This content provides a comprehensive, albeit informal and opinionated, historical overview of Roman civilization, tracing its evolution from a small city-state to a vast empire and its eventual transformation, emphasizing its enduring legacy and adaptability.
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Rome was a mess. And I mean that on every level. Living in Rome was messy, dealing with Rome was
messy, and in our case, talking about Rome is messy. Admittedly, that’s like 80% of
the fun with them – Because there is no single history of Rome. The perspective of every era,
every province, every social class, and every outsider is completely different. Instead,
my goal today is to tell a complete history of Rome as a Mediterranean Civilization-State.
Not just looking at warfare, nor literature, nor politics, nor architecture – mmm, man I wish – and
certainly not imperial tabloid scandal, but a history of the Idea Of Rome – the collective
consciousness that defines the Senātus Populusque Rōmānus: The Senate and People of Rome. Those 4
letters “SPQR” weren’t just a moniker the Romans called themselves, it was a communal promise that
remained true throughout centuries of evolution and change – and qualities like that make Rome
feel really special. There's honestly nothing like it, and I think it's important to appreciate not
just what Rome became, but how much slow, careful, calculated effort was put into its cultivation and
preservation. As we’ll see in a minute, early Roman history is a notoriously slow burn,
as generation after generation dedicated themselves to something they'd never see the
end of. And I just think that's really cool, so: as we start from the very beginning of the Roman
story and weave our way through two millennia of glory, triumph, and deeply hilarious disasters,
Let's do… some History!
Rome was not built in a day, but it was built, consciously and with intentionality. Roman
civilization as we understand it is the product of millions of people: men and women, young and old,
weak and powerful – working over millennia to make their culture something spectacular. We
can see that they built and accomplished amazing things across three continents, but what’s less
obvious is what they built on. Not literally, mind you, that’s usually just brick or stone;
but what cultural foundation sustained so huge an idea as “Rome”? That’s the kind of question that
takes us to the very beginnings of their history, as we’d try to figure out what inciting incident
led to all of this. However, any records from the earliest Roman chronicles are agonizingly absent,
as the city was sacked and burned in 390 by a tribe of Gauls, so we are instead left at the
mercy of Roman Legend: completely ahistorical, and hella propaganda. But despite this rather
considerable setback in understanding the earliest roots of Roman history, we can work
with this – because later Romans also didn’t know where exactly they came from, and were voraciously
curious to fix that. So, lacking a verifiable answer, they instead devised one, consciously
and intentionally compiling a narrative out of half-remembered myths and historical
foreshadowing of the later Rome they knew. This web of folktales, retold and refined by centuries
of storytellers until their codification around the turn of the millennium, is our best source of
cultural intent and ambition for the Rome that was to be. So, let’s untangle this Roman Creation Myth
to better understand the underlying Roots of Rome.
If we take the Romans at their word, their origins goeth thusly: 1100-something-or-other BC, Troy’s
on fire and one lucky prince Aeneas escaped. He made his way to Italy, with interruptions, and
won kingship of the plain of Latium, but it’s not Rome Time quite yet. His descendants ruled in Alba
Longa a short ways south of the Tiber river for four centuries, until the Alban king Numitor got
deposed by his brother Amulius, who made Numitor’s daughter Rhea Silvia a vestal virgin to ensure
the bloodline ends with her. This was always a failing strategy when Olympians were afoot, and
sure enough the war god Mars slid in to give her twin sons Romulus and Remus. Amulius demanded they
be killed river-style, but they were saved at the banks of the Tiber by a she-wolf, who then nursed
them through early childhood before they were taken in by shepherds – bringing the twins’ parent
count to one dad, two moms, one god, and a wolf. They grew up and deposed that nasty awful Amulius,
and later set about founding a new settlement along the Tiber. A brotherly quarrel escalated
as they were plotting out the course of their new walls, and Romulus killed Remus in the first but
distinctly not last Roman-on-Roman violence. That, kids, is why it’s called Rome and not Reme. With
his kingship secure and the city founded in the year 753, Romulus got to populating his new town,
so he welcomed bandits, exiles, and other such ruffians, and then captured the Sabine women
en-masse to ensure Rome would have heirs. Unlike Rhea Silvia , we can’t all be slammed by the god
of war, but the Romans sure learned from his example. Romulus also implemented several core
features of Roman society: the tribes, Patrician and Plebeian classes, marriage laws, the
patron-client system, even the Senate arose as if springing fully-formed from the head of Romulus.
After him, six more kings ruled over Rome, the last three of whom were from the Etruscan
Tarquinii clan, and the very last was Tarquinius Superbus, AKA Tarky-Tark Super-Bus, who was a
total knob. His incessant assholery enraged the Romans into throwing their very first coup-d’état,
very exciting, ousting Tarquin and establishing Rome as a republic in 509 BC. From there,
the Italian peninsula was destined to one day fall under the stunning force of Rome’s
military and kickass civic institutions, and the whole Mediterranean would undoubtably be next.
This origin story is dignified, tidy, a little
self-indulgent, but above all else, convenient. So let’s go through this and, you know, rip it
apart. First off, Rome’s founding date of 753 is a guess, posited in the first century BC to roughly
line up with the earliest Greek Olympics. As far as the story itself goes, the Italy-bound journey
of Aeneas the perfect Roman OC Do Not Steal is suspiciously Odyssean enough as is, but it’s first
attested by Greek sources during the Republic. Aeneas is also way back in the Bronze Age
compared to 753; that hefty 4-century gap between Aeneas and Romulus went largely unexplained until
Dionysius of Halicarnassus seemingly invented the entire concept of the Alban Kings in his “Roman
Antiquities” from the first century BC. The Kings of Alba longa have very little characterization,
and some can be mapped onto nearby Latium place-names, so it’s not a stretch to think
Dionysius decided that hill over there is totally derived from this ancient king you guys I promise,
don’t google it, I promise, please, please don’t investigate it. It’s only when we run
into the twins’ backstory that the Alban kings Numitor and Amulius actually do anything. The
boys’ story is overtly mythical, and even Livy questions Mars and the wolf, but what might be
less believable than divine parentage is the idea that 7 kings ruled Rome for a combined 244 years,
which requires an unbroken string of seven 35-year reigns on average. That is a royal runtime matched
by only two emperors before the fall of Western Rome. And yes, that of all things is where I draw
the realism line; because each segment of this story feels abundantly retrofitted to clean up a
messy set of chronologies between key events: the well-known establishment of the republic in 509,
the vaguely-understood foundation of the city in the mid 700s-ish, and the heavily mythologized
Trojan origins of Aeneas back in the Bronze Age. Everything else is just narrative-scaffolding.
Republican-era Romans wondered
aloud how exactly their history could fit two founders in the same folk-tradition, and it took
until the Augustan period to square all that by having Aeneas found the Roman dynasty and Romulus
build the city itself. Other classical states didn’t struggle this much with contradicting
narratives – Athens certainly didn’t mind having multiple founder heroes, and one of them was
Theseus, eugh – but in the first century BC, Rome took an organic storytelling tradition and forced
all those disparate threads to play by History’s rules: one continuous narrative. It didn’t need
to be what we would call “Factual”, it just needed to fit. Of course the Alban kings were retconned
into existence to tidy up the timeline, Aeneas and Romulus are the only two who narratively matter.
