This content is an interview with a former CIA officer, John Kuryaku, discussing his career, the CIA's operations, recruitment tactics, and significant events like 9/11 and the hunt for al-Qaeda operatives. It also touches upon the influence of foreign intelligence agencies, particularly Mossad, on US policy and the complexities of international relations.
Mind Map
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spell your name.
So I spell it which made me angry and
then he says to me like this, you are
Jewish. The Israelis are the best
intelligence service in the world.
>> Are they better than the CIA?
>> I think they are. Yeah, they're
certainly deadlier.
I'm from the CIA in Washington. I know
exactly who you are and what you're
doing here.
>> Most were involved. The CIA was the
guilty party here because the CIA did
know that the hijackers were in the
United States.
>> What do you mean by very rich?
>> To work with the CIA 95% of the time
it's money. And so the CIA can kill
anybody that it wants to kill. And they
have a meeting every Tuesday on that.
>> The the teams go all around the world.
They kill the targets and then they meet
again the next Tuesday and come up with
the next list of people to kill. It's sick.
sick.
>> Do the CIA work with the with Hollywood?
Oh, he is. In fact, there's an office in
the CIA's Office of Public Affairs whose
job it is just to work with Hollywood
Studios, nothing else.
>> So, [music] you went to Pakistan and
your objective was to find Abua.
>> Like, that's al-Qaeda. That's what we're
so afraid of. They're children.
>> Once you start torturing someone,
they're going to admit to stuff that
they haven't done. And you could see the
exact moment when he said, "Oh my god,
the Americans have me." Because he
John Kyako, welcome to Thank you so much
for having me. Thank you for coming. Um,
so there's a lot of things we'd like to
talk about today and a lot of stuff that
I've been reading. Um, especially I've
read your book, The Reluctant Spy.
>> Thank you for So now I know what [music]
your career the 15ear career in the CIA
and there are so many questions I want
to ask about. Um but if we were thinking
maybe what's the best place to start
from um you being someone who worked 15
years you have 10 honorary medals is it
that you've gotten one of the biggest
one the the biggest one of them is you
got the counterterrorism medal >> right
>> right
>> um and having a lot of experience in the
CIA if we were to understand for us to
kickstart our discussion today what's
the main job of the CIA why is it there
>> um actually you can boil it down to its
basic tenants. It's to recruit spies, to
steal secrets, and then to analyze those
secrets so that the American policy
maker can make the best informed policy.
So, we're specifically talking about the
president, the vice president, the
national security adviser, and the
secretaries of state and defense. Those
are the customers.
>> So, those are those are your main audience.
audience.
>> That's right.
>> So, you provide the best information
through recruiting spies. When you say
recruiting spies, do you is it spies in
in different countries? So So the CIA
focuses on what's happening outside the US.
US.
>> Yeah, this is this is an important point
actually that most Americans don't
understand. It is that the CIA is
focused overseas. The FBI is focused
domestically. The CIA doesn't care what
Americans are doing on a day-to-day
basis. That's the FBI's jurisdiction.
The CIA focuses only on recruiting
foreign spies to steal foreign
intelligence and to give it back to them.
them.
>> But there are controversies about the
CIA being involved in domestic stuff.
>> Yeah. And and there are credible
allegations that the CIA has been
involved in domestic operations mostly pre975.
pre975.
The CIA was just an outof control
organization until 1975. It was
experimenting on American citizens. It
was recruiting Americans. It was dosing
Americans with LSD just to see how they
responded. It was um following and
bugging the homes of uh civil rights
activists and political activists,
especially people who opposed the
Vietnam War. That all changed in 1975
with what we call the Church Committee
and the Pike Committee. They became the
Senate Intelligence Committee and the
House Intelligence Committee. and they
passed a law saying that the CIA was not
permitted to operate domestically.
>> Okay. So, let's focus on what on on on
your experience in the in the CIA and
then throughout your experience uh we're
going to talk about important stuff that
happened that changed the Middle East
and changed the world world frankly.
>> Um but before we lead up to September 11th
11th
>> Mhm. uh which was one of the biggest
pivots as um you were working in Greece
before that.
State Department language services. Okay.
Okay.
And you even stayed in in Bahrain for a
bit for three years.
>> I spent two years in Bahrain. Two of the
happiest years of my life.
>> I served in Kuwait and I served in Saudi
Arabia. It's uh
>> we're going to dedicate um a full
episode um about what about your service
in Kuwait
>> and especially the invasion and you've
we've we've had so many episodes about
what has happened in 1990. Um but we had
it from a Kuwaiti perspective. it would
be nice to to to talk to you about it
because you were the main guy basically
the CIA guy in 1990.
>> Um so yeah we we'll do that uh on a
later stage but um so you were in Athens
and you were before going to Athens you
were an analyst. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> And then you switched to ops. Yes.
>> So let's what's the what's the
difference between being an analyst in
the CIA and and being an an operations
guy? analysts are are stationed in the
CIA's directorate of intelligence and
operations people in the directorate of
operations. And back then, you know,
never the two shall meet. So, as an
analyst, your job is to sit in a cubicle
about this size and think the big
thoughts. So, you're reading CIA cables,
State Department reporting cables, NSA
telephone intercepts, uh, cables from
the Pentagon and from the Pentagon's
people overseas, and foreign press. So,
you become an expert on the country that
you're covering. That's all you're
reading all day long, five or six days a
week. And then you write papers that
mostly nobody reads
>> or you respond to questions from the
president. Most importantly, you write
for something called the president's
daily brief. This is a 16page
um report that's written for the
president six days a week on everything
that has happened overnight and it's
briefed to the president, the vice
president, the national security
adviser, the secretaries and deputy
secretaries of state and defense, the
chairman and joint chairman of the g of
the chiefs of staff and uh and a handful
of people at the White House and the
National Security Council. So it's like
um it's like a newspaper a foreign
policy newspaper comes to the president
and the main people
>> and it's very very highly classified.
It's the most sensitive report.
>> What would be typically in government?
>> What would be typically on let's say
>> I'll give you an example. Yeah.
>> And it's it's safe to say this now that
so many years have passed. I noticed in
late 1990
that Saddam Hussein was very quietly
moving milit senior military officers
out of their positions and he was making
them ambassadors in weird places like
Philippines or Burma, Myanmar, you just
getting them out and he was replacing
them with people from his Tigriti clan.
Saddam was from Alja, this village in
Tit. And so he was mostly taking people
from Aja and putting them in these
senior positions. They were
inexperienced, but he knew he could
trust them because they were relatively
close relatives. So I noticed this and I
said it to my boss
um and I said, "These these are barely
being announced in the Iraqi press and
nobody's even commenting about them." He
said, "Well, what does it mean?" I said,
"He's worried about an uprising, and so
he's replacing people with his closest
relatives, but they don't have any
military experience, so it's good for
him, but it's better for us."
>> So he said, "You have to tell the
president that."
>> So I wrote the whole thing for the
president. They gave me the first page
in the book that next day. And then in
the margin, the president wrote,
"Thanks. I appreciate it." And sent it
back to me.
was present at
>> uh that was George HW Bush.
>> George HW
>> I'll tell you a funny story about that
morning if if I could.
>> Um the morning actually no you know what
I'll save it for tomorrow.
>> All right great.
>> Yeah [laughter] it's more appropriate
for tomorrow
>> please note just just so we don't forget
the that story it's
just want to make sure the OCD in me
>> um you transferred from being an analyst
to an operations guy and for you to do
the transfer. So we spoke about what an
anal an analyst does right what's what's
what what does operation do
>> right in operations it's very simple
it's to recruit spies to steal those
secrets and then you implement
operations there was a CIA psychiatrist
that I worked with a couple of times on
a couple very sensitive operations
because sometimes you're recruiting
somebody who might be crazy or almost
crazy and you need to make sure that you
can get the information from them
>> before they go crazy.
So she paid me a great compliment one
time. She told my promotion panel, "John
Kuryaku will think of 30 different ideas
for an operation. 28 of them are crazy,
but two of them are really good." And
everybody laughed. That was actually a
very big compliment because you have to
come up with these ideas that nobody's
ever thought of. I'm not going to
recruit Saddam Hussein to tell me what
his plans are. So, I need to recruit
somebody who has access to Saddam. How
do I get to somebody with access to
Saddam when he's completely surrounded
by his own people who never leave the
country? Well, you come up with an idea
where you start with the Kurds or maybe
there's some Shia guy from Basra or some
Jordanian general or and you work your
way into that circle. That's what
operations is all about.
>> So, how would you typically work your
way into that circle? Like if if you
recruit someone who's on the in the
third circle, how would you be able to
get into his closest circle?
