0:17 last time we began trying to we begin by
0:20 trying to navigate our way through Kanta
0:27 moral theory now fully to make sense of
0:32 continuity in the ground work requires
0:35 that we be able to answer three questions
0:37 questions
0:41 how can duty and autonomy go together
0:45 what's the great dignity in answering to
0:51 duty it would seem that these two ideas
0:54 are opposed duty and autonomy what's con
0:57 censored that need someone here to speak
1:00 up on Khan's behalf does he have an
1:08 answer yes go ahead stand up Khan
1:10 believes that you only act autonomously
1:12 when you work when you're pursuing
1:14 something only in the name of duty and
1:16 not because of your own circumstances
1:18 such as like you you're only doing
1:21 something good and moral if you're doing
1:23 it because of duty and opteka something
1:24 of your own personal gains now why is
1:27 that acting at what's your name - Matt
1:29 Matt why is that acting out of freedom
1:32 is what you choose to accept those moral
1:34 laws in yourself and not brought on from
1:37 outside upon okay good because acting
1:40 out of duty yeah is following a moral
1:43 law that you impose on yourself
1:45 that you impose on yourself that's what
1:48 makes Duty compatible with freedom yeah
1:50 okay that's good man that is con censor
1:52 that's great thank you
1:58 so Khan's answer is it is not in so far
2:01 as I am subject to the law that I have
2:04 dignity but rather insofar as with
2:08 regard to that very same law I'm the
2:11 author and I'm subordinated to that law
2:13 on that ground
2:16 that I took it as Matt just said I took
2:19 it upon myself I willed that law so
2:23 that's why for Kant acting according to
2:25 duty and acting freely in the sense of
2:29 autonomously are one in the same but
2:32 that raises the question how many moral
2:36 laws are there because if dignity
2:38 consists in being governed by a law that
2:42 I give myself what's to guarantee that
2:46 my conscience will be the same as your
2:51 conscience who has counts answer to that
2:55 yes because a moral law trend is not
2:57 contingent upon subjective conditions it
2:59 would transcend all particular
3:02 differences between people and so would
3:05 be a universal law and in this respect
3:08 there would only be one moral law that's
3:09 exactly right
3:11 what's your name Kelly Kelly so Kelly
3:15 can't believes that if we choose freely
3:19 out of our own consciences the moral law
3:22 we're guaranteed to come up with one in
3:24 the same moral law yes and that's
3:29 because when I choose it's not me
3:31 Michael Sandel choosing it's not you
3:34 Kelly choosing for yourself what is it
3:38 exactly who is doing the choosing who's
3:40 the subject who's the agent who's doing
3:42 the choosing reason
3:46 well reason pure reason pure reason and
3:47 what you mean by pure reason is what exactly
3:48 exactly
3:52 well pure reason is like we were saying
3:55 before not subject to any external
3:58 conditions that may be imposed yeah
4:01 that's great so the reason that does the
4:04 Willing the reason that governs my will
4:09 when I will the moral law is the same
4:14 reason that operates when you choose the
4:18 moral law for yourself and that's why
4:21 it's possible to act autonomously to
4:26 choose for myself for each of us to
4:27 choose for ourselves
4:30 as autonomous beings and for all of us
4:34 to wind up willing the same moral law
4:37 the categorical imperative but then
4:39 there is one big and very difficult
4:43 question left even if you accept
4:45 everything that NAT and Kelly have said
4:52 so far how is a categorical imperative
4:57 possible how is morality possible to
4:59 answer that question Kant says we need
5:01 to make a distinction we need to make a
5:08 distinction between two standpoints two
5:14 standpoints from which we can make sense
5:17 of our experience let me try to explain
5:18 what he means by these two standpoints
5:24 as an object of experience I belong to
5:27 the sensible world there my actions are
5:32 determined by the laws of nature and by
5:35 the regularities have caused an effect
5:39 but as a subject of experience I inhabit
5:44 an intelligible world here being
5:46 independent of the laws of nature I am
5:49 capable of autonomy capable of acting
5:53 according to a law I give myself now
5:56 Kant says that only from this second
5:59 standpoint can I regard myself as free
6:02 for to be independent of determination
6:05 by causes in the sensible world is to be
6:12 free if I were wholly an empirical being
6:18 as the utilitarians assume if I were a
6:25 being wholly an only subject to the
6:28 deliverances of my senses the pain and
6:30 pleasure and hunger and thirst and
6:32 appetite if that's all there were to
6:36 humanity we wouldn't be capable of
6:41 freedom Kant reasons because in that
6:45 case every exercise of will would be
6:47 conditioned by the desire for some
6:52 object in that case all choice would be
6:56 heteronomous choice governed by the
7:00 pursuit of some external and when we
7:02 think of ourselves as free con Trites
7:06 we transfer ourselves into the
7:08 intelligible world as members and
7:11 recognize the autonomy of the will
7:16 that's the idea of the two standpoints
7:20 so how are categorical imperatives
7:23 possible only because the idea of
7:26 freedom makes me a member of an
7:32 intelligible world now Kant admits we
7:36 aren't only rational beings we don't
7:40 only inhabit the intelligible world the
7:46 realm of freedom if we did if we did
7:51 then all of our actions would invariably
7:59 accord with the autonomy of the will but
8:01 precisely because we inhabit
8:03 simultaneously the two standpoints the
8:07 two realms the realm of freedom and the
8:14 realm of necessity precisely because we
8:17 inhabit both realms there is always
8:23 potentially a gap between what we do and
8:27 what we ought to do between is and ought
8:30 another way of putting this point and
8:32 this is the point with which Kant
8:36 concludes the groundwork morality is not
8:38 empirical whatever you see in the world
8:42 whenever you discover through science
8:48 can't decide moral questions morality
8:50 stands at a certain distance from the world
8:52 world
8:56 from the empirical world and that's why
9:01 no science could deliver moral truth now
9:05 I want to test Kant's moral theory with
9:08 the hardest possible case a case that he
9:11 raises the case of the murderer at the
9:18 door Kant says that lying is wrong we
9:22 all know that we've discussed why lying
9:24 is at odds with the categorical
9:30 imperative a French philosopher Benjamin
9:35 constant wrote an article responding to
9:37 the groundwork where he said this
9:39 absolute prohibition on lying is wrong
9:47 what if a murderer came to your door
9:50 looking for your friend who was hiding
9:53 in your house and the murderer asked you
10:00 point-blank is your friend in your house
10:04 Costin says it would be crazy to say
10:05 that the moral thing to do in that case
10:11 is to tell the truth Cal Stone says the
10:15 murderer certainly doesn't deserve the
10:22 truth and Kant wrote a reply and Kant
10:26 stuck by his principle that lying even
10:32 to the murderer at the door is wrong and
10:38 the reason it's wrong he said is once
10:39 you start taking consequences into
10:43 account to carve out exceptions to the
10:45 categorical imperative you've given up
10:48 the whole moral framework
10:51 you've become a consequentialist or
10:54 maybe a rule utilitarian but most of you
10:58 and most of Kant's readers think there's
11:01 something odd and implausible about this answer
11:03 answer
11:08 I would like to try to defend
11:11 on this point and then I want to see
11:14 whether you think that my defense is
11:17 plausible and I would want to defend him
11:22 within the spirit of his own account of
11:25 morality imagine that someone comes to
11:27 your door you were asked a question by
11:30 this murder you're hiding your friend is
11:35 there a way that you could avoid telling
11:42 a lie without selling out your friend
11:45 does anyone have an idea of how you
11:49 might be able to do that yes stand up I
11:52 was just gonna say if I were to let my
11:55 friend in my house to hide in the first
11:57 place I'd probably make a plan with them
11:59 so I'd be like hey I'll tell the
12:02 murderer you're here but escape and
12:05 that's one of the actions mentioned so
12:08 but I'm not sure that's a Content option
12:11 hmm you're still lying though no because
12:14 he's in the house but he won't be oh I see
12:21 alright good enough one more try if you
12:23 just say you don't know where he is
12:26 because he might not be locked in the
12:28 closet he might have left the closet you
12:32 have no clue where he could be so you
12:34 would say I don't know which wouldn't
12:37 actually be a lie because you weren't at
12:41 that very moment looking in the closet
12:45 exactly so it would be strictly speaking
12:47 true yes
12:54 and yet possibly deceiving misleading
13:00 but still true what's your name John
13:04 John all right John has now John may be
13:07 on to something John you're really
13:10 offering us the option of a clever
13:13 evasion that is strictly speaking true
13:16 this raises the question whether there
13:21 is a moral difference between an
13:27 outright lie and a misleading truth from
13:32 Kant's point of view there actually is a
13:39 world of difference between a lie and a
13:42 misleading truth why is that even though
13:45 both might have the same consequences
13:49 but then remember Kant doesn't base
13:53 morality on consequences he bases it on
13:58 formal adherence to the moral law now
14:02 sometimes in ordinary life we make
14:05 exceptions for the general rule against
14:08 lying with a white lie what is a white
14:11 lie it's it's a lie to make well to
14:13 avoid hurting someone's feelings for
14:16 example it's a lie that we think of as
14:18 justified by the consequences now Kant
14:21 could not endorse a white lie but
14:25 perhaps he could endorse a misleading
14:28 truth suppose someone gives you a tie as
14:29 a gift
14:34 and you open the box and it's just awful
14:39 what do you say thank you you could say
14:41 thank you but they're waiting to see
14:43 what you think of it or they ask you
14:45 what do you think of it you could tell a
14:49 white lie and say it's beautiful but
14:53 that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's
14:58 point of view could you say not a white
15:01 lie but a misleading truth you open the
15:04 box and you say I've never seen a tie
15:05 like that before
15:23 can you think of a contemporary
15:28 political leader who engaged you can
15:34 what are you thinking of remember the
15:38 hole carefully worded denials in the
15:41 Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton
15:47 now those denials actually became the
15:50 subject of very explicit debate and
15:54 argument during the impeachment hearings
15:59 take a look at the following excerpts
16:01 from Bill Clinton is there something do
16:03 you think morally at stake in the
16:09 distinction between a lie and a
16:15 misleading carefully couched truth I
16:17 want to say one thing to the American
16:20 people I want you to listen to me I'm
16:24 going to say this again I did not have
16:27 sexual relations with that woman miss
16:31 Lewinsky I never told anybody to lie not
16:34 a single time never these allegations
16:41 are false did he lie to the American
16:44 people when he said I never had sex with
16:46 that woman you know he doesn't believe
16:49 he did and because of the way I
16:51 explained congressman what he said was
16:53 to the American people that he did not
16:57 have sexual relations and I understand
16:58 you're not gonna like this congressman
17:00 because it you will see it as a
17:03 hair-splitting evasive answer but in his
17:07 own mind his definition was not okay I
17:14 so there you have the exchange now at
17:18 the time you may have thought this was
17:20 just a legalistic hair-splitting
17:23 exchange between a republican who wanted
17:25 to impeach clinton and the lawyer who is
17:28 trying to defend him but now in the
17:30 light of Conte
17:35 do you think there is something morally
17:38 at stake in the distinction between a
17:45 lie and an evasion a true but misleading
17:49 statement I'd like to hear from
17:52 defenders of God people who think there
17:55 is a distinction are you ready to defend
17:57 Conte well I think when you try to say
17:59 that lying in the same truths are the
18:01 same thing you're basing it on a
18:03 consequentialist argument which is that
18:05 they achieve the same thing but the fact
18:07 of the matter is you told the truth and
18:08 you intended that people would believe
18:10 what you were saying which was the truth
18:12 which means it is not morally the same
18:14 as telling a lie and intending that they
18:16 believe it is the truth even though it's
18:18 not true good what's your name
18:22 Diana so Diana says there if that kinda
18:25 has a point here and it's a point that
18:27 might even come to the aid of Bill
18:33 Clinton and that is well what about that
18:36 someone over here for compote evasion is
18:39 key so if you give to someone because
18:41 primarily you want to feel good about
18:42 yourself Khan would say that has no
18:44 moral worth well this the motivation is
18:46 the same it's to sort of mislead someone
18:48 it's to lie it's to sort of throw them
18:49 off the track and the motivation is the
18:51 same so there should be no difference
18:54 okay good so here isn't the motivate
18:57 motive the same Diana what do you say to
19:00 this argument that well the motive is
19:02 the same in both cases there is the
19:05 attempt or at least the hope that one's
19:09 pursuer will be mislead well that you
19:11 could look at it that way but I think
19:13 that the fact is that your immediate
19:14 motive is that they should believe you
19:16 the ultimate consequence of that is that
19:18 they might be deceived and not find out
19:20 what was going on but your immediate
19:21 motive is that they should believe
19:24 you because you're telling the truth may
19:28 I help a little sure um can't why don't
19:30 you say and what's your name I'm sorry
19:35 what why don't you say to Wesley it's
19:38 not exactly the case that the motive in
19:44 both cases is to mislead they're hoping
19:47 they're hoping that the person will be
19:51 misled by the statement I don't know
19:56 where they are or I never had sexual
19:58 relations you're hoping that they will
20:00 be mislead but in the case where you're
20:04 telling the truth your motive is to
20:07 mislead while at the same time telling
20:09 the truth and honoring the moral law and
20:10 staying within the bounds of the
20:12 categorical imperative
20:15 I think Kant's answer would be Diana yes
20:20 you like that okay so I think Constantia
20:24 would be unlike a falsehood unlike a lie
20:28 a misleading truth pays a certain homage
20:32 to duty and the homage it pays to duty
20:36 is what justifies that the work of even
20:40 the work of the evasion Diana yes you
20:47 lie okay and so there is something some
20:51 element of respect for the dignity of
20:56 the moral law in the careful evasion
20:59 because Clinton could have told an
21:03 outright lie but he didn't and so I
21:07 think Kant's taunts inside here is in
21:11 the carefully couched but true evasion
21:14 there is a kind of homage to the dignity
21:17 of the moral law that is not present in
21:22 the outright lie and that Wesley is part
21:24 of the motive it's part of the motive
21:27 yes I hope he will be misled I hope the
21:29 murderer will run down the road or go to
21:31 the mall looking for my friend instead
21:33 of the closet I hope that will be the
21:35 effect I can't control
21:38 that I can't control the consequences
21:42 but what I can control is standing by
21:46 and honoring however I pursue the ends I
21:51 hope will unfold to do so in a way that
21:54 is consistent with respect for the moral
21:58 law Wesley I don't think is entirely
22:01 persuaded but at least this brings out
22:04 this discussion brings out some of
22:06 what's at stake what's morally at stake
22:08 in constant ocean of the categorical imperative
