0:02 After being introduced in World War I by
0:04 the British as a secretive new
0:06 technology to break the stalemate of
0:08 trench warfare, tanks began their
0:10 turbulent journey through history, a
0:12 journey that's still ongoing today. As
0:14 World War II approached, tanks were no
0:16 longer a secret, and all major nations
0:18 were building them according to their
0:21 own theories of armored warfare. When
0:23 the war broke out, the race to create
0:25 the best tank began, shifting between
0:27 absurdly heavy and extremely light
0:30 designs with everything in between. But
0:31 a few of them would be remembered not
0:33 because they were invincible or
0:35 overwhelmingly powerful, but because
0:37 they were what we call workh horses,
0:39 mass-roduced machines meant to defeat
0:42 the enemy through sheer numbers. This is
0:44 the story of the three main workhorse
0:46 tanks that carried World War II. You'll
0:47 see everything you didn't know about
0:49 them and hear the unique but dark
0:51 stories of the people who had to fight inside
0:59 them. Number one, the M4 Sherman, USA.
1:01 Before World War II, the United States
1:03 thought that tanks wouldn't play a major
1:04 role on the battlefield. They were
1:06 quickly proven wrong by the Germans, who
1:08 used them to great effect in their
1:10 Blitzkrieg tactics, shocking the world
1:12 with their rapid advance. When it became
1:14 clear that the United States would enter
1:16 the war, the best, let's say, tank they
1:18 could send to the front lines was the M1
1:20 combat car and the M2 light tank. Both
1:22 of which were severely outdated compared
1:25 to what the Germans had. To make matters
1:27 worse, the United States had only ever
1:29 built 300 tanks up to that point with no
1:31 large-scale production facilities,
1:33 experience, or even proper equipment for
1:36 tank manufacturing. So, they scrambled
1:37 and came up with an often overlooked
1:40 stop gap solution, the M3 Lee tank. They
1:43 had already outdated 37 mm gun with a
1:46 turret as well as a 75 mm field gun, but
1:47 they still lacked the technology to
1:50 mount that 75 mm gun in a rotating
1:52 turret. So, they did the best they could
1:54 to field something in North Africa where
1:55 the Allies were sustaining heavy tank
1:59 losses against the Germans. The 75mm gun
2:00 was modified and crammed into the hull
2:02 in a fixed casemate. On top of that,
2:04 they slapped on the already familiar 37
2:07 mm gun and its turret, packed six people
2:09 inside, and sent them off to battle. It
2:11 needed to plug the gap and buy time
2:13 until something better could be
2:15 developed. US engineers working on the
2:17 Sherman were closely observing European
2:18 tanks, trying to learn from their
2:21 advantages and shortcomings. They needed
2:23 to come up with a new tank as soon as
2:24 possible. And it had to be agile,
2:26 wellarmed, wellarmored, reliable, and
2:28 most importantly, cheap and quick to
2:30 produce in huge numbers. It also had to
2:32 be light and compact enough to be lifted
2:34 by cranes and loaded onto ships. So
2:36 through various ideas, errors and
2:39 trials, the M4 Sherman was born. They
2:40 had what they thought ticked all these
2:42 boxes and it was ready for deployment in
2:45 October 1942, just before the Battle of
2:48 Elmagne. Around 300 Shermans were
2:50 delivered to the British 8th Army, which
2:51 urgently needed tanks to replace its
2:53 horrific losses and support its
2:55 remaining tanks already outgunned by the
2:58 Panza 3 and four. And so the Sherman saw
3:00 combat for the first time in the hands
3:02 of the British. Alongside other tanks,
3:04 they were immediately thrust into heavy
3:06 assaults against Ruml's Africa Corps.
3:07 And although they were not invincible,
3:09 the Sherman was a huge improvement over
3:12 the Crusaders and M3 Lees. It had
3:14 greater firepower and better armor
3:15 protection, and even came with an early
3:17 version of a stabilization system,
3:19 allowing it to fire on the move with
3:21 some accuracy. But the most important
3:23 thing was its reliability in the harsh
3:24 desert terrain where other tanks
3:27 struggled to work. The Sherman was far
3:29 more reliable and easier to repair and
3:31 put back into action. The Americans
3:32 applied their automotive industry
3:34 experience, ensuring that all parts were
3:36 standardized and available in great
3:38 supply, which was extremely important in
3:41 the field. The Sherman's 75mm gun was
3:43 much better than the 50mm gun on the
3:46 Panza 3 and the shortbarreled 75mm on
3:49 the Panza 4. It also had solid
3:50 protection against them, at least until
3:52 the Panza 4 was upgraded with a high
3:56 velocity 75 mm longbarreled gun.
3:57 However, losses were high from the start
3:59 as combat was extremely intense. The
4:01 biggest tank killers were actually mines
4:04 and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns repurposed
4:06 as longrange tank killers which were a
4:07 nightmare for the Sherman's high
4:09 silhouette and medium-range gun in the
4:12 open desert terrain. There were a few
4:14 encounters with Tiger ones which first
4:16 appeared in Tunisia and they didn't end
4:18 well for any Allied tanks. The stories
4:20 of Tiger encounters terrified Allied
4:22 tank crews so much that they often
4:25 mistook Panzer 4s for Tigers in battle.
