0:18 we ended last time with that remarkable
0:23 pole you remember the poll about birth order
0:32 what percentage of people in this room
0:37 raised their hands was it to say that
0:47 they were the firstborn 75 80 % and what
0:48 was the significance of that if you're
0:50 thinking about these theories of
0:56 distributive justice remember we were
1:00 discussing three different theories of
1:03 distributive justice three different
1:04 ways of answering the question how
1:06 should income and wealth and
1:09 opportunities and the good things in
1:12 life be distributed and so far we've
1:15 looked at the libertarian answer that
1:17 says the just system of distribution
1:20 it's a system of free exchange of
1:23 free-market economy against a background
1:28 of formal equality which simply means
1:33 that jobs and careers are open to anyone
1:35 Rawls says this represents an
1:39 improvement over aristocratic and caste
1:43 systems because everyone can compete for
1:46 every job careers open to talents and
1:48 beyond that the just distribution is the
1:52 one that results from free exchange
1:56 voluntary transactions no more no less
2:02 then Wells argues if all you have is
2:11 the result is not going to be fair it
2:13 will be biased in favor
2:16 of those who happen to be born to
2:19 affluent families who happen to have the
2:21 benefit of good educational
2:25 opportunities and that accident of birth
2:30 is not a just basis for distributing
2:37 life chances and so many people who
2:43 notice this unfairness Rawls argues have
2:47 led to embrace a system of fair equality
2:52 of opportunity that leads to the
2:56 meritocratic system fair equality of
3:01 opportunity but Wall says even if you
3:02 bring everyone to the same starting
3:07 point in the race what's going to happen
3:12 who's going to win the fastest runners
3:15 so once you're troubled by basing
3:18 distributive shares on morally arbitrary
3:23 contingencies you should if you reason
3:26 it through he carried all the way to
3:29 what was calls the Democratic conception
3:32 a more egalitarian conception of
3:36 distributive justice that he defines by
3:38 the difference principle now he doesn't
3:44 say that the only way to remedy or to
3:46 compensate for differences in natural
3:50 talents and abilities is to have a kind
3:53 of leveling equality a guaranteed
3:57 equality of outcome but he does say
3:59 there's another way to deal with these
4:04 contingencies people may gain may
4:07 benefit from their good fortune but only
4:10 on terms that work to the advantage of
4:15 the least well-off and so we can test
4:17 how this theory actually works by
4:19 thinking about some pay differentials
4:25 that arise in our society what does the
4:27 average school teacher make
4:30 in the united states do you suppose
4:37 roughly it's a little more 40 40 mm what
4:39 about David Letterman how much do you
4:42 think David Letterman makes more than a
4:50 schoolteacher 31 million dollars David
4:53 Letterman is that fair the David
4:56 Letterman makes that much more than a schoolteacher
4:56 schoolteacher
5:00 well Rawls's answer would be it depends
5:03 whether the basic structure of society
5:06 is designed in such a way that
5:08 Letterman's 31 million dollars is
5:10 subject to taxation so that some of
5:15 those earnings are taken to work for the
5:18 advantage of the least well-off one
5:22 other example of a pay differential a
5:24 Justice of the United States Supreme
5:32 Court what do they make it's it's just
5:34 under two hundred thousand dollars
5:38 here's Sandra Day O'Connor for example
5:44 there she is but there's another judge
5:46 who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor
5:53 do you know who it is Judge Judy how did
5:58 you know that you watch no but you hurt
6:00 your right Judge Judy you know how much
6:07 she makes there she is 25
6:15 25 million dollars now is that just is
6:21 it fair well the answer is it depends
6:24 whether this is against a background
6:27 system in line with the difference
6:30 principle where those who come out on
6:32 top in terms of her income and wealth
6:36 are taxed in a way that benefits the
6:39 least well-off members of society now
6:44 we're going to come back to these wage
6:48 differentials pay differentials between
6:52 a real judge and a TV judge the one
6:56 Marcus watches all the time what I want
6:59 to do now is return to these theories
7:09 and to examine the objections to Rawls's
7:13 more egalitarian theory the difference
7:16 principle there are at least three
7:20 objections to Rawls's difference
7:26 principle one of them came up last time
7:28 in the discussion and a number of you
7:29 raised this worry
7:33 what about incentives isn't there the
7:37 risk if taxes reach 70 80 90 percent
7:41 marginal rate that Michael Jordan won't
7:47 play basketball the data David Letterman
7:54 won't do late night comedy or that CEOs
