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العدالة (جامعة هارفرد) المحاضرة 18: ما هو الهدف؟

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Summary

Core Theme

The discussion explores the philosophical underpinnings of affirmative action, questioning whether distributive justice (like college admissions) should be based on moral desert or serve a broader social purpose, and introduces Aristotle's teleological approach to justice as a counterpoint to modern theories.

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when we ended last time we were

considering arguments for and against

affirmative action counting races of

factor in admissions and in the course

of the discussion three arguments

emerged three arguments for affirmative

action one of them was the idea that

race and ethnic background should count

as a way of correcting for the true

meaning of test scores and grades

getting a more accurate measure of the

academic potential

those scores those numbers represent

second was what we called the

compensatory argument the idea of

writing past wrongs past injustice and

the third was the diversity argument and

when Cheryl Hopwood in the 1990s

challenged the University of Texas law

schools affirmative action program in

the federal courts the University of

Texas made another version of the

diversity argument saying that the

broader social purpose the social

mission of the University of Texas law

school is to produce leaders in the

legal community in the political

community among judges lawyers

legislators and therefore it's important

that we produce leaders who reflect the

background and the experience and the

ethnic and the racial composition of the

state of Texas it's important for our

serving our wider social mission that

was the University of Texas law schools

argument and then we considered

an objection to the diversity argument

which after all is an argument in the

name of the social mission the common

good we saw that Rawls does not simply

believe that arguments of the common

good or the general welfare should

prevail if individual rights must be

violated in the course of promoting the

common good you remember that was the

question the challenge to the diversity

rationale that we were considering when

we finished last time and we began to

discuss the question well what right

might be at stake may be the right to be

considered according to factors within

one's control maybe this is the argument

that Cheryl Hopwood implicitly was

making she can't help the fact that

she's white why should her chance at

getting into law school depend on a

factor she can't control and then Hannah

who was advancing an argument last time

said Harvard has the right to define its

mission any way it wants to it's a

private institution and it's only once

Harvard defines its mission that we can

identify the qualities that count

so no rights are being violated now what

about that argument what I would like to

do is to hear objections to that reply

and then see whether others have an

answer yes and tell us your name da da

right you spoke up last time all right

how do you answer that argument well I

think I was two things in there one of

them was that a private institution to

define its mission however it once but

then that doesn't make however it defy

it right like I couldn't find my

personal mission as I want to collect

all the money in the world but does that

make it even a good mission so you can't

like you can't say that just because a

college is a private institution it

could just define it whatever once is we

still have to think about whatever the

way it's defining it it's right and in

the case of affirmative action a lot of

people have said that since there's a

lot of other factors involved we could

why not race like if we already know

that this is I want to stick with your

first point yeah

here's das objection can a college or

university define its social purpose any

way it wants to and then define

admissions criteria accordingly what

about the University of Texas law school

not today but in the 1950s then there

was another Supreme Court case against

the admissions policy of the University

of Texas law school because it was

segregated it only admitted whites and

when the case went to court back in the

50s the University of Texas law school

also invoked its mission our mission as

a law school is to educate lawyers for

the Texas bar for Texas law firms and no

Texas law firm hires african-americans

so to fulfill our mission we only admit

whites or consider Harvard in the 1930s

when it had anti-jewish quotas president

Lowell president of Harvard in the 1930s

said that he had nothing personally

against Jews but he invoked the mission

the social purpose of Harvard he said

which is not only to Train intellectuals

part of the mission of Harvard he said

is to train stockbrokers for walls

presidents and Senators and there are

very few Jews who go into those

professions now here's the challenge is

there a principle distinction between

the invocation of the social purpose of

the college or university today in the

diversity rationale and the invocation

of the social purpose or mission of the

university by Texas in the 1950s or

Harvard in the 1930s is there a

difference in principle

what's the reply Hannah well I think

that's the principle that's different

here is basically the distinction

between inclusion versus exclusion I

think that it's morally wrong of the

university to say we're going to exclude

you on the basis of your religion or

your race that's denial on the basis of

arbitrary factors what Harvard is trying

to do today with its diversity

initiatives is to include groups that

were excluded in the past good let's see

if stay there let's see if someone would

like to reply go ahead as actually this

was kind of in support of Hannah rather

than a reply but so I was gonna say

another principal difference can be

based on malice being the just or the

motivation I guess for the historical

segregation act so it's saying that

we're not going to let blacks or Jews in

because they're worse as few people are

as a group good so the element of malice

isn't present and what's your name

Stevie Stevie says that in the in the