>> It's all about what is called targeting.
So, you need to figure out before you
say anything at all, you need to figure
out who has the access that you're
looking for. And then once you identify
the per the hard part is identifying the person.
person.
>> The easy part is actually making the
recruitment. You have to look for
something called a vulnerability. Now, a
vulnerability may be obvious. Maybe
you're a gambler and you're in debt. I
can pay your debts
>> if you give me what I'm looking for.
Maybe you're not a gambler.
Maybe you don't drink. You don't do
drugs. You don't gamble. You don't do
anything. You're just a good man. Well,
maybe that's the vulnerability. Maybe
you love your family so much that you
want the best for your children and you
want your children to go to
Harvard, Stanford, University of Texas.
I can take care of that for you and it
won't cost you anything if you give me
what I want. Um, in training.
>> So, so training. So, you before you
moved to be being an op guy, you went to
the farm, >> right?
>> right?
>> Which is where the training happened, right?
right?
>> That's right. So what happens in the in
the farm and what kind of training do
you usually get there?
>> Oh, the easier question is what kind of
training don't you get?
>> Uh so the analytic training was was
easy. They just teach you the CIA
writing style. It takes six weeks and
then you go back to headquarters and
live happily ever after.
>> In operations, you're in training
constantly. So it started off with what
we called crash and bang. They teach you
how to crash cars through roadblocks
100 kilometers an hour backwards while
you're shooting out the window at
another car. Movie stuff.
>> Movie stuff. Legitimately.
>> Um, and if you have car sickness, you're
going to have a seriously hard time.
People throwing up all the time. Uh,
then you go to the actual operations
training where they teach you how to
recruit spies to steal secrets. And you
start in a mock uh diplomatic cocktail
party, right? So all the instructors are
pretending to be diplomats from other
countries. And in mine, [snorts] I spoke
Arabic and I spoke Greek. So I went up
and I said, "Hi, how are you? I'm John
Kiryaku. I'm the new first secretary at
the American Embassy."
>> So you come and you pose as a person who
works in the embassy. >> Okay?
>> Okay?
>> Or in the military or in the commerce
department or in some company. It could
be anything. Anything at all. And this
guy says to me, um, um, Buenos Diaz.
>> Yeah, I don't speak Spanish.
And he says, Bahada de Kuba from the
Cuban embassy. And I said, okay, nice to
meet you. And I walked away because
clearly that wasn't my target. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> So I went to another guy and he was a
Russian and we exchanged business cards. And
And
>> that's all a mock.
>> Yeah. All mock. All for pretend. And
then I I come upon this short guy and I
said, "Hi, John Kiryaku from the
American Embassy. How are you?" And he
says, "Um, I dinkro in Greek. I'm from
Cyprus." And I thought, "Okay, here's my
target that they created for me." [laughter]
[laughter]
I said, "What do you do for a living?"
He said, "I work at the port." Okay, I
don't I don't care about that. I don't
know anything about ports. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> And I said, "Oh, that sounds so interesting."
interesting."
>> Which it didn't. I said, 'What do you do
at the port?' And he said, 'Oh, you
know, when the ships come in, I'm in
charge of the the lading and then when
they go out, I make sure all the
paperwork is right. Also not interesting
to me. And I said, that's fascinating.
It it it's so international things
constantly coming in and I'm just trying
to make make conversation. And he said,
yes, like for example, tomorrow we have
a shipment coming in full of hydrochloro thorioide.
thorioide.
I don't know what that is. And I said,
"Oh, that sounds so interesting.
Would you do me the honor of letting me
take you to lunch?" And I gave him my
business card, which is exactly what I
was supposed to do. So, we went to lunch
and I said, "So, tell me about this
hydrochloro floral."
>> So, the mock continues.
>> Oh, yeah. It continues for weeks. For
weeks. Okay. Six weeks, as a matter of fact.
fact.
>> Wow. Okay.
>> So, we're at lunch and he says, "Yeah, I
don't know what this stuff is." So, I
send a mock cable to headquarters and I
say, "I'm I'm here in the Republic of
Victoria and I met this criate and
here's his name and here's his age and
here's his height and eye color and hair
color. Please tell me if you have
anything in the files on him with his
name." He told me he's expecting a
shipment of hydrochloroioide.
I don't know what that is. So, they send
me back. They said yes in our files.
He's a nice guy. He works for the port
just like he said. Hydrochlorofluioide
is the precursor chemical to cocaine.
So now I'm interested.
>> You're interested. Yeah.
>> I would be writing for the analyst. So I
would say there's a shipment of hydrochlorazide
hydrochlorazide
coming in to the port of Victoria, which
is of course a madeup country, and uh
the ship is coming from North Korea.
Well, now the analysts are going to say,
"Oh my gosh, the North Koreans are
involved in cocaine production." >> Okay?
>> Okay?
>> And so they write that for the
president. That's the the system. Okay?
The way it works. But anyway, that
operational thing went six weeks and
then we did bomb training. We we learned
how to make bombs and then we learned
how to diffuse bombs. And then in the
final exam, you can build any bomb you
want. And uh the the final is it has to
explode and destroy whatever it is
you're trying to destroy. So, I built a
it's called an anfo bomb. It's ammonium
nitrate and I put it under a van. And
so, we all got in the bunker. We looked
through the slit that's just barely
above ground.
We pushed the plunger. Actually, it was
a button, not really a plunger.
>> And it blew up and they found the
transmission 300 meters away. >> Wow.
>> Wow.
>> I got an A. So, um,
then we went to because I was going to
Athens, I actually went out to Athens
and then they sent me back for another
six weeks for something called advanced
counterterrorist operations training. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> And then advanced counterterrorist
driving, which is, you know, in the
desert in Nevada and over sand dunes
while you're shooting out the window
trying to drive. And
>> it was all very, very theatrical
>> and demanding as well. and demanding.
The pressure is ridiculous.
>> You're one of the few people who were
able to do the transition from being an
analyst to
>> It was exceedingly rare to move from
analysis to operations. But I'll tell
you how that happened. I got so bored in
analysis. It's Iraq, Iraq, Iraq, Iraq,
24 hours a day. For years, I said, I'm
going to go crazy because Bill Clinton
is not going to overthrow Saddam
Hussein. I got to do something
different. So, I saw a job listing and
it was looking for a counterterrorism
operations officer in Greece and it
said, "Successful candidate will have
either Greek or Arabic."
>> Tailored for you.
>> As it turned out, I was the only person
in the entire CIA who spoke both Greek
and Arabic.
>> But for you to work in the CIA, do you
have to be obviously you have to be born
in the US, a US citizen?
>> You have to be US citizen. But does your
mom and dad also have to be born in the
US or that doesn't matter?
>> No, it doesn't matter. They're going to
investigate you just like they
investigate everybody. My investigation
actually took very long. It was 18
months because not only were were many
of my relatives still in Greece and
Greek citizens, but one cousin of my
grandmother was a member of the Pulit
bureau of the Greek Communist Party,
which caused me no end of trouble. And I
never met the man. So, it took 18 months
to investigate him and they just decided
he was just some old man who loves
communism and so they gave me the job.
>> So, they'll investigate all of your
family and just see.
>> They sure do.
>> Okay. So, they just they need to clear
all all of your family before you become
someone who works in the CIA.
>> That's right.
>> Okay. So, um you you saw the the thing
that said they needed someone,
>> right? So I went down to talk to the
hiring officer who was a very senior
officer and I said, "Listen, I have no
operational experience whatsoever, but I
speak Greek and Arabic." And he said,
"What? Are you willing to be tested?"
And I said, "Yeah." I said, "I just
tested three weeks ago in Arabic, but
I'll test again if you want." It turned
out that his secretary was Greek. And
not only was she Greek, she was from the
same island and same village that my
grandparents were from. >> Roads.
>> Roads.
>> Roads. the village of Yalisos. So she
comes out of the office and she starts
speaking speaking to me in Greek. I
respond in Greek and she says, "Um, he
gets a thumbs up from me, Dave." And and
then this Dave says, "Well, your Arabic
scores are excellent." He said, "It's
going to take some convincing for up the
chain of command, but it's a lot easier
and a lot cheaper to take a linguist and
teach him operations than it is to take
an operations officer and teach him to
speak Greek and Arabic."
>> Fair enough.
>> So, it took, I'm going to say, a couple
of months, but he convinced people up
the chain that I was the guy. And so, I
got the job and I went to Athens as a
counterterrorism operations officer. So,
so back to the farm, you were you had
this u Gibbro. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> The criate guy.
>> That's right.
>> Um to um to to convince over the period
of 6 weeks. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> So you you you you met you sent them a
cable. They said, "Oh, this is um raw
material for cocaine." >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> So for you to pass, you need to you need
to recruit him.
