0:01 Have you ever wondered what it was like
0:03 to be a soldier flown directly into
0:05 combat by helicopter? Well, today you're
0:07 going to find out how their job really
0:08 looked and why it was much scarier than
0:11 it seems in the movies. Let's begin.
0:13 During the Korean War, the US was
0:14 impressed by the effectiveness of
0:16 helicopters. Even though they weren't
0:18 the safest way to transport people, they
0:19 showed remarkable potential in wars
0:21 without clear front lines, where the
0:22 terrain made it impossible to use the
0:25 military in the traditional way. The
0:27 Vietnam War proved this as the US
0:29 deployed around 12,000 helicopters,
0:30 nearly half of which were destroyed
0:33 during the conflict. However, air
0:34 mobility would become a new
0:36 revolutionary tactic that for the first
0:38 time combined helicopters and infantry
0:40 in direct battle. Its first large-scale
0:42 test came during Operation Chopper when
0:45 American CH21 Shauny helicopters were
0:47 used to drop over 1,000 ARVN
0:49 paratroopers in an attack on Vietkong
0:52 positions near Saigon. They managed to
0:53 completely surprise the enemy by
0:55 attacking from an unexpected direction
0:57 and successfully completed the mission.
0:59 Since in the Vietnam War, roads were
1:01 difficult, often impossible for heavy
1:02 vehicles and prone to ambush,
1:04 helicopters took on the role of
1:06 transporting troops and providing them
1:08 with direct fire support. However, the
1:10 Vietnamese would quickly understand this
1:12 new tactic and develop counter measures
1:14 that would make their job extremely
1:16 dangerous. Even before Vietnam, the
1:18 experimental 11th Air Assault Division
1:20 was formed with the idea of introducing
1:22 this new tactic from the start. Although
1:24 it had many flaws for fighting
1:26 traditionally against whole armies, it
1:27 was ideal for combating the guerilla
1:29 formations that would characterize the
1:32 Vietnam War. Shortly afterward, the
1:34 well-known First Cavalry was recreated
1:36 with recruits from the 11th Air Assault
1:38 Division and immediately sent to
1:40 Vietnam. The first cavalry division was
1:43 originally formed back in the 1920s as a
1:45 traditional horse cavalry unit. It
1:46 fought all through World War II and
1:49 later Korean War as infantry, but kept
1:51 its historic name. And when the Vietnam
1:53 War began, it was no different. Only
1:55 this time, instead of horses, they were
1:56 riding helicopters, officially
1:58 designated as the First Cavalry Division
2:01 Air Mobile. Using this tactic, soldiers
2:03 no longer had to carry heavy packs for
2:05 weeks and hike for miles to reach their
2:07 destination. They didn't even have to
2:09 jump out like paratroopers. Instead,
2:11 they arrived fresh and ready, delivered
2:13 straight to the fight by helicopter.
2:15 Soon, many other units began serving as
2:17 air mobile infantry, even though they
2:18 were not originally formed for this
2:21 purpose. The famous airborne divisions
2:24 173rd and the 101st instead of jumping
2:26 with parachutes. They were now also
2:28 delivered into battle by helicopter and
2:30 soon standard infantry units as well.
2:32 The core of the air mobile tactic is the
2:34 air assault, which allowed soldiers to
2:36 bypass dense jungles, rivers, and
2:38 mountains, and land directly in
2:40 enemy-held territory, hoping to catch
2:42 them off guard. In practice, however, it
2:44 was far from safe and simple. Both the
2:46 North Vietnamese army and the Vietkong
2:48 quickly adapted to these new methods and
2:50 became experts at using traps and
2:52 ambushes. So, what did a typical air
2:55 assault look like? UH1 Huey helicopters
2:57 flying in tight formation would carry a
2:59 squad of 10 to 12 soldiers packed
3:01 tightly in open bays with their legs
3:03 often dangling outside. If you wonder
3:05 whether someone could fall out, the
3:07 answer is yes. And it happened for
3:10 various reasons. Alongside them, CH47
3:12 Chinuks might carry extra supplies or
3:14 even artillery while armed Hueies and
3:16 later AH1 Cobra gunships provided
3:18 covering fire and cleared the landing
3:20 zone. First, the gunships would sweep
3:22 the landing zone with machine guns,
3:24 miniguns, rockets, and grenades. This
3:26 would also help to activate hidden booby
3:29 traps or mines. Sometimes they would
3:31 even set up a fake landing zone and then
3:33 land somewhere else to trick the enemy.