historic segregationist racist

anti-semitic quotas or prohibitions

there was built into them a certain kind

of malice a certain kind of judgment

that african-americans or Jews were

somehow less worthy than everybody else

whereas present-day affirmative action

programs don't involve or imply any such judgment

judgment

when it amounts to saying is so long as

a policy just uses people in a way as

valuable to the social purpose of the institution

institution

it's okay provided it doesn't judge them

maliciously as Steve Eve might add as

intrinsically less worthy I'd like to

raise a question

doesn't that concede that all of us when

we compete for positions or for seats in

colleges and universities in a way are

being used not judged but used in a way

that it has nothing to do with moral

desert remember we got into this whole

discussion of affirmative action when we

were trying to figure out whether

distributive justice should be tied to

moral desert or not and we were launched

on that question by Rawls and his denial

his rejection of the idea the

distributive justice whether its

positions or places in the class or

income and wealth is it is a matter of

moral desert suppose that were the moral

what letters would they have to write to

people they rejected or accepted for

that matter

wouldn't they have to write something

like this you're unsuccessful applicant

we regret to inform you that your

application for admission has been

rejected it's not your fault that when

you came along society happened not to

need the qualities you had to offer

those admitted instead of you or not

themselves deserving of a place nor

worthy of praise for the factors that

led to their admission we are in any

case only using them and you as

instruments of a wider social purpose

better luck next time what was the

letter you actually got when you were

admitted perhaps it should have read

something like this

dear successful applicant we are pleased

to inform you that your application for

admission has been accepted it turns out

lucky for you that you have the traits

that society needs at the moment so we

propose to exploit your assets for

society's advantage you are to be

congratulated not in the sense that you

deserve credit for having the qualities

to let your admission but only in the

sense that the winner of a lottery is to

be congratulated and if you choose to

accept our offer you will ultimately be

entitled to the benefits that attach to

being used in this way we look forward

to seeing you in the fall now there is

something a little odd morally odd if

it's true that those letters do reflect

the theory the philosophy underlying the

policy so here's the question they posed

and it's a question that takes us back

to a big issue in in political

philosophy is it possible and is it

desirable to detach questions of

distributive justice from questions of

moral desert and questions of virtue in

many ways this is an issue that

separates modern political philosophy

from ancient political thought

what's at stake in the question of

whether we can put desert moral desert

aside it seemed when we were reading

Rawls that the incentive the reason he

had for detaching distributive justice

from moral desert was an egalitarian one

that if we set desert to one side

there's greater scope for the exercise

of egalitarian considerations the veil

of ignorance the two principles the

difference principle

helping the least well-off

redistribution and all that but what's

interesting is if you look at a range of

thinkers we've been considering there

does seem to be a reason they want to

detach justice from desert that goes

libertarian rights oriented theorists as

a kind we've been studying as well as

egalitarian rights oriented theorists

including Rawls and for that matter also

including can't all agree

despite their disagreements over

distributive justice and the welfare

state and all of that they all agree

that justice is not a matter of

rewarding or honouring virtue or more

moral desert now why do they all think

that it can't just be for egalitarian

reasons not all of them argue 'let

areum's this gets us to the big

philosophical question we have to try to

sort out some how they think

is going to lead away from freedom from

respect for persons as free beings well

in order to see what they consider to be

at stake and in order to assess their

shared assumption we need to turn to a

thinker to a philosopher

who disagrees with them who explicitly

ties justice to honor

honoring virtue and merit and moral

desert and that thinker is Aristotle now

in many ways Aristotle's idea of justice

is intuitively very powerful in some

ways it's strange I want to bring out

both its power its possibility and its

strangeness so that we can see what's at

stake in this whole debate about justice

and whether it's tied to dessert and

virtue so what is Aristotle's answer the

question about justice for Aristotle

justice is a matter of giving people

what they deserve giving people their

due it's a matter of figuring out the

proper fit between persons with their

virtues and their appropriate social

roles well what does this picture of

justice look like and how does it differ

from the conception that seems to be

shared among libertarian and egalitarian

rights oriented theorists alike justice

means giving each person his or her due

giving people what they deserve but what

is a person's do what are the relevant

grounds of merit or dessert Aristotle

says that depends on the sort of things

being distributed justice involves two

factors things and the persons to whom

the things are assigned in general we

say Aristotle writes that persons who

are equal should have equal things

assigned to them but here there arises a

hard question equals in what respects

Aristotle says that depends and the sort

of thing we're distributing

suppose we're distributing flutes what

is the relevant merit or basis of

dessert for flutes who should get the

best ones

what's Aristotle's answer anyone the

best the best flute players right those

who are best in the relevant sense the

best flute players is it just to

discriminate in allocating fluids yes

all justice involves discrimination

Aristotle says what matters is that the