7:59 will go into some other line of work now
8:02 who among those who are defenders of
8:07 Rawls who has an answer to this
8:14 yes go ahead
8:19 stand up Rawls's idea is that
8:20 there should only be so much difference
8:23 that it helps the least well-off the
8:27 most so if there's too much equality
8:29 then the least well-off might not be
8:31 able to watch late-night TV or might not
8:33 have a job because their CEO doesn't
8:36 want to work so you need to find the
8:39 correct balance where taxation still
8:41 leaves enough incentive for the least
8:43 well-off to benefit from the talents
8:45 good and what's your name
8:48 Tim Tim all right so Tim is saying in
8:50 effect that Rawls's takes account of
8:53 incentives and could allow for pay
8:57 differentials and for some adjustment in
8:59 the tax rate to take account of
9:04 incentives but Tim points out the
9:08 standpoint from which the question of
9:11 incentives needs to be considered is not
9:13 the effect on the total size of the
9:16 economic pie but instead from the
9:19 standpoint of the effect of incentives
9:22 or disincentives on the well-being of
9:27 those at the bottom right good thank you
9:29 I think that is what Rawls would say in
9:35 fact if you look in Section 17 where he
9:41 describes the difference principle he
9:46 allows for incentives the naturally
9:49 advantaged are not to gain merely
9:51 because they are more gifted but only to
9:53 cover the cost of training and education
9:56 and for using their endowments in ways
9:59 that help the less fortunate as well so
10:01 you can have incentives you can adjust
10:05 the tax rate if taking too much from
10:07 David Letterman or from Michael Jordan
10:12 or from Bill Gates winds up actually
10:14 hurting those at the bottom that's the test
10:21 so incentives
10:23 that's not a decisive objection against
10:27 Rawls's difference principle but there
10:30 are two weightier more difficult
10:40 objections one of them comes from
10:44 defenders of a meritocratic conception
10:47 the argument that says what about effort
10:52 what about people working hard having a
10:55 right to what they earn because they've
10:57 deserved it they worked hard for it
11:01 that's the objection from effort and
11:05 moral desert then there's this another
11:10 objection that comes from libertarians
11:16 and this objection has to do with
11:25 doesn't the difference principle by
11:28 treating our natural talents and
11:32 endowments has common assets doesn't
11:35 that violate the idea that we own
11:42 ourselves now let me deal first with the
11:44 objection that comes from the
11:48 libertarian direction Milton Friedman
11:52 writes in his book free to choose life
11:55 is not fair and it's tempting to believe
11:59 that government can rectify what nature
12:06 has spawned but his answer is the only
12:09 way to try to rectify that is to have a
12:13 leveling equality of outcome everyone
12:16 finishing the race at the same point and
12:22 that would be a disaster this is an easy
12:26 argument to answer and Rawls
12:32 addresses it in one of the most powerful
12:35 passages I think of a theory of justice
12:39 it's in section 17 the natural
12:42 distribution and here he's talking about
12:44 the natural distribution of talents and
12:47 endowment is neither just nor unjust
12:50 nor is it unjust that persons are born
12:52 into society at some particular position
12:54 these are simply natural facts what is
12:56 just and unjust is the way that
13:00 institutions deal with these facts
13:05 that's his answer to libertarian less a
13:07 fair economists like Milton Friedman who
13:12 say life is unfair but get over it get
13:14 over it and let's see if we can at least
13:18 maximize the benefits that flow from it
13:20 but the more powerful libertarian
13:23 objection to Rawls is not libertarian
13:25 from the libertarian economists like
13:29 Milton Friedman it's from the argument
13:32 about self ownership developed as we saw
13:39 in Nozick and from that point of view
13:42 yes it might be a good thing to create
13:46 headstart programs and public schools so
13:47 that everyone can go to a decent school
13:50 and start the race at the same starting
13:54 line that might be good but if you tax
13:57 people to it to create public schools if
14:02 you tax people against their will you
14:06 coerce them it's a form of theft if you
14:11 take some of Letterman's 31 million tax
14:13 it away to support public schools
14:17 against his will the state is really
14:21 doing no better than stealing from him
14:27 it's coercion and the reason is we have
14:29 to think of ourselves as owning our
14:32 talents and endowments because otherwise
14:34 we're back to just using people and
14:38 coercing people that's the libertarian
14:42 reply which Rawls answer to that objection
14:51 he doesn't address the idea of