4:27 So all in all, the Sherman was deemed
4:28 good enough and pushed into mass
4:29 production. And when we say mass
4:31 production, we mean that at the height
4:33 of production, one Sherman rolled off
4:35 the assembly line every 30 minutes with
4:37 over 50,000 units produced throughout
4:39 the war. However, on the battlefield,
4:41 some glaring flaws quickly became
4:43 obvious. The Sherman couldn't
4:45 effectively destroy a Panzer 4 or
4:46 anything heavier unless it was at point
4:48 blank range or had a clear sideshot. And
4:50 then there was the second, more infamous
4:52 issue, its tendency to burst into flames
4:54 when hit. This earned the Sherman some
4:56 controversial and morbid nicknames that
4:58 stuck with it to this day. Tommy Cucker,
5:01 Ronson Lighter, etc. Let's first address
5:03 the gun issue. You've all heard about
5:05 the Sherman being a medium tank with a
5:07 medium velocity gun. The Sherman was
5:09 designed to support infantry and fire
5:11 mostly high explosive shells, which were
5:13 quite effective, while towed anti-tank
5:15 guns were originally the primary means
5:17 of destroying enemy armor before tank
5:19 destroyers were introduced. Also, the
5:21 Sherman's gun was deliberately shortened
5:23 so it wouldn't exceed the length of the
5:25 tank's hull, making transportation on
5:27 ships and trains easier. So, the Sherman
5:28 was never really intended to be a tank
5:31 killer. Of course, in practice and
5:32 combat, you couldn't always choose your
5:34 fights, and it quickly became clear that
5:36 the gun needed an upgrade. The British
5:38 came up with a stop gap solution, much
5:40 like the Americans did with the M3 Lee
5:42 by cramming a 17 pounder gun into the
5:45 Sherman's turret, creating the Sherman
5:47 Firefly. Later, the Americans developed
5:50 the 76 mm gun and a new turret for
5:52 versions like the E8, somewhat leveling
5:54 the playing field in terms of armor
5:56 penetration. Nevertheless, the Sherman
5:58 compensated for its lack of high
6:00 velocity projectiles with the sheer
6:01 volume of ordinance it could put down
6:04 range. It could fire up to 20 rounds per
6:06 minute with a good loader. Even enemy
6:07 tanks were sometimes engaged with high
6:09 explosive or smoke shells to blind them
6:11 and destroy their optics. And a couple
6:13 of Shermans firing together at the same
6:15 target was nothing to laugh at when you
6:17 were on the receiving end. Now, the most
6:20 famous issue, the Sherman being a death
6:22 trap. While it was far less protected
6:23 than German tanks, the Sherman actually
6:25 had the highest survivability rate for
6:28 its crew with an average of 1.3 tankers
6:30 killed per destroyed tank. For
6:32 comparison, T34 crews had twice this
6:34 number, despite the tank having one
6:36 fewer crew member, meaning that 50% of
6:38 the crew was killed per knocked out
6:40 tank. The biggest problem wasn't its
6:42 gasoline engine catching fire after the
6:44 first hit, as was often portrayed, but
6:46 actually the ammunition storage. In
6:48 early versions, shells for the main gun
6:50 were stored in the hull sides. also
6:52 known as sponssons in unarmored
6:54 containers. This was the most likely
6:56 place to get hit in the tank. And on top
6:57 of that, the shells were completely
6:59 exposed to sparks and shrapnel that
7:00 would fly through the tank if
7:03 penetrated. This earned the Sherman its
7:05 grim nicknames. Statistically, seven out
7:07 of 10 times a Sherman would immediately
7:10 burst into flames after being hit. To
7:12 solve this, the ammo rack was moved to
7:13 the floor and wet stowage was
7:16 introduced. This area was less likely to
7:18 get hit, and if it was hit, the ammo
7:19 bins were surrounded by a container
7:22 filled with a water glycol mixture. If
7:24 perforated, this fluid would extinguish
7:25 the fire, or at least buy enough time
7:27 for the crew to bail out. This
7:29 dramatically reduced the Sherman's
7:31 tendency to burst into flames from
7:34 around 70% down to below 20%, greatly
7:36 improving crew survivability. But once
7:38 the Sherman entered the war in Europe,
7:40 it was vulnerable to almost every
7:42 anti-tank weapon the Germans had. And if
7:43 it ran into anything heavier than a
7:46 Panza 4, it was usually a bad day for a
7:48 couple of Shermans. You've seen the
7:49 countless photos of additional armor
7:52 plates, sandbags, logs, track links, and
7:54 even concrete added to Sherman armor in
7:55 a desperate attempt to increase
7:58 protection. Commanders were furious at
8:00 first and ordered tank crews to remove
8:02 this improvised armor, but it continued
8:04 to be used throughout the war. Crew
8:06 survivability was further improved by
8:08 adding a hatch for the loader. Yes, the
8:10 loader didn't have his own hatch and had
8:11 to go through the commander's hatch.