Rome’s legendary origins only needed to make sense to The Romans, and in the absence of records from
before Rome’s first sack in 390 BC, that’s the closest thing to a primary source we have.
As pure history, it’s bound to leave us wanting anything more substantive – but as an artifact of
their culture, this origin tells us everything the Romans needed to know about themselves and wanted
anyone else to know: Their heroes are divine descendants of Venus and Mars, their lineage
runs back as far as anywhere in Greece, they come from disparate places and backgrounds, civil war
is in their blood, they 100% have a wolf kink, and they kill tyrants. That’s Rome – everything else
is Livy’s filler arcs.
Now, for a supposedly ancient story, two of Romulus’ deeds point decidedly forwards in Roman
history, and reveal what later Romans thought must have been intrinsic to their identity.
His first act as king was to welcome Italy’s dispossessed and outlaws as Rome’s citizens,
which may seem rather unheroic on the face of it, but this reflects Rome’s most peculiar trait:
its openness to cultures and people. Rome, of course, thought it was the best civilization ever,
and made that known loudly and frequently, but Rome took good ideas wherever they found them,
and was willing to let any barbarian become Roman so long as they took on Rome’s customs and learned
Latin. Romans always started as outsiders, be they exiles from across Italy or refugees from
far off Troy, supposedly. Rome was also remarkably comfortable with granting citizenship to freed
slaves, a quality the Greeks absolutely did not share. This seemingly undignified story actually
enshrines the idea that regardless of social class or cultural boundaries, it was possible to
become a Roman – and that idea is the stuff that pan-Mediterranean civilizations are made of. But
alongside Rome’s great aspirations, their deepest anxiety is also present in the Romulus story:
as their ruinously blood-soaked hobby of civil wars finds its start in that fratricidal founder.
Rather than being intended as justification to go out murdering (as if they needed that),
this looks like the closest thing to Rome’s Original Sin, the foundational crime they will
be doomed to repeat over and over and over and over and over for more than two thousand years.
These stories take their most
permanent forms seven centuries after the supposed founding of the city, in the pages of Livy’s
History of Rome and Virgil’s Aeneid – and as we wait for potential discoveries in archaeology to
illuminate the earliest settlements amid those hills beside the Tiber, that’s all we’ve got to
go on. The image sharpens into historical focus as we depose king Tarquin, start the republic,
and embark on the slow process of building Rome’s civic institutions and establishing
a domain across central Italy, but the further we progress along the timeline, the more meaningful
and relevant their origin story becomes. The roots of Rome ultimately tell us nothing about the
earliest Romans – if they even called themselves Romans, even came from Troy, even had kings,
even did any of the things their myths take for granted – but this narrative reveals so
much about the civilization they would become and the kind of people the Romans would one day be:
Crafty Bastards. As the next two thousand years will amply demonstrate, they were crafty bastards.
What's important
to keep in mind as we start laying down more and more red paint on this lovely marble map is that
Rome did not begin with a grand plan of conquest. Rather, after shaking off Etruscan domineering and
suffering their first major incursion of the Gauls in 390 by Brennus, the Romans needed to
fortify their territory by pacifying threats at their frontier. Simply put, this process began,
and never finished. Individuals had their social or political motives for participating,
but at scale, this doctrine of Expanding Defense just kept on expanding. Rome did not have some
53-and-a-half step plan for Mediterranean domination imposed from the top, but a set of
priorities which successive generations inherited and renewed. This defensively-expansionist
military philosophy carved through Etruria, Samnium, Magna Graecia, Carthage, Macedonia,
Gaul, Syria, Egypt, Germania, and Parthia – there would always be another enemy to fear. But we're
getting ahead of ourselves; Rome handled its enemies one at a time, and so will we.
A majority of Rome’s early
history was simply a spearited back and forth between its neighbors the Etruscans to the north,
the Samnites to the south, and later on the Greek colonies of Magna Graecia to the way
further south. And by "spearited" I do literally mean they were stabbing each other with spears.
While all of this neighborly murder-y business was going on, the city of Rome was building itself
up both physically and institutionally, with walls, streets, a sewer system, stone temples
and buildings, a governmental system reminiscent of the Greek Polis system, and a religious system
reminiscent of the Greek pantheon. Man that Greek influence really got in there early.
Institutionally speaking, by the time they
kicked out Tarquin and swore never to have a king again, a lot of the mechanics of the republic were
already in place, like the Senate, the Patrician nobility and the citizen assembly. The transition
to a Republic was really more of a reorganization of authority than a political revolution or
anything like that. Broadly speaking, the whole idea was to take their government and publicize
the power so the people could participate, and the word Republic comes from the Latin
"Res Publica" which just means "public thing". Structurally the government was controlled by
two annually elected Consuls, the Praetors ran the justice system, and the Quaestors, the silliest
roman name ever, managed state finances. The Aediles were responsible for the state of the
city, so they handled food, games, infrastructure, and all that jazz. The Senate, though it didn't
technically legislate anything, published opinions on policy that were often very quickly put in
place by their respective officers down the chain.
Almost all of these magistrates and Senators in the early republic were of the Patrician
nobility. If you happened to be one of Rome's many Plebeians, you might have rightly felt a
little left out of this supposed Res Publica. The Plebeians unsurprisingly wanted political
and social rights and they were determined to acquire them, so on any given season of
campaigning against Rome's bothersome neighbors, the Plebeians, who composed the majority of the
army, simply went on strike. They'd just go sit on a hill and wait until the Senate granted them
the right to marry Patricians or to have their own government positions in a special assembly,
or to elect their own members of that special assembly, or to serve as consul! And then by
287 BC the Plebeians and the Patricians were equal in everything but name. Good for them!
The government
of the Roman Republic simultaneously had elements of a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy.
This mixed constitution and its flexibility in governance – according to the historian
Polybius – was one of Rome's greatest strengths, and I'm inclined to agree. Rome's institutions
were its backbone for over two thousand years and you need a backbone like that to hard-carry an
entire civilization. Okay, enough of the politicky stuff, back to the stabby stuff. Now like I said,
early Roman Republican history is a notoriously slow burn: the struggle for Plebeians’ rights took
over two centuries, and conquering the Italian peninsula was similarly slow going. Rome was
intent on being careful, taking small steps, and taking its time. Compare this to the aftermath of
the Macedonian conquests happening just a short ways east: when you go too far too fast, things
tend to fracture. Rome spent most of the fourth and early third centuries fighting with various
neighbors and working its way down to only the bay of Naples. That's a pretty short way to go in so
long a time – Call it careful, call it as fast as a small state like Rome could hope to go anyway,
either way it worked. Key to Rome's military strategy was that aforementioned doctrine of
"Expanding Defense". Essentially Rome would never be so brash as to go out and attack someone,
Good heavens no! Rome had the good manners to only fight in self-defense, and they knew that
their gods would only grant them victory if their war was a just and pious war. Buuuuut if Rome
suspected that someone was going to attack them, Rome would absolutely shoot first –eh, defensively
of course! A pre-emptive retaliatory strike, if you will. And that is how you go on to conquer the
entire world, defensively.