>> Yes. So I recruited him.
>> You recruited him? How would you
typically recruit someone? Because we're
going to speak about this a lot. And you
you recruited in in Greece five people
over a period of 18 months.
>> I had success and you had that comp in
comparison to everyone else uh was was
was more than just good. It was really
good. It was outstanding if I may say
>> it was.
>> So you had a special thing for
recruiting people. So now I would like
to learn from you. How would you
typically go about in terms of
recruiting? Maybe take me to a real case
that has happened.
>> Sure. Well, even before you you meet the
person that you want to recruit, there
have to be some things about you that
have to be consistent.
You have to really love people, right? I
would so much rather go to a party where
I know nobody than to sit at home and
watch a movie.
>> Oh, so you are a social person.
>> Very much so. And you have to be to be
successful. There are no introverts in
CIA operations. You have to be an extrovert.
extrovert.
And so, um,
>> because I just love doing things like
that, I would go out I I'm not
exaggerating when I tell you I would go
out five or six nights a week overseas
to um parties, dinners, receptions,
events. Hi, how are you? Here's my card.
Let's get to know each other.
>> So, when you were in in in Greece, um
you you recruited someone from the
Middle East.
>> Yeah. See, in Greece, our targets were
the Abu Nidal Organization. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> The Libyans, the Iraqis,
uh the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine and PFLP, General Command,
and the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine.
>> Do you have any information about the
Abu Nidal operations because that's very
popular here in the Middle East? Just to
know more about Abu Nidal and his type
of operations that he did.
>> Yeah, the reason the reason that Abu
Nidal was in the end unsuccessful is
because his organization was based on
his personality alone.
and his personality was such that he was
very conspiratorial.
And so
what we were able to do was to plant a
seed in his ear that his people were
talking to the CIA. So listen, if you're
a member of Abonal organization, your
name is Muhammad. I can't recruit you.
You hate me. You want to kill me.
>> Yeah. So
I know that there's this other guy
Abdullah in Abu Nidal and I say Abdullah
I'm from the CIA. Muhammad told me to
talk to you. Well, he's going to kill
you. And then I tell Rashid, I said,
"Hey, did you hear Abdullah killed
Muhammad, which is crazy because
Abdullah is one of our sources and and
Muhammad was one of the true believers
of Abu Nidal and then Rashid kills
Abdullah and next thing you know >> chaos.
>> chaos.
>> They've all killed each other and the
only one left is Abu Nidal and then
Saddam kills him."
>> So that's what happened with Abdullah.
>> You know, I think in the end they said
he had a heart attack. He didn't have
any heart attack,
>> but there was chaos around the
>> Oh, yeah.
>> from the CIA.
>> Oh, yeah. We We created that chaos
because we knew he was crazy in the
first place and that if we just planted
a seed, he would do the rest himself.
Very interesting.
See, this is what you do. If you can't
get to that innermost circle, you get
others to do your dirty work.
And there's another component to this,
too. Mhm. It's what motivates people to
work with the CIA. 95% of the time it's
money. The CIA has literally an
unlimited supply of money. If you are
wellplaced, we can make you very rich.
>> What do you mean by very rich? Well, we
gave out 25 million in cash for
Khalichek Muhammad, 10 million in cash
for Abu Zuba, 50 million for Nicholas
Maduro. If you have the access and you
help us and we'll give it to you any way
you want it. Cash, gold, diamonds, land,
Bitcoin, name it, we'll pay it on the
first day.
>> And they usually do pay that.
>> Oh, they always pay it. Otherwise, what
kind of reputation would the
organization have if they made a promise
and didn't fulfill it?
>> They gave out a lot of money in Iraq.
>> A lot of money.
>> So, he never had an heart attack cuz
that's the that's the theory.
>> I I never believed he had a heart
attack. No, I believed he was snuffed
out because he wasn't any use to the
Iraqis anymore. He was just a pain
yelling about this and that. And, you
know, Saddam was weird about control and
this was somebody he couldn't control.
So when you were in in Greece, there was
I stopped you when you said there was an
Abunadala organization. There was
another one the November 17th is it as well?
well?
>> Well, and then the Greek groups that we
were going against were 17 November and
uh Popular Revolutionary Struggle, Ella,
two domestic Greek groups. That's where
I spent almost all of my time working
against the uh the Greeks.
>> And they were all anti-Americans. This
is why you were
>> Oh, yeah. They murdered well they
murdered 27 people including the CIA
station chief, two American defense
attaches, the minister of
communications, the minister of finance,
uh the Turkish ambassador, the deputy
ambassador, uh the British defense
attache. They were very very murderous.
And so we knew that they were constantly
casing the American embassy. They were
constantly planning attacks on American
embassy personnel. And so the job was to
to capture them.
>> But you're an analyst guy. And then you
went we moved to ops. Were you not shook
by the circumstances? You were you were
a guy who were just behind the office in Langley.
Langley.
>> And then
>> I learned a lot
>> when you moved to Greece and
>> it's a different life.
>> You being an American. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> You would by default be targeted and you
were targeted. Yeah, I was.
>> But were you not like were you not
scared um to be in that uh environment?
>> That's a good question. Athens was
literally the only place where I was
scared. And it was it was because it was
for a couple of reasons. First of all,
my family was there and I had two young
sons at the time. And um and my wife was
Greek American and she just loved being
there. She just could not see it as a
dangerous place, which it very much was.
In fact, we spent more money on security
in Athens then than we spent in Beirut.
That's how dangerous it was. >> So,
>> So,
>> so that was one of the reasons why I was
scared. The other reason was I knew that
they were actively targeting me.
>> I drove a fully armored car. It was a
level four armored BMW 540. I carried a
9mm on my waist and a 38 revolver on my
ankle. And just in case things really
went bad, I kept a knife in my back pocket.
pocket.
>> And you had two security guards. And I
had two security guards on the house all
the time. Yeah. In the meantime, I'm out
there provoking them, you know, actively
trying to recruit them. And so it was it
was a hot war between us.
>> There was a story that you mentioned in
your book where where there was a Middle
Eastern intelligence guy that you went
to his house.
>> That story.
>> I am so proud of that operation and I
wish that it had been my idea. It was
not my idea.
I had a mentor at the CIA. He was an old
man. He was a retiree. His name was Gus
Avricatus. He became famous and they
even made a movie about him, Charlie
Wilson's War, in which he's played by
Philip Seymour Hoffman. So, I told Gust,
I said, "Listen,
this this enemy country, the CIA won't
allow me to say what country it is, but
it's kind of obvious. this enemy
country. They're getting a new
intelligence service uh representative
and I want to bump into him, but this is
not a guy who's going to be at a
diplomatic cocktail party.
>> How do I get to him? So Gus gave me this
idea. I I was much younger at the time.
I was 35 years old. My hair was darker.
My my I grew a beard and it was dark.
Now I'm all gray. But I put some books
in a book bag. I went to his house. I
saw his car was on the street. And with
my book bag, I broke the side view
mirror off of his car. So I picked it
up. I went to the next door neighbor
just to provide cover for myself. And I
said to the woman, "Is this your car?"
She said, "No, it's the man next door.
He doesn't speak Greek." So I went to
his house. I knocked on the door and I saidto,
"I'm so sorry, sir, but the lady next
door told me that this is your car." And
I broke the I said, "I'm so clumsy." He
says, "Wait, wait a minute. Wait a
minute. I don't speak I don't speak
Greek." I said, "Oh, you speak English?"
"I speak English." I said, "I'm so
sorry. I I I was clumsy and I wasn't
paying attention to where I was going
and and I broke the mirror off your car
and the lady next door told me that it
was your car and I want to say I'm sorry
and I want to pay for it. He's like,
"Oh, you're so clumsy. What's wrong with
you? You could you couldn't see how
close you were." I said, "I I'm so
sorry. I was just not paying attention.
It's all my fault. I want to pay for
it." In the meantime,
well, I said to him, I said, "Uh, I
said, "Your English, you have an accent.
can you tell me where you're from? And
he told me from this Middle East
country. And I said, I'm from the United
States. I said, oh, I wish our countries
could be friends again. Maybe someday.
And he's just like,
and I see his little daughter. She
looked to be about four years old. She's
playing on the floor of the living room.
And I I said to him, "May I have a glass
of water?" Knowing that culturally he
had to give it to me.
>> Yeah. and he says, "Wait right here."
So, uh, I walked into the house and I
said to his daughter, I got down on my
knee and I said, "Uh, uh,"
and she tells me her name and I said,
"How old are you?" And she says, "She's
four." And he comes in, he's holding the
water and he says, "What exactly do you
want from me?"
