0:01 The Tiger 2 was probably the best and
0:04 worst tank Germany ever built. It had
0:06 incredible armor and firepower, but it
0:07 came with a long list of serious
0:09 problems. So, how did something that
0:11 looked unbeatable end up failing so
0:13 badly in the field? We'll try to break
0:16 that down in this video. Let's set the
0:19 stage. By the end of 1943, Germany was
0:20 in a rapidly worsening military
0:22 position. On the Eastern Front, the Red
0:24 Army had reversed the momentum at
0:26 Stalingrad and was now pushing west with
0:29 increasing speed and strength. Soviet
0:31 armored formations were growing in size,
0:33 but also in quality, introducing new
0:36 models like the T-3485 and the IS-
0:38 tanks, which were now more than enough
0:41 to challenge German armor. Meanwhile, on
0:42 the Western Front, the Allies had
0:44 successfully invaded Italy, and it was
0:46 clear that a cross channel invasion into
0:48 France was only a matter of time.
0:50 British and American tank development
0:52 was also accelerating. And although
0:54 their tanks weren't necessarily superior
0:56 one-on-one, the numbers, air support,
0:58 and mobility they brought with them made
1:00 German armored forces increasingly
1:02 vulnerable. The German workhorse Panzer
1:05 4 with its improved 75mm gun was still
1:07 relevant on the battlefield, but it was
1:09 becoming outdated. The Panther was
1:11 supposed to replace it, but it had
1:13 notorious reliability problems and was
1:15 stretched thin across multiple fronts.
1:17 The Tiger 1 was built in insufficient
1:19 numbers to actually make a difference.
1:21 You see, the Germans approached this
1:22 problem completely opposite to the
1:25 Soviet Union, for example. They found
1:26 something that worked and was good
1:28 enough, the T34, and then focused on
1:30 pumping out as many as possible. The
1:32 Germans, on the other hand, instead of
1:34 pumping out upged Panza 4s, wanted
1:36 something to restore fear and respect to
1:38 their armor. So, they ordered the
1:40 development of a new heavy tank. The
1:42 requirements were ambitious. It needed
1:44 to be far better armored than the Tiger
1:46 1, carry a more powerful version of the
1:49 88 mm gun, and also incorporate design
1:51 improvements based on combat experience.
1:53 Hitler took a personal interest in the
1:55 project, which meant that development
1:56 would be influenced by political and
1:58 ideological factors as well, as if they
2:00 weren't already having enough trouble
2:02 with resources and the Allied strategic
2:04 bombing campaign. Hitler, in his
2:06 fashion, wanted another wonder weapon
2:08 that would symbolize German superiority
2:10 and turn the tide of the war. that would
2:12 become the Tiger 2, later known to the
2:15 Allies also as the King Tiger. It was
2:16 developed under intense pressure with
2:18 limited resources and in an increasingly
2:22 chaotic wartime environment. Still, the
2:23 designers attempted to meet every
2:25 demand, combining the thickest armor
2:27 ever seen on a German tank with one of
2:28 the most powerful anti-tank guns of the
2:31 war. At first glance, the King Tiger was
2:33 everything German crews could have hoped
2:35 for. The gun was a major upgrade. It was
2:38 the same 88 mm caliber like on the Tiger
2:42 one, but this was the KWK 43 L71, a much
2:44 longer barrel with a more powerful
2:46 cartridge. This gave it an extremely
2:49 high muzzle velocity of around 3,400 ft
2:51 pers and of course drastically increased
2:53 armor penetration. To put that into
2:56 perspective, the Tiger 1 could penetrate
2:59 120 mm of sloped armor at 100 m, more
3:01 than enough to make every Allied tank
3:03 crew worried. Now, the Tiger 2 could go
3:05 through 200 mm under the same
3:07 conditions. However, the difference
3:10 really shows at long range. At 2,000 m,
3:12 the Tiger 1's penetration dropped to 84
3:17 mm. The Tiger 2 could punch through 132,
3:19 meaning it could penetrate more at 2,000
3:22 m than the Tiger 1 could at just 100.
3:24 This meant it could destroy any Allied
3:25 tank at ranges where their fire would be
3:28 irrelevant. Then when you combine that
3:29 with the frontal hull armor that was
3:32 sloped and 180 mm thick, you get
3:33 yourself a nightmare to fight against if
3:35 you were an allied tanker. That sloped
3:37 upper glacis made it nearly impossible
3:39 for any Allied tank of the time to
3:41 penetrate it headon. In fact, there are
3:43 no known cases of Tiger 2 being
3:44 destroyed by frontal shots from enemy
3:47 tanks or anti-tank guns. Every recorded
3:49 tank kill came from side or rear hits.
