0:02 Last week was full of big news on the
0:05 nuclear front. The New START arms
0:07 controlled treaty expired. The United
0:09 States Department of State accused China
0:12 of conducting nuclear tests. These are
0:14 big stories that I don't think got a lot
0:15 of attention. Certainly not the
0:17 attention they deserve. So today we
0:19 welcome Matt Cronig back to the show to
0:21 help us understand this strange
0:24 concerning new nuclear era that humanity
0:26 has just entered. Let's get into it.
0:29 >> It is a prescription for war. Iraqi
0:30 invasion of Kuwait.
0:33 >> December 7th, 1941.
0:37 A date which will live in infamy. The
0:39 bloody experience of Vietnam is to end
0:42 in a statement. We continue to face the
0:44 grave situation in Iran.
0:46 >> The people who knock these buildings down.
0:48 down.
0:50 >> We shall fight on the beaches. We shall
0:53 fight on the landing grounds. We shall
0:55 fight in the fields and in the streets.
1:02 Hi, I'm Aaron Mlan. Thanks for joining
1:03 School of War. I am delighted to welcome
1:06 back to the show today, Professor Matt
1:08 Cronig. He is a professor at Georgetown
1:09 where he teaches in the department of
1:12 government in the Edund A. Walsh School
1:14 of Foreign Service. He's also the vice
1:15 president and senior director of the
1:17 Atlantic Council Skraftoft Center for
1:19 Strategy and Security. He is an expert
1:21 on nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy,
1:23 the author of numerous books on that
1:25 subject. And Matt, you are here today to
1:27 discuss with us what was a pretty huge
1:31 week in uh in nuclear news. Thank you so
1:32 much for coming on School of War.
1:34 >> Thanks very much for having me, Erin.
1:35 It's always a pleasure to be back and
1:37 big big week indeed. We have a lot to discuss.
1:38 discuss.
1:41 >> So, a lot happened. There was um uh
1:44 there was a a kind of a barn burner of a
1:47 speech from a senior American diplomat
1:49 named Thomas Dano um out in Geneva. I
1:50 realize you don't you don't hear things
1:53 like um senior diplomat and barn burner
1:55 of a speech um in combination very
1:56 often, but I I actually think it was
1:58 like it was it was quite a speech um
2:00 about the future of uh of America's
2:02 attitude towards arms control and
2:04 nuclear weapons. Um you had obviously
2:07 the expect expiration of the New START
2:08 treaty, which we can talk about what
2:10 that was and what that means. But then
2:11 the thing that that caught my eye and
2:13 what what immediately made me want to
2:14 pick up the phone and call you, Matt,
2:17 was sort of buried a little bit in all
2:18 of that news was, and again, forgive
2:21 forgive the expression, but a bombshell
2:25 revelation um uh that China uh has been
2:27 conducting nuclear tests. And this
2:30 really did not get I think the attention
2:31 that I think it deserved. I think I saw
2:33 it on something like page eight of the
2:36 Wall Street Journal print edition. Um
2:37 which yes, I do I do subscribe to the
2:38 Wall Street Journal print edition. So
2:40 you can you can infer from that what you
2:42 like. But um we I I want to start us
2:44 there and let me just read us I'll read
2:47 the paragraph from the speech where Dano
2:51 um makes this claim. He says, "Today I
2:53 can reveal that the US government is
2:56 aware that China has conducted nuclear
2:58 explosive tests, including preparing for
3:00 tests with designated yields in the
3:03 hundreds of tons. The PLA sought to
3:05 conceal testing by obfuscating the
3:06 nuclear explosions because it recognized
3:09 these tests violate testban commitments.
3:12 China has used decoupling, a method to
3:14 decrease the effectiveness of seismic
3:16 monitoring to hide their activities from
3:18 the world. China conducted one such
3:21 yield producing nuclear test on June
3:25 22nd of 2020. Matt, what does all of
3:26 this mean?
3:28 >> Well, it's a big deal, um, Erin, for a
3:31 number of reasons. Uh, first, new start.
3:34 um uh expiration. You know, there's been
3:37 uh binding bilateral arms control
3:39 agreements between the United States and
3:41 the Soviet Union and then Russia since
3:44 the early 1970s. Uh so this is the first
3:46 time in in essentially a half century uh
3:48 that there have not been binding arms
3:50 control agreements uh between the United
3:52 States and Russia. Um I think it's a
3:53 good thing on balance and we can talk
3:56 about that. Uh but then the uh nuclear
3:59 testing um essentially since the end of
4:02 the cold war the major nuclear powers uh
4:04 have not conducted explosive tests. Uh
4:06 you had um North Korea a rogue state
4:09 that conducted a series of tests. Uh but
4:11 there was a moratorium in place among
4:13 the major powers and there has been
4:16 speculation over the years that maybe
4:18 Russia and China were cheating using
4:20 this decoup decoupling method that we
4:23 can talk about. Um but what was notable
4:25 about Dano's speech is uh he said
4:27 publicly for the first time that we know
4:29 that China is doing this and really
4:31 interesting put an exact date on it
4:33 which seems to suggest that we have
4:35 pretty good intelligence and put the
4:37 Chinese on notice that their efforts to
4:39 keep this secret from us are are not
4:41 working. Uh so um I think there's a lot
4:44 to uh unpack here and we are um you know
4:46 I guess bottom line up front is we are
4:49 entering a new nuclear uh age um like
4:52 we've never experienced before where we
4:53 need to deal with two nuclear
4:56 superpowers Russia and China at the same time.