14:55 self-ownership directly but the effect
14:58 the moral weight of his argument for the
15:02 difference principle is maybe we don't
15:04 own ourselves in that thoroughgoing
15:08 sense after all now he says this doesn't
15:13 mean that the state is an owner in me in
15:16 the sense that it can simply commandeer
15:19 my life because remember the first
15:22 principle we would agree to behind the
15:26 veil of ignorance is the principle of
15:29 equal basic liberties freedom of speech
15:31 religious liberty freedom of conscience
15:38 and the like so the only respect in
15:41 which the idea of self-ownership must
15:46 give way comes when we're thinking about
15:52 whether I own myself in the sense that I
15:58 have a privileged claim on the benefits
16:00 that come from the exercise of my
16:02 talents in a market economy
16:06 and Rawls says on reflection we don't we
16:09 can defend rights we can respect the
16:18 without embracing the idea of
16:25 self-possession that in effect is his
16:30 reply to the libertarian I want to turn
16:34 now to his reply to the defender of a
16:36 meritocratic conception who invokes
16:41 effort as the basis of moral desert
16:43 people who work hard to develop their
16:51 talents deserve the benefits that come
16:55 from the exercise of their talents well
16:56 we've already seen
16:59 the beginning of Rawls's answer to that
17:03 question and it goes back to that poll
17:06 we took about birth order his first
17:12 answer is even the work ethic even the
17:14 willingness to strive conscientiously
17:17 depends on all sorts of family
17:19 circumstances and social and cultural
17:22 contingencies for which we can claim no
17:25 credit you can't claim credit for the
17:28 fact that you most of you most of us
17:30 happen to be first in birth order and
17:33 that for some complex psychological and
17:35 social reasons that seems to be
17:39 associated with striving with achieving
17:44 with effort that's one answer there's a
17:48 second answer those of you who invoke
17:54 effort you don't really believe that
17:59 moral desert attaches to effort take two
18:01 construction workers one is strong and
18:04 can raise four walls in an hour without
18:08 even breaking a sweat and another
18:11 construction worker is small and scrawny
18:16 and it has to spend three days to do the
18:19 same amount of work no defender of
18:22 meritocracy is going to look at the
18:23 effort of that weak and scrawny
18:25 construction worker and say therefore he
18:29 deserves to make more so it isn't really
18:33 effort this is the second reply to the
18:37 meritocratic claim it isn't really
18:40 effort that the defender of meritocracy
18:45 believes is the moral basis of
18:48 distributive shares its contribution how
18:52 much do you contribute but contribution
18:55 takes us right back to our natural
18:58 talents and abilities not just effort
19:02 and it's not our doing how we came into
19:05 the possession of those talents in the
19:08 first place alright suppose you accepted
19:10 these arguments
19:12 that effort isn't everything that
19:15 contribution matters from the standpoint
19:19 of the meritocratic conception that
19:26 effort even isn't our own doing does
19:31 that mean the objection continues does
19:34 that mean that according to Rawls moral
19:36 desert has nothing to do with
19:43 distributive justice well yes
19:45 distributive justice is not about moral
19:48 desert now here
19:51 Rawls introduces an important and a
19:54 tricky distinction it's between moral
19:58 desert on the one hand and entitlements
20:01 to legitimate expectations on the other
20:05 what is the difference between moral
20:08 deserts and entitlements consider two
20:11 different games a game of chance in a
20:16 game of skill take a game of pure chance
20:19 say I play the Massachusetts state
20:24 lottery and my number comes up I'm
20:29 entitled to my winnings but even though
20:32 I'm entitled to my winnings there's no
20:35 sense in which because it's just a game
20:39 of luck no sense in which I morally
20:42 deserve to win in the first place that's
20:45 an entitlement now contrast the lottery
20:49 with a different kind of game a game of
20:58 skill now imagine the Boston Red Sox
21:03 winning the World Series when they win
21:07 they're entitled to the trophy but it
21:11 can be always asked of a game of skill
21:15 did they deserve to win it's always
21:19 possible in principle to distinguish
21:22 what someone's entitled to under the rules
21:23 rules
21:26 and whether they deserve to win in the
21:29 first place that's an antecedent
21:35 standard moral desert now Rahl says
21:38 distributive justice is not a matter of
21:41 moral desert though it is a matter of
21:45 entitlements to legitimate expectations
21:50 here's where he explains it a just
21:54 scheme answers to what men are entitled
21:58 to it satisfies their legitimate