discrimination be according to the

relevant excellence according to the

virtue appropriate to having flutes he

says it would be unjust to discriminate

on some other basis in giving out the

flutes say wealth just giving the best

flutes to the people who can pay the

highest price or nobility of birth just

giving flutes to aristocrats or physical

beauty giving the best flutes to the

Aristotle says birth and beauty may be

greater Goods than the ability to play

the flute and those who possess them may

surpass the flute player more in these

qualities than he surpasses them in his

flute claim but the fact remains that he

is the person who ought to get the best

fluid it's a strange idea this

comparison by the way that I mean could

you say am i more handsome than she is a

good lacrosse player it's a strange kind

of comparison but putting that aside

Aristotle says we're not looking for the

best overall whatever that might mean

we're looking for the best musician now

why this is important to see why should

the best flutes go to the best flute players

well why do you think anybody what

they'll produce the best music well and

everybody will enjoy it more

that's not Aristotle's answer Aristotle

is not a utilitarian he's not just

saying that way but there will be better

music and everyone will enjoy it

everyone will be better off his answer

is the best flutes should go to the best

flute players because that's what flutes

are for to be played well the purpose of

flute playing the purpose is to produce

excellent music and those who can best

perfect that purpose ought properly to

have the best ones now it may also be

true as a welcome side effect that

everyone will enjoy listening to that

music so that answer is true enough as

far as it goes but it's important to see

that Aristotle's reason is not a

utilitarian reason it's a reason that

looks here's where you might think it's

a little bit strange it looks to the

purpose the point the goal of flute

playing another way of describing this

looking to the goal to determine what

the just allocation the Greek for goal

or end was Tilos so Aristotle says you

have to consider the point the end the

goal the Telos of the thing in this case

of flute playing and that's how you

define a just allocation a just

discrimination so this idea of reasoning

from the goal from the Telos is called

teleological reasoning teleological

moral reasoning and that's Aristotle's

way reasoning from the goal from the end

now this may seem as I said a strange

idea that we're supposed to reason from

the purpose but it is does have a

certain intuitive plausibility consider

the allocation let's say at Harvard of

the best tennis courts or squash courts

how should they be allocated who should

have priority in playing on the on the

best courts well you might say those who

can best afford them set up a fee system

charge money for them Aristotle would

say no you might say well Harvard

bigshots the most influential people at

Harvard who would they be the senior

faculty should have priority in playing

on the best tennis courts no Aristotle

would reject that some scientists may be

a greater scientist than some varsity

tennis player is a tennis player but

still the tennis player is the one who

should have priority for the best

playing in the best tennis court there

is a certain intuitive plausibility to

this idea now one of the things that

makes it strange

is it an Aristotle's world in the

ancient world it wasn't only social

practices that were governed in

Aristotle's view by teleological

reasoning and teleological explanation

all of nature was understood to be a

meaningful order and what it meant to

understand nature to grasp nature to

find our place of the nature was to

inquire into and read out the purposes

or the key laws of nature and with the

advent of modern science it's been

difficult to think of the world that way

and so it makes it harder perhaps to

think of Justice in a teleological way

but there is a certain

naturalness to thinking about even the

natural world as teleologically ordered

as a purpose of whole in fact children

have to be educated out of this way of

looking at the world I realized this

when my kids were very young and I was

reading them a book Winnie the Pooh and

we need the Pooh gives you a great idea

of how there is a certain natural

childlike way of looking at the world in

a teleological way you remit you may

remember a story of Winnie the Pooh

walking in the forest one day he came to

a place in the forest and from the top

of a tree there came a loud buzzing

noise we need the Pooh sat at the foot

of the tree put his head between his

paws and began to think here's what he

said to himself that buzzing noise means

something you don't get a buzzing noise

like that just buzzing and buzzing

without its meaning something if there's

a buzzing noise somebody's making a

buzzing noise and the only reason for

making a buzzing noise that I know of is

because you're a bee then he thought for

another long time and said and the only

reason for being a bee that I know of is

making honey and then he got up and he

said and the only reason for making

honey is so I can eat it so he began to

climb the tree this is an example of

it isn't it isn't so implausible after

all now we grew up and we're talked out

of this way of thinking about the world

but here's the question

even if teleological explanations don't

fit with modern science even if we've

outgrown them in understanding nature

isn't there something still intuitively

and morally plausible even powerful

about Aristotle's idea that the only way

to think about justice is to reason from

the purpose the goal the Telos of the

social practice and isn't that precisely

what we were doing when we were

disagreeing about affirmative action you

could almost recast that disagreement as

one about what the proper appropriate

purpose or end of a university education

consists in reasoning from the purpose

or from the Telos or from the end

Aristotle says that's indispensable to

thinking about justice is he right think

about that question as you turn to

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คำบรรยาย YouTube:العدالة (جامعة هارفرد) المحاضرة 18: ما هو الهدف؟