8:14 then around or under the gun breach. One
8:15 veteran Sherman loader recalled his
8:17 horrifying experience from the war when
8:19 his tank was hit in the upper right part
8:21 of the turret. The shell instantly
8:23 killed the gunner and commander,
8:25 trapping the loader inside as the tank
8:27 quickly filled with smoke. He couldn't
8:29 move the two bodies in the tight space
8:31 of the turret. But luckily for him, the
8:33 turret was traversed in a position that
8:35 allowed him to crawl under the gun to
8:36 the driver's position where the driver
8:38 had already bailed out and from there
8:41 escape through the driver's hatch. This
8:42 was resolved by simply adding a hatch
8:44 for the loader along with springs for
8:46 easier and faster opening in an
8:48 emergency. The driver and co-driver also
8:50 received wider hatches when the frontal
8:53 armor plate was sloped 10° less. The
8:55 Sherman's armor was softer than armor of
8:56 German tanks. And while this made it
8:58 easier to penetrate, it had an
8:59 unexpected benefit because it created
9:02 less shrapnel when hit. German armor was
9:04 much harder, at least before shortages
9:06 of manganesees made the steel too
9:08 brittle. When German tanks were
9:09 penetrated, the armor broke apart
9:12 violently, sending sharp steel fragments
9:14 flying inside the tank and shredding the
9:15 crew. And in Sherman, this effect was
9:18 significantly less. The Sherman was
9:20 chosen as the backbone of the Allied
9:22 armored forces and saw combat in all
9:24 theaters used by different nations and
9:27 converted into numerous variants. In the
9:29 European theater, they struggled against
9:31 heavy German tanks which executed some
9:33 devastating ambushes. But in reality,
9:35 tank-on-tank battles were rare. They
9:36 were widely talked about because when
9:38 they did happen, they were dramatic and
9:40 unforgettable. In one of the first
9:42 encounters between Shermans and New
9:44 German armor in Europe, 17 out of 18
9:46 Shermans were knocked out in just 20
9:48 minutes. However, the majority of
9:50 knocked out tanks weren't total losses
9:52 and could be repaired and put back into
9:54 action. The mechanics, however, were
9:55 often traumatized by what they found
9:57 inside penetrated Shermans if a crew
9:59 member had been hit. The scenes were
10:01 often so gruesome that the entire
10:03 interior had to be repainted over the
10:05 stains of what was once a tanker. The
10:07 swimming duplex drive Shermans led the
10:08 way in the invasion of Normandy, while
10:10 many others were modified for roles
10:12 ranging from laying bridges to clearing
10:14 mines and everything in between.
10:16 Shermans arrived when and where they
10:17 were needed, and most importantly,
10:20 always in large numbers. It wasn't a
10:22 perfect tank, and the US had already
10:23 started looking for a replacement during
10:25 World War II to correct the Sherman's
10:28 flaws. But bringing a new tank to the
10:29 same mass production level as the
10:31 Sherman during wartime was impossible.
10:33 So the Sherman remained the main
10:35 workhorse until the end of the war. It
10:36 made up for its flaws through sheer
10:38 numbers, ease of production, and
10:40 reliability, playing a major role in
10:42 bringing World War II to an end and
10:44 forever staying in our history. Number
10:48 two, the Panza 4, Germany. So where does
10:49 the story of the Panzer 4 actually
10:53 begin? January 1934. With the Reich
10:54 still constrained by the Treaty of
10:56 Versailles, German military planners
10:57 discreetly issued requirements for a new
10:59 medium tractor, their laughably
11:01 transparent code for a medium tank.
11:03 Under their revolutionary Blitzkrieg
11:05 doctrine, the Vermacht needed a support
11:07 vehicle that could accompany all their
11:08 other vehicles and provide them with
11:11 direct high explosive support. The idea
11:13 was that the Panza 1 and 2 would engage
11:15 infantry. The Panza 3 would serve as the
11:18 main anti-tank weapon with its 37mm gun.
11:20 And the Panza 4, now called accompanying
11:22 vehicle, would work alongside them,
11:23 filling the gap in high explosive
11:26 firepower with its short-barreled 75mm
11:29 howitzerike gun. Due to the limitations
11:30 of early industry, a practical design
11:33 was chosen and production began. The
11:35 initial production model A had just 15
11:37 mm of frontal armor and leaf spring
11:39 suspension. Far less sophisticated than
11:40 the torsion bar systems favored by
11:42 German engineers, but significantly
11:45 easier to manufacture. Only 35 of these
11:46 Model A's were produced before
11:48 improvements began rolling in with
11:49 additional armor plates, engine and
11:52 visibility improvements, etc. Then the
11:55 infamous September 1st, 1939 came.