4:57 time.
4:58 >> So I want to I want to kind of take each
5:01 piece of the situation that you just
5:04 outlined uh and go into more detail on
5:05 it but let's let's stick with the
5:09 testing for a moment. Um
5:12 what are the origins of the moratorum on
5:13 nuclear testing? There is a treaty
5:15 architecture there, right? But it's not
5:18 ratified. What but but even before we
5:19 get to the legality of everything like
5:22 why why once upon a time did people want
5:24 to stop testing nuclear weapons?
5:27 >> Well, the um main reason to conduct a
5:30 nuclear test is to uh test the design of
5:32 your nuclear warhead and the physics
5:35 package. uh and during the cold war the
5:37 United States and the Soviet Union
5:40 conducted uh many tests uh to perfect
5:42 their nuclear weapon design and uh try
5:44 to make the design more efficient, get
5:46 larger yield, uh lighter weight warheads
5:49 and and so on. Um by the end of the cold
5:52 war, well actually let me go back. Um
5:54 and then during the cold war there were
5:56 several arms control agreements on the
5:58 way limiting uh types of nuclear
6:01 testing. So it used to be countries
6:03 would uh conduct atmospheric nuclear
6:05 testing. Uh and then with the limited
6:07 testban treaty after shortly after the
6:09 Cuban missile crisis uh the United
6:11 States and the Soviet Union agreed to
6:14 only do underground testing. Um uh but
6:16 by the end of the cold war there was a
6:17 sense that the United States and the
6:19 Soviet Union had done all the test uh
6:21 that they needed to do. Uh the nuclear
6:24 era was behind us and there was this
6:26 effort to negotiate a comprehensive test
6:30 ban treaty uh that would um ban all um
6:33 nuclear test above and and below ground.
6:36 Um and many of the major powers signed
6:39 up for this. Uh the United States and
6:42 China never ratified. um Bill Clinton
6:44 wanted to ratify, but uh Republicans in
6:47 the Senate uh were opposed and in part
6:49 precisely because of this issue that's
6:50 come to light in the past few days. They
6:52 were worried that we wouldn't be able to
6:54 verify the agreement that Russia and
6:56 China would be able to cheat. Um so the
6:58 United States never ratified and
7:00 nevertheless the major powers agreed to
7:03 respect this uh moratorum uh where they
7:06 would not conduct um tests that uh
7:08 produced an explosive yield. Um and
7:10 again speculation over the years that
7:12 Russia and China have been cheating uh
7:15 on this moratorum and um just in the
7:17 past couple of days it's become clear
7:19 that uh yeah China has in fact been been cheating.
7:20 cheating.
7:22 >> If you wanted to hide a nuclear
7:24 explosion I mean I guess burying it
7:26 underground is a start but what what is
7:28 this decoupling method? You know if you
7:30 if you want to do a test and hope the
7:32 world doesn't see what are you what are
7:34 you um what are you up to?
7:36 >> Yes. Uh so the main way uh the
7:38 international community uh detects uh
7:41 nuclear explosions is through a system
7:43 of seismic monitoring. Uh so there's a
7:45 comprehensive testban treaty
7:49 organization uh that uh operates uh this
7:51 system of seismic monitors all over the
7:54 world. So it's essentially the same uh
7:55 technique you would use to detect an
7:57 earthquake. Uh because if you conduct an
8:00 underground nuclear test uh that's a big
8:02 explosion, the earth shakes and and you
8:05 pick it up on uh these seismic monitors.
8:08 Um and so um you know to get into the
8:11 jargon here, you know, the uh nuclear
8:13 explosion is coupled with the
8:15 surrounding uh earth that shakes the
8:17 earth and it's picked up on these
8:20 seismic monitors. uh this decoupling
8:23 method that Dano talked about and that
8:25 uh you know uh Republican senators
8:27 worried about back in the 1990s is well
8:31 if you uh dig a big underground cavern
8:33 uh and conduct a nuclear explosion it's
8:35 possible to decouple that explosion from
8:38 the surrounding earth uh so you don't
8:40 get the big uh seismic uh waves that
8:43 picked up on the detectors and so Dano
8:45 said that China has been using that
8:48 method to conduct underground explosions
8:50 in a way that are not detectable with
8:52 this seismic monitoring system.