By 280 Rome had successfully yoinked all of Samnium and proceeded to set its sights at
Magna Graecia in southern Italy. Magna Graecia, not being the biggest fans of the Romans, and
wishing to keep their land thank you very much, sent for help from Greece proper, and they brought
in the big guns. Specifically they imported the Hellenistic king Pyrrhus of Epirus. Pyrrhus fought
two battles against the Romans, and even though he won both of them, his losses were so devastating
that he bailed on the campaign. After a detour through Sicily, he fought the Romans again, lost,
and went home for good. Pyrrhus's abilities to win battles coupled with his inability to not burn
through a third of his army in the process is what gives us the term "Pyrrhic Victory". So uh, good
on Pyrrhus for eternally tethering his name to the military equivalent of pulling five consecutive
all-nighters to cram for a test. Yeah it's a win but was it worth it, ehhhhh? So with pretty
much no one left to protect Magna Graecia, Rome proceeded to swoop in and colonize all over the
place. And unlike those who employ the "Torch it and start over" method of conquest, the Romans had
a political motive to be kind-ish toward conquered peoples, keeping existing systems in place and not
rocking the boat too badly. Exceeeeeept for this next example, from a rather salty chapter in roman
History, The Punic Wars against Carthage.
The first war can be roughly attributed to a miscommunication with some Sicilian Pirates.
While Carthage and Rome may have been destined to fight each other at some point or another,
they ultimately came to blows on account of both being called into Sicily to settle a fight between
the city of Syracuse and some rowdy pirates. Rome and Carthage kind of just tripped face-first into
war, and spent most of the 23-year long war not actually fighting each other. The issue
was Carthage had been a long-standing naval power in the Mediterranean but Rome had no
navy to speak of. So Rome really needed a navy, and quick. This is another of many instances
of Rome adapting to situations scarily well. Say what we will about Rome, and boy is there plenty,
they were immensely clever, and had a great habit of taking good ideas, methods, technologies and
techniques from other cultures and using them to great effect. In this case the Romans found
a few beached and sunk Carthaginian Triremes and Quinqueremes and proceeded to reverse engineer an
entire fleet of ships. You know, just casually, as you do. Rome's first aquatic outings weren't all
that fruitful but at battles like Cape Ecnomus, which is arguably one of the Biggest naval battles
in history, Rome pulled out wins.
Ultimately Rome won the war, claiming Sicily for itself and forcing heavy reparations on
Carthage. They also decided to take Corsica and Sardinia because "Screw you Carthage,
these are mine now." In the decades following, the Carthaginians, led by the general Hamilcar Barca,
colonized the seaside coast of Hispania or Spain, largely for the purposes of mining
silver to pay their Roman reparations. Little did Rome know, Hamilcar, his son Hannibal,
and the other Carthaginians in Spain, were furious over losing Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, and had
been casually scheming to completely destroy Rome for almost two whole decades. In 219 BC
Hannibal sacked the Roman allied Seguntum in Spain and Rome, defensively of course, declared war.
Hannibal, the madman proceeded
to rather famously Leroy Jenkins his way across the god-damn Alps with over 40,000 soldiers and 37
elephants. ELEPHANTS! And while Elephants aren't particularly scary to us – if you're an ancient
Roman who's never seen an elephant before, that thing is a four-legged giant with two spears and a
snake coming out of its face! Bottom line, they're monsters, the Romans thought they were Monsters.
Granted most of Hannibal's elephants died while crossing the Alps, perhaps unsurprisingly,
but it doesn't take a lot of elephants to have a scary amount of elephant on the battlefield. I
genuinely can't convey how viscerally terrifying the mere mention of Hannibal's name would have
been to a Roman. After arriving in Italy, Hannibal demonstrated his tactical brilliance
by immediately winning two battles in northern Italy through guerrilla and ambush tactics.
Hannibal and his armies would proceed to stay in Italy effectively behind enemy lines with next to
no means of supply or reinforcement, for 16 years. The Carthaginians went up and down the peninsula
setting fire to farms left and right hoping above all else for Rome to simply surrender.
Two years into the campaign,
Hannibal said “Alright screw this I'm gonna destroy the entire Roman army!” and proceeded
to make plans for his next battle, at the roman supply depot at Cannae, in southern Italy. At the
battle the Carthaginians advanced in a U-shape with 40,000 infantry forming the front line and
10,000 cavalry on the wings. The Romans however had almost twice as big an army, so they felt
pretty good about their chances. The armies met and as the fighting progressed the center of the
Carthaginian line fell back, and the Romans pushed forward hoping to break the retreating line.
Except at that moment when they all rushed in, the Carthaginian's African infantry and famed Numidian
cavalry advanced on the flanks and effectively enveloped the whole roman army. From there it was
a bloodbath – estimates are all over the place but the gist is that most of the 80,000-strong
Roman army was killed outright, and the rest were imprisoned. It was the single greatest defeat that
Rome ever suffered in its history. And Hannibal hoped that a shattered and dismayed Rome, having
lost 16 legions and the entire south of Italy, would surrender at once. Rome's response was,
simply, “See ya next year”. And it spent the entire winter raising more armies to go out
the following summer.
For the next several years, the Roman army pursued the strategy of "Just bother him"
and shadowed Hannibal around the Italian countryside. He was still being annoying
and they obviously didn’t want him there, but he wasn't a direct threat to the City of Rome,
so good enough for now. But jumping back, can we take a second to appreciate the sheer
quintessential Roman badassery it takes to hear that you lost at least 50,000 soldiers, and then
turn around and tell the guy who killed them to shove it and wait for round two! Because holy crap
that takes some serious coleones, serious and massively suicidal coleones. And speaking of,
in 211 the young Publius Cornelius Scipio took up a generalship for the Spanish campaign, which was
widely considered to be a dead-man’s quest. To the surprise of basically everyone, He spent the next
five years successfully de-Carthagifying Spain. Following his campaign he hatched a brilliant
plan to take the fight back to Carthage. But the Senate, thinking this was another suicide mission,
told him he could do it, but they wouldn't finance his armies. So Scipio raised a couple legions
in Italy and Sicily and hopped over to north Africa. Why would anything else be what happened?
Now while Hannibal is absolutely a brilliant
general, in that he did impossibly crazy stuff like crossing the alps, campaigning in Italy for
16 years, and wiping out an entire roman army – Scipio's brilliance came from his quintessentially
Roman ability to adopt and adapt. The Romans above all else knew a good idea when they saw one,
and they almost never made the same mistake twice. Scipio studied Cannae and he knew what he
had to do to defeat Carthage. Since the Numidian cavalry was critical to the Carthaginian army,
Scipio played into a Numidian civil war to get some of their cavalry for himself. In doing so
he had massively weakened Carthage on their own soil and had nearly orchestrated their surrender
when OH SNAP HANNIBAL'S BACK.