11:57 Germans had just a little over 200 Panza
12:00 4s among their 2,700 tanks. They were
12:02 distributed sparingly with 20 to 30
12:04 tanks per division, ready to shock the
12:07 world. Panza crews spearheaded the new
12:08 Lightning War, pushing through Poland
12:12 for 72 hours continuously. Panza 4 did
12:13 its job just as intended, supporting
12:15 other tanks with a howitzer that
12:17 immediately proved effective. Its armor
12:18 turned out to be its biggest flaw,
12:20 incapable of stopping any anti-tank
12:22 weapons. Later in the invasion of
12:24 France, in isolated cases where panzas
12:27 met French B1 tanks, it was proved that
12:29 the 75 mm howitzer was useless against
12:31 armor. But as it was never intended to
12:33 fight tanks, this wasn't a big deal. But
12:35 we said that the Panzer 4 was the main
12:37 workhorse. Well, things were about to
12:40 take a dramatic turn. Production began
12:42 mounting up, reaching over 8,500 Panzer
12:44 4s of all models by the end of the war.
12:46 The assault gun is actually the only
12:48 fully tracked vehicle Germans produced
12:51 more than the Panza 4 with around 10,000
12:53 units. Panzer 4 crews would find
12:55 themselves facing a rude awakening on
12:58 the Eastern Front in 1941. The German
13:00 high command had expected another swift
13:02 victory and initially everything seemed
13:04 like one. But soon their tank crews
13:07 encountered Soviet T34s and KV tanks
13:08 which were virtually immune to almost
13:10 everything the Germans had at the time
13:13 except for 88mm flack anti-aircraft
13:15 cannons. On the other hand, their panzas
13:17 were being pierced by Soviet 76 millm
13:20 high velocity guns. Hitler reading these
13:22 panicked reports made one of his rare
13:25 sensible military decisions. At first,
13:28 the Panza 3 was upgraded from 37 to 50
13:30 mm cannon, but this one also quickly
13:32 became obsolete. Because the tank
13:33 designed to fight other tanks could no
13:35 longer be uparmed due to its smaller
13:37 turret ring, which couldn't accommodate
13:39 anything larger than a 50mm gun. Hitler
13:41 ordered the development of a high
13:44 velocity 75mm gun for the Panza 4 which
13:47 had a turret ring 12 in larger. The
13:49 result was the F2 variant equipped with
13:50 the quite formidable version of the
13:54 famous 7.5 cm Pac 40 now capable of
13:58 penetrating 77 mm of armor at 1,800 m.
14:00 Thus, the Panza 4 became something
14:02 entirely different than originally
14:03 designed with a weapon completely
14:06 opposite to the 75mm howitzer. But what
14:08 about the crews? They were designed and
14:10 trained as essentially artillery support
14:11 on tracks. And all of a sudden, they got
14:13 a high velocity gun and became a
14:15 designated anti-tank weapon and a main
14:18 battle tank. Although crews with these
14:20 upgraded tanks had some sense of relief
14:21 as they finally had a fighting chance
14:23 against the Soviet behemoths, they were
14:25 about to be pushed into an even more
14:27 dangerous position to fight other tanks.
14:29 And there would be no shortage of that
14:31 on all fronts. The Panther that was from
14:33 the ground up made to fight tanks with
14:35 sloped armor and arguably one of the
14:36 best anti-tank guns of the war was
14:38 intended to replace the Panzer 4 for its
14:41 medium tank role. However, as the
14:43 Panther was rushed into production to be
14:45 ready for battle at Kusk, many of its
14:46 flaws were overlooked and found out in
14:49 the field. So, the Panza 4 had to still
14:51 pull most of the weight. Because it was
14:53 a well-designed platform from the
14:55 beginning, the Panza 4 had enormous room
14:56 for improvements, at least when that was
14:59 possible. An additional 30 mm armor
15:01 plate was bolted directly onto the
15:03 original 50mm frontal hull armor. And
15:05 the distinctive shirten side skirts were
15:07 added along the sides to protect against
15:09 anti-tank rifles and even came in handy
15:11 for predetonating shaped charges of
15:13 American bazookas away from the main
15:15 armor. But crews were frustrated by how
15:17 those skirts were easily torn off when
15:19 driving through dense brush. The frontal
15:21 armor in upgraded versions was now
15:24 strong enough to deflect Sherman's 75mm
15:27 medium velocity shells. By late 1942,
15:29 the Panza 4 was facing a new enemy in
15:32 North Africa. The F2 and G variants
15:34 became known as Panzer 4 specials among
15:35 British tankers who quickly learned to
15:38 respect their firepower. At Casarine
15:40 Pass in February 1943, they destroyed
15:42 over 20 M3 Grants and early model
15:45 Shermans while suffering minimal losses.
15:47 The longer L48 gun could penetrate a
15:49 Sherman's frontal armor easily at over
15:52 1,000 m, while the Sherman's 75 mm
15:54 needed to close to within 500 m to have
15:56 any hope of penetrating the Panza 4's
15:59 enhanced glacus plate. North African
16:01 combat proved unique for all tankers,
16:03 and Panzer 4 crews fared no different.