3:35 Next, the transport helicopters rapidly
3:37 approached the LZ one after the other,
3:38 landing only briefly so the infantry
3:40 could jump off before taking off again
3:42 while the next helicopter took its
3:44 place. Very often, this happened under
3:47 heavy enemy fire, so-called hot LZs. One
3:50 of the scariest experiences possible. A
3:52 veteran pilot recalled he needed all the
3:53 strength in the world to push the
3:55 joystick down and lower his helicopter
3:57 into the cloud of machine gun tracers
3:59 below. During landing, both helicopters
4:02 and soldiers were extremely exposed and
4:04 vulnerable to small arms fire, let alone
4:06 heavier weapons, and catastrophic
4:08 outcomes were not rare. Many choppers
4:09 were shot down before they could even
4:11 deploy their infantry or while trying to
4:13 extract them. Because helicopters were
4:15 sometimes piloted by very young and
4:18 inexperienced pilots, some only 18 years
4:20 old, accidents and collisions were
4:23 common. Flying in tight formations under
4:24 immense pressure, they could fly in each
4:26 other's rotors and propellers, causing
4:29 severe damage or crashes. The enemy
4:31 quickly learned how to lure Americans
4:33 into ambushes or predict where they
4:35 would land. Vietkong would be laying in
4:37 weight around landing zones with machine
4:38 guns, recoilless rifles, and
4:41 anti-aircraft weapons. Their 51 caliber
4:43 machine guns were especially lethal to
4:45 helicopters. A favorite strategy was to
4:48 lure American troops into mined areas
4:49 and prepared crossfire zones where
4:52 anti-aircraft guns were positioned. They
4:54 knew exactly which helicopters to target
4:56 and when to disrupt the Americans as
4:58 much as possible. They studied US
5:00 tactics and could often predict the next
5:02 steps such as the arrival of resupply or
5:05 medevac choppers. Still, it is said that
5:07 nine times out of 10, helicopters would
5:08 land when needed, no matter the
5:11 conditions. Cobra gunships had
5:12 significantly longer hover time than
5:14 Hueies, so they would arrive first to
5:16 prepare the landing zone, cover, and
5:18 support the landing, and even stay for a
5:19 while to support soldiers on the ground
5:22 before needing to refuel and rearm.
5:23 However, they were also vulnerable to
5:26 enemy fire, especially during low-flying
5:28 gun runs to provide close support. And
5:29 they were an even bigger target because
5:31 the enemy knew how dangerous their
5:33 firepower was. They were also followed
5:35 by several helicopters designated for
5:37 medevac, the famous dust offs manned by
5:39 some of the bravest crews credited with
5:41 saving thousands of lives. The entire
5:43 concept was based on extreme speed and
5:46 coordination, leaving no room for error.