And on that day, history nerds from all around the world and across time busted out the popcorn,
because this was gonna be good! The night before the impending battle of Zama, Hannibal and Scipio
actually, supposedly, had a meeting. It's detailed in Livy's "History of Rome" book 30, chapters 30
and 31. Just read it okay, for me, read it it's incredible. First they're simply in awe of each
other. Then Hannibal waxes philosophical about fortune, gives Scipio life advice,
and asks for peace. Scipio respondes "Well I was going to make peace but then you brought an army
here, I can't just leave now. Look Hannibal I respect you I really do, but you're leaving me
no choice here man. I've just gotta kick your ass dude, I'm sorry, there's no other way,
I have to kick your ass."
And on the following day, some asses were certainly kicked. At the battle of Zama,
Scipio's Numidian cavalry put the Carthaginian cavalry to flight. And fighting between the
infantry lines was actually very close until the Roman cavalry returned from behind the
Carthaginian line to ultimately win the day. It was a hard-fought and super tense battle,
but with that, the second Punic War was won. Half a century later, and after lots of Cato the Elder
ending all of his senate speeches with "Carthago Delenda Est", Rome returned to raze Carthage to
the ground. Later accounts would embellish this victory with tales of salting the earth to ensure
Carthage would never rise again. In literal terms, that’s demonstrably false given Rome later built
its own Carthage on the site of the original, but it points to how thoroughly they destroyed
the Carthaginian state. Further, that fable is an essential piece of the popular Roman tradition and
a core trait of their character: There’s regular bitter, there’s 90% extreme dark chocolate bitter,
and then there’s Rome hates you so much they wipe your empire off the face of the earth forever”
bitter. Moral of the story is Rome does not screw around, so don't screw with Rome, and salt or not,
that much is true.
With Spain and north Africa now happily Romanized, focus shifted eastward and Rome proceeded to clean
up the squabbling and stagnating Hellenistic kingdoms from the aftermath of Alexander the
Shortsighted's campaigns. The Macedonians had helped Carthage in the Punic wars,
so Rome considered that sufficient grounds for bespearment. And bespearment of course
is a word that I made up for the act of getting stabbed with a spear. Anywho, in that conflict
the Seleucid Greeks helped the Macedonians, so the Romans saw that too as provocation.
Not wanting to go too far too fast (and also because they didn't quite have a big enough
army yet) Rome stopped at Greece for the better part of a century, and simply took to kneecapping
the armies of the eastern Mediterranean so they didn't pose any direct threat.
This marks a much more aggressive roman attitude
towards conquest. It was super important that Italy be unified through diplomacy and generosity
because that was Italy. But all of these new places were explicitly considered provinces
under Rome. Even though Rome was still a Republic and didn't yet have an emperor,
it absolutely possessed an empire by this point. After the conquest of Greece and the acquisition
of the kingdom of Pergamum through a will of all things, Rome was clearly the dominant power in the
Mediterranean. But there was one thing Expanding Defense could not protect against: itself.
By the mid 100s BC, Rome had become rather
adept at exporting violence. In 146, it capped the Punic War trilogy by burning the city of Carthage
to the ground, meanwhile that very same year, the Roman Army plundered, ransacked, destroyed,
murdered, and/or enslaved every Man, Woman, Child, and artefact in the city of Corinth to complete
their conquest of Greece. This was a banger year for Rome’s cartographers who had the happy task
of painting a beautiful shade of Red all across Greece and North Africa, but it was a mixed bag
at best for the new subjects, not citizens, who lived there. Violence was a key ingredient of
Roman statecraft abroad, and with such a thin line between the military and political establishments,
we shouldn’t be surprised when someone applies that same thinking to local politics. … OH NO.
With that foreboding
preamble out of the way, let’s meet the Gracchi Brothers! Members of the lower Plebeian class,
these boyos were the sons of a Consul and general, as well as the maternal grandsons
of the great general Scipio Africanus himself. During his political career, the elder brother
Tiberius set about reforming land rights to be more egalitarian. The plan was that no one could
own more than half a square mile of the Public Lands acquired by the state during wars. Notably,
a lot of Public Land was recently acquired by the state during wars. His idea was to partition all
that out in small lots for the poorer citizens, so that everyone — well, actually not everyone — but
all the citizens had a farm and a livelihood to call their own. The thing is, a version of this
law had already been in place since 367 BC, but nobody enforced it, so wealthy romans and generals
gobbled up loads of public land during the recent conquests. Naturally, the reason this law was
ignored was the same reason Tiberius would have so much trouble getting it back on the books: Rome’s
old-money-est citizens tended to be Senators, who had plenty to lose from a law that capped a
considerable source of their family wealth.
But Tiberius was not a Senator himself, rather, in 133 BC he held the office of Tribune. In centuries
past, this was the only office available to the lower Plebeian class, but generations of
reforms and good old fashioned bullying eroded the social, political, and financial barriers
between Patricians and Plebeians. And as a result, the Tribune was no slouch, having
the authority to veto many government actions and upper magistrates. Tiberius’ own father used this
veto to save Scipio Africanus from a sham bribery trial back in the 180s BC, which is supposedly
why Scipio’s daughter was swiftly betrothed into the Gracchi family. That particular sidebar will
remain unexplored, but the relevant point is how Rome’s weaponized gridlock pressured the Senate to
act in the interest of the Plebeians. Except this time, as Tiberius pushed his legislation through
the Plebeian Assembly, the Senators pressured an aristocratic-leaning Tribune to veto it.
This was legal, but had never been done before,
and despite Tiberius’ requests, neither the Senate nor the other Tribune would budge.
So Tiberius took a similarly unprecedented step and had the other guy deposed, voiding his veto,
and then finally passing the reforms, with him and his family in charge of divvying up the plots
to landless citizens. Now with all that done… even for the Romans who liked these reforms,
that last bit was a little shifty. A frivolous veto is one thing, but deposing a Tribune and
passing a law with blatant conflicts of interest made Tiberius look dangerous. And just like that,
Rome’s Proto-Socialist fave became problematic. Honestly, the political machinations at play here
are a fascinating showcase of how Romans began breaking constitutional customs before they got
to outright Breaking the Republic. But, let’s not get off-track, I promised you a bodycount,
so here is the fun part.
Fearing prosecution once he left office, Tiberius took another unprecedented step of running for a
consecutive second term as Tribune, which his opponents interpreted as a tyrannical power
grab on top of his existential threat to their wealth. Unfortunately for them, the land reform
was popular, and Tiberius' enemies in the Senate figured he would win his re-election for Tribune.
So the Pontifex Maximus and several senators went over to the Assembly with the intent to cause a
ruckus and stop the vote counting. But the ensuing scuffle got out of hand, and without any weapons,
they grabbed what was available, and subsequently beat Tiberius to death, with clubs and chairs. As
we will see later, stabbing Caesar with knives was one thing, but using chairs? Now that’s a
full-body workout – that takes intent and a good deal of persistence. This was the first time the
Roman instinct for violence had turned inward and spilled into republican politics, and with
that blood-red line so spectacularly crossed, boy oh boy it would not be the last. Frankly,
the senators were already in too deep to just go home and change, so they proceeded to kill another
300 of Gracchus' supporters, thus introducing the concept of political martyrdom and removing any
prejudice against the expediency of assassination.