8:54 >> And can we speculate, you know, where
8:56 this might have occurred? I mean, do we
8:57 know where the Chinese testing
9:00 facilities are? Like put some some color
9:01 on this uh even if it has to be
9:03 speculative to a degree.
9:05 >> Yeah. So, the Chinese have had a ma main
9:08 nuclear testing area, the Laor testing
9:11 area going back to the days of Mao Dong.
9:14 Um and um over the years um uh US
9:17 government has said uh that given
9:19 activity around the LPN test site we
9:22 have concerns about whether China is um
9:25 abiding by its moratorium on on testing.
9:27 Uh so presumably using other technical
9:29 means the US government was picking up
9:31 activity at the site that they thought
9:34 may be uh consistent with um nuclear
9:37 testing. Uh and um Dano in his uh speech
9:39 just a couple of days ago did mention
9:42 this Lopnor um test site. Uh and so you
9:44 know United States has a testing range
9:47 out in the the west the Nevada uh test
9:50 range. Uh and so similar in in China
9:52 it's an outlying uh area far away from
9:55 major cities uh where you can you know
9:56 do things like conduct nuclear
9:58 explosions without bothering the
10:02 neighbors. roughly when did America um
10:05 stop testing its own weapons? When did
10:06 that actually come to an end?
10:08 >> Yeah, that's a good question. I' I'd
10:10 have to um double check, but um you
10:12 know, during the Cold War, the United
10:14 States conducted a lot. I think in the
10:16 hundreds of nuclear tests, first
10:18 atmospheric and then below ground. Uh
10:20 and and I do think it was up until the
10:22 uh near the end of the cold war that the
10:26 United States uh conducted um test. And
10:28 as again, as long as the arms control or
10:30 the uh uh nuclear arms competition was
10:32 going on with the the Soviet Union, you
10:34 know, having a a modern effective
10:36 nuclear force was of course a top
10:38 national security priority. And I guess
10:40 that's the crux of the issue, isn't it?
10:43 is I mean and I'm I'm not an expert in
10:46 how you make a nuclear bomb but I expect
10:48 that with as with every other kind of
10:50 technology even if the basic principle
10:52 of nuclear explosions probably hasn't
10:53 undergone an enormous amount of
10:56 evolution uh in our lifetimes probably a
10:57 lot of other things about how you make
11:00 these bombs has and so how do you really
11:02 know at the end of the day if it's all
11:04 going to work as a whole system if you
11:07 don't test it and that's the advantage
11:09 that the Chinese and I guess we've also
11:11 we we We we were under the impression
11:12 the Russians as well but but this
11:14 particular moment with the Chinese
11:16 asserted specifically by the Trump
11:19 administration they have this advantage
11:20 that they are testing. So they know they
11:22 know what's working and what doesn't
11:23 work in their own systems that
11:25 contributes to their ability to deter
11:27 that contributes to their confidence
11:29 that should um it come to an exchange
11:31 their stuff's going to work. And that's
11:33 why I guess the president has said he
11:35 wants to he wants to test. What are the
11:36 pros and cons of of the United States
11:38 embarking on this new testing regime,
11:40 which we seem to be about to do?
11:42 >> Yeah. Well, first on, uh what the
11:43 Chinese gain, you're you're right that
11:45 they have more uh confidence that
11:48 there's uh work. Um but then also, um if
11:51 you want a new warhead design, um if you
11:52 want to try something that's a larger
11:55 yield or more efficient, um you really
11:59 do need to test for that. and and so um
12:01 China may have more of a reason to test
12:02 than the United States because we do
12:05 have more of a test uh record during the
12:06 Cold War. They were a little bit later
12:09 to the game. Uh and so I suspect that uh
12:11 China is doing this not just to make
12:13 sure everything works, but because it's
12:15 experimenting with new types of uh
12:18 weapons designs. Um and so as it relates
12:21 to to the United States then uh pros and
12:24 cons of a return to testing. Um, you
12:26 know, one, all all the uh, you know, I'm
12:29 a political scientist, not a uh nuclear
12:31 engineer, but all the nuclear engineers
12:33 agree that if the United States wanted
12:35 new designs, we would have to return to
12:37 testing. Now, there's no one calling for
12:39 new designs right now. Um, I personally
12:41 don't think it's needed, but if we did
12:43 want new designs, uh, we'd have to test.
