0:01 During one of the scariest battles in
0:03 human history, something seemingly
0:04 impossible happened. Some German tank
0:06 units received more than 100%
0:08 casualties, we'll explain exactly what
0:10 this means and how it happened through
0:12 the unique, turbulent, and little known
0:14 story of the Panzer 4, a tank almost
0:16 nobody remembers today. So, to
0:18 understand how things got that bad, we
0:20 need to start at the beginning. The
0:21 Panza 4 is one of the most important
0:23 tanks of the Second World War, and yet,
0:25 it's also one of the most overlooked.
0:26 You won't find it anywhere near the
0:28 level of fame tanks like the Tiger and
0:30 Panther got, but this was the tank that
0:32 carried the German army from the first
0:34 shots fired in Poland all the way to the
0:36 ruins of Berlin and everything in
0:38 between. And although it was never even
0:39 meant to be the star of the show, it
0:42 surely became one. So, let's start from
0:44 the very beginning. In the early 1930s,
0:46 as Germany secretly began rebuilding its
0:48 military power under the nose of the
0:50 Treaty of Versailles, naming this tank
0:52 an accompanying vehicle, tank doctrine
0:53 was still taking shape. The idea wasn't
0:56 to build single all-purpose tank like
0:58 you'd see later with the Soviet T-34 or
0:59 the American Sherman, which set the
1:01 stage for the main battle tank concept
1:03 that would come after the war. Instead,
1:05 the Germans at first envisioned two main
1:07 classes of armored vehicles, one for
1:08 fighting other tanks and another for
1:11 supporting infantry. The Panzer 3 was
1:13 supposed to be the tank killer with its
1:15 37 mm cannon, the same as the German
1:17 infantry's standard anti-tank gun at the
1:20 time. It was enough for the time, but it
1:21 would soon get the nickname doorner for
1:23 its effectiveness and was already in the
1:25 process of being replaced by the 50 mm
1:27 gun as armor thickness rapidly increased
1:30 in all tanks. Meanwhile, the Panza 4,
1:33 accepted into service in 1937, was built
1:35 as an infantry support vehicle. That's
1:37 why its earliest models from A through
1:40 F1 carried a shortbarreled 75mm KWK37
1:43 gun. This was a low velocity weapon
1:44 optimized for firing high explosive
1:46 shells at enemy infantry positions,
1:47 machine gun nests, and light
1:50 fortifications. This made it excellent
1:52 for lobbing explosive rounds that burst
1:54 on impact. But against enemy armor, it
1:55 was nearly useless as the shells lacked
1:57 the kinetic energy needed to punch
1:59 through even moderately thick tank
2:01 armor. Still, that didn't matter because
2:04 in 1939 and 1940, there wasn't much
2:05 enemy armor to deal with anyway, and
2:07 that was the job for the Panza 3. When
2:09 Germany invaded Poland in September
2:12 1939, the Panzer 4 was in service. Still
2:14 in small numbers, but it worked just as
2:16 intended. Enemy tanks were rare and not
2:18 much of a threat. Then in France, the
2:19 story was similar. Most Allied tanks
2:21 were either outdated or misused. And
2:23 while some models, like the French B1
2:26 and Sua S35 gave German crews a nasty
2:28 surprise with their thicker armor. The
2:29 sheer speed, coordination, and
2:31 communication of the Panza divisions won
2:33 the day. Radio communication became a
2:35 key advantage because every German tank
2:37 had a radio. In French and British
2:39 tanks, usually only the commander tank
2:41 did. That alone made a massive
2:42 difference in coordinating movement in
2:45 unstoppable Blitzcreek. The Panzer 4's
2:46 role remained stable with the biggest
2:48 complaint being the lack of armor to
2:50 protect from anything heavier than
2:51 machine gun fire, as first models had
2:55 only 15 to 25 mm of armor. But very
2:56 soon, the bigger cracks would begin
2:58 showing, and the illusion of German tank
3:00 superiority would be shattered once they
3:03 turned their sights east. In the summer
3:05 of 1941, Germany launched Operation
3:07 Barbarasa, the largest land invasion in
3:09 human history, aimed at nothing less
3:11 than the total destruction of the Soviet
3:14 Union. Over 3 million Axis troops poured
3:16 across the border, backed by more than
3:18 3,000 tanks. Entire Soviet divisions
3:20 were surrounded and wiped out, and
3:22 cities fell one after another.
3:23 Everything looked like another lightning
3:25 victory for the German war machine. But
3:27 then came the shock because what German
3:29 tank crews began encountering deep in
3:30 Soviet territory was unlike anything
3:32 they had seen before. First it was
3:34 isolated, then more frequent, and soon
3:36 it was clear. The Soviet Union had tanks
3:38 that German guns couldn't destroy while
3:40 they punched through armor of their own
3:42 like butter. We're talking here about
3:44 first the KV1. This was a heavy tank
3:47 weighing about 47 tons and armed with
3:50 for the time powerful 76 mm gun. Its
3:52 thick frontal armor made it almost
3:55 invulnerable to the 37 and even 50 mm
3:57 guns of the Panza 3. Germans had either
4:00 to call in 88 mm flat guns or to swarm
4:02 and overwhelm a single KV1 in order to
4:04 destroy it effectively. But the real
4:06 nightmare was the T-34 that Germans
4:08 didn't even know existed. With sloped
4:11 armor and a powerful 76 millm gun with
4:13 higher muzzle velocity, then wide tracks
4:15 giving it superior mobility on mud and
4:17 snow and a more reliable diesel engine.
4:18 Everything made it look like it
4:20 outclassed German tanks in almost every
4:23 aspect. German crews were stunned. And
4:24 to make matters worse, the Panzer 3's
4:26 turret ring was too small to mount a
4:28 bigger gun. They hit the limit of
4:30 upgrades with the 50 mm gun. And while
4:32 there were efforts to upgrade it with
4:34 the same caliber but longer L60 gun, it
4:37 still wasn't enough. The tank that was
4:38 supposed to be the core of the German
4:40 armored force was now clearly obsolete.
4:43 So the Germans turned to the Panzer 4.
4:44 Ironically, the tank that had been built
4:46 to support infantry was now the only one
4:48 that could save the day, or at least by
4:50 time for new tanks to arrive because of
4:52 its larger turret ring and more
4:54 adaptable design. That made it possible
4:56 to mount a bigger high velocity gun. And
4:58 that's exactly what they did. In early
5:00 1942, the Panzer 4 model F2 was
5:04 introduced armed with the 7.5 cm KWK40
5:06 L43 gun. This was now a dramatic leap in
5:08 firepower as this gun was capable of
5:11 penetrating the sloped armor of the T-34
5:13 at over 1,000 m range. A year later, it
5:15 was followed by the Model G, which
5:17 somewhat improved protection and had the
5:19 longer L48 gun, giving it even more
5:21 muzzle velocity. So now, the Panzer 4
5:23 took over leading the fight despite
5:25 never even being imagined to fight other
5:27 tanks. Its crews were originally
5:29 considered artillerymen, but everything
5:31 shifted completely, and the Panzer 4
5:33 became the closest thing to what we have
5:35 today as the main battle tank. It fought
5:37 everywhere on every front. It was now
5:38 tasked with fighting tanks, holding
5:40 lines, and acting as the primary armored
5:42 spearhead. The Panza 3 was on its way
5:44 out with its chassis now used for 3
5:46 production, and heavy tanks like the
5:48 Tiger and upcoming Panther were still
5:49 rare and unreliable and would never
5:52 actually manage to replace the Panza 4.
5:53 And while the upgrades had made it more
5:55 capable, it was now being thrown into a
5:57 battlefield that was changing faster
5:59 than it could keep up with. Soviet tank
6:01 factories were running at full speed,
6:03 and what was coming next would make all
6:05 challenges until now laughable. Before
6:07 that, let's first take a quick look at
6:09 the German armor situation at the time.
6:12 By early 1943, the Panzer had become the
6:14 most common and most important tank in
6:16 the German army, and it had changed a
6:18 lot from its humble beginnings. By the
6:19 time the Model H appeared, it had
6:22 thicker bolted on armor of up to 18 mm
6:24 on the front and muchneeded side skirts
6:25 called Schzen added to the hull and
6:27 turret sides. They were meant to defend
6:29 against Soviet anti-tank rifles like the
6:32 PTRD41, which were everywhere and could
6:33 punch through thinner side armor at
6:36 close range. The skirts helped tumble
6:37 armor-piercing rounds so they couldn't
6:39 go through the main armor. However, the
6:41 added armor and heavier gun made the
6:42 tank that wasn't designed for it pushed
6:44 to its limit. Mechanical breakdowns
6:46 became more common, especially in the
6:47 muddy or frozen conditions of the
6:50 Eastern Front. But for now, the Panzer 4
6:51 was still the most reliable and battle
6:53 tested tank in Germany's arsenal.
6:56 Germans had many other things in 1943
6:58 that were arguably better than the Panza
7:00 4, like the Tiger, for example. It could
7:02 destroy any Allied tank from well
7:04 outside return fire range, but Tigers
7:06 were rare and scarce, as each one took
7:08 far more time and resources to build.
7:10 The Panther was intended as a new medium
7:13 tank to replace the Panzer 4 with its
7:16 sloped armor and a long-barreled 75 mm
7:17 gun that was even better than the
7:20 Tiger's 88 at penetrating armor. But the
7:22 Panther had one huge problem. It was
7:24 rushed. The first batch sent to the
7:25 front was plagued with transmission
7:27 failures, engine fires, and breakdowns.
7:28 And at Kursk, many caused more problems
7:30 than actually helping in battle. Then
7:32 there were tank destroyers. Most
7:34 importantly, the Stug 3. Same like
7:35 Panzer 4, originally an assault gun for
7:37 infantry support, it had evolved into a
7:39 highly effective tank destroyer. Low
7:41 silhouette, good gun, and cheap to
7:42 build, while armed with the same
7:44 anti-tank gun as the Panzer 4, it was
7:46 deadly in ambush, but without a turret
7:48 got limited flexibility. All of this
7:50 meant that despite the arrival of
7:51 so-called super tanks and tank
7:53 destroyers like Elephant, Panther, etc.,
7:55 the Panzer Force still remained the only
7:57 dependable workhorse, the tank that
7:59 commanders could actually count on to be
8:01 there, work, and fight. But it was now
8:03 facing a Soviet force that did its own
8:05 share of catching up. T-34s were
8:07 improving and now being pushed out in
8:10 staggering numbers of over 1,000 per
8:12 month at peak of production. It was far
8:13 from perfect. The twoman turret
8:15 overworked the commander who had to
8:17 spot, load, and command at once. Optics
8:19 were inferior to Germans. Ergonomics
8:21 catastrophic, and crew training was
8:23 rushed to say the least. But quantity
8:25 had its own quality. The Soviets could
8:27 afford to lose five tanks for every
8:29 German one and still keep coming. There
8:30 were also growing number of
8:32 self-propelled guns like the bizarre
8:34 SU52, essentially artillery pieces
8:36 mounted on tank chassis with devastating
8:38 high explosive firepower that shattered
8:40 even heaviest German tanks. If you were
8:43 a German tank commander in mid1943, you
8:45 were fighting a war of attrition against
8:47 an army that had more tanks, more
8:49 factories, and more replacements. And on
8:51 top of that, you knew something big was
8:53 coming. Both sides knew that a massive
8:55 showdown was inevitable. The Germans
8:57 were planning operation citadel, a
8:59 colossal offensive aimed at a Soviet-
9:01 held bulge near the city of Kursk. The
9:03 Germans goal was to encircle and destroy
9:05 the Red Army forces in the salient. The
9:06 Soviets, of course, knew it was coming
9:08 and prepared massive layers of defenses,
9:10 minefields, and anti-tank guns. The
9:12 Hitler believed the gamble was worth it
9:14 and that with new tanks, they could
9:16 smash through anyway. And this leads us
9:18 to what is widely referred to as the
9:19 largest and heaviest tank battle in
9:21 history. And in raw numbers, it
9:23 certainly looks like it. Over 6,000
9:25 tanks, two million soldiers, and
9:27 thousands of aircraft were involved. And
9:30 the Panza 4 and its crews were now about
9:31 to be thrown into the bloodiest meat
9:33 grinder of their entire service, the
9:35 battle at Kursk. In the early morning of
9:38 July 5th, 1943, the German army launched
9:40 their last major offensive on the
9:42 Eastern Front. If it worked, Germany
9:44 might regain the initiative. If it
9:46 failed, they would not get another
9:47 chance. The attack came from two
9:49 directions, and leading the southern
9:51 thrust at the tip of the spear were
9:53 Panzer fours. What they were driving
9:54 into was one of the most heavily
9:56 fortified zones in military history. The
9:58 Soviets had known about the attack for
10:00 months. With help from partisan networks
10:02 and intercepted German communications,
10:04 they anticipated every move. They built
10:06 up a layered defense with over a million
10:08 mines, thousands of trenches, anti-tank
10:10 guns, and fortified strong points
10:12 stretching for miles designed to bleed
10:14 out the Germans one step at a time. The
10:16 Panzer Fours moved out, backed by Tigers
10:18 and Panthers. But most of the new
10:19 Panther tanks broke down before they
10:21 could even reach the battlefield. Rushed
10:23 production and teething issues turned
10:25 them almost into dead weight. That left
10:28 the Panza falls once again as the core
10:29 of the offensive. They were advancing
10:31 through open minefields under fire from
10:33 pre-sighted artillery and dug in Soviet
10:35 anti-tank guns. Tanks were getting
10:37 knocked out right, left, and center.
10:38 Those that were not burned out were at
10:40 night towed back by recovery crews,
10:42 patched up, and thrown straight back
10:44 into action, but usually not with the
10:45 original crews because more often than
10:47 not, they were not coming back. This is
10:49 where the number from the title of this
10:51 video becomes disturbingly real. German
10:53 records from Kursk show that the number
10:55 of killed and wounded tank crew members
10:57 actually exceeded the number of crews
10:58 originally assigned to the operation. In
11:00 other words, total crew casualties
11:02 exceeded the unit's initial strength.
11:04 That is because the same tanks were
11:06 reused multiple times during the battle
11:07 with new crews sent in to replace the
11:09 ones who had either died or were lying
11:11 in field hospitals. This meant that a
11:12 tank could go through a couple of crew
11:14 rotations in a matter of days. And these
11:16 replacements were usually young men
11:17 still in their teens, loaded into
11:19 patched up vehicles, many of them barely
11:21 trained, and now replacing veterans who
11:24 had been KIA only hours earlier. A tank
11:26 crewman from the 11th Panza Division
11:27 wrote in his diary, "We didn't even
11:29 learn their names. We just loaded in and
11:31 drove until it was our turn." Meaning,
11:33 they literally did not even get to know
11:35 each other before going into the battle
11:36 and just waited for their turn for their
11:39 tank to burst into flames. The Soviets
11:40 were taking heavy losses, too, with
11:42 entire tank brigades wiped out sometimes
11:44 within a day. But they could afford such
11:47 losses and still win. Waves of T-34s
11:50 just kept coming. The famous clash at
11:52 Procarovka on July 12th saw tanks of
11:54 both sides colliding at point blank
11:56 range with tanks ramming one another,
11:57 firing while burning and soldiers
12:00 fighting on foot among the wreckage. It
12:02 was just chaotic, close, and beyond
12:03 anything either side had ever
12:05 experienced before. Despite their
12:06 disadvantages in numbers, the Panza
12:08 fours fought well with skilled crews.
12:10 They were decimating Soviet tanks, no
12:12 doubt. But the math did not favor them.
12:14 The Soviets could afford to lose five
12:16 tanks for every German one and still
12:18 have more tanks. By the second week of
12:20 July, the German advance had stalled.
12:22 They had failed to break through, and
12:23 Soviet counterattacks were already
12:25 gaining ground. Germany sustained
12:27 irreoverable tank losses during
12:28 Operation Citadel and the
12:29 counteroffensives that followed.
12:31 Thousands of tank crews were dead,
12:33 wounded, or missing. For the Panza 4,
12:35 Kursk was a turning point and the moment
12:36 when the tank's reputation as a
12:38 dependable workhorse began to collapse
12:40 under the weight of unsustainable losses
12:42 in everything from new tanks, spare
12:44 parts, fuel, and of course, crews. For
12:46 them, death actually became a
12:48 statistical certainty. In other words,
12:50 they fought until they weren't no more,
12:51 if you know what I mean. The momentum on
12:53 the Eastern Front now shifted, and
12:55 Germany was never able to take it back.
12:57 The Red Army pushed with new offensives,
12:59 new divisions, new equipment, and while
13:01 the German military was still dangerous,
13:03 it was now reacting, not dictating. From
13:05 this point on, it was a long, grinding
13:07 retreat. But the Panza 4 was still
13:09 trying to hold the line on all fronts.
13:11 By 1944, though, the Panza 4 was
13:14 undoubtedly outclassed. The Soviets had
13:16 the T3485 with a new turret, better
13:19 armor, and a powerful 85 mm gun that
13:20 could knock out a Panza 4 from long
13:24 range. The heavy I2 with a 122mm gun
13:26 didn't need a second shot. In the west,
13:28 M4 Shermans came in waves with growing
13:30 numbers of bazookas, anti-tank guns, and
13:32 especially fighter bombers, which made
13:34 any open movement not great for tankers
13:36 health. And speaking of them, the crews
13:38 had changed, too. In the early years,
13:40 Panzer crews were some of the best
13:42 trained, often veterans with hundreds of
13:44 hours in drills, field exercises, and
13:45 combat. But by late war, they were
13:47 mostly teenagers pulled from training
13:48 schools, given a few weeks of
13:50 instruction, and sent to the front. Some
13:52 had never even fired the gun before
13:54 combat or were put in semi-operational
13:56 tanks without radios and barely any fuel
13:59 and ammo. They were sent into senseless,
14:01 futile one-way missions until the final
14:03 end of the bloodiest global war. While
14:05 the Panzer 4 was never the most
14:07 powerful, never the fastest or the most
14:09 feared. It was everywhere. And by the
14:11 end, it had seen everything. It adapted,
14:13 it evolved, and it held the line until
14:15 there was no line left to hold. No tank
14:17 in the German arsenal saw more action,
14:19 fought in more places, or buried more
14:21 crews than the Panza 4. And maybe that's
14:23 the legacy worth remembering. A few even
14:25 continued fighting after the war, with
14:27 captured units being used by countries
14:29 like Syria into the 1960s, fighting
14:31 Israeli Shermans in the Golden Heights.
14:33 But by then, they were little more than
14:35 relics of a war that had long since passed.