Now with that point made, I mentioned Tiberius had a brother. That would be Gaius, and his story is…
well, let’s see for ourselves. Gaius was unfazed by his brother’s grisly demise, and embarked on
even more aggressive reforms when he became Tribune in 123. These new policies included:
redoing the provincial tax system so income went back to Rome instead of the governors, then using
that new revenue to offer low-price wheat for the Roman people. Elsewhere, he cut down on bribery
in the courts and stopped the senate from playing favorites with Consuls. Gaius’ consistent strategy
was to prevent Senatorial corruption by elevating the Equestrian class to advisory positions and
oversight roles in the Republic. Far more daring than Tiberius’ little old land laws, this thicc-o
slate of reforms touched nearly every level of government – from revenue to public programs
and courts to consuls – so it could only be passed with big help. Gaius allied with the Equestrians,
offering them new authority and prestige in exchange for passing those laws to help the poor
and make the Republic run smoother.
That all sounds good and noble, but let’s remember that Gaius’ brother was f*cking assassinated,
so the man justifiably held a grudge. To that end, he limited the Senate’s power to prosecute without
the Assembly’s consent, and forbade anyone deposed by the Assembly from holding any other office. On
paper, that’s a power-grab for the Assembly, but those are also just reasonable laws. So despite
all the reasons Senate hated him, he remained extremely popular with the Roman people, securing
a second consecutive term as Tribune in 122.
But it’s here that Gaius played himself by raising the question of citizenship. Essentially,
Rome was Rome, and proper Romans were citizens, but outside of Rome, the Latin-speaking population
weren’t citizens, and the other Italians in the peninsula had even fewer rights than the
Latins. Gaius sensed widespread discontent among these allied non-citizens, and figured
he could win them over by giving Latin Rights to free Italians, and making the Latins into full
citizens. One could imagine how such a grateful new voting block would happily elect Gaius into
everything forever. But while this solution was rather clever, it was intensely unpopular with
every class of citizen in Rome, so the measure completely failed, his popularity plummeted across
the board despite his astounding reforms, and he handily lost his next election for Tribune.
Wait hold on, this isn’t an assassination,
this is just realpolitik. Ugh, Dammiiiit. – Wait, wait, there’s another page – oh yeah, here we go.
SO, one of Gaius’ pet policies was setting up new colonies of Roman citizens in Carthage and Italy,
so that proper Romans had a place to live in these shiny new provinces they killed so many
people to get. But the new Tribune proposed to dissolve the colonies, so Gaius triggered illegal
protests against it, and in the ensuing scuffles, one of Gaius’ supporters was killed. The Senate,
horrified at the uproar, feared a classic Gracchi Brothers Power Grab, so they passed the Senatus
Consultum Ultimum, an ultimate decree branding Gaius and his allies as enemies of the state and
granting themselves the authority to strategically unalive them. And thus, the senators partied like
it’s 133 BC – Gaius and his gang fortified themselves atop the Aventine hill, so the
Consul raised a mob and brought soldiers within the city walls to go slash their way up. Sources
differ on the details, as is tradition, but Gaius had likely fallen on his own sword by the time the
Senate found him. So technically, technically, He Specifically was not actually assassinated…
However, 3,000 of his supporters were absolutely murdered to death during and after the riot,
and that handy purge left a template for targeted political violence that later Romans would be all
too eager to follow.
In the years after, nearly all of Gaius’ laws were repealed, but the Republic could
not escape him throughout its last century. His defining reforms remained highly contentious,
and the political violence of his term became frighteningly commonplace – decades later,
the issue of citizenship erupted into the Social War in 91 BC, ending with all Italians getting
full citizenship, but nearly toppling the entire Roman state in the process. Meanwhile,
the Equestrian class benefitted immensely from Gaius’ reforms, taking on vast new powers with
none of the checks or customs that kept the Senate at least nominally in line. The Roman Republic
didn’t collapse overnight, and the worst of its civil wars was yet to come, several times over,
but the reforms, political battles, and violent deaths of the Gracchi brothers made it far easier
to be Bad – and that was a temptation the Romans absolutely did not need – because nobody could
kick Rome’s ass like Rome.
Okay, Rome buddy hold up you had no political violence for 400 years, you got a really good
thing going, please don't screw this up... Oh WOW yeah they really screw this one up don't they?
Jeez, yikes where do we start?
Well, crises like the Gracchi derived in part from the roman Patron-Client system, in which a
wealthy and well-connected Roman provided for his clients, who in turn supported him politically.
This worked fine on a small scale but things got problematic when people effectively tried to buy
public support in large quantities. On top of that, there were three mass slave revolts
in Sicily and Italy. Then there's the social war where most of Italy revolted against Rome, after
which all Italians were granted full citizenship. And let's also not forget the Catiline conspiracy
to overthrow the consulship of Cicero! All of those civil wars were reconciled but still,
that's a lot of civil warring to happen in just the span of a half century. But by far
the worst of the lot were the factional civil wars between the populist Populares and the
aristocratic Optimates. Otherwise known as the two civil wars between Marius and Sulla. Gaius Marius,
a seven-time Consul and general who conquered parts of north Africa and settled the Social War,
headed the Populares. While the Optimates were led by Lucius Sulla, another successful general.
The Optimates, for context, were the ones who assassinated the Gracchi brothers. And they
clearly remained satisfied with their handiwork, because when Sulla came back from a campaign
in Anatolia, he marched his army into Rome, established himself as dictator, and proceeded to
massacre his rival Populares, Twice. He did all of that, TWICE. That's huge! In 50 years we went from
not a single Roman being killed over politics to armies marching on Rome and carrying out
prescribed hit lists of political enemies. Things were really really bad in the first century.
For now though let's recap:
Rome started as one tiny irrelevant city and grew itself very gradually through calculated
means. First conquering Italy, then the islands, then Spain and soon after Greece north Africa and
Anatolia. What astounds me is that a typical Roman would only ever see a small part of this unfold.
Whether intentionally or not, the Romans were patient – and their combination of smarts, skills,
and strategic restraint let them build towards something bigger than themselves. As Rome grew,
it appeared to be creating a world far greater and more stable than the floundering conquests of a
Greek kid on a horse, but as we’ll see, that only held true so long as Rome exercised restraint,
and that was not a given.
Ah the roman republic, perhaps the ancient world's most brilliant form of government. It's had a
rough go in its later years, but with the right people in charge I bet that it could continue on
for centuries to come – like this guy right here, Julius Caesar, who I'm sure will do everything in
his power to preserve the Republic. We’ve seen so far that as Roman politics got increasingly
factional and Roman territory got increasingly massive, things started getting increasingly
civil war-y, as in they'd barely be able to go a decade between 135 and 30 BC without collapsing
into some variety of a civil war. It's honestly a minor miracle that Rome didn't permanently tear
itself in half before we even got to Caesar, so as we push forward through history and get to talking
about our old buddy Julius I want to consider the question of whether the Roman Republic – not Rome
as a whole but specifically the republican system of government – was doomed to fail,
or whether it had any chance of survival. Because our answer to that question really matters when
we look at people like Caesar and Augustus and ask ourselves what they did and whether or not
they went too far, but since I'm impatient I'm going to give you my answer right now: To me,
the republic had almost no chance of surviving on its own. Zero. You saw what happened in the
first century, you know what kind of mess Rome was in. The motives for individuals were irrevocably
misaligned from the good of the state. I love the Roman Republic, it's one of my favorite systems
of government ever, But that poor thing was so screwed. So with our sickly looking republic
on its last legs, let's meet the guy who took it out back and killed it dead: Julius Caesar.