22:01 expectations is founded upon social
22:05 institutions but what they are entitled
22:08 to is not proportional to nor dependent
22:12 on their intrinsic worth the principles
22:14 of justice that regulate the basic
22:16 structure do not mention moral desert
22:20 and there is no tendency for
22:23 distributive shares to correspond to it
22:27 why does Rawls make this distinction
22:31 what morally is at stake one thing
22:33 morally at stake is the whole question
22:36 of effort that we've already discussed
22:39 but there's a second contingency a
22:41 second source of moral arbitrariness
22:45 that goes beyond the question of whether
22:47 it's to my credit that I have the
22:50 talents that enable me to get ahead and
22:54 that has to do with the contingency that
22:57 I live in a society that happens to
23:03 prize my talents the fact that David
23:07 Letterman lives in a society that puts a
23:11 great premium puts a great value on a
23:16 certain type of smirky joke that's not
23:18 his doing he's lucky that he happens to
23:26 but this is the second contingency this
23:28 isn't something that we can claim credit
23:32 for even if I had sole unproblematic
23:36 claim to my talents and to my effort it
23:38 would still be the case that the
23:40 benefits I get from exercising those
23:44 talents depend on factors that are
23:47 arbitrary from a moral point of view
23:50 what my talents will reap in a market
23:53 economy what does that depend on what
23:55 other people happen to one or like in
23:57 this society it depends on the law of
24:01 supply and demand that's not my doing
24:06 certainly not the basis for moral desert
24:11 what counts as contributing depends on
24:13 the qualities that this or that society
24:16 happens to prize most of us are
24:19 fortunate to possess in large measure
24:21 for whatever reason the qualities that
24:26 our society happens to prize the
24:28 qualities they need that enable us to
24:33 provide what society wants in a
24:35 capitalist society it helps to have
24:38 entrepreneurial Drive in a bureaucratic
24:40 society it helps to get on easily and
24:43 smoothly with superiors in a mass
24:47 democratic society it helps to look good
24:50 on television and to speak in short
24:57 in a litigious society it helps to go to
25:00 law school and to have the talents to do
25:05 well on ell SATs but none of this is how
25:05 we're doing
25:07 suppose that we with our talents
25:09 inhabited not our society
25:11 technologically advanced highly
25:14 litigious but a hunting Society or a
25:16 warrior society what would become of our
25:19 talents then they wouldn't get us very
25:22 far no doubt some of us would develop
25:27 others but would we be less worthy would
25:31 be be less virtuous would be would we be
25:34 less meritorious if we live in that kind
25:36 of society rather than in ours
25:41 well this answer is no we might make
25:46 less money and properly so but while we
25:49 would be entitled to less we would be no
25:52 less worthy no less deserving than we
25:55 are now and here's the point the same
25:58 could be said of those in our society
26:01 who happen to hold less prestigious
26:04 positions who happen to have fewer of
26:07 the talents that our society happens to
26:12 reward so here's the moral import of the
26:15 distinction between moral desert and
26:17 entitlements to legitimate expectations
26:21 we are entitled to the benefits that the
26:23 rules of the game promised for the
26:25 exercise of our talents but it's a
26:29 mistake and a conceit to suppose that we
26:31 deserve in the first place a society
26:34 that values the qualities we happen to
26:38 have in abundance now we've been talking
26:41 here about income and wealth
26:46 what about opportunities and honors what
26:49 about the distribution of access of
26:55 seats in elite colleges and universities
27:01 it's true all of you
27:07 most of you firstborn work hard strived
27:14 developed your talents to get here but
27:18 Rawls asks in effect what is the moral
27:21 status of your claim to the benefits
27:25 that attach to the opportunities you
27:31 have our seats in colleges and
27:35 universities a matter a kind of reward
27:38 an honor for those who deserve them
27:43 because they've worked so hard or are
27:46 those seats those opportunities and
27:49 honors entitlements to legitimate
27:55 expectations that depend for their
28:00 justification and those of us who enjoy
28:07 them doing so in a way that works to the
28:12 benefit of those at the bottom of
28:15 society that's the question that Rawls's
28:18 difference principle poses it's a
28:20 question that can be asked of the
28:22 earnings of Michael Jordan and David
28:27 Letterman and Judge Judy but it's also a
28:29 question that can be asked of
28:36 opportunities to go to the top colleges
28:38 and universities and that's a debate
28:41 that comes out when we turn to the