>> He knows that, you know.
>> Oh, 100%. He's a professional. He's not
an idiot. So I said, 'L
I'm from the CIA in Washington. I know
exactly who you are and what you're
doing here. You have one chance to be on
the side of the good guys. And I took
out my business card and I said, "This
is my real name. The phone rings on my
desk at the American embassy. You have
until 10:00 tomorrow morning to call me.
You can be on the side of the good guys
or you can go down with your leader."
and I put it down on it the table and he
said to me, "I admire your courage in
approaching me. Very inventive."
He said, "But I hate that you did it in
my own home. You can leave now." So I
said, "10 tomorrow morning." And I
walked out. The next morning,
everybody's gathered around my desk
>> waiting for the phone call.
>> Waiting everybody. [laughter]
And then the phone rings.
>> Does it?
>> Uhhuh. And he said, "What do you want
from me?" And I said, "Meet me in the
Hilton Hotel coffee shop in two hours
and don't bring a weapon."
So we had we our security people were
literally at every table. >> Wow.
>> Wow.
>> Of the Hilton coffee shop. Everybody's
armed. I have a bulletproof vest on
under my suit. And he comes and I tell
him, "Have a seat." And he said, "So,
how does this play out?" And I said,
"I want access to your code room and I
want all your weapons."
And he said, "Do you know how hard that
is?" And I said, "Yes, I also know how
important you are and I know that of
anybody in the embassy besides the
ambassador, you have the access." And he
said, "What do I get in return?" I said,
"Well, number one, you get to live.
Number two, I can make you rich beyond
your wildest dreams.
So, what is it? What do you want? And we
negotiated a deal. And we made a plan.
We took the codes. The weapons were
buried in a bunker outside the embassy
underground. We went in the middle of
the night, six guys with shovels. We
took all the weapons
and then he disappeared.
Is there a witness protection program in
gender? Is that is that a is that a really
really
>> Yes. The last time I heard about him, it
was it was several years after I left
the uh left the CIA and I ran into a
former colleague and I said, "How's
Steve?" Steve was what we just called
him. We didn't use his Arabic name. We
just made up a name. I said, "How's
Steve?" He said, "Believe it or not,
Steve owns seven restaurants."
>> Oh, good for Steve.
>> And I said, "Really?" He said, "We set
him up with one restaurant. He just had
a knack for it and now he has seven
restaurants. He's rich. I said, "Good
for him." So, he made a life for
himself. He said, "Yeah, his kids are in
college. Everything's good." I said,
"Great. That's what it's all about."
>> So, the witness protection thing is is
is a real thing.
>> Oh, it's a real thing.
>> And then he just gets vanishes. And
>> you you get American citizenship.
>> Your family gets American citizenship.
Uh you get the seed money to start
whatever it is you want. I mean, you've
provided us with a great service. And
whatever we negotiated, I'm going to
give him a hundred,000. I'm going to
give him a million or five million or
whatever it's going to be. That's what
he used to get started in life.
>> But those people and that's where the
real talk gets gets in is those people
are are informants against their country
at the end of the day. They've committed espionage
espionage
>> or treason some treason, right? >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> So in that sense, how are they viewed in
the CIA? Are those are they're viewed as people?
people?
>> Yeah, that's a good question. So,
you would think that they would be held
at arms length because they they're traitors.
traitors. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> But there is such an overwhelming
sense in the CIA that we are the good
guys that we consider them to be the
good guys, too. I'll give you another example.
example.
When I was in Greece,
I got a cable.
I have to be careful how I say this. I
okay in in a in a Middle Eastern country
there was a person who had been the head
of that country's intelligence service
and he decided to flip and work for us
and somehow
the leader of that country learned that
he was working for us. He escaped
All three of his sons were executed. He
only had three sons.
>> They were all executed.
He was relocated to the United States,
but he was destroyed.
>> Yeah, it must be >> destroyed.
>> destroyed.
I got a cable in Washington saying that
his brother had just arrived in
Washington. I'm sorry, had just arrived
in Athens. He had been hiding on a
Libyan oil tanker and he jumped over the
side when it came into the port in Beir
Pereas, Greece. And they said, "He's not
a source of ours, but we we owe it to
his brother to take care of him. So meet
him. Here's the number the brother had
given to us, and give him $5,000."
So I called him. I told him, "I'm a
friend of your brother and let's meet at
this cafe." So, we met at the cafe and I
said, "Your brother is a hero and it's
sickening what happened to to his sons.
We're very sorry, but he told us that
you were on this oil tanker. I wanted to
give you this to just tide you over. Get
yourself a hotel or something." I ended
up meeting with him three times. And
again, because his brother had done this
great service to the CIA, we decided
we're just going to give him a green
card and let him relocate to the United
States. Okay. I resigned in 2004,
effective in early 2005. In 2007,
I happened to be in Dulles airport. I
don't work for the CIA anymore. I'm
going on a business trip and I hear this
voice say, "John." And I looked and I
said, Muhammad.
I said, "You're in Washington."
And he says, "Yeah, I got a job at the
airport. I'm a baggage handler." And I
said, "You speak English?" [laughter]
And he said, "Yeah, I'm an American
now." I said, "Mashallah, I can't
believe it." He said, "Yeah, I got the
green card. You helped me out." And it
was just so good to see him. I said,
"How's your brother?" And he said, "Uh,
my brother and I don't talk anymore. We
had a falling out and but everybody's
good. Everybody's healthy. I was so
happy to see him. I never saw him again,
but I was glad that he landed on his feet.
feet.
>> Are those moments and you've had many of
those kind of moments. Are those moments
special to you?
>> They really are. I mentioned to you
before we started recording that that in
a different life, I would be friends
easily with 90% of the people that I had
recruited. Easily. You know, there's
this conventional wisdom that if you're
if you're recruited by the CIA, it's
because you have some kind of flaw.
There's some flaw in your personality or
in your mind, something wrong. Why would
you do this?
>> These are usually really great people.
They just find themselves in some situation.
situation.
Oh, which was something that I was going
to tell you. 95% of them do it for the money.
money.
>> Okay. And I can understand that. You
know, life is expensive.
The other 5% though that were
fascinating um they'll do it for
revenge. They hate their government.
Maybe they've it's maybe it's as simple
as they've been passed over for promotion.
promotion.
Maybe it's that they hate their
government's leader or they hate a
policy that the government has
implemented. But some of them do it for
the revenge. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Others do it because they love love love
the United States. They've seen these
movies and it's incredible and Top Gun
and you know whatever and they just they
want to be as close to being an American
as possible.
>> So with these movies and media,
>> do the CIA work with the with Hollywood
and work with with news agencies?
>> Oh yes. Yes. And they've finally come
clean about that in the last 10 years.
>> So it's propaganda.
>> Absolutely. Yes. >> And
>> And >> 100%.
>> 100%.
In fact, there's an office in the CIA's
Office of Public Affairs whose job it is
just to work with Hollywood Studios,
nothing else. That's why every movie
that comes out about the CIA is pro-CIA.
Every one of them. That they do that on
purpose. And and the rest of the 95% is
some people just do it for the
excitement. They see these James Bond
movies or, you know, John Wick or
whatever the other ones are and they
think, "Oh my god, that's so exciting. I
want to do that." And so they just volunteer.
volunteer.
>> Interesting. So, but the company thing
is not real, is it? The company one they
call the CIA.
>> That one's especially bad. Listen,
there's one that's worse. It It was on
the CBS network in the United States and
it was called um Covert Affairs. stupid
name for a stupid show. I watched one episode.
episode.
>> So, this analyst just walks into the
Oval Office. First of all, you would be
arrested if you did that. >> Okay?
>> Okay?
>> You don't even have access to the Oval
Office. And you just walk in like you
own the building and she says, "Madame
President," the president, of course, is
a black woman. >> Okay?
>> Okay?
>> She says, "Madame President, I need to
take a hit out on someone." It's like,
"What? First of all, you're under arrest
for for conspiracy to commit murder. You
can't just go walk like you own the
White House. You walk into the
president's office. I watched one
episode on I said I'll never watch it
again. And then it was cancelled. But
I've been an adviser on oh four or five
Hollywood movies and several different
series where they'll send me the script
six months in advance and I go through
the script line by line and I say,
"Nope, that would never happen." Yes,
good point. There was one uh I was
consulting on a on a TV series called uh
True Lies based on the Arnold
Schwarzenegger movie and um they told me
read the script carefully and tell us if
all of it is true to life if it would
really happen. Well, in the very opening
scene there's this clandestine operation
in London and I said no no no this would
never ever happen in London. we are so
close to the British that we would have
to inform the British in advance that we
were going to do this operation. Can't
do it. And I said, "You have to move it
to another country."