To establish what kind of guy Caesar really is,
I'll spin you a yarn about some Cilician pirates. When Caesar was in his early 20s he managed to get
himself captured by a band of pirates who wanted to ransom him off for 20 talents of silver.
There's no agreed-upon conversion between talents and US dollars but for our purposes let's just say
that one talent is about a million bucks. So when Caesar heard this sum, he straight up laughed at
them and demanded that they ask for a much more respectable 50 talents instead. The pirates,
charmed by Caesar's overwhelming diva-ness (and razor-sharp cheekbones I might add) Were
all too happy to keep him around for the sheer entertainment factor. He played games with them,
told stories, and even wrote poems and speeches for them. Sometimes they'd joke about how his
speeches were bad, and Caesar would respond by saying that when he got free he'd come back and
crucify every last one of them, which the pirates apparently thought was hilarious. Eventually the
pirates did get their 50 talents so they let Caesar go, and then about five seconds later
Caesar came back with a bunch of ships and arrested all of them, casually taking his
50 talents back. He brought the pirates to the provincial governor but since he didn't really
seem to care all that much, Caesar took matters into his own hands and took the high road by
keeping his promise and crucified all of them... Fun! Moral of the story is Caesar cares a lot
about his image, he's amazingly charismatic, he's not afraid to take matters into his own hands if
he needs to, and he does not screw around.
On to more historically significant matters, our boy Gaius Julius Caesar was a well-to-do nobleman
from a prestigious family that traced its ancestry back to the epic hero Aeneas and his mother Venus.
However, Caesar had a chip on his shoulder because his dad was never Consul. You see in
Roman culture, the concept of Nobilitas was rooted in the idea that you can inherit excellence,
but you have to confirm it by doing excellent things in the present. So unlike in the middle
ages and the renaissance and the enlightenment and the industrial revolution and the early modern
period you couldn't just coast by on familial prestige, you actually had to, you know... DO
something for it in ancient Rome. Caesar's dad not being Consul was a big deal so his primary
goal in life was to confirm his Nobilitas by just being Consul. To do it he struck a deal with two
other prominent Romans: Crassus the richest man in Rome and Pompey Rome's most accomplished general,
and they created an informal alliance. In other words they made "The First Triumvirate". They
were all good friends, Pompey married Caesar's daughter, Crassus bribed Caesar's way to the
consulship in 59 BC, Caesar passed all the laws that Pompey & Crassus wanted. It was a good time!
In the process of ramming through debt forgiveness
and land redistribution legislation, Caesar maybe (definitely) broke several procedural norms and
did things that were straight up illegal, but since Ceasar was Consul he had "Imperium" the gold
Mario star of roman politics, which meant that he couldn't be prosecuted for his actions while
he was in office. Regularly overriding the veto of your co-consul on the principle of "Because I
said so" and filling the city with legionaries to dissuade your political opponents may be definite
no-no's in the eyes of the Roman elite, but no one could really do anything about it.
So for Caesar's year in power he was safe,
but once that consulship and his Imperium expired, Caesar had a big target on his back,
so he needed to find a way to keep his Imperium until he was allowed to run for consul again 10
years later. Conveniently, Governors and Generals also have Imperium so Caesar's next move was to
secure himself a governorship of a province and the command of a few legions so he could
go around campaigning with all the Imperium in the world until he could stand for consul again. Some
senators, fearing that Caesar would do literally exactly that, tried to swap his guarantee for
governor of a province for essentially governor of the Italian woods, but Pompey and Crassus,
again, had enough power to overturn that. Coins and stabby things tend to get you a lot in life!
But here we see just
how fragile the republic really was at this point: anyone with enough connections and resources could
effectively cripple the normal flow of government and steer it in favorable directions for their
own benefit. Speaking of, Caesar got himself four legions and a cushy governorship in southern Gaul
along with a metric butt-load of military Imperium to keep him safe, and set about campaigning in
Gaul for the next 10 years. It's astounding how much we know in detail about these campaigns,
and it's because Caesar himself wrote extensive commentaries on them. This was critical,
as he could justify his continued campaign in Gaul year after year by showing how cool he was
and how great of a job he was doing, while also building up support among the Roman people by also
showing how cool he was and how great of a job he was doing. Plus we got a history out of it,
so win-win-win. Caesar’s work happens to be hideously boring to actually read, granted,
but meh, quibbles.
Alright, so in enough detail that I can still sleep at night but also in short
enough form that we wont be here for hours, Caesar's campaign went roughly as follows:
In 58 BC Caesar attacked the Helvetii tribe on the pretense that they were attacking an ally of Rome,
because remember, Rome would never be so crass as to attack unprovoked. At the end of each year's
campaigning season, Caesar left his armies in Gaul and spent the winters in northern Italy.
The next year Caesar went north, won a battle and got ambushed one time. In 56 Caesar claimed that
the Veneti tribe had, quote, "revolted from Rome" even though they were in god-damn Finisterre,
so... he conquered it. Safe to say at this point that Caesar functionally considered all of Gaul
as already his, uh I mean Rome's. The next year Caesar went really hard on the "Gaul is Roman"
thing. He considered Britain and Germany as threats to Gaul and therefore as threats to
Rome So in the same year he bridged the Rhine and attacked some Germans, and he sailed across
the English channel. The invasion of Britain was honestly a total bust, so the next year, he went
back with a huge fleet because the man can't leave well enough alone, and pushed as far north as the
Thames. After his floundering humiliating scramble on the British beaches the year before, Caesar
had to prove that Rome was no pushover — to his enemies, to himself, and to his Romans back home.
Oh uh, also he lost an entire legion to an ambush in the dead of winter. so uh... Whoops! In 53 he
went back to Germany and afterwards left half of his bridge still standing in a sort-of "Don't you
make me come back there" kind of warning.
The following year was probably the biggest year of the campaign, because king Vercingetorix had
unified the remaining Gallic tribes against Rome. After some battling back and forth,
Vercingetorix camped out on the fortified hill city of Alesia. Now, Caesar needed to surround
and wall off the city to starve it out, but there was also the distinct likelihood that he himself
got attacked while investing the city. So Cesar needed to fortify both directions! His army built
a 10 mile long wall on the inside, and a 14 mile long wall on the outside! That's 24 miles of WALL
that Caesar threw down because he was determined to take this city. But uh oh boys, next thing you
know a ton of Gauls come down to attack Caesar. So Caesar rolls a natural 20 on his deception check,
sends out a cavalry detachment to attack them, but the Gauls think it's the first of an ENTIRE
Roman Reinforcement force, so they panic and book it right the hell out of there, allowing
Caesar to take the city, and just like that, all of Gaul basically belongs to Caesar. BOOM,
that's how you do a campaign.