16:05 Machines and people were brought to the
16:07 breaking point in extreme heat during
16:09 the day and cold at night with flies and
16:11 sand everywhere. Inside temperatures
16:16 easily exceeded 50° C, 122° F. The
16:18 fiveman crew fought from basically an
16:20 oven surrounded by ammunition,
16:22 equipment, and each other's sweat. Metal
16:24 surfaces were untouchable by bare skin,
16:26 and they could and did literally bake
16:28 eggs on their armor. They were fighting
16:30 over fuel and water more than anything
16:32 else. Sand and dust in the lubricant oil
16:34 could turn grease into grinding paste,
16:36 causing guns to jam, tracks to
16:38 disintegrate, and engines to overheat or
16:40 seize up. In the open desert, a broken
16:42 down Panza could easily mean death or
16:44 capture, so crews were highly motivated
16:47 to improvise repairs. By early 1943, the
16:49 Africa Corps was cornered in Tunisia.
16:51 Outnumbered and cut off from supplies as
16:53 the Allies pressed their final offensive
16:55 with no route of escape as defeat became
16:57 inevitable, orders were given to destroy
16:59 any remaining panzas to prevent them
17:01 from falling into Allied hands. One
17:03 veteran recounted how his crew poured
17:05 sand into the fuel tank, ran the engine
17:07 until it seized, then hammered rocks
17:09 into the barrel, loaded an H shell, and
17:11 fired the gun remotely with string. This
17:13 left the tank completely wrecked with
17:15 dead engine and exploded gun, so it was
17:17 useless to the enemy. However, if you
17:18 could ask any veteran Panza crewman
17:20 about their worst posting, they'd
17:22 usually point east. Besides the fact
17:24 that 75% of all Panza 4 losses occurred
17:27 there, just the nature of the front and
17:29 combat were outright horrifying. Mass
17:31 waves of Soviet tanks charging in
17:33 seemingly endless numbers and extremely
17:36 close combat broke tanker's psyche. The
17:39 subtle minus40° C temperatures, snow,
17:41 and mud wre havoc on machines and people
17:44 just like heat and sand in Africa. The
17:46 transmission fluid became so viscous
17:48 that it had to be heated with torches
17:50 for up to an hour before the tank could
17:52 move. The Maybach engine starter system
17:54 frequently failed, forcing crews to
17:56 light small fires under the engine, then
17:58 use the inertia handc cranked starter
18:00 system. Even fuel and grease could
18:02 freeze, making just putting the tank in
18:04 working order a nightmare. Crews
18:06 improvised to somewhat heat their tank
18:08 overnight and slept inside breathing
18:10 gasoline fumes to not freeze to death.
18:12 While frostbite was a common thing,
18:14 ammunition storage was another horror
18:16 for its crew. The Panza 4 carried
18:19 between 80 to 87 rounds of 75 mm
18:21 ammunition depending on the variant, and
18:22 it was stored in bins throughout the
18:23 fighting compartment, including
18:26 vulnerable positions in the hull sides.
18:28 Unlike late war American tanks with wet
18:30 ammo storage that cleared their lights
18:32 every time reputation, a penetrating hit
18:35 in Panza 4 often caused catastrophic
18:37 secondary explosions. German tankers
18:39 called being hit brewing up a darkly
18:41 humorous euphemism for the tank erupting
18:43 into flames as ammunition cooked off,
18:45 giving crews at best mere seconds to
18:48 escape. You can find such photos on the
18:49 internet where crews didn't manage to
18:51 get out in time. Then imagine that
18:53 you're looking at this site as a tanker
18:55 of the same type of tank, knowing that
18:57 same fate might happen to you at any
19:01 moment. By 1943, Soviet IS-2 heavy tanks
19:04 and improved T-34s with 85mm guns began
19:06 emerging on the battlefield. The Model H
19:08 tried to address this with additional
19:10 armor, but there wasn't really much they
19:11 could do as the tank was now weighing
19:14 over 25 tons despite being designed as a
19:17 16-tonon vehicle. On the Western Front
19:19 after the invasion of Normandy, Panzer
19:21 4s fought heavily with Allied Shermans
19:23 and Churchills. But the tanks were not
19:24 such a problem as Allied superior
19:26 artillery, handheld anti-tank weapons,
19:28 and ground attacking aircraft that
19:30 terrorized German armor. As resources
19:32 dwindled, quality suffered. The final
19:36 variant J introduced in March 1944 was
19:38 actually a step backward. The auxiliary
19:40 200 L fuel tank was moved into the crew
19:42 compartment to extend range, but this
19:44 made it more vulnerable to fires. The
19:46 power traverse system for the turret was
19:48 eliminated entirely, so gunners had to
19:51 manually crank the turret. Now a full
19:54 360° rotation took at least 60 seconds
19:56 compared to just 15 seconds with power
19:58 traverse. Because of shortages of
20:00 rubber, road wheels were now made all
20:02 steel, giving it a funny reputation that
20:04 it could be heard miles ahead as tracks
20:06 were squeaking. Manganese shortages also
20:08 made all German later war tanks suffer
20:10 from brittle armor. And even paint was
20:13 in scarce supply. They'd paint just the
20:14 upper part of the fighting compartment
20:16 white for better visibility and leave
20:18 the lower part with just anti- rust
20:21 protection. Because of bombings taking a
20:23 heavy toll on factories, spare parts
20:25 became so scarce that maintenance units
20:27 regularly cannibalized disabled tanks to
20:29 keep others running. At least this was
20:31 an advantage, as all Panzer 4s had
20:33 standard and interchangeable parts, and
20:34 older variants could easily be fit up
20:36 with parts of newer models and vice
20:38 versa. With factories in ruins and
20:40 resources dwindling, the final chapters
20:43 of the Panza 4 story would reveal just
20:45 how desperate the Reich had become.