>> And so when it came out six months
later, I was so excited to watch it. So
I'm watching it. And then the whole
scene was in Brussels. And I said, "They
listen to me." [laughter] >> Great.
>> Great.
>> Another one was they're in a mosque and
everybody's praying and they all have
shoes on. And I said, "No, no, no. You
can't have everybody praying with their
shoes on. Have none of you ever been in
a mosque? Like, there's not one Muslim
in all of Hollywood to tell them you
take your shoes off before you walk into
the mosque.
>> Do you think Do you think that
represents the disconnect between the
American American culture and the Muslim culture?
culture?
>> 100%. People just don't know. I'll tell
you what they do know now is they know
Dubai and they think Dubai is the Middle
East. And it's like, no, Dubai is New
York with better weather. That's it.
That's not the Middle East. You got to
actually go to the Middle East. You
know, this is why this is why I wanted
to live and work in the Middle East.
I don't know if you've heard me tell
this story, but when I was 9 years old,
I told my parents that I wanted to be a
spy when I grew up.
>> No, I didn't.
>> And they thought that was cute. I was a
little kid. They bought me
walkie-talkies. My seven-year-old
brother and I used to play on the
walkie-talkies. And disappearing ink. I
could write messages and it would
disappear and then you put it underwater
and the message reappears. Very cool.
>> So when I was 16,
my father and I were driving down the I
still remember we were driving down Old
Plank Road past Frasier's Pond and I
said, "Dad, I decided that I want to be
a spy in the Middle East." And he said,
"Oh my goodness, still with this spy
business. You can't be like a dentist or
a doctor or something.
>> You have to be a spy." I said, "I'm
serious. I want to be a spy, but I want
to live in the Middle East." And he
said, "Why? we've never been to the
Middle East. I said, "Dad, I love the
culture and the history and the the
poetry and I just I love everything
about it." He was
he was upset because he was worried.
>> He wasn't really sure what that meant at
the end of the day. And so I only
applied to George Washington University
for two reasons. One, because it was two
blocks from the White House, right in
the center of the action. And two,
because it was one of only three
universities in all of the United States
that offered a Middle Eastern studies
degree. So I majored in Middle Eastern
studies. My focus was Islam.
And um then I stayed for a master's
degree in legislative affairs thinking
I'll go to Capitol Hill. I'll go to the
State Department. And then I was
recruited into the CIA. And I became a
spy in the Middle East just like I said
I wanted.
>> By Dr. What's his name? Dr.
>> Dr. Post. Gerald Post. That's a really
nice story.
>> He's a good man. A good man.
>> Advice everyone listening to this is to
read your book. It's it's a fascinating
story honestly and um just explains a
lot of details that we might not have
time to explain today.
>> Um but we're trying to build a layer on
top of that uh today which is is equally
important. And so we let's go back to to
Greece and and and recruitment for us to
finish with the recruitment question is
um once you recruit someone um it takes
you a lot of time to recruit him. You
the the story you told us is not the typ
it's not a typical story.
>> It's not at all a typical story.
>> Usually you'll work with someone they
call it developing, right?
>> Yes. There's a there's something called
the asset acquisition cycle. Okay.
>> This is the cycle whereby you make a
recruitment. Spot, assess, develop, recruit.
recruit.
>> So, I spot you somewhere and I say, "He
might be interesting to talk to and I
assess you." I say, "Hi, how are you?"
"Oh, your name is Fisel. What do you do
for a living?" "Oh, you're a you're a
general in the Ministry of Defense."
"Okay, now I'm interested." Then I
develop you. That's the long period
where I take you to lunch, I take you to
dinner, I introduce you to my wife, you
introduce me to your wife, we become
friends, we go on vacation together, we
become best friends.
>> And then I say, "Yeah, fel. Um,
you know that new Russian tank that just
came out? I would really appreciate it
if you could give me the plans to that
tank. I I know that you guys are buying
this tank. I would really love to see a
copy of the plans and you do that for me
because we're best friends. And then in
the end I say, "Listen, Fisel, there's
something I haven't really been honest
with you about." And I I'm not really in
the State Department. I'm actually a CIA
officer. I hope you're okay with that.
>> Breaking cover.
>> Breaking cover. That's what it's called.
And you say, because we're best friends,
you say, "Yeah, I kind of suspected
something was up when you asked me for
the plans to the Russian tank." And I
say, "Yeah, I mean, you're a good guy.
I'm a good guy. We're friends. Um, but
listen, you've been really good to me.
And um,
and I know that, you know, you love your
family so much. You don't make as much
money as, you know, some other people
might. So,
if you would agree to be a consultant
for me, the word consultant often
softens the blow. if I could hire you as
a consultant, I can give you $10,000,
$20,000 a month. And it's easy. We meet
once a month for an hour or two hours in
a hotel someplace. And uh I give it to
you in cash and um you just I'll ask you
questions and you answer my questions.
That's it.
>> They always say yes.
>> Always say yes.
>> Always. You never make a pitch unless
you're certain they're going to say yes.
So that's a lot of time after developing
and then
>> a lot of time and it's usually a year
sometimes two years it takes.
>> Would they negotiate with you and just
say on top of the the money I'd like to
re relocate myself to the US when I'm done.
done.
>> A lot of times they say that and and I
say of course and that's a conversation
we can have at some point in the future.
No problem. Because once you move to the
United States, you're no good to me. You
don't have access to the information
anymore. So, I need for you to stay in
place as long as you can. It's not
uncommon to relocate people to the
United States.
>> Which country would you think is the
toughest to recruit? Which which people
do you think were the toughest? Because
you've dealt with a lot of people.
>> Was there a specific nationality that
you think they were the toughest or they
were the longest for me to recruit?
>> A lot of them are tough. In my own
personal experience, the Iraqis were the
toughest because they were so afraid of
their own government. They just didn't
trust that I was actually an American.
They were afraid that I was an Iraqi
putting on an American accent to trap
them. And so, cuz they would do
something like that.
>> Yeah. And then what? If they say yes and
I'm an Iraqi, they're going to be
executed. If they say no, the
government's going to say, "Why did the
CIA approach you?" Because you're weak,
so they're going to get executed anyway.
Then if they say yes and they get
caught, they're going to get executed.
So there's no there's no upside.
>> Yeah. No upside.
>> Mhm. So you finished with Greece and
then you moved back to the US and you
stayed there for a bit.
>> Mhm. And then September 11th happened, >> right?
>> right?
>> Um, so what happened? Where were you in
September 11th?
>> I was at the at the uh CIA's
headquarters. Um, I had a meeting at the
White House that morning. Um, Kofheer
Black, who was the director of CIA
counterterrorism operations, and I had a
meeting with Condisa Rice that morning.
She was the national security adviser on
a very what what in historical
retrospect was a very stupid reason.
There's a there's a minor
almost unknown government office in
Washington called the um government
printing office. Okay.
>> It's its own little tiny agency and what
it does is it prints all of the
government reports. okay,
>> for the whole American government. And
[snorts] they were going to print a book
of declassified State Department cables
and it was called Foreign Relations of
the United States, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus,
Cyprus,
1949 to 1967.
Nobody is going to read that book. But
But
in the thousand pages,
there were three names
of people who had been CIA informants
who were still alive.
And there's a law in the United States
that if the US government exposes your
name, we have to offer you American citizenship.
citizenship.
>> These people are like a hundred years
old. They were recruited in in the in
the 50s.
So, we thought it would be easier and
faster if we asked Condisa Rice to pause
the publication of the book just so we
could pull the pages out. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> So, at 8:50 that morning, the driver
called me to say he was at the the east
entrance to the building to take us to
the White House. I walked over to
Kofheer Black's office to tell him the
car was ready. And
these were the days before you could
watch TV on a computer. So Kofheer's
secretary had a small TV on her desk and
it was on the news. It had the news
playing. And I looked at the desk and I
said I said, "What happened to the World
Trade Center?" And she said, "A plane
flew into it." And I said, because I'm
stupid sometimes,
>> I said, "You know what? That happened
once before in 1931. A plane flew into
the Empire State Building, but it was
very foggy and rainy, heavy rain that
day. It's so clear today. How can you
not see that you're flying into the
World Trade Center? And just as I said
it, the second plane hit the North Tower.
Tower.
And she turned to me and she said, "Did
you see that or did I imagine it?" I ran
back to my office and I said, "Guys, two
planes just hit both towers of the World
Trade Center. I think we're under attack.
attack.
