill tanks in Italy
6:32 frequently operated continuously for up
6:34 to 2 weeks without major mechanical
6:35 failures, which was a stunning
6:37 improvement for a vehicle that started
6:40 out as a rolling disaster. By 1944, the
6:42 Churchill had achieved a reliability
6:44 rate comparable to the Sherman while
6:45 offering superior protection and
6:47 cross-country mobility. Seeing what it
6:49 could do, engineers began developing
6:51 specialized variants of the Churchill
6:52 that would transform the tank into a
6:54 Swiss Army knife on tracks. The
6:56 Churchill's robust chassis proved an
6:58 ideal platform for the so-called
7:00 Hobart's funnies. Funnyling, but
7:01 actually very effective versions of
7:03 Churchills. They were built in direct
7:05 response to the dark truth learned at
7:07 DEP that conventional tanks alone could
7:09 not overcome the wide range of anti-tank
7:11 obstacles. Their design focused
7:13 especially on beach landings and the
7:15 upcoming operation overlord. One of the
7:17 most interesting Churchill Frankenstein
7:18 versions of armored vehicle Royal
7:22 Engineers was one with a 290 mm petard
7:24 spigot mortar firing a 40lb high
7:26 explosive projectile nicknamed the
7:28 flying dust bin. It had an effective
7:29 range of just 80 yards, but it could
7:31 demolish concrete bunkers, roadblocks,
7:34 and buildings with ease. The AVRE also
7:36 carried fashions, large bundles of wood
7:37 that could be dropped to fill anti-tank
7:39 ditches. The Churchill Crocodile
7:42 retained the 75mm gun, but added a
7:43 flamethrower in place of the whole
7:45 machine gun with fuel carried in an
7:46 armored trailer. There were many other
7:48 variants as well, designed for crossing
7:50 ditches, clearing mines, recovering
7:52 damaged vehicles, etc. Although they
7:53 looked funny, they were actually quite
7:55 useful and effective tools. However,
7:57 there is a different opinion that these
7:59 many versions did not come because the
8:01 Churchill was brilliantly versatile, but
8:02 because its original battlefield role
8:04 had failed, so the British kept
8:06 salvaging it for niche uses. As D-Day
8:08 approached, these specialized Churchills
8:10 would play a crucial role in the largest
8:12 amphibious operation in history. On the
8:14 British and Canadian beaches, Churchills
8:15 cleared paths through minefields and
8:17 obstacles and gave the infantry
8:19 muchneeded support, undoubtedly saving
8:22 many lives. In late 1944, the Churchill
8:24 Mark 7, the heaviest production variant,
8:26 entered service with even thicker armor,
8:28 152 mm on the front glacis, even more
8:30 than the Tiger 1 had. It was still armed
8:33 with the 75mm gun rather than the more
8:35 powerful 17 pounder mounted on Sherman
8:37 Fireflies, which were much better for
8:39 fighting German big cats. By war's end,
8:46 upgraed multiple times and deployed in
8:48 more specialized variants than any other
8:50 British tank. But as the war drew to a
8:52 close, a final chapter in the Churchill
8:54 story was unfolding. As tank technology
8:55 developed rapidly, British designers
8:57 were working on Churchill's successor,
9:00 the A43 Black Prince. Essentially an
9:02 enlarged Churchill mounting the powerful
9:04 17p pounder anti-tank gun, the Black
9:05 Prince addressed the Churchill's main
9:07 remaining weakness, relatively light
9:09 firepower compared to late war German
9:11 tanks. Six prototypes were completed by
9:14 May 1945, just as the war in Europe
9:16 ended. The Black Prince weighed an
9:17 enormous 50 tons and retained the
9:19 Churchill's low speed. Testing revealed
9:21 that while it offered exceptional
9:23 protection and firepower, its mobility
9:25 was insufficient for modern warfare. The
9:26 future belonged to the universal main
9:28 battle tank concept, which would form
9:30 the basis for the Centurion, combining
9:32 reasonable armor, good firepower, and
9:33 adequate mobility. Although the
9:35 Churchill eventually became a reasonably
9:37 good tank, many of its crew members had
9:38 to pay the price with their lives so
9:40 that stubborn generals and engineers
9:42 could learn lessons and eventually
