This content explores John Rawls's "difference principle" as a theory of distributive justice, arguing that inequalities in wealth, income, and opportunities are only justifiable if they benefit the least well-off members of society.
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we ended last time with that remarkable
pole you remember the poll about birth order
what percentage of people in this room
raised their hands was it to say that
they were the firstborn 75 80 % and what
was the significance of that if you're
thinking about these theories of
distributive justice remember we were
discussing three different theories of
distributive justice three different
ways of answering the question how
should income and wealth and
opportunities and the good things in
life be distributed and so far we've
looked at the libertarian answer that
says the just system of distribution
it's a system of free exchange of
free-market economy against a background
of formal equality which simply means
that jobs and careers are open to anyone
Rawls says this represents an
improvement over aristocratic and caste
systems because everyone can compete for
every job careers open to talents and
beyond that the just distribution is the
one that results from free exchange
voluntary transactions no more no less
then Wells argues if all you have is
the result is not going to be fair it
will be biased in favor
of those who happen to be born to
affluent families who happen to have the
benefit of good educational
opportunities and that accident of birth
is not a just basis for distributing
life chances and so many people who
notice this unfairness Rawls argues have
led to embrace a system of fair equality
of opportunity that leads to the
meritocratic system fair equality of
opportunity but Wall says even if you
bring everyone to the same starting
point in the race what's going to happen
who's going to win the fastest runners
so once you're troubled by basing
distributive shares on morally arbitrary
contingencies you should if you reason
it through he carried all the way to
what was calls the Democratic conception
a more egalitarian conception of
distributive justice that he defines by
the difference principle now he doesn't
say that the only way to remedy or to
compensate for differences in natural
talents and abilities is to have a kind
of leveling equality a guaranteed
equality of outcome but he does say
there's another way to deal with these
contingencies people may gain may
benefit from their good fortune but only
on terms that work to the advantage of
the least well-off and so we can test
how this theory actually works by
thinking about some pay differentials
that arise in our society what does the
average school teacher make
in the united states do you suppose
roughly it's a little more 40 40 mm what
about David Letterman how much do you
think David Letterman makes more than a
schoolteacher 31 million dollars David
Letterman is that fair the David
Letterman makes that much more than a schoolteacher
schoolteacher
well Rawls's answer would be it depends
whether the basic structure of society
is designed in such a way that
Letterman's 31 million dollars is
subject to taxation so that some of
those earnings are taken to work for the
advantage of the least well-off one
other example of a pay differential a
Justice of the United States Supreme
Court what do they make it's it's just
under two hundred thousand dollars
here's Sandra Day O'Connor for example
there she is but there's another judge
who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor
do you know who it is Judge Judy how did
you know that you watch no but you hurt
your right Judge Judy you know how much
she makes there she is 25
25 million dollars now is that just is
it fair well the answer is it depends
whether this is against a background
system in line with the difference
principle where those who come out on
top in terms of her income and wealth
are taxed in a way that benefits the
least well-off members of society now
we're going to come back to these wage
differentials pay differentials between
a real judge and a TV judge the one
Marcus watches all the time what I want
to do now is return to these theories
and to examine the objections to Rawls's
more egalitarian theory the difference
principle there are at least three
objections to Rawls's difference
principle one of them came up last time
in the discussion and a number of you
raised this worry
what about incentives isn't there the
risk if taxes reach 70 80 90 percent
marginal rate that Michael Jordan won't
play basketball the data David Letterman
won't do late night comedy or that CEOs
will go into some other line of work now
who among those who are defenders of
Rawls who has an answer to this
yes go ahead
stand up Rawls's idea is that
there should only be so much difference
that it helps the least well-off the
most so if there's too much equality
then the least well-off might not be
able to watch late-night TV or might not
have a job because their CEO doesn't
want to work so you need to find the
correct balance where taxation still
leaves enough incentive for the least
well-off to benefit from the talents
good and what's your name
Tim Tim all right so Tim is saying in
effect that Rawls's takes account of
incentives and could allow for pay
differentials and for some adjustment in
the tax rate to take account of
incentives but Tim points out the
standpoint from which the question of
incentives needs to be considered is not
the effect on the total size of the
economic pie but instead from the
standpoint of the effect of incentives
or disincentives on the well-being of
those at the bottom right good thank you
I think that is what Rawls would say in
fact if you look in Section 17 where he
describes the difference principle he