20:47 Panza crew training had been shortened
20:49 from the original 16week program to
20:51 barely 4 weeks. Even the intercom
20:52 systems were often absent in late
20:54 production tanks. The driver training
20:56 before combat deployment had been
20:58 reduced, resulting in frequent
21:00 transmission failures as inexperienced
21:02 drivers mishandled the delicate gearbox.
21:04 Young crews with barely 3 weeks of
21:06 instruction were being thrown into
21:08 combat against battleh hardened Allied
21:10 and Soviet tankers. The life expectancy
21:12 of a Panza 4 crew on the Eastern front
21:14 had dropped to roughly 2 weeks. While
21:16 the Tiger was an overengineered
21:18 primadona that was giving Germans some
21:20 desperate hope, the reality was that for
21:22 every operational Tiger on the front
21:24 lines, there were 20 Panza 4s. And the
21:26 average operational readiness rate for
21:30 Panzer 4s stood at 62% versus just 37%
21:33 for Tigers. So even when Tigers were on
21:34 the battlefield, more than half of them
21:37 weren't working. As Germany sought to
21:39 use everything they had, available Panza
21:40 4 hulls were used for the creation of
21:42 many other vehicles like the Yagged
21:46 Panza 4 or Stomashutz 4 and even Panza 4
21:49 with a 150 mm gun. As the war situation
21:51 deteriorated, fuel shortages and no
21:53 spare parts meant tanks were abandoned
21:55 when they stopped. The once proud
21:57 spearhead of Blitzkrieg had become
22:00 static pill boxes dug into defensive
22:01 positions as the Reich collapsed around
22:04 them. Yet somehow the Panzer 4's story
22:06 didn't end with Germany's surrender.
22:09 Over 300 vehicles were supplied to Nazi
22:11 allies during the war. Syria even
22:14 deployed Panzer against Israel in 1967
22:16 in the initial phases of the 6-day war,
22:19 ending a remarkable 30-year combat
22:20 career for a tank designed as infantry
22:22 support in
22:26 1936. Number three, the T-34 Soviet
22:29 Union. The story of the T-34 begins in
22:32 1937 when the highly maneuverable BT
22:34 tanks showed their lack of protection
22:37 and firepower. A new fast tank was
22:39 requested with better specifications and
22:42 most importantly sloped armor. After a
22:45 couple of prototypes like the BT20, A20,
22:47 and playing around with different types
22:49 of suspension and track systems, finally
22:52 by the beginning of 1940, the first two
22:55 T34 prototypes were ready for testing.
22:57 They immediately proved to be faster
22:59 than the BTS. But the revolutionary
23:01 sloped armor, although it increased
23:04 protection made the interior of the tank
23:06 super cramped, and visibility from
23:08 inside the tank was catastrophic.
23:11 Prototypes were shot at with 37 and 45
23:14 mm anti-tank guns and surprisingly
23:17 didn't take any major damage. After a
23:18 couple of months of testing, mass
23:21 production was ordered. The early models
23:24 weighted 27 tons battle ready with four
23:26 crew members cramped inside. It was
23:29 powered by a V2 400 horsepower engine
23:33 giving it a top speed of 30 mph and 460
23:36 L of diesel gave it a maximum range of
23:39 180 mi. It was shown that mass-roduced
23:41 models were not the same quality as
23:43 prototypes and the first notable
23:44 problems came with the engine and
23:47 cannon. The average lifespan of V2
23:50 engines was just 100 hours, while the
23:53 first 76.2 mm cannon couldn't penetrate
23:56 standard armor plates. Luckily, the F34
23:58 gun in the same caliber solved this
24:01 problem, at least temporarily. With its
24:05 500 m/s muzzle velocity at,000 yd, it
24:08 could penetrate more than 2 in of armor,
24:10 which was more than any German vehicle
24:13 had at the time. Another problem came
24:15 with the first turret design as it was
24:18 small and extremely cramped. Also, it
24:20 didn't have a wide field of periscopes
24:22 around it for a commander to observe the
24:25 battlefield from inside. It had only one
24:28 view slit and a single periscope, so you
24:30 would be semi- blind from inside the
24:32 tank. A good thing was that it had an
24:34 electric motor for traversing the turret
24:36 and could perform a full circle within
24:39 just 10 seconds. However, the gunner had
24:41 to constantly switch between powered and
24:43 manual operation to precisely guide his
24:46 gun to a target because when using the
24:47 electrically powered system, the turret
24:49 would continue spinning after releasing
24:52 the switch. So, for precise aiming, the
24:54 manual handle had to be used. Although
24:56 it made the interior of the tank
24:57 anything but comfortable and pleasant
25:00 for the crew, the 60° sloped armor with
25:03 a 45 mm front plate was significant
25:06 protection against early German tanks
25:08 and anti-tank guns. The armor was made
25:11 of a special steel alloy designed to be
25:13 strong but flexible so it could be bent
25:16 without breaking. Also, the angled
25:18 design made it easier to deflect
25:21 incoming shells. And this way, the 45 mm
25:22 angled plate would offer the same
25:26 protection as a 90 mm non-angled plate.