Everybody ran back up to the front to
Kofheer's office." Now, we had we had
TVs hanging from the the ceiling. By
then, they were all on, you know, CNN,
MSNBC, BBC, Kal, Russia Today,
everything, you know, from around the
world, the big stations. And they were
all showing the same thing.
By then like 150 people had gathered. It
was a very very large office. 150 people
had gathered. And somebody behind me
shouted, "Will somebody please lead
and Kofheer, it was like a slap in his
face. Yes." He says, "You go to the
director's office and tell him this. You
go to security. You go to operations."
And we just stood there. We watched the
World Trade Center burn. And then a
third plane hit the Pentagon and
somebody quietly said, "There's still a
plane in the air. We should probably
assume that it's headed here."
And just then a CIA police officer came
in. The CIA has its own police force
called the Special Protective Office.
And um he came in and he said,
"Everybody evacuate."
Nobody moved.
>> So that third plane hit the Pentagon.
And then the the policeman came back in
and he said, "If you don't evacuate,
you'll be arrested."
We were like, "Now, what do we do?"
Kofheer said, "Everybody go. Just go."
>> I got in my car. It took me two hours to
just get out of my parking space. This
was unprecedented. Nothing like this had
ever happened before in American history.
history.
So you have tens of thousands of people
all trying to evacuate it at the same
time through just two exits. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Two hours to get out of my parking
space. I only live 10 kilometers from
the CIA's headquarters. I got halfway
and I abandoned my car. I just pulled
over to the side of the road, turned it
off, and just started walking because I
couldn't move.
>> Yeah. It was just stopped. I got to the
Teddy Roosevelt bridge that connects
Arlington, Virginia with Washington DC
and I saw the deputy national security
adviser and he had no shoes.
And I remember thinking, my god, this is
a catastrophe.
>> Why did he have no shoes?
>> He ran away so fast from the White House
that he left his shoes.
>> Oh wow.
>> And I thought this this is how bad this
is. He's supposed to be at the White
House protecting us and he ran away with
no shoes.
So, I went back to my apartment. My
girlfriend, who later became my wife,
she was also a senior CIA officer, um
she she called me and she said, "I'll
meet you at your place." So, we climbed
to the roof of the building and we
watched the Pentagon burn for a couple
of hours and I said, "This is
ridiculous. we should give blood or
something. So, we went downstairs. We
found a Red Cross blood mobile, the big
bus where they take your blood. But the
line was so long, they told us it would
be 24 hours before we could give blood.
And I said, "I'm going back to the
office. This is ridiculous." So, I
walked back to my car on the highway,
got in, I drove across the grass, went
back to CIA, and I didn't leave for the
next four days. when I got tired, I just
went underneath my desk and I slept for
an hour, two hours and um just got up
and started working again. Everybody did that.
that.
>> Before we get to January 2002 is when
you flew to Pakistan. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> You mentioned call for black. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> And flashback before before what has
happened in a few months, right?
>> You had people visiting from the Middle
East, an intelligence uh agency, an ally
>> coming in to get some training.
>> Yes. And then you tried to get Co for
Black to come and say hello to them.
>> I actually didn't. Um that was July the
6th, 2001. I remember the date clearly
because it became so important in my own
personal story. You're right. That
morning we had a delegation of um Arab
intelligence officers.
>> So you're not allowed to say which
>> they won't they won't let me say which one.
one. >> Okay.
>> Okay.
>> It's one that you know quite well. And um
um
this was a completely normal thing. We
would do it literally every day where we
would have delegations of foreign
intelligence services. We come, we give
them a day full of briefings and then we
take them to meet the director of the
CIA and they take a picture together
shaking hands. Then we exchange gifts
and that night we take them to a very
expensive restaurant and the next day we
do it all over again with somebody else.
That day we had these Arabs, close
friends, and I scheduled the day of
briefings, including at 10 o'clock that
morning, a briefing on al-Qaeda.
But I scheduled it with a very young
junior analyst, 25 years old, young kid.
Instead of the kid coming, Kofheer Black
came in with the director of operations
from the Osama bin Laden group called
Alex Station. And I was so surprised. I
I stood up and I said, "Oh," I said,
"Gentlemen, gentlemen, this is this is
Kofheer Black. He's the director of
counterterrorism for the CIA." And I
introduced them. They were all majors
and colonels in their service. And
Kofheer sat down and he was very, very
serious. He said, "Something terrible is
going to happen. We don't know where and
we don't know when, but we know it's
going to be an attack on a huge scale.
We're hearing
chatter from the al-Qaeda camps.
[snorts] We're hearing camp commanders
speaking to their students and crying on
the phone and saying, "I'll see you in paradise."
paradise."
We're hearing code words for a massive
attack. The honey salesman is coming
with vast quantities of honey. there's
going to be a great football match.
There's going to be a huge wedding. He
said, "We know what this means. We just
don't know when and where." And then he
said these words that still stick with
me. He said, "I'm begging you if you
have any sources inside Akaida.
Please help us."
And they just sat there and looked at
him. And then he stood up and he shook
their hands and he walked out.
That afternoon at five o'clock we
finished the briefings. So they went
back to the hotel. I'm going to pick
them up two, three hours later for
dinner. But I went back to Kofer's
office to thank him. And I said, "Kofer,
I wanted to thank you for spending the
time speaking to those guys, but I have
to ask you." I said, "I don't work on al-Qaeda.
al-Qaeda.
Were you saying that just for them, like
to be dramatic,
>> or were you serious?" And he said, "Oh,
I'm deadly serious. Something terrible
is going to happen." And then it did.
>> So you need So the CIA had like knew
something's going to happen. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm.
>> There are so many conspiracies floating
out there, John. As as you know, um some
say it's an inside job. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah.
>> Some say the CIA knew they had all of
these indicators that Osama bin Laden
had his people come to the US and
>> that is true.
>> He people from the had came to the US
and started doing training. >> Yes.
>> Yes.
>> Uh on flying um >> correct airplanes. So those were those
>> correct airplanes. So those were those indicators were there, huh?
indicators were there, huh? >> Yeah. Let me start by saying it was not
>> Yeah. Let me start by saying it was not an inside job. It was not the Bush
an inside job. It was not the Bush family. It was not the also family. It
family. It was not the also family. It was not the space aliens or the lizard
was not the space aliens or the lizard people or the Jews. It was al-Qaeda.
people or the Jews. It was al-Qaeda. Number one,
Number one, >> were they capable of that?
>> were they capable of that? >> Absolutely. Yes.
>> Absolutely. Yes. >> Okay. Number two,
>> Okay. Number two, the CIA was the guilty party here
the CIA was the guilty party here because the CIA did know that the
because the CIA did know that the hijackers were in the United States.
hijackers were in the United States. The CIA didn't tell the FBI. Now
The CIA didn't tell the FBI. Now remember, the CIA can only operate
remember, the CIA can only operate overseas. The FBI can only operate in
overseas. The FBI can only operate in the United States. The CIA is not
the United States. The CIA is not permitted to make a recruitment inside
permitted to make a recruitment inside the United States. The FBI has to make
the United States. The FBI has to make the recruitment. But the CIA and the FBI
the recruitment. But the CIA and the FBI hated each other so much that the CIA
hated each other so much that the CIA never told the FBI
never told the FBI that the hijackers were in the United
that the hijackers were in the United States. And the FBI never told the CIA
States. And the FBI never told the CIA that they had intelligence that the
that they had intelligence that the hijackers were going to use the
hijackers were going to use the airplanes as the weapons.
airplanes as the weapons. Do you understand what I mean?
Do you understand what I mean? >> Yeah, of course I understand what you
>> Yeah, of course I understand what you mean. So that information was already
mean. So that information was already there.
there. >> It was there. It's that it wasn't
>> It was there. It's that it wasn't shared.
shared. >> Wasn't connected. It wasn't shared.
>> Wasn't connected. It wasn't shared. >> Right. And in fact, it wasn't until 2009
>> Right. And in fact, it wasn't until 2009 that the CIA and the FBI had compatible
that the CIA and the FBI had compatible computer systems. Before that they just
computer systems. Before that they just had to manually share.
had to manually share. >> Exactly. But they hated each other. So
>> Exactly. But they hated each other. So they didn't even do that. In 2002 when I
they didn't even do that. In 2002 when I was in Pakistan just
was in Pakistan just >> pushing ahead for a minute. If I wanted
>> pushing ahead for a minute. If I wanted to write a cable, I wrote cables all day
to write a cable, I wrote cables all day every day. You have to inform
every day. You have to inform headquarters what you're doing. But if I
headquarters what you're doing. But if I had to write a cable, I would say to CIA
had to write a cable, I would say to CIA headquarters, to this office, that
headquarters, to this office, that office, and the other office, add CC to
office, and the other office, add CC to the White House, to the State
the White House, to the State Department, to the Defense Department. I
Department, to the Defense Department. I could not send a cable to the FBI. The
could not send a cable to the FBI. The system just couldn't handle it.
system just couldn't handle it. >> It would be like me saying CC to Fisel.