12:45 Uh, and so the question then gets to to
12:48 yours of can we be sure that everything
12:50 works? And here the scientific community
12:53 is somewhat, uh, divided. Uh so Lawrence
12:55 Slivermore uh has the most advanced
12:57 supercomputer in the world or or maybe
12:58 they're number two right now. They go
13:01 back and forth with the Chinese. Uh but
13:02 one of the things they do with that
13:05 supercomputer is uh conduct a simulated
13:09 nuclear uh explosions using uh test data
13:12 from uh from the past. And some of the
13:13 scientists I've talked to there say
13:15 actually these computer simulations are
13:17 even better than real tests because with
13:19 real tests you're blowing up some of
13:22 what you want to study. Uh, and so, uh,
13:23 they say we never need to return to
13:26 testing again. Um, other scientists I
13:28 talked to, um, elsewhere say, well, no,
13:30 of course we'd have to test at some
13:32 point. You know, you think your car is
13:33 going to start in the morning, but until
13:36 you turn the key, you you really can't
13:38 um, know. So, I think those are some of
13:41 the uh, uh, potential advantages if we
13:42 need new warhead designs, just making
13:45 sure that it works. There are also cons
13:48 as well, potentially, but um, I've been
13:49 going on for a while, so I'll pause
13:50 there. Well, no, no, no. This is
13:52 interesting. So, the I mean I mean these
13:54 are these are all what the real
13:56 significance of the week is is it
13:59 punctuates and emphasizes trends that
14:00 have been developing for years now, but
14:02 all of a sudden it's just we woke up
14:04 last week and it was all just real that
14:09 we are in this new age of at this moment
14:12 uh unconstrained legally unconstrained
14:15 uh nuclear competition with Russia and
14:18 China. Um uh and not not to mention the
14:20 North Koreans and there there's there's
14:21 other factors but the the major players
14:24 are the United States, Russia and China.
14:27 Um and so let's let's stick with this
14:30 question of new designs. I mean this is
14:34 you know I I think for a lot of people
14:36 the notion that you would need the new I
14:38 think a lot of people appreciate the
14:39 fact that the development of nuclear
14:41 weapons during the Cold War got to the
14:42 point where there are weapons that can
14:45 level whole cities a single blast. I
14:46 mean, if they know a little bit more,
14:48 they know that, you know, there are
14:51 warheads um uh you know, there there are
14:53 missiles that can deliver multiple
14:54 warheads. So, it's harder to even if
14:55 you're going to attempt to intercept
14:58 things, it's hard to intercept. So, the
14:59 people are generally aware that we can
15:01 kill cities and the Russians can kill
15:03 cities. Now, the Chinese can kill cities
15:05 if they want to. And so, with that fact
15:07 on the table, it might be reasonable to
15:09 ask, well, why on earth would you need
15:11 more or different? Like, what what what
15:15 further um advance as it were? um uh is
15:17 necessary when you already have that
15:19 capability. And it sounds like you you
15:20 sort of agree though maybe for different
15:22 reasons. Explain your position why we
15:24 don't need design new designs in this
15:25 new era of competition, but also give us
15:27 a sense of why those who argue that we
15:28 do like what what would be useful about
15:30 new designs.
15:31 >> Yes. Well, and it's important to
15:33 distinguish between um the delivery
15:37 vehicle and the nuclear warhead and the
15:40 explosive package in the warhead. uh and
15:42 and so I do think that we need new and
15:44 and different kinds of um delivery
15:47 vehicles uh for the uh moment we're uh
15:49 entering into. And so there is a plan
15:51 underway to modernize our strategic
15:53 bombers, modernize our intercontinental
15:55 ballistic missiles, modernize our
15:58 submarines. Um I also think that we need
16:02 new um theater-based um nuclear systems.
16:04 Um but that's not constrained by this
16:06 testing moratorum. We've always been
16:09 able to test delivery systems. Uh and so
16:10 uh then when it comes to the physics
16:12 package as you rightly point out uh you
16:14 know during the cold war uh we designed
16:17 a a lot of different types of um uh
16:20 nuclear warheads um including kind of
16:22 dial yield where we could make them very
16:25 low yield very high yield. So I just
16:26 think when it comes to the the physics
16:29 package we don't need anything new there
16:30 and and I don't think there's anybody
16:33 really calling for new physics packages.
16:35 I I think the real debate is over uh
16:38 numbers of of warheads and um what kinds
16:41 of delivery vehicles they're deployed on
16:43 and also where they're deployed. Um do
16:45 we need more in Europe and Asia for example?
16:46 example?
16:48 >> The other part of the news uh from the
16:50 week obviously was the expiration of of
16:53 new start. There have been um gestures
16:56 in the directions in the direction of um
16:59 of extending it in some fashion. I mean,
17:01 obviously, um, we have the State
17:03 Department saying very emphatically,
17:05 "This is dead." But I, you know, back
17:07 during that round of, um, negotiations
17:08 with the Russians over the war in
17:11 Ukraine back in whenever that was, one
17:14 loses track, November, I think, was this
17:17 headline in the in the points of the of
17:19 the uh, of the peace terms that leaked
17:21 to the press. One of them involved um,
17:23 the extension of I think they actually
17:25 got the name wrong. I think they meant
17:26 new start, but they said they say salt
17:28 or something like that. Yeah, but but
17:30 they meant new they meant they meant the
17:32 extension of new start. Um and then you
17:34 hear I it's like every day there's new
17:36 new headlines. It's very hard to track,
17:38 but you hear, you know, mentions that
17:40 no, we're going to continue to enforce
17:41 the restrictions as sort of a a
17:43 handshake agreement between the United
17:46 States and Russia. So say if you would a
17:49 few words to eulogize New Start, uh uh
17:52 its its its qualities, but also its
17:55 warts. um and say a word about where
17:57 things actually stand today in terms of
17:59 the future of arms control.
18:02 >> So first I think there is value uh to
18:04 arms control and um there there are a
18:07 number of benefits. Um you know US
18:08 strategic command commanders have said
18:10 that they like the certainty that it
18:13 gives them in terms of Russian uh forces
18:15 and what they need to plan against. Uh
18:17 there are these verification measures
18:20 that give us more uh insight into what
18:23 the Russians are are doing. um and does
18:28 I think um um you know it did uh
18:31 constrain um the the uh arms competition
18:32 during the cold war. You know at the
18:34 peak the United States and the Soviet
18:36 Union both had tens of thousands of
18:38 nuclear weapons and so putting a cap on
18:42 that I think was um helpful. Um but it's
18:44 it's now um and I guess a final benefit
18:46 when everything else was um rocky in the
18:48 USRussia relationship that was one area
18:50 where diplomats could get together and
18:54 and talk and agree on things. Um but but
18:56 I think it has come to the uh end of its
18:59 uh useful life and the main reason is
19:01 because of China's rapid nuclear
19:04 buildup. Uh and um you know I was um
19:07 appointed by Congress to a strategic
19:08 posture commission a couple of years
19:10 ago. Uh and this was the central
19:12 question really assigned to us by
19:15 Congress is what does China's massive
19:17 nuclear buildup mean for American
19:20 nuclear strategy? Um and essentially the
19:22 conclusion that we came to is that to
19:25 deter China and Russia at the same time,
19:27 you know, essentially two peer powers
19:30 because China is projected to have 1500
19:33 nuclear weapons by 2035. Uh so that's
19:35 right there with the new start limits.
19:38 Um so this is new. uh you know never
19:40 before has the United States had to deal
19:42 with two peer nuclear superpowers at the
19:44 same time. Uh and essentially we
19:46 concluded that the uh current and
19:49 planned nuclear forces are necessary but
19:52 not sufficient. Uh that we are going to
19:54 need a larger andor different nuclear
19:56 force to deal with Russia and China at
19:58 the same time. So that's the first
19:59 important starting point. The purpose of
20:01 nuclear weapons of course is to deter
20:04 nuclear war not to have treaties for its
20:06 own sake. And so the experts think that
20:09 to deter nuclear war, we need a bigger
20:11 nuclear force and new start doesn't
20:13 allow us to do that. So it's getting in
20:15 the way of our security goals, not
20:18 advancing them. We've talked on the show
20:21 before about the Chinese nuclear buildup
20:23 um and the strategy behind it. We had a
20:25 great conversation maybe a year ago now
20:28 with Dan Blumenthal and Kyle Balzer who
20:29 wrote some really smart stuff on what
20:31 China is up to with its nuclear weapons
20:34 and how it fits into their non-uclear
20:37 um uh strategy for East Asia and the
20:39 first island chain and these are these
20:42 are essentially in their potential power
20:44 um tools of coercion to break the
20:45 alliance structure in the first island
20:46 chain. It was really fascinating
20:49 discussion. Um, I want to get your take
20:51 on the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also
20:53 I'd like to ask you, you know, what what
20:56 does it really mean for us in terms of
20:58 the weapons that we need for deterrence?
21:00 I mean, and again, keep in mind as
21:02 you're as you're answering,
21:04 you know, what I what I think is this
21:07 widely held question and a reasonable
21:10 one. It's like gosh, if if it's true
21:11 that between the various countries, we
21:13 already have enough nuclear weapons to
21:14 effectively destroy the world, which I
21:16 think still is true even with the the
21:19 New START restrictions more or less, how
21:20 is it possible that you need more? How
21:22 does the logic of that actually function?
21:23 function?
21:25 >> Well, first I'd um uh challenge the
21:27 premise and and you're right that uh
21:29 people often say we have enough nuclear
21:31 weapons to destroy the world many times
21:34 over. Uh but actually it's not true. In
21:36 fact, um, John's Hopkins Applied Physics
21:38 Laboratory did a study several years
21:40 back where they calculated how many
21:42 nuclear weapons would be required, uh,
21:45 to kill 100% of the Russian population.
21:48 Uh, not that anybody's arguing we should
21:51 do that, but just as a uh, uh, you know,
21:53 kind of a thought experiment. And I
21:54 think they calculated that something
21:57 like 140,000 nuclear weapons would be
21:59 required for that. Uh the United States
22:02 only has 1500 nuclear weapons today. So
22:04 well short of what would be required
22:07 even just to destroy all of Russia. Um
22:10 so so um they are the most powerful new
22:11 weapons ever invented. But I think
22:14 people often um in their minds um kind
22:16 of overestimate what they're capable of.
22:18 Um so then bringing it back to US
22:20 nuclear strategy, I think um you know
22:22 kind of these ideas of mutually assured
22:24 destruction that people learn about in
22:26 uh college or or high school classes. it
22:28 kind of assumes, okay, we're going to
22:30 threaten to kill a bunch of people in
22:31 Moscow and Beijing. They're going to
22:32 threaten to kill a bunch of people in
22:35 Washington, New York, and Los Angeles.
22:37 Uh, nobody wants that. And so that's why
22:40 deterrence holds. Um, and if that were
22:42 our strategy, then, you know, maybe, you
22:44 know, how many nuclear weapons do you
22:45 need to kill a lot of people in Moscow
22:47 and Beijing? You know, maybe two is
22:49 enough, maybe four is enough. You know,
22:50 certainly a couple hundred would be
22:53 enough. Um, but that's not US nuclear
22:54 strategy and hasn't been for many
22:58 decades. Um and instead um uh the US
23:00 government has uh assessed essentially
23:02 that Putin and she don't care if their
23:05 people die. Um and we see that right now
23:07 in Ukraine. Putin has no regard for
23:10 Russian life. Um Ma Dong during the Cold
23:12 War famously said if a bunch of Chinese
23:14 die in a nuclear war, he'll make more
23:16 Chinese. Um so so that's not what deters
23:19 them. What they care about is their uh
23:21 themselves, their regimes, their
23:24 militaries, their nuclear forces. Uh and
23:26 so deterrence is all about holding at
23:29 risk what the adversary values. And so
23:32 since they uh value those things, that's
23:34 what the United States holds at risk
23:36 with its nuclear strategy. Uh we don't
23:38 target um population centers for their
23:41 own sake. We only target legitimate
23:43 military targets, leadership targets,
23:45 military command and control, missile
23:48 silos, submarine bases, etc. And so uh
23:50 when we were calculating numbers for new
23:53 start, we said okay how how many nuclear
23:54 weapons do we need to hold that set of
23:57 targets at risk in Russia and the number
24:00 was 1550 uh the new start limit and at
24:02 the time China and North Korea had so
24:04 few nuclear weapons the assessment was
24:07 made yeah that um essentially if we
24:08 build for Russia we have enough for
24:10 China and North Korea too. Now with
24:13 China's massive buildup that changes it
24:16 means US targeting uh strategy needs to
24:17 change. We can't just hold those targets
24:20 at risk in Russia. We now need have a
24:21 whole new set of targets we need to hold
24:24 at risk. Chinese missile silos,
24:26 submarine bases, air bases, leadership,
24:28 etc. Uh, and so that's what's putting
24:30 upward pressure on the size of our
24:32 force. We need more nuclear weapons to
24:34 hold at risk that set of targets in both
24:37 Russia and now China. Yeah, as you as
24:39 you know, Matt, as we've discussed it
24:41 before, I'm I'm semi-obsessed with this
24:43 early uh nuclear theorist named William
24:46 Bordon uh who uh who who to the extent
24:48 that anybody knows who he is, they know
24:50 him as a as the villain in the movie
24:52 Oppenheimer uh who turns over
24:54 Oppenheimer's uh uh you know files to
24:57 the Senate. Um, but you know, back in
24:59 4546 where he wrote his book, There Will
25:01 Be No Time, he made an argument then
25:03 that's very relevant to what you just
25:05 said that has seems to me to be
25:07 borderline decisive even if it's been
25:10 rejected probably more rejected than not
25:12 um in the mainstream community of of
25:14 thought on these issues ever since.