3:51 The armor on the turret was weaker by
3:53 comparison, especially on the sides and
3:55 rear, and that created a major
3:57 vulnerability. Since a significant
3:59 portion of the ammunition was stored in
4:01 the turret itself, a penetrating hit
4:03 from the side could ignite the ammo and
4:05 quite ruin the day for a German crew.
4:07 Later in the war, they deliberately
4:09 reduced their ammunition loadout by
4:11 about 20 rounds in order to stop storing
4:14 shells in the turret. Now, on paper, the
4:16 Tiger 2 seemed like it was going in the
4:19 right direction. Well, not quite. Its
4:20 appearance didn't solve any of the
4:22 deeper problems the Germans had,
4:25 technical, logistical, and strategic.
4:27 The first obvious thing was its weight.
4:29 It was the heaviest operational tank of
4:31 the entire war, weighing around 70 tons.
4:33 But to power that kind of mass, the
4:35 Germans didn't design a new engine.
4:37 Instead, they used a slightly upgraded
4:39 version of the same Mayback F12 that was
4:41 already in use in the Panther and Tiger
4:44 1, now pushed to around 700 horsepower.
4:46 That engine had always been borderline
4:48 underpowered in 20 ton lighter tanks.
4:50 And now in the Tiger 2, it was clearly
4:53 overstressed. Each bridge crossing was a
4:55 gamble, and bridge reinforcement units
4:57 had to travel with them. It wasn't rare
4:59 to see a Tiger 2 destroy the bridge and
5:01 fall into the river. The engineers had
5:03 to work around the growing problems of
5:05 wartime Germany. Material shortages,
5:07 production delays, and simultaneously
5:09 constant pressure to deliver results
5:12 fast. So many design compromises were
5:13 made. Tanks were rushed through
5:15 production with some parts hand fitted
5:18 instead of standardized. This meant that
5:19 maintenance in the field was harder than
5:21 it should have been, and replacement
5:23 parts weren't always interchangeable.
5:24 But from the top, there was no backing
5:27 down. Hitler wanted the King Tiger to be
5:29 a symbol of German power. That meant
5:31 bigger, thicker, stronger, and more
5:32 lethal than anything else that had ever
5:35 existed on the battlefield. But as we'll
5:36 see, building an impressive tank isn't
5:39 the same as building a practical one.
5:40 Because so much weight went into
5:42 protection and firepower without
5:43 improving all the other components to
5:46 carry it, the Tiger 2 had poor
5:48 acceleration, especially off-road, and
5:50 suffered frequent mechanical failures.
5:52 The final drives and transmission were
5:54 not designed for a vehicle of this
5:56 weight. They wore out quickly and failed
5:57 completely during long movements, or
6:00 more importantly, in combat. Its
6:02 suspension used overlapping road wheels
6:04 that became a serious liability in wet
6:06 or cold conditions. Mud and debris would
6:08 get trapped between the wheels, and in
6:09 winter, this could freeze solid, locking
6:12 up the entire running gear. If one wheel
6:13 needed to be replaced, several others
6:15 had to be removed just to reach it.
6:17 Maintenance crews especially loved this
6:20 design. Fuel consumption was also a
6:22 major issue, especially for a country
6:24 that was actively running out of oil.
6:28 The Tiger 2 burned up to 500 L per 100
6:30 km. There were constant logistical
6:32 problems just moving the tanks to the
6:34 front, let alone keeping them supplied
6:36 all the time. Because of the tanks
6:37 width, it required narrow transport
6:40 tracks to be loaded onto rail cars. Once
6:42 unloaded, the crew now had to replace
6:43 the transport tracks with the wide
6:45 combat tracks, which again took hours in
6:48 field conditions. Now add to that a
6:49 combination of limited spare parts,
6:52 fragile drivetrains, and extreme fuel
6:54 demands, and on a good day, you would
6:56 get only about four out of 10 Tiger 2
6:58 operational at any given time. The rest
7:00 were broken down, waiting for repairs or
7:02 stuck somewhere in transit. Crews
7:04 regularly found themselves forced to
7:06 abandon perfectly functional tanks just
7:08 because they ran out of fuel,
7:09 ammunition, or got stuck and could not
7:12 be recovered in time. In many cases,
7:13 they had to destroy their own tanks to
7:15 prevent them from falling into enemy
7:17 hands. And they are actually the biggest
7:19 cause of Tiger 2 losses, their own
7:22 crews. The Tiger 2 first saw combat in
7:25 mid 1944, by which point the situation
7:27 on both fronts had shifted dramatically.