The next two years were spent cleaning up the last pockets of resistance, because remember,
Caesar still had a few years before he's allowed to buy his way to the consulship again. To
complicate things Crassus died while on a campaign in Parthia, and Pompey, feeling his oats, got the
senate to rescind Caesar's governorship of Gaul. So even the Triumvirate, which was supposed to be
immune to the vices of factionalism, fell victim to the vices of factionalism... That's uh, that's
not a good sign. So Caesar got Pompey's note, and astutely realizing that going back to Rome on his
own was nearly a death sentence, Caesar – feeling his oats – said "screw it" or more accurately said
"Alea Iacta Est" and brought the 13th legion over the Rubicon river and into Italy. Pompey and most
of the Senate proceeded to nope right the hell out of town and go to Greece. Caesar, rousing the
support of the people, was proclaimed temporary "Dictator" (Latin for speaker) with the goal of
restoring peace, even though he technically was the one who started the civil war but,
shhh, details. — Against all odds, he proceeded to absolutely demolish Pompey's army in Greece
at the battle of Pharsalus. Then he chased poor old Pompey to the end of the earth, which in this
case was Egypt. Pompey sought refuge with the boy king Ptolemy who owed him a favor and was likely
very displeased to find himself beheaded instead. Terrible way to start a vacation.
Caesar was absolutely
horrified to see Pompey's head because, first of all, gross, but also because he was a fellow Roman
citizen, and Caesar was planning on pardoning him afterwards, not killing him. See this is a lesson
in how healthy communication saves lives. But yeah Caesar was super big on clemency, that was
pretty much his thing (except for you know the pirates he crucified), but in addition to some
small pardons during the Gallic campaign, Caesar pardoned pretty much Pompey's entire army and all
of his supporters who fled to Greece with him. In my reading, that's one of the most important
aspects of Caesar's character. He was certainly a controversial one, and arguably a full-on menace,
but it's important that we weigh the Nice with the Yikes, because neither exists in a vacuum.
He broke a ton of laws and sold his soul just to become Consul, but he made moderate reforms that
benefited the people. He killed a terrible sum of Gauls and Romans in the wars following his
consulship, but he granted clemency more than any other Roman would have even considered. And
he basically fashioned himself a king after he was appointed dictator for life, but he was beloved by
his people and he used his power to stabilize Rome. All in all, he did a lot of serious and
lasting good for Rome's people, but that good was done through politically devious means for
suspiciously power-hungry motivations. He's a thoroughly controversial character, then as now,
and even his nobler accomplishments are drenched in blood and crime. My goal here is to give a full
perspective, so you can get a feel for some of the questions people like Brutus asked themselves
when they were making plans to assassinate him. But I' m getting behead of myself – Uh,
"ahead" of myself... awkward.
While Caesar was in Egypt deciding what to do with poor old Pompey's head, he was making moves both
with and on the queen Cleopatra, supporting her in her civil war against her brother. The arrangement
proved beneficial for both of them, as Cleopatra could count on Caesar's Rome supporting rather
than annexing Egypt, and Caesar could count on Cleopatra's Egypt as a continuous source of food,
which helped supply Caesar's generous public food programs. And for bonus points, by all accounts
Cleopatra was utterly captivating to talk to, so win-win. Following Caesar's return to Rome,
his position as dictator was extended to 10 years. During his time as Dictator,
Caesar managed to instate even more reforms that promoted public welfare, government efficiency,
and general stability. For one, he limited the political and military power of provincial
governors, mostly to stop other people from doing to him what he did to Pompey and the
senate. He reformed the monstrosity that was the old Roman calendar so well that we still use a
version of it today. He also conducted a census, carried out several building projects, unified
the roman provinces more closely with italy, and was just all around a really solid leader.
Did he pull a lot of super mega illegal stunts to get himself to this point? Eheh, absolutely.
But did he make substantially beneficial reforms that the people loved? Absolutely.
Now, after a long career of breaking the
system, Caesar’s first and final true mistake was assuming that nobody could do to him what he did
the republic. In march of 44 BC Caesar was named Dictator for Life and this made a lot of senators
really antsy, because at this point he was basically king and Rome still very specifically
didn't like kings. So on the Ides of March, Brutus, Cassius, and about 60 other senators
surrounded and killed Caesar in the theater of Pompey. (Ironic). Caesar's last moments are
rather disputed, but my take on it is that when he saw Brutus, his friend, whom he had pardoned
after Pharsalus, was a part of the conspiracy, he accepted his fate and fell to the ground,
covering his face with his toga. I don't think Caesar even was eloquent enough to have fancy last
words when there were 23 knives simultaneously stabbing him. No one is. The assassins may have
fancied themselves liberators and restorers of the republic, but they didn't count on the fact
that the Romans really liked Caesar because, oh gee I don't know, he was a generous and effective
leader? While I disapprove of Caesar's motives and means, I abhor his assassins. He granted
them clemency and they killed him! Dante puts Brutus and Cassius in the lowermost pit of hell
for betraying their protector, and I'm with Dante on this one. So, that's Caesar. Stabbed 23 times
and left bleeding out on the floor of the curia. Brutus and Cassius were able to read the mood in
the room well enough to tell they weren't wanted, so they and a bunch of senators hightailed it to
Greece to build up an army.
In my mind, Caesar killed the republic long before he was even dictator. He proved how breakable
the system was. I mean, let's count it: he bribed his way into office, illegally rammed legislation
through the Senate, intimidated his political enemies with threats of force, escaped any and all
consequences for his actions on a technicality, commandeered roman resources for his own prestige
and enrichment, marched an entire legion into Rome, and declared war on a fellow Roman for his
own political gain. The entirety of Caesar's main political career was either distinctly
unrepublican in character or explicitly illegal. And remember that only after all of that did the
senate name Caesar as dictator for the FIRST time. By the time Caesar was named Dictator Perpetuo and
functionally had become a king, he had long since proven that the republic was fundamentally broken.
For most of the republic's history, its success came from fantastic Roman teamwork, but here its
downfall came primarily from the selfishness of powerful Romans. People realized how incredibly
fragile and gameable the institutions of the Republic were when you stretched them across
the entire Mediterranean. So basically one of two things could have happened to Rome:
either civil wars continued on and eventually ripped Rome to bits, or something in Rome's
government changed to make it less susceptible to all those civil wars in the first place.
Barring a full overhaul of the republic’s deepest mechanisms, it was basically monarchy or bust at
this point because nothing else could stop the chaos. While Augustus becoming emperor down the
line was far from a guarantee, Rome's transition from a republic to a monarchy was inevitable if
it was to survive. It's a little paradoxical but in a way Caesar saved Rome by destroying the then
unstable and unworkable republic. He abused the hell out of its institutions, but in doing so,
he showed how effective a strong and stable central government could be, and this was the
basis of Rome's accomplishments for the centuries to follow. Today Caesar kills the republic,
next time, Augustus starts an empire.