25:28 When the invasion of the Soviet Union by
25:30 the Germans began, it was time for the
25:33 T34 to show its capabilities. At that
25:35 point in the war, the most advanced
25:38 German tanks were the Panza 3 and 4, and
25:39 although they had similar thickness of
25:42 armor, it wasn't at steep angles. Also,
25:45 the German guns were shorter and fired
25:48 shells at lower velocity. This made them
25:51 both vulnerable to the T34's powerful
25:53 cannon, and chances of their guns
25:56 penetrating its frontal armor were slim.
25:58 The best option against the T34 was the
26:01 88 flat cannon, but they were rare and
26:04 scarce in this period of the war. The 37
26:07 and 50 mm anti-tank guns simply couldn't
26:08 do much against the
26:12 T34. So, the T34 was better protected
26:14 with a more powerful gun and even in
26:16 bigger numbers. But the Soviets were
26:18 beaten by the Axis battle after battle.
26:20 Ever wondered why that was? Well,
26:22 firstly, being in a cramped interior
26:24 without any effort in making comfort for
26:26 the crew made it exhausting. The
26:28 commander had to do all his duties while
26:31 also being a gunner with poor visibility
26:34 from inside. The early forward opening
26:36 hatch without a turret cuper forced him
26:38 to observe the battlefield through a
26:40 single vision slit and traversible
26:43 periscope. In the extremely cramped
26:45 turret, the loader stood on small metal
26:47 boxes of ammunition without a turret
26:49 basket. This meant that when the turret
26:51 was spinning, the floor stayed in its
26:53 place, and if not careful to move with
26:55 the turret, it could cause horrific
26:57 injuries to the loader. After firing
26:59 nine rounds from the racks, the loader
27:01 had to pull shells from floor boxes,
27:03 which were now covered with spent
27:06 casings. The driver's situation was
27:09 described as inhumanly harsh. Controls
27:11 for driving the tank were incredibly
27:13 heavy and unreliable, and he sat behind
27:15 sloped frontal armor in anything but a
27:17 comfortable position. And to add a
27:20 cherry on top of the cream, T34s were
27:23 operated by young, inexperienced crews
27:26 receiving just 72 hours of specialized
27:28 training on top of basic military
27:30 training. So the highly organized and
27:33 experienced German armored units quickly
27:35 surrounded and defeated Soviet armor
27:38 time after time, although being almost
27:41 always outnumbered by Soviet tanks.
27:43 Even Germans reported that Soviet
27:45 tankers were disorganized, that they
27:48 needed much more time to spot and aim at
27:50 the target, and that Germans could put
27:53 out three shots in the same time Soviets
27:55 could fire one. Instead of engaging
27:57 different targets, an entire platoon
27:59 would focus on a single one along with
28:02 other basic tactical mistakes. Most
28:04 T-34s didn't have radios, forcing
28:07 platoon leaders to rely on flags and
28:09 hand signals to communicate. Mechanical
28:11 malfunctions were so frequent that crews
28:13 spent more time repairing the tank than
28:16 actually operating it. They even carried
28:17 a spare transmission because of how
28:20 often it failed. The gearbox frequently
28:22 got stuck, so drivers kept a
28:23 sledgehammer nearby to deal with the
28:25 issue. The tracks could also come apart
28:27 at any moment, leaving the tank
28:29 immobilized in the middle of the
28:31 battlefield. Rods connecting the track
28:33 links often slid out while the tank was
28:36 in motion, so crews welded steel blocks
28:38 to the sides of the hull. These blocks
28:40 would stop the rods from sliding out
28:42 completely by pushing them back into
28:45 place. These mechanical issues alone led
28:48 to a horrific 50% of tank losses in
28:51 battle. Although the T34 was relatively
28:53 safe from early tank guns, its armor was
28:55 prone to splintering from
28:58 non-penetrating hits. This caused metal
29:00 fragments to shear off from the inside
29:03 and fly at great speed, effectively
29:05 becoming shrapnel that severely injured
29:07 the crew. And if your tank caught fire,
29:10 and by the way, Soviet shells were more
29:11 prone to catching fire and were
29:13 scattered throughout the tank. Good luck
29:15 trying to open a single extremely heavy
29:18 hatch on top of the turret. For the
29:20 driver, the forward hatch made it even
29:22 harder to escape from their awkward
29:24 sitting position. To make matters worse,
29:27 the fire extinguishers used toxic carbon
29:28 tetrachloride, meaning you'd want to