7:29 The allies had landed in Normandy and
7:31 Soviet forces were launching massive
7:33 offensives in the east. Germany did not
7:35 have time for gradual deployment or
7:37 careful integration. So the Tiger 2 was
7:39 thrown into action under increasingly
7:41 desperate conditions. Its first major
7:43 use came in the Normandy campaign,
7:45 particularly around KH during Operation
7:47 Goodwood. The tank's raw firepower and
7:49 frontal armor were immediately
7:51 noticeable. Allied Shermans, Cromwells,
7:53 and Churchills had no real chance of
7:56 penetrating the front of a Tiger 2, and
7:57 British and American crews quickly
7:59 learned to avoid direct confrontations
8:01 and relay their position to artillery.
8:03 Allied air superiority also meant that
8:05 once a Tiger 2 was spotted, it became a
8:07 huge, slowmoving target for fighter
8:09 bombers armed with high velocity
8:12 rockets. Normy's narrow hedge and soft
8:14 ground were not suited to a 70 ton
8:15 vehicle with poor mechanical
8:18 reliability. Many Tiger 2s broke down
8:20 before ever reaching the front lines.
8:22 Others got stuck in tight urban streets
8:24 where they could not traverse their long
8:26 gun and got outflanked by the Allied
8:28 tanks that did not have such issues. On
8:30 the Eastern Front, Tiger 2s were
8:32 deployed in several key battles. The
8:35 53rd Heavy Panza Battalion, for example,
8:38 saw extensive action over 166 days. The
8:42 unit destroyed 121 Soviet tanks, 244
8:45 anti-tank guns, five aircraft, and even
8:48 one train. That proved the Tiger 2 could
8:50 do the job very effectively, just when
8:52 it worked and had proper support. On the
8:54 other hand, the battalion lost 25 Tiger
8:57 2s in the same period, 13 of which were
8:59 destroyed by their own crews. Then came
9:02 the Arden's offensive, Germany's last
9:03 major attempt to turn the tide on the
9:07 Western Front. Around 150 Tiger 2s were
9:08 committed to the Battle of the Bulge in
9:11 late 1944. After initially shocking the
9:13 Allies, the offensive eventually utterly
9:15 failed. They did not manage to capture
9:17 the fuel depots they aimed for, and most
9:19 Tiger twos, like other German equipment,
9:22 were abandoned and destroyed. In the
9:24 fall of 1944, one of the major tank
9:26 factories was almost completely
9:28 destroyed by a bombing raid, halting the
9:31 production of around 600 Tiger 2. Also,
9:34 manganese was in short supply, and all
9:35 late war German tanks suffered from
9:37 lower quality armor, more prone to
9:39 cracking and splintering, sometimes with
9:41 entire armor plates collapsing after
9:44 being hit. Because of this, only about
9:48 500 Tiger 2s were ever built. 500 Tiger
9:49 2s, poorly equipped and virtually
9:52 unsupported, although with an estimated
9:54 three Allied tanks destroyed per knocked
9:56 out Tiger, could not make a dent in the
9:58 Allied offensive, let alone stop it and
10:00 turn the tide of the war. In the final
10:02 months of the war, Tiger 2s were still
10:04 deployed in small numbers on both
10:06 fronts. Despite being completely
10:07 surrounded, outnumbered, and running out
10:09 of fuel and ammo, the last operational
10:12 Tiger 2s made a horrific last stand in
10:14 Berlin. They positioned themselves in
10:16 strategic choke points and caused
10:18 tremendous damage to Soviet armor trying
10:21 to break into the city. So, while the
10:23 Tiger 2 delivered undeniable tactical
10:25 results under the right conditions, it
10:27 rarely operated under those right
10:29 conditions. Its best moments came when
10:31 it was stationary in an ambush, raining
10:33 hell on the Allied tanks until it ran
10:35 out of fuel or ammo and was then
10:38 destroyed by its crew. The King Tiger
10:40 utterly failed because it was deployed