>> It would be like me saying CC to Fisel. You don't have a CIA computer. You can't
You don't have a CIA computer. You can't receive this cable. The FBI couldn't
receive this cable. The FBI couldn't receive the cable. And similarly, the
receive the cable. And similarly, the FBI could only send cables to other FBI
FBI could only send cables to other FBI offices. They couldn't send it to
offices. They couldn't send it to anybody else.
anybody else. >> So, there was a gap in communications.
>> So, there was a gap in communications. >> A terrible one. A deadly one. A deadly
>> A terrible one. A deadly one. A deadly one that resulted in in the murder of
one that resulted in in the murder of 3,000 Americans in one day.
3,000 Americans in one day. Mosad, were they involved?
Mosad, were they involved? [sighs]
[sighs] >> My own personal belief is yes, not
>> My own personal belief is yes, not necessarily in a direct way.
necessarily in a direct way. We've all heard the story of the dancing
We've all heard the story of the dancing Israelis. Yeah,
Israelis. Yeah, >> they were arrested and they were held
>> they were arrested and they were held for
for >> so for context for the listener.
>> so for context for the listener. >> Yeah. So there were there were there was
>> Yeah. So there were there were there was a vanload of Israeli citizens that were
a vanload of Israeli citizens that were arrested in New York City several days
arrested in New York City several days before 9/11. They were taking pictures
before 9/11. They were taking pictures of the World Trade Center, but they were
of the World Trade Center, but they were doing it in this odd way and and taking
doing it in this odd way and and taking pictures of other sensitive targets in
pictures of other sensitive targets in lower Manhattan.
lower Manhattan. It's not a crime to take pictures in the
It's not a crime to take pictures in the United States. And so they were
United States. And so they were eventually released. They were all
eventually released. They were all Israeli citizens and they kept saying,
Israeli citizens and they kept saying, "We're the good guys. We're the good
"We're the good guys. We're the good guys. We're Israelis. We're with you."
guys. We're Israelis. We're with you." They were released.
They were released. But then on 911, there was a larger
But then on 911, there was a larger group of Israeli citizens who were
group of Israeli citizens who were dancing in the streets, right? Because
dancing in the streets, right? Because we had been attacked. Now, they knew the
we had been attacked. Now, they knew the the reason why they were dancing is
the reason why they were dancing is because they knew how the United States
because they knew how the United States would react.
would react. >> So, they were celebrating the reaction.
>> So, they were celebrating the reaction. >> They were celebrating the reaction.
>> They were celebrating the reaction. We're going to go out and we're going to
We're going to go out and we're going to kill a million Muslims, which is exactly
kill a million Muslims, which is exactly what happened. the number may be two
what happened. the number may be two million if you count in Afghanistan.
million if you count in Afghanistan. I'm sorry, if you count in Iraq.
I'm sorry, if you count in Iraq. >> And so, um, they were arrested and they
>> And so, um, they were arrested and they were held for a 100 days. Now, many of
were held for a 100 days. Now, many of them had direct ties to the Israeli
them had direct ties to the Israeli government.
government. That has led me to believe that the
That has led me to believe that the Israelis I the Israelis were not
Israelis I the Israelis were not involved with al-Qaeda and the planning,
involved with al-Qaeda and the planning, but I believe the Israelis had
but I believe the Israelis had infiltrated al-Qaeda. They knew that the
infiltrated al-Qaeda. They knew that the attack was coming. They knew that would
attack was coming. They knew that would be good for Israel and so they allowed
be good for Israel and so they allowed the attack to happen. And every time we
the attack to happen. And every time we would ask the Israelis, "Do you know
would ask the Israelis, "Do you know anything about this group?" They would
anything about this group?" They would say, "No, we don't know anything." Of
say, "No, we don't know anything." Of course they knew. The Israelis are the
course they knew. The Israelis are the best intelligence service in the world.
best intelligence service in the world. >> Are they better than the CIA?
>> Are they better than the CIA? >> I think they are. Yeah, they're
>> I think they are. Yeah, they're certainly deadlier.
certainly deadlier. >> What do you mean?
>> What do you mean? You know, in the CIA, we have we have
You know, in the CIA, we have we have laws that are not always respected, but
laws that are not always respected, but we have pretty clear laws on um
we have pretty clear laws on um assassinations.
assassinations. Between 1975 and September 11th, 2001,
Between 1975 and September 11th, 2001, it was illegal for the CIA to
it was illegal for the CIA to assassinate anybody. And it's because
assassinate anybody. And it's because the CIA used to assassinate all kinds of
the CIA used to assassinate all kinds of people before 1975, killing world
people before 1975, killing world leaders, overthrowing governments. We
leaders, overthrowing governments. We had to stop that. And so 1975, President
had to stop that. And so 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 12333
Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 12333 and it said, "You cannot kill people.
and it said, "You cannot kill people. Period."
Period." A couple of days after September 11th,
A couple of days after September 11th, President Bush amended 1233 to allow
President Bush amended 1233 to allow political assassinations if the if the
political assassinations if the if the target of the assassination poses what
target of the assassination poses what is called a clear and present danger to
is called a clear and present danger to the United States. Now, what's that
the United States. Now, what's that mean?
mean? >> That's subjective.
>> That's subjective. >> Very much so. And that has been amended
>> Very much so. And that has been amended to this day.
to this day. >> Mhm.
>> Mhm. >> Okay.
>> Okay. >> And so the CIA can kill anybody that it
>> And so the CIA can kill anybody that it wants to kill.
wants to kill. >> And they have a meeting every Tuesday on
>> And they have a meeting every Tuesday on that.
that. >> They have a meeting every Tuesday
>> They have a meeting every Tuesday morning at the White House and they come
morning at the White House and they come up with what's called the Tuesday
up with what's called the Tuesday morning kill list. And it's it's mostly
morning kill list. And it's it's mostly lawyers who are in this meeting plus CIA
lawyers who are in this meeting plus CIA operations people. And they come up with
operations people. And they come up with a list of people they want to kill that
a list of people they want to kill that week. The the teams go all around the
week. The the teams go all around the world. They kill the targets and then
world. They kill the targets and then they meet again the next Tuesday and
they meet again the next Tuesday and come up with the next list of people to
come up with the next list of people to kill. It's sick.
kill. It's sick. >> Very.
>> Very. >> So, Mossad is deadlier.
>> So, Mossad is deadlier. >> Oh, Msad, they'll kill you if you look
>> Oh, Msad, they'll kill you if you look at them. Funny.
at them. Funny. >> Sure.
>> Sure. And um you know what you mentioned when
And um you know what you mentioned when you had the Arab intelligence agents
you had the Arab intelligence agents that came and then after he said you
that came and then after he said you just mentioned how you said how the the
just mentioned how you said how the the protocol is at the end you'll shake
protocol is at the end you'll shake hands, you'll exchange gifts. I've heard
hands, you'll exchange gifts. I've heard stories about the gifts that uh the
stories about the gifts that uh the Mossad used to give the
Mossad used to give the >> Yeah, we we don't uh we don't accept
>> Yeah, we we don't uh we don't accept gifts anymore from the Mossad. Um
gifts anymore from the Mossad. Um because every gift they gave us had
because every gift they gave us had listening devices built in inside and we
listening devices built in inside and we x-ray everything and we we would say
x-ray everything and we we would say guys you have to stop trying to bug our
guys you have to stop trying to bug our conference rooms. We hate it and we
conference rooms. We hate it and we catch you every single time. So Mossad
catch you every single time. So Mossad for the last 40 years now, Mossad has
for the last 40 years now, Mossad has not been allowed inside CIA
not been allowed inside CIA headquarters. We meet with them outside
headquarters. We meet with them outside in a private office because we can't
in a private office because we can't trust them. They're constantly trying to
trust them. They're constantly trying to bug us, constantly trying to recruit our
bug us, constantly trying to recruit our people. In my very first briefing as a
people. In my very first briefing as a CIA officer, I'd been at the CIA for
CIA officer, I'd been at the CIA for about
about six weeks
six weeks and uh my boss said, "Listen, you're
and uh my boss said, "Listen, you're going to do your first briefing and it's
going to do your first briefing and it's going to be for Mossad and Shinbet." and
going to be for Mossad and Shinbet." and he told me, "We we can't trust them, so
he told me, "We we can't trust them, so they're not allowed in the building. We
they're not allowed in the building. We meet with them over here at this safe
meet with them over here at this safe house."
house." >> So Shinet is like the FBI.