5:47 All participants were instructed never
5:49 to hesitate and to make and carry out
5:51 decisions, even if they were wrong,
5:53 because waiting almost always meant
5:55 certain death or a failed mission. After
5:57 landing, the soldiers would disembark as
5:59 quickly as possible and run for cover to
6:02 establish a perimeter and defense. Many
6:03 times they were delivered literally
6:05 straight into combat. If they were lucky
6:07 enough to avoid traps, they would then
6:09 proceed with their mission depending on
6:11 their specific objective. In the field,
6:13 soldiers removed their shiny insignas
6:16 loved by enemy snipers and leaders
6:17 stayed close but not right beside the
6:19 radio men as officers and radio men were
6:22 the first to be targeted along with M60
6:23 gunners. Because of that, they always
6:25 tried to keep a formation where a single
6:28 RPG, grenade, or machine gun burst
6:29 couldn't take out all the most important
6:32 people at once. The US Army constantly
6:34 experimented with new and creative ways
6:37 to use helicopters. Even in places where
6:38 they couldn't land, they could hover
6:40 overhead so that soldiers could dismount
6:42 by ropes or special ladders. This made
6:44 it possible to insert troops almost
6:46 anywhere, especially in high mountain
6:48 regions where the Vietkong dug in,
6:50 expecting the enemy to come from lower
6:53 ground. Another tactic was diversionary
6:55 landings and extractions. Helicopters
6:56 would drop off troops and later pick
6:58 them up, but small groups of soldiers
7:00 would remain behind, hidden in ambush
7:02 patrols. The enemy often came to
7:04 investigate after the Americans had
7:07 left, so they would fall into an ambush.
7:09 Night landings were also used sometimes,
7:10 though they were less common because of
7:13 the higher risks involved. As an example
7:14 of how badly things could go during air
7:16 mobile operations, we can look at the
7:18 Battle of LZ Albany, one of the
7:20 deadliest and most chaotic engagements
7:22 of the Vietnam War. It was part of the
7:25 larger I drang campaign. After intense
7:27 fighting at LZ X-ray, two battalions of
7:29 the seventh cavalry regiment began a
7:31 tactical march toward new landing zones
7:33 to regroup and prepare for evacuation.
7:36 Their columns stretched out in a 550
7:38 line as it moved through dense jungle
7:41 and tall elephant grass. The soldiers
7:43 were exhausted, having gone 60 hours
7:45 without sleep, fighting and marching.
7:47 While trying to reach the extraction
7:48 point, the reconnaissance platoon
7:50 stumbled upon the enemy by surprise,
7:52 capturing two of them, likely part of an
7:54 enemy recon team. The scouts also found
7:56 sandal footprints, bamboo arrows
7:58 pointing directions, and rice grains in
8:00 the jungle, which creeped them out. The
8:02 column was ordered to halt and prepare
8:04 flank defense, but they did not realize
8:06 they were just 200 yd away from a
8:08 heavily fortified enemy headquarters.
8:10 The worn out troops were sitting in
8:12 chest high grass stretched out in the
8:15 open, unaware that around a corner were
8:17 hundreds of enemy fighters. About an
8:19 hour after capturing those soldiers,
8:20 enemy troops launched a coordinated
8:22 L-shaped ambush, hitting the front and
8:25 side of the American column. They poured
8:26 out of the jungle by the hundreds,
8:28 engaging in hand-to-hand combat and
8:31 overwhelming the disoriented Americans.
8:32 They split the column into isolated
8:34 pockets, and some companies were overrun
8:37 and wiped out within minutes. As the
8:39 battle raged, US helicopters tried to
8:41 help the ambushed soldiers. They flew
8:43 into heavy fire trying to evacuate them,
8:45 and several were shot down immediately.
8:46 Some landed to pick up troops, but were
8:48 damaged in the field and could not take
8:51 off again. The battle of Eadrang as a
8:53 whole saw 16 helicopters destroyed and
8:56 more than 125 damaged with LZ Albany
8:58 accounting for a large part of them.
9:00 Close air support arrived with A1E
9:03 Skyraiders dropping Napal, but the US
9:05 and NVA soldiers were so close together
9:06 that the air strikes caused
9:09 indiscriminate casualties on both sides.
9:11 Fighting continued in chaos until
9:12 nightfall when some reinforcements
9:14 managed to land and secure a perimeter
9:16 around the survivors. They were
9:18 extracted under heavy fire and by the
9:20 end of the day, the second battalion had
9:23 suffered catastrophic losses of 155 men