Alright, Caesar’s dead, so uh… where do we go from here? Well, Let’s do some History and find
out! If you were one of the handful of senators that had just forcibly perforated your dictator,
your first move would be to get the Pluto out of town. See, the assassins thought that they
were about to restore Rome to the full glory of the republic, but they didn’t count on Caesar’s
massive popularity among the Roman people. Needless to say, they didn’t quite get the warm
welcome and round of applause they were hoping for. So Brutus, Cassius, and some others pulled a
Pompey and high-tailed to Greece to build an army.
Back in Rome, Caesar’s corpse was still sitting there all squidgy-like on the floor of the Curia,
part of the senate was gone, and most of what was still there didn’t really like Caesar. So we had
a power vacuum on our hands. The current consul Marcus Antonius, Caesar’s trusted friend and ally,
attempted to brand himself as Caesar’s avenger against the assassins in order to rally the
people to his side and fill that power vacuum. As Consul, he was able to work out a compromise,
so that the assassins would be granted a general amnesty so long as Caesar’s reforms stayed in
place. The problem for him, like Caesar, was that even though the people liked him, the Senate,
and Cicero in particular, very much did not. So after his consulship ended, Antony bailed to go
be governor of Cisalpine Gaul.
With Rome divided between dumpster fire and more overtly treasonous dumpster fire,
let’s leave all manners of fire behind us and jump over to Augustus, who at this point was
named the rather-less-august Gaius Octavianus, after his father. For clarity, historians refer
to the pre-imperial Augustus as Octavian instead. Octavian was the great nephew of Julius Caesar,
and they were decently close. At the time of the assassination, he was studying astronomy
in Epirus, and after learning that Caesar had died, Octavian rushed back to Rome. Upon reaching
Italy he read Caesar’s will, and promptly acquired the single most valuable thing that Caesar could
possibly have given him: his name. From that day on Gaius Octavianus was known to everyone
as Gaius Julius Caesar, the officially adopted heir to the big man himself. And that was huge.
So now Gaius “Little Caesar’s”
Octavian and Mark “I’ll bang anything that moves and drink whatever doesn’t” Antony were both in
the race to become Caesar’s avenger against the assassins. This was important for both of
them because that role would entail not only glory but a butt-load of power. The short of it is that
Octavian was successful in this because he was a brilliantly crafty manipulator of iconography and
cultural symbolism, and he even convinced all of Rome that Caesar had become a god.
The next handful
of political movements are honestly needlessly complicated, but the gist is that most people just
wanted to be on the winning side, regardless of which side that was, so the alliances were almost
constantly shifting. Octavian was probably the one encouraging Cicero to give all of those angry
speeches against Antony, and then after Antony skipped town and went north, he had to wrestle
the governorship from another one of Caesar’s assassins. The Senate, being markedly anti-Caesar,
sided with the current governor and against Antony, and declared him an enemy of the state.
The Senate wanted to send a legion or two to deal with Antony, but they didn’t have an army.
Octavian, however, had promised Caesar’s veterans that he could pay them if they remained loyal to
him. So Octavian, interestingly, buddied up with the Senate to go fight Antony. Which, on paper,
makes no sense, because, you know, the whole “Caesar’s Avenger” business. In practice, however,
Octavian was very pragmatic, and if helping the anti-Caesar Senate fight the pro-Caesar
Antony seemed politically expedient for him, you bed he’d do it in a heartbeat. As such, Octavian
and the two consuls that year marched up to Mutina against Antony. Octavian’s Senatorial army won,
but both consuls were killed in the battle. When the Senate asked Octavian to give up his army,
he said “hahahhh, eh, that’s a good one, NO” and allied with Mark Antony to march on Rome with
eight legions and politely request that the Senate declare him Consul or else. And they did! With
the Senate’s begrudging compliance, Mark Antony hopped over to Spain to meet up with his Caesarian
political ally Marcus Lepidus.
Meanwhile, anybody remember Pompey? Y’know, first triumvirate, fought a civil war with Caesar,
decapitated on an Egyptian beach? Yeah, that guy. So the Senate granted Pompey’s son Sextus command
of the Republic’s entire navy and Sicily to use as a base. Also Brutus and Cassius were
happily serving as governors of Macedonia and Syria, respectively, just doing their thing,
having fun, building up their armies, all that jazz. The Senate got a really great deal out of
that amnesty agreement.
Following the misunderstanding up at Mutina, Octavian buddied up with Mark Antony and his
friend Lepidus to form the Triumviri Rei Publicae Constituendae, in English, the Triumvirate for the
Reconstitution of the Republic, and in smaller words, the “three guys for making Rome not-have
a civil war again”-team. Unlike the first triumvirate, which was an informal political
alliance between Pompey Crassus and Caesar, this second triumvirate, created by plebiscite,
was a legally-recognized entity that gave each triumvir full dictatorial power,
so everything they said or did was law. Now, what exactly “reconstituting the republic” meant was
up for debate, but as far as the Triumvirate was concerned, the most important matter was
taking care of Brutus and Cassius in the east, and financing the armies necessary for that would have
been quite expensive. The senate would likely have disagreed with this because, in their eyes, the
formation of the Triumvirate was nothing more than the Plebeian assembly handing over Rome to a few
Caesarinos playing dictator. So the Triumvirate had to contend not only with the remote threat of
the assassins, but also with local hostility in the senate. To solve this conundrum,
they split the difference and killed all of them. The Triumvirate pulled a page out of Sulla’s book
and drafted up a hit list of Rome’s enemies, which conveniently contained about 300 wealthy
anti-Caesarian senators and some two-thousand landowners in Rome. The kicker is that everyone’s
funds were confiscated when they were killed, so the Triumvirate conveniently accumulated insane
amounts of money in the process of killing off all of their political enemies. The proscriptions
started with that initial 2000-some-odd people, but rapidly ballooned to double that. They gutted
over a third of the senate. This was… *whooof* obviously pretty messed up. I mean, it worked, but
jeez. They killed Cicero and hanged his head up in the Forum. There’s no way the Triumvirate comes
out of this not looking like Murder Tyrants. Civil war is one thing, but this was domestic slaughter.
The next big event
on the docket for the Triumvirs was using their ill-gotten funds to finance a campaign against
the assassins. Antony and Octavian led their armies into Greece and met Brutus and Cassius
at Philippi. Antony defeated Cassius, who killed himself, and Brutus overran Octavian’s camp,
but conveniently Octavian didn’t die because for some reason he wasn’t there. Suspicious.
After that, Antony came back to Octavian’s camp and defeated Brutus, who then killed himself.
So the Triumvirs win, but Antony did all of the hard work, and also Octavian had maybe possibly
bailed from the battle altogether. Forget the proscriptions, in the eyes of the Romans,
Philippi was the biggest disgrace in Octavian’s career, and you can see him trying to make up for
it by representing himself through calculated military imagery for decades after the fact.
After Philippi, the Republic was somewhat,
slightly reconstituted, and in the wake of a reconquered East and gutted senate, the Triumvirs
were the biggest players in the Roman world. So they carved it up into East, West, and South, with