>> So Shinet is like the FBI. >> Shinet is like the FBI. The Israeli is
>> Shinet is like the FBI. The Israeli is like the
like the >> Yes. And and they're both working in the
>> Yes. And and they're both working in the Israeli embassy in Washington.
Israeli embassy in Washington. >> So I was one of like
>> So I was one of like 8, 10, 12 analysts. It was a whole bunch
8, 10, 12 analysts. It was a whole bunch of analysts.
of analysts. And we're all sitting around this
And we're all sitting around this conference room table and the Mossad and
conference room table and the Mossad and Shinbet people are sitting across the
Shinbet people are sitting across the table from us. And so the senior analyst
table from us. And so the senior analyst starts and she says,"I the senior
starts and she says,"I the senior analyst and then the political analyst
analyst and then the political analyst and the economics analyst and the
and the economics analyst and the military analyst and the oil analyst and
military analyst and the oil analyst and this one and that one. I'm the last one
this one and that one. I'm the last one because I'm the most junior."
because I'm the most junior." So I said, I'm going to back up so I can
So I said, I'm going to back up so I can show you how how this went. I said, "My
show you how how this went. I said, "My name is John Kuryaku." I was overt, not
name is John Kuryaku." I was overt, not undercover. So I said, "My name is John
undercover. So I said, "My name is John Kuryaku and I'm going to brief you on
Kuryaku and I'm going to brief you on Saddam Hussein's psychology."
Saddam Hussein's psychology." And the Shinbetk guy, he has his glasses
And the Shinbetk guy, he has his glasses like this and he says, "Spell your
like this and he says, "Spell your name."
name." So I spell it, which made me angry. And
So I spell it, which made me angry. And then he says to me like this, "You are
then he says to me like this, "You are Jewish."
Jewish." And I said, "I am not recruitable. Don't
And I said, "I am not recruitable. Don't even think about trying to recruit me."
even think about trying to recruit me." I was enraged.
I was enraged. >> So afterwards,
>> So afterwards, everybody was laughing and they said,
everybody was laughing and they said, "They've done that to all of us. Every
"They've done that to all of us. Every one of us."
one of us." >> They tried to talk
>> They tried to talk >> right to your face, right in front of
>> right to your face, right in front of everybody. They tried to recruit you. I
everybody. They tried to recruit you. I got back to the office. He said, "My
got back to the office. He said, "My boss said, "How did it go?" And I said,
boss said, "How did it go?" And I said, "I'm so mad right now." And he said,
"I'm so mad right now." And he said, "Mossad tried to recruit you, didn't
"Mossad tried to recruit you, didn't they?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "They
they?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "They do that to everybody. They're just crude
do that to everybody. They're just crude about it. just like a punch in the face.
about it. just like a punch in the face. >> So where does that come from there? The
>> So where does that come from there? The that courage that was it courage would I
that courage that was it courage would I say courage or that um you know
when someone doesn't have uh right there's no filter. No filter. Yeah. I
there's no filter. No filter. Yeah. I think it's because they really truly
think it's because they really truly believe that they are alone in the
believe that they are alone in the world. For example, on my very first day
world. For example, on my very first day at the CIA, we had a series of
at the CIA, we had a series of briefings. The director came, "Welcome
briefings. The director came, "Welcome to the CIA. Congratulations.
to the CIA. Congratulations. And then the director of personnel, the
And then the director of personnel, the director of health insurance, the
director of health insurance, the director of whatever, the director of
director of whatever, the director of security.
security. So he told us things like, "There's a
So he told us things like, "There's a restaurant right down the street, a
restaurant right down the street, a steakhouse. Don't ever go there." He
steakhouse. Don't ever go there." He says,
says, >> "Because it's the restaurant that's
>> "Because it's the restaurant that's closest to the CIA. The KGB thinks that
closest to the CIA. The KGB thinks that we all go there. So they all go there.
we all go there. So they all go there. So the place is only KGB.
So the place is only KGB. So we never go inside. I've never been
So we never go inside. I've never been in there still to this day. So
in there still to this day. So he said the Israeli embassy has a
he said the Israeli embassy has a representative from Mossad and a
representative from Mossad and a representative from Shinbet, right? And
representative from Shinbet, right? And they conduct liaison with us. But the
they conduct liaison with us. But the FBI has identified
FBI has identified 187 Mossad agents in the United States
187 Mossad agents in the United States not declared to the US government spread
not declared to the US government spread all around the country to steal our
all around the country to steal our defense secrets. And I raised my hand. I
defense secrets. And I raised my hand. I said, "Why? We give them 99% of our
said, "Why? We give them 99% of our defense secrets." And he said, "Exactly.
defense secrets." And he said, "Exactly. They're here to steal the last 1%."
They're here to steal the last 1%." And that's what they do. The Israelis
And that's what they do. The Israelis are not friends of the United States.
are not friends of the United States. >> If the KGB did that, what would be what
>> If the KGB did that, what would be what would be the reaction of the United
would be the reaction of the United States?
States? >> We would arrest those sources and
>> We would arrest those sources and prosecute them just like we did with
prosecute them just like we did with Jonathan Pard, right? Jonathan Pard was
Jonathan Pard, right? Jonathan Pard was an American um Navy
an American um Navy uh analyst, Navy intelligence analyst.
uh analyst, Navy intelligence analyst. He was also Jewish and the Israelis
He was also Jewish and the Israelis recruited him to give them top secret
recruited him to give them top secret information on
information on uh the Soviet Union. But the Israelis
uh the Soviet Union. But the Israelis gave the information to the KGB and in
gave the information to the KGB and in exchange the KGB allowed the Russian
exchange the KGB allowed the Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. So Pard was
Jews to immigrate to Israel. So Pard was arrested. He was charged with espionage,
arrested. He was charged with espionage, convicted.
convicted. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> And spent 30 years in prison. He did the
>> And spent 30 years in prison. He did the the whole 30 years and then when he got
the whole 30 years and then when he got out
out uh Sheldon Adlesen, a rich American uh
uh Sheldon Adlesen, a rich American uh Jew,
Jew, provided his private jet,
provided his private jet, flew Pard back to Israel. He was met at
flew Pard back to Israel. He was met at the airport by Benjamin Netanyahu. When
the airport by Benjamin Netanyahu. When he got off the plane, he kissed the
he got off the plane, he kissed the ground in Israel and Netanyahu gave him
ground in Israel and Netanyahu gave him Israeli citizenship and now he's running
Israeli citizenship and now he's running for the Knesset.
for the Knesset. >> Wow.
>> Wow. anybody else would have died in prison
anybody else would have died in prison or eventually would have been the
or eventually would have been the subject of a prisoner exchange.
subject of a prisoner exchange. Him, he was one of the most damaging
Him, he was one of the most damaging spies in American history and now he's
spies in American history and now he's seen as some kind of a hero which makes
seen as some kind of a hero which makes me so angry. So this brings us to
me so angry. So this brings us to confronting the whole situation of the
confronting the whole situation of the Israeli involvement in the US. And
Israeli involvement in the US. And that's something I think is very
that's something I think is very critical to talk about now, especially
critical to talk about now, especially with what's happening in the world. And
with what's happening in the world. And we're not here to talk about taking
we're not here to talk about taking sides as much as laying down the facts
sides as much as laying down the facts and take and being on the right side of
and take and being on the right side of history
history >> in terms of where what's our take
>> in terms of where what's our take position in terms of how much Israel has
position in terms of how much Israel has influence in the United States
influence in the United States >> and how do they have that much influence
>> and how do they have that much influence and they're able to get away with a lot
and they're able to get away with a lot of things and a lot has to do with um
of things and a lot has to do with um their influence, right? Um, and so if we
their influence, right? Um, and so if we were to talk about this a little bit,
were to talk about this a little bit, um, how is Israel why how does Israel
um, how is Israel why how does Israel have that much influence in the US?
have that much influence in the US? Where does it come from? And and why
Where does it come from? And and why can't anyone do anything about it? Let
can't anyone do anything about it? Let me preface my answer by telling you that
me preface my answer by telling you that a few weeks ago,
a few weeks ago, an obscure
an obscure pro-Israel
pro-Israel journal, scholarly journal, published an
journal, scholarly journal, published an article written by the Israeli foreign
article written by the Israeli foreign minister's political director in which
minister's political director in which he said that I was a noted anti-semite.
he said that I was a noted anti-semite. >> You,
>> You, >> me,
>> me, >> because he criticizes
>> because he criticizes >> because I'm pro-Arab and I I criticize
>> because I'm pro-Arab and I I criticize Israel's u uh operations in the West
Israel's u