25:15 Though not interestingly enough, as you
25:17 as you point out, in the military and
25:18 the people actually doing the targeting,
25:19 they're the ones who are sort of
25:21 orthodox Bordonites whether they know it
25:24 or not. Bordon's case was we can talk
25:26 about, you know, using these new
25:28 weapons, these new atom bombs mounted on
25:31 V2s is the way he put it, um, to
25:33 destroy, you know, London or Berlin, but
25:36 the reality is when the war actually
25:37 starts, no one's actually going to do
25:39 that because it would be insane. Not
25:42 because of humanitarian reasons, but
25:44 because everyone's first instinct is
25:45 going to be to try to destroy the other
25:47 person's super weapon. And so the
25:50 inevitable logic of the war is going to
25:52 be you need to destroy the other guy's
25:54 super weapons before he can destroy your
25:56 super weapons because the the guy left
25:58 standing with super weapons when the
25:59 other guy doesn't have super weapons
26:01 wins because that guy gets to dictate
26:04 terms. And that's just the inescapable
26:08 logic of the whole thing. Um, and it
26:09 seems from what you're saying that the
26:11 Pentagon proceeds on that planning
26:12 assumption. one because there's this
26:15 cultural analysis that the of of all
26:16 countries the Russians and the Chinese
26:18 perhaps least of all would be um
26:20 deterred by the threat to their
26:22 populations but also just for the fact
26:25 that barring you know scenarios where
26:26 obviously we can't really reject the
26:28 possibility that there's a you know a
26:30 terrorist or a madman who's taken over a
26:32 country and just has plain murder on
26:35 their minds. The truth is a a war will
26:37 have goals and and and goals will be
26:40 pursued with strategies and having super
26:42 weapons um and your enemy not having
26:44 super weapons. That logic will build
26:46 into it and you'll have this exchange
26:48 based on that logic. And so we can we
26:50 can talk all we want about oh maybe 50
26:53 weapons would be enough but the truth is
26:55 if the other guy then has 60 it's not
26:57 enough. It's not enough and that's the
26:59 unfortunate logic we're trapped in.
27:02 >> Yes, you're absolutely right. Uh so one
27:04 of the benefits of uh this counterforce
27:07 so-called counterforce strategy is
27:08 because we think that's what the
27:10 adversaries care about. But the second
27:11 one, you're you're absolutely right. God
27:13 forbid if deterrence fails and the
27:16 adversary starts using nuclear weapons,
27:18 you know, a US president's not going to
27:20 want to go and give a national press
27:22 conference and say now we accept our
27:24 mutually assured destruction. you know,
27:25 he's going to want to be able or she's
27:26 going to want to be able to do whatever
27:29 they can uh to destroy the adversaries
27:31 nuclear weapons before they can be used.
27:33 And so that's another benefit of a
27:35 counterforce approach. Uh the other one
27:37 is is just law of armed conflict. The
27:40 United States are the good guys. As
27:41 people know, it's illegal to
27:43 intentionally target innocent civilians
27:47 in warfare. Uh only legitimate military
27:49 uh targets are are legitimate. And so
27:51 the United States tries to do that. um
27:53 comply with the law of armed conflict
27:55 even when it comes to nuclear strategy.
27:56 And Darren, I love how you keep coming
27:58 back to this foundational nuclear
28:00 strategist. You and I should really uh
28:02 write something on on him at some point.
28:04 >> I'm all for it. I'm all for it. And as
28:05 you as you and this is kind of the in
28:07 way the the ongoing premise of the whole
28:10 show is the first time arguments are
28:11 expressed, the first time problems are
28:14 confronted often time oftentimes that's
28:16 when you see them in their purest form.
28:19 Uh uh but we can we can philosophize
28:22 about that um some other time. Um so
28:24 okay so it's by the way every time Matt
28:26 you and I do an episode or I do any
28:27 episode on nuclear strategy for that
28:29 matter I get all kinds of um anguished
28:33 notes from people who with some justice
28:34 by the way because here you and I are
28:37 discussing dispassionately and with even
28:39 with your um uh you know important
28:40 comments about the law on conflict and
28:42 and everything else there is a way
28:44 inescapably in which what we are talking
28:47 about is a kind of mass murder um and
28:48 you you can you can reject that if you
28:50 like but that that'll be my point of
28:51 view I mean there's there's no way to
28:54 fight a large-scale nuclear war. Um, uh,
28:56 you know, even once the tactical nukes
28:58 are being employed on land as opposed to
28:59 to against naval targets, like we're
29:01 starting to talk about casualty levels,
29:03 civilian casualty levels that are are
29:05 going to be likely quite substantial.
29:06 So, I get these notes saying, you know,
29:09 what are you crazy people talking about?
29:12 This is insane. Like, you you sound like
29:14 a rational, logical person, but actually
29:16 what you're saying is complete madness.
29:18 And look, there's a way in which you
29:19 could respond to the events of the last
29:21 week with something like that attitude.
29:25 The last vestage of uh of you know, cold
29:27 war arms control is now dead. The
29:30 Chinese are here and they are uh at
29:32 breakneck pace building up their
29:33 arsenal. Here you have the president of
29:35 the United States saying we need to test
29:38 nuclear weapons and um uh a lot of
29:39 support in the United States for
29:42 modernization perhaps expansion. You can
29:44 you can share more detail on that of our
29:46 arsenal. what are the limits? What you
29:49 know is this just going to be you know I
29:51 think that the concern would run
29:52 something like now we are just in an
29:57 arms race um uh trapped in this um crazy
29:59 counterforce logic of matching warhead
30:02 for warhead. Um what are going to
30:04 constrain what's going to constrain this
30:06 new world? Um what would the shape of
30:09 new arms control agreements look like?