allows for incentives the naturally
advantaged are not to gain merely
because they are more gifted but only to
cover the cost of training and education
and for using their endowments in ways
that help the less fortunate as well so
you can have incentives you can adjust
the tax rate if taking too much from
David Letterman or from Michael Jordan
or from Bill Gates winds up actually
hurting those at the bottom that's the test
so incentives
that's not a decisive objection against
Rawls's difference principle but there
are two weightier more difficult
objections one of them comes from
defenders of a meritocratic conception
the argument that says what about effort
what about people working hard having a
right to what they earn because they've
deserved it they worked hard for it
that's the objection from effort and
moral desert then there's this another
objection that comes from libertarians
and this objection has to do with
doesn't the difference principle by
treating our natural talents and
endowments has common assets doesn't
that violate the idea that we own
ourselves now let me deal first with the
objection that comes from the
libertarian direction Milton Friedman
writes in his book free to choose life
is not fair and it's tempting to believe
that government can rectify what nature
has spawned but his answer is the only
way to try to rectify that is to have a
leveling equality of outcome everyone
finishing the race at the same point and
that would be a disaster this is an easy
argument to answer and Rawls
addresses it in one of the most powerful
passages I think of a theory of justice
it's in section 17 the natural
distribution and here he's talking about
the natural distribution of talents and
endowment is neither just nor unjust
nor is it unjust that persons are born
into society at some particular position
these are simply natural facts what is
just and unjust is the way that
institutions deal with these facts
that's his answer to libertarian less a
fair economists like Milton Friedman who
say life is unfair but get over it get
over it and let's see if we can at least
maximize the benefits that flow from it
but the more powerful libertarian
objection to Rawls is not libertarian
from the libertarian economists like
Milton Friedman it's from the argument
about self ownership developed as we saw
in Nozick and from that point of view
yes it might be a good thing to create
headstart programs and public schools so
that everyone can go to a decent school
and start the race at the same starting
line that might be good but if you tax
people to it to create public schools if
you tax people against their will you
coerce them it's a form of theft if you
take some of Letterman's 31 million tax
it away to support public schools
against his will the state is really
doing no better than stealing from him
it's coercion and the reason is we have
to think of ourselves as owning our
talents and endowments because otherwise
we're back to just using people and
coercing people that's the libertarian
reply which Rawls answer to that objection
he doesn't address the idea of
self-ownership directly but the effect
the moral weight of his argument for the
difference principle is maybe we don't
own ourselves in that thoroughgoing
sense after all now he says this doesn't
mean that the state is an owner in me in
the sense that it can simply commandeer
my life because remember the first
principle we would agree to behind the
veil of ignorance is the principle of
equal basic liberties freedom of speech
religious liberty freedom of conscience
and the like so the only respect in
which the idea of self-ownership must
give way comes when we're thinking about
whether I own myself in the sense that I
have a privileged claim on the benefits
that come from the exercise of my
talents in a market economy
and Rawls says on reflection we don't we
can defend rights we can respect the
without embracing the idea of
self-possession that in effect is his
reply to the libertarian I want to turn
now to his reply to the defender of a
meritocratic conception who invokes
effort as the basis of moral desert
people who work hard to develop their
talents deserve the benefits that come
from the exercise of their talents well
we've already seen
the beginning of Rawls's answer to that
question and it goes back to that poll
we took about birth order his first
answer is even the work ethic even the
willingness to strive conscientiously
depends on all sorts of family
circumstances and social and cultural
contingencies for which we can claim no
credit you can't claim credit for the
fact that you most of you most of us
happen to be first in birth order and
that for some complex psychological and
social reasons that seems to be
associated with striving with achieving
with effort that's one answer there's a
second answer those of you who invoke
effort you don't really believe that
moral desert attaches to effort take two
construction workers one is strong and
can raise four walls in an hour without
even breaking a sweat and another
construction worker is small and scrawny
and it has to spend three days to do the
same amount of work no defender of
meritocracy is going to look at the
effort of that weak and scrawny
construction worker and say therefore he
deserves to make more so it isn't really
effort this is the second reply to the
meritocratic claim it isn't really
effort that the defender of meritocracy
believes is the moral basis of
distributive shares its contribution how
much do you contribute but contribution
takes us right back to our natural
talents and abilities not just effort
and it's not our doing how we came into
the possession of those talents in the
first place alright suppose you accepted
these arguments
that effort isn't everything that
contribution matters from the standpoint