29:30 leave the tank whether the fire was
29:32 extinguished or not. On average, Soviet
29:34 crews suffered two men killed per
29:37 destroyed tank, compared to 1.3 crewmen
29:39 killed per destroyed US Sherman tank,
29:40 despite the Sherman having one
29:43 additional crew member. If that wasn't
29:45 enough, in 1942, Panzas were upgraded
29:47 with long barrel guns, making them
29:51 capable of destroying T34s at longer
29:54 ranges. Soon, the Tiger 1 and Panthers
29:56 entered the battlefield, while the T34
29:59 remained mostly unchanged. Although the
30:01 T34 saw slight improvements, a
30:03 redesigned turret with better hatches,
30:06 increased frontal armor to 75 mm, and
30:08 external fuel tanks, the situation on
30:10 the battlefield was still overwhelmingly
30:12 against them. To counter the heavily
30:14 armored Panther tank, the T34 was
30:17 upgraded with an 85 mm cannon adapted
30:19 from an anti-aircraft gun. This new
30:22 weapon had a high muzzle velocity and
30:24 was capable of penetrating 94 mm of
30:28 sloped armor at 1,000 yd. Despite this
30:30 improvement, Soviet armored forces
30:32 continued to suffer devastating losses
30:35 with 15,000 tanks destroyed in 1942
30:38 alone. However, the Soviet Union was far
30:40 from defeated. They relocated their
30:43 armament factories far to the east out
30:46 of reach of German bombers. By 1943,
30:49 these factories produced an astonishing
30:52 15,500 tanks, tripling Germany's
30:54 production. Workers lived in freezing
30:57 barracks in remote locations, working
30:59 long hours with makeshift tools, limited
31:01 materials, and under the constant threat
31:03 of bombing. These enormous production
31:05 numbers, where a single factory could
31:08 sometimes produce 1,000 tanks in a
31:10 single month, came at a cost to quality,
31:13 of course. Many tanks were sent into
31:15 battle without paint or even without
31:17 optics or machine guns. Engineers were
31:18 well aware of these issues, but
31:20 understood that addressing them would
31:22 slow down the production of desperately
31:24 needed tanks. As a result, the only
31:26 changes allowed in production were those
31:28 that made it faster and cheaper. This
31:31 was best shown at the Stalinrad tractor
31:33 factory, which continued producing tanks
31:35 despite relentless bombing. Even when
31:37 German forces reached the facto's yard,
31:39 workers kept assembling tanks that went
31:41 straight into battle in semi-operational
31:43 condition. When the Germans finally
31:45 captured the factory after intense
31:47 fighting, they found workers still
31:50 putting tanks together. After the
31:52 Soviets liberated the factory, they
31:54 immediately resumed production,
31:56 assembling tanks from leftover parts
31:58 amid the ruins, demonstrating just how
32:01 desperate the situation had become. In
32:04 1943, the T34 was about to clash in the
32:07 largest tank battle in history against
32:09 the superior German Panthers, Tigers,
32:12 and improved Panza Force. The crews of
32:15 T34s were no longer inexperienced
32:17 rookies and now knew how to use the best
32:19 of their machine. With meticulously
32:21 planned and prepared defenses with
32:23 thousands of mines, obstacles, and
32:26 anti-tank weapons, around 6,000 tanks
32:29 clashed in a horrific battle. Although
32:30 winning the battle and completely
32:32 changing the tide of the war, Soviets
32:35 saw the urgent need for a more powerful
32:37 cannon for the T34.
32:39 Some German tanks received dozens of
32:41 non-penetrating hits, still being in the
32:43 fight even after both their tracks were
32:47 blown off. T34s could only penetrate the
32:49 armor of Tigers or Panthers at point
32:51 blank range or by hitting them from the
32:55 sides. So in 1944, the T3485 went into
32:57 production with the cannon we mentioned
32:59 earlier. Also, the bigger and simpler
33:01 turret was introduced, moving to a
33:03 three-man turret instead of two, giving
33:05 the tank commander a slight relief.
33:08 Interestingly, Germans employed a lot of
33:11 captured T34s on the Eastern front,
33:12 which were modified to use German
33:15 equipment. They were also painted with
33:17 large crosses or swastikas on top of the
33:19 turret to prevent friendly fire
33:23 incidents. After World War II, the T34
33:25 was still widely used around the world
33:27 long after the war despite being
33:30 technologically long surpassed. The T34
33:32 evolved into the
33:34 T-5455 series, which became the backbone
33:36 of Soviet armored forces and the most