30:11 What are the natural constraints? That
30:13 is to say, how do we even calculate what
30:16 we need given the nature of the Russian,
30:18 Chinese, etc. arsenals? Just help us
30:20 understand what the limits of the new
30:21 world are going to be, if any.
30:23 >> At first, and maybe I should have
30:25 started the show with this to those uh
30:28 people sending you those notes who are
30:30 understandably concerned. I I think I
30:32 would say that US nuclear weapons have
30:34 been one of the greatest forces for good
30:37 in uh human history. uh you know before
30:41 uh 1945 we saw Europe and and Asia uh
30:43 consistently consumed with warfare.
30:46 Millions of people died. Um after 1945
30:49 uh the United States um built these
30:52 strong alliances in Europe and Asia and
30:54 um uniquely um the United States doesn't
30:56 use its nuclear weapons just to defend
30:58 itself. You know that's what India and
31:00 China and other countries do. Instead
31:01 the United States extends its nuclear
31:04 umbrella over the entire free world. Uh
31:06 so our 30 formal treaty allies, 30 plus
31:09 formal treaty allies in Europe and Asia.
31:10 Uh we go to them and make a deal and say
31:12 don't build your own nuclear weapons,
31:14 you can rely on our nuclear weapons. Uh
31:17 and that extended nuclear umbrella has
31:19 deterred major war in Europe and Asia
31:21 for 80 years and counting and has
31:23 stopped our um allies from building
31:26 their own independent nuclear arsenals.
31:28 So a strong uh US nuclear arsenal is a
31:31 is a good thing for the free world. Um,
31:32 and then this gets to the the question
31:35 of um, you know, then does this lead to
31:38 an arms race? Um, and I I guess I would
31:40 say maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. Uh,
31:42 you know, it's not easy for Russia and
31:44 China to just snap their fingers and and
31:47 build more um, nuclear weapons. Uh, we
31:49 saw the United States consistently out
31:51 compete the Soviet Union um, during the
31:54 Cold War in this area. I think um, you
31:56 know, given Russia's sorry state of its
31:58 economy and everything else, we're well
32:00 positioned to out compete them again.
32:05 and I think China too. Um u but um uh
32:07 you know we don't want an arms race but
32:09 the the first purpose is to have what we
32:12 need for nuclear deterrence and does
32:13 that lead to an arms race or not? What
32:15 are the arms control agreements? Those
32:17 are secondary considerations. You know
32:18 we can't choose an arms control
32:21 agreement that undermines uh deterrence.
32:24 Deterrence has to come first. Um so uh
32:26 let's get what we need for deterrence.
32:28 Maybe that leads to an arms race and and
32:30 then yes, let's try to constrain that
32:32 with arms control agreements. What we
32:34 would need is a trilateral arms control
32:36 agreement that constrains both Russian
32:38 and Chinese forces consistent with our
32:41 deterrent requirements. And there are
32:42 possibilities. is in fact the Atlantic
32:45 Council where uh I work had a paper
32:46 published a few years ago that we should
32:49 probably refresh laying out kind of five
32:51 or six possible arrangements for
32:54 trilateral arms control that would
32:56 advance US national security interests.
32:58 Uh the big problem right now, final
33:00 point on this, the big problem right now
33:02 though is not the United States. Uh it's
33:04 Russia and China. Uh Russia's cheated on
33:06 almost every arms control agreement it's
33:08 been a part of and China refuses to even
33:11 seriously talk about arms control. So I
33:12 think that realistically there's not
33:14 going to be another arms control
33:17 agreement uh in the uh near future and
33:19 so the United States needs to build the
33:22 forces uh required to uh protect itself
33:24 and protect its allies.
33:26 >> Well Matt, this has been a bracing start
33:28 to a Monday morning. Uh thanks for
33:30 spreading good cheer uh wherever you go.
33:32 Um but it has actually been quite
33:34 fascinating and important. That's that's
33:36 why I I wanted to do this with you
33:38 quickly because it just struck me that
33:41 last week was packed with um uh you know
33:45 glo world world altering um potentially
33:48 world altering level significance news
33:50 um uh that was getting very little
33:52 attention because it's kind of technical
33:54 and this Chinese nuclear test happened
33:57 years ago uh the one that we asserted
34:01 the state department asserted and um I I
34:03 I think this is something that um you
34:04 know informs citizens ought to pay
34:06 attention to and and have informed views
34:08 about. And Matt, I'm grateful to you for
34:10 for helping us form those views.
34:11 >> Thanks very much for having me and it's
34:13 always a pleasure and uh congrats on the
34:15 great work you're doing on the podcast.
