0:01 It was the largest air assault of the
0:03 entire Vietnam War and one where the
0:05 most helicopters were shot down. The
0:07 operation was a gamble from the very
0:09 beginning and it would just go sideways
0:11 almost immediately. However, helicopter
0:13 crews and especially their door gunners
0:15 would show just how brave they could be,
0:17 risking their lives over and over again
0:21 to help their comrades. In early 1971,
0:23 American commanders launched Operation
0:26 Lamson 719, a bold attempt to strike
0:28 deep into Laos. The mission was to hit a
0:30 key enemy supply hub near the village of
0:32 Chapon and sever the Ho Chi Min Trail,
0:34 the lifeline the North Vietnamese used
0:36 to move troops and weapons into the
0:38 south. That trail ran through the jungle
0:40 covered mountains of Laos, and
0:41 Washington wanted it shut down once and
0:44 for all. But there was a catch. Just a
0:46 month earlier, Congress had passed a law
0:48 banning American ground forces from
0:50 stepping outside of South Vietnam. So,
0:51 this operation had to rely entirely on
0:53 South Vietnamese troops to do the ground
0:55 fighting while American forces would
0:57 provide the air support.
0:59 That meant the ARVN, short for the Army
1:01 of the Republic of Vietnam, would be
1:03 alone on the ground for the first time.
1:05 It was the first real test of whether
1:07 they could carry the war themselves. And
1:09 to pull it off, the US committed almost
1:11 everything it had in the air. Nearly
1:12 every bird in Vietnam was assigned to
1:15 this single assault. transport choppers,
1:17 gunships, medevacs, all of them were
1:18 flying into Laos to support the
1:20 operation. And on them were the men with
1:22 a crucial task, dangling from the sides
1:24 of helicopters and giving their absolute
1:27 best to help their allies on the ground.
1:28 Door gunners would play a major role
1:30 here and also be the only thing
1:32 preventing just complete obliteration of
1:34 helicopters. To get a better picture,
1:36 helicopters didn't have any armor, and
1:37 you could literally punch the aluminum
1:40 skin and dent it. So, there was no
1:41 protection from the fire. And to make
1:43 matters worse, they were about to
1:44 encounter the heaviest anti-aircraft
1:47 fire of the entire war in Southeast
1:49 Asia. The plan for the operation was to
1:51 send South Vietnamese armored units
1:53 racing down Highway 9 toward Chapon
1:56 while US helicopters inserted ARVN
1:58 infantry around the highway to cut off
2:00 enemy reinforcements and destroy supply
2:03 caches. Over 12,000 South Vietnamese
2:05 soldiers crossed the border. For many of
2:07 them, this was their first time flying,
2:09 but also their first time fighting.
2:11 However, no one knew that very soon
2:13 around 60,000 North Vietnamese troops
2:15 would gather to stop them and that they
2:17 were already well aware of the upcoming
2:19 attack. They had plenty of time to dig
2:21 in, lay out ambush zones, and prepare
2:23 anti-aircraft defenses. They would even
2:25 have tanks, which was also not taken
2:28 into significant consideration. American
2:29 intelligence also wrongfully assumed
2:31 that the enemy reinforcements would take
2:33 14 days to arrive marching, but they
2:36 were much closer, much faster, and in
2:38 much greater number. From the very
2:39 beginning of the mission, the problems
2:41 began to stack up fast. First thing was
2:44 the language barrier between US and ARVN
2:46 forces. They had their interpreters, but
2:48 once the actual battle began,
2:50 communication simply became chaotic
2:51 through translation going back and
2:53 forth. The armored column barely made it
2:55 halfway to Chapone before getting bogged
2:57 down by heavy fire and the mission began
2:59 going sideways very fast. That's when
3:01 high command made a bit of a desperate
3:03 attempt to solve the situation. They
3:05 decided to insert troops by helicopters
3:06 directly into three forward landing
3:09 zones called Lolo, Liz, and Sophia to
3:11 outflank the enemy and jumpst start the
3:12 stalled advance. But when the
3:14 helicopters approached the LZ's, they
3:16 could see hundreds and hundreds of
3:18 camouflaged enemy soldiers moving
3:20 through the trees like a living carpet.
3:21 No one could have even imagined that
3:24 they would be there in such number. They
3:26 opened fire on the helicopters with
3:27 everything they had, and they had a lot
3:30 of it. From AKs, heavy machine guns up
3:33 to Soviet supplied 37 mm anti-aircraft
3:35 cannons, helicopters were now flying
3:37 directly into a storm of fire to insert
3:39 South Vietnamese troops. Within minutes,
3:42 multiple helicopters were shot down. The
3:43 rest could just desperately watch other
3:45 birds going down and hear surviving
3:47 crews radioing for help, but they
3:48 couldn't do anything at that point. The
3:50 gunships that weren't hit were circling
3:53 above crash sites, and door gunners laid
3:54 fire to protect surviving crews from
3:57 being overrun. They did that until they
3:59 were either shot down themselves or ran
4:01 out of fuel or ammo. Many of the
4:03 helicopters that could still fly even
4:05 with wounded crew returned to Kesan
4:07 base, refueled, rearmed, and went back
4:09 to try to rescue crews of downed
4:12 helicopters. As the operation began, and
4:13 although initially gaining some
4:15 momentum, somewhat surprising the North
4:16 Vietnamese on the ground, they quickly
4:18 reorganized and counterattacked in what
4:20 was described by veterans as one of the
4:22 most successful counterattacks in
4:24 history. The ARVN and their American air
4:26 support, on the other hand, were about
4:28 to suffer tremendously.
4:30 Helicopters were frantically going from
4:31 mission to mission, back to back, flying
4:34 fire support, medevacs, extracting and
4:36 inserting troops. Landing zones were
4:38 just a complete chaos, surrounded by the
4:39 enemy that fired at helicopters
4:41 attempting to touch down. And in the
4:43 middle of all that chaos, there were
4:45 door gunners. They were the only form of
4:47 protection helicopters had, and they sat
4:49 at the most exposed position in the open
4:51 sides with only air between them and the
4:53 enemy. No matter what would happen, they
4:55 must not stop firing or else they would
4:57 all be dead. So before we go any
4:59 further, we need to talk about them and
5:01 what made what they were doing almost
5:03 insane. First thing to keep in mind is
5:05 that, as we said, they were flying into
5:07 hot landing zones under fire in aircraft
5:09 that couldn't take a hit. When you
5:10 consider this, you'd understand why
5:12 almost half of all helicopters deployed
5:14 during the Vietnam War crashed. And add
5:16 to it that those birds were flown by
5:18 young, often hastily trained pilots,
5:20 many of whom were actually learning
5:22 under live fire. Then on top of all
5:24 that, add not so reliable early
5:25 helicopters operating in extreme heat
5:27 and humidity with a whole lot of angry
5:29 North Vietnamese. So after the
5:31 assumption that helicopter speed would
5:32 be enough to protect them from ground
5:34 fire was shattered, crews tried to find
5:37 some form of protection. A typical UH1
5:39 Huey that characterized the war had a
5:41 pilot, co-pilot, and a crew chief. and
5:43 that crew chief was the first one to
5:45 start hanging out of the side door with
5:47 an M60 machine gun strapped in with a
5:49 harness or bungee cord and try to put
5:51 down covering fire during landings. They
5:53 soon realized one gun on one side wasn't
5:55 enough. So, they added a fourth man, now
5:58 a designated door gunner. But that role
5:59 quickly grew and the door gunner became
6:01 a full member of the crew, participating
6:03 in all activities needed for a
6:04 helicopter to be effective in combat
6:07 missions. As the role evolved, so did
6:09 the weapons. What started as a single
6:11 M60 soon turned into full-on direct air
6:14 support. Door gunners began using pintal
6:16 mounted machine guns or twin M60s which
6:17 were modified specifically for this
6:19 purpose with a higher rate of fire,
6:21 modified trigger mechanisms, and thicker
6:23 barrels. Soon came experimental
6:25 variations with 50 caliber machine guns,
6:27 grenade launchers, and miniguns. The
6:29 concept immediately proved effective,
6:30 and the Huey got a new role as an
6:33 improvised gunship. Some got rocket pods
6:34 mounted and carried more weapons and
6:37 ammo. From there, the design kept going,
6:38 eventually leading to the creation of
6:41 the AH1 Cobra, the first true dedicated
6:43 attack helicopter. And we could freely
6:45 say that it wouldn't exist without the
6:47 evolution of door gunners. However, the
6:49 door gunner job came with a heavy cost.
6:51 They logically had the highest casualty
6:53 rate among the crew. Although the whole
6:54 helicopter wasn't armored, the rest of
6:56 the crew at least had something in
6:58 between them and enemy fire. There is
7:00 also the factor that door gunners were
7:02 feared by the enemy, so snipers would
7:04 shoot them first. They wore flack
7:05 jackets and chest ceramic plates that
7:08 could stop AK rounds, infamously called
7:10 chicken plates. But they were bulky and
7:12 hot, and a lot of guys chose not to wear
7:14 them because they needed to move fast.
7:16 They had their helmet with intercom for
7:17 coordination with the rest of the crew
7:19 to help pilots guide them during
7:21 landings in tight LZs and to help with
7:23 loading and unloading the cargo or
7:25 wounded. Their most important moment was
7:27 during landings and takeoffs from hot
7:29 landing zones. The North Vietnamese had
7:31 learned to predict where Americans might
7:32 land and turned those areas into
7:35 ambushes for helicopters. To insert
7:37 troops, the helicopter had to hover and
7:39 touch down, at which point it was a
7:41 sitting duck for enemy fire. During the
7:43 approach and takeoff, the door gunners
7:45 would reign continuous fire to suppress
7:46 the enemy, and by time for the airborne
7:48 infantry to mount down and take cover,
7:50 and also for themselves to not get shot
7:52 down, preferably. But they were also
7:54 quite useful in hunter killer missions,
7:56 erasing enemy caught in the open and
7:58 supporting ground units in trouble with
8:00 accurate fire. They had to be very good
8:02 shooters because they were firing from a
8:04 moving and vibrating platform at a
8:06 moving target on the ground. So they'd
8:07 have to make all sorts of adjustments to
8:09 their fire to hit what they wanted. They
8:11 would always aim ahead or behind their
8:13 intended target. So volume of fire was
8:16 required for them to be effective. Now
8:19 going back to operation Lamsson, that
8:21 region in Laos was so critical to the
8:22 war that the US had been bombing it for
8:24 years with more explosives per square
8:26 mile than any other country in history.
8:29 That's not an exaggeration. Thousands of
8:31 sorties by B-52 bombers had torn apart
8:33 the Ho Chi Min Trail, but it somehow was
8:36 still in function. So this time the goal
8:38 was to once and for all cut the artery
8:40 and walk away with a win. Operation
8:42 began with an overwhelming display of
8:44 American air and artillery power. Then
8:47 came the main force of ARVN troops. Many
8:48 of them young, undertrained,
8:50 inexperienced, and barely prepared for a
8:52 fight of this scale. And right from the
8:55 start, things went wrong. First thing
8:57 was the terrain, where visibility was
8:59 almost zero, and the enemy knew it
9:01 intimately. The NVA had been operating
9:03 there for years. And more importantly,
9:05 they saw the attack coming. So by the
9:06 time the first helicopters crossed the
9:08 border, they were already dug in with
9:11 heavy weapons. Now, as the battle kicked
9:13 off, the only way to move ARVN troops,
9:15 supplies, and wounded through that
9:17 jungle was by helicopter. For days,
9:19 there were dozens of insertions,
9:21 extractions, resupply missions, and
9:23 medevacs. And every single one of those
9:25 was just a nightmare for helicopter
9:26 crews flying through clouds of
9:29 anti-aircraft fire. Helicopters were
9:31 being shot down at a massive rate, and
9:34 losses were piling up fast. At LZ Lolo,
9:36 for example, over half the helicopters
9:38 were shot down during a single insertion
9:40 attempt. Some were destroyed midair,
9:42 while others crash landed and their
9:44 crews were either killed or captured.
9:46 Some veterans recounted helicopters
9:48 falling in flames while their gunners
9:49 were still firing at the enemy even in
9:52 their final seconds. Despite these
9:54 losses, helicopter crews continued
9:56 flying missions non-stop. Most of the
9:58 flights were launched from Kesan Combat
9:59 Base just across the border in South
10:02 Vietnam over the course of a month. The
10:04 South Vietnamese were desperately trying
10:05 to push their armor and infantry
10:07 through, but the trails were already
10:10 presited for ambushes. Soon, fire bases
10:11 along the flanks of the main route 9
10:13 push started getting attacked with some
10:15 of them being overrun and hundreds of
10:17 South Vietnamese killed, captured, or
10:19 missing. Meanwhile, helicopters were
10:21 non-stop frantically flying mission
10:23 after mission with their door gunners
10:25 trying to protect their allies on the
10:27 ground as best as they could. In the
10:29 first two weeks alone, over 100
10:30 helicopters were shot down with more
10:33 than 600 heavily damaged. But they just
10:35 had to keep flying. Even after capturing
10:37 Chapone, the operation was running on
10:39 fumes. It turned out it had little
10:41 strategic value by that point. While the
10:43 ARVN's main advance had stalled and the
10:46 flanks were being overrun. By the second
10:47 week of March, the South Vietnamese
10:49 began retreating, and the withdrawal
10:52 quickly turned into a nightmare. The NVA
10:53 launched even more attacks on the
10:55 convoys, blocking roads with tanks and
10:57 pounding the retreating columns with
10:59 artillery. One ARVN commander even had
11:01 to abandon Route 9 entirely and bulldoze
11:03 a new path through the jungle to escape
11:06 across the Sepon River. All while US air
11:08 power provided frantic cover overhead.
11:10 And even though the US declared the
11:12 operation a victory, pointing to the
11:14 temporary capture of Chapone and some
11:16 enemy casualties, the cost was
11:18 staggering. The ARVN suffered nearly 50%
11:20 casualties with thousands killed,
11:24 wounded, or missing. The US lost 253 men
11:26 along with six fighter bombers and at
11:28 least 117 helicopters shot down. Some
11:30 historians described the result as the
11:32 near decimation of America's helicopter
11:35 fleet in Vietnam. The Ho Chi Min trail
11:37 was not cut. The enemy's supply lines
11:39 were barely disrupted, but the door
11:40 gunners in this mission proved their
11:42 worth once again as outright savage
11:44 fighters who gave their lives for the others.