of the meritocratic conception that
effort even isn't our own doing does
that mean the objection continues does
that mean that according to Rawls moral
desert has nothing to do with
distributive justice well yes
distributive justice is not about moral
desert now here
Rawls introduces an important and a
tricky distinction it's between moral
desert on the one hand and entitlements
to legitimate expectations on the other
what is the difference between moral
deserts and entitlements consider two
different games a game of chance in a
game of skill take a game of pure chance
say I play the Massachusetts state
lottery and my number comes up I'm
entitled to my winnings but even though
I'm entitled to my winnings there's no
sense in which because it's just a game
of luck no sense in which I morally
deserve to win in the first place that's
an entitlement now contrast the lottery
with a different kind of game a game of
skill now imagine the Boston Red Sox
winning the World Series when they win
they're entitled to the trophy but it
can be always asked of a game of skill
did they deserve to win it's always
possible in principle to distinguish
what someone's entitled to under the rules
rules
and whether they deserve to win in the
first place that's an antecedent
standard moral desert now Rahl says
distributive justice is not a matter of
moral desert though it is a matter of
entitlements to legitimate expectations
here's where he explains it a just
scheme answers to what men are entitled
to it satisfies their legitimate
expectations is founded upon social
institutions but what they are entitled
to is not proportional to nor dependent
on their intrinsic worth the principles
of justice that regulate the basic
structure do not mention moral desert
and there is no tendency for
distributive shares to correspond to it
why does Rawls make this distinction
what morally is at stake one thing
morally at stake is the whole question
of effort that we've already discussed
but there's a second contingency a
second source of moral arbitrariness
that goes beyond the question of whether
it's to my credit that I have the
talents that enable me to get ahead and
that has to do with the contingency that
I live in a society that happens to
prize my talents the fact that David
Letterman lives in a society that puts a
great premium puts a great value on a
certain type of smirky joke that's not
his doing he's lucky that he happens to
but this is the second contingency this
isn't something that we can claim credit
for even if I had sole unproblematic
claim to my talents and to my effort it
would still be the case that the
benefits I get from exercising those
talents depend on factors that are
arbitrary from a moral point of view
what my talents will reap in a market
economy what does that depend on what
other people happen to one or like in
this society it depends on the law of
supply and demand that's not my doing
certainly not the basis for moral desert
what counts as contributing depends on
the qualities that this or that society
happens to prize most of us are
fortunate to possess in large measure
for whatever reason the qualities that
our society happens to prize the
qualities they need that enable us to
provide what society wants in a
capitalist society it helps to have
entrepreneurial Drive in a bureaucratic
society it helps to get on easily and
smoothly with superiors in a mass
democratic society it helps to look good
on television and to speak in short
in a litigious society it helps to go to
law school and to have the talents to do
well on ell SATs but none of this is how
we're doing
suppose that we with our talents
inhabited not our society
technologically advanced highly
litigious but a hunting Society or a
warrior society what would become of our
talents then they wouldn't get us very
far no doubt some of us would develop
others but would we be less worthy would
be be less virtuous would be would we be
less meritorious if we live in that kind
of society rather than in ours
well this answer is no we might make
less money and properly so but while we
would be entitled to less we would be no
less worthy no less deserving than we
are now and here's the point the same
could be said of those in our society
who happen to hold less prestigious
positions who happen to have fewer of
the talents that our society happens to
reward so here's the moral import of the
distinction between moral desert and
entitlements to legitimate expectations
we are entitled to the benefits that the
rules of the game promised for the
exercise of our talents but it's a
mistake and a conceit to suppose that we
deserve in the first place a society
that values the qualities we happen to
have in abundance now we've been talking
here about income and wealth
what about opportunities and honors what
about the distribution of access of
seats in elite colleges and universities
it's true all of you
most of you firstborn work hard strived
developed your talents to get here but
Rawls asks in effect what is the moral
status of your claim to the benefits
that attach to the opportunities you
have our seats in colleges and
universities a matter a kind of reward
an honor for those who deserve them
because they've worked so hard or are
those seats those opportunities and
honors entitlements to legitimate
expectations that depend for their
justification and those of us who enjoy
them doing so in a way that works to the
benefit of those at the bottom of
society that's the question that Rawls's
difference principle poses it's a
question that can be asked of the
earnings of Michael Jordan and David
Letterman and Judge Judy but it's also a
question that can be asked of
opportunities to go to the top colleges
and universities and that's a debate
that comes out when we turn to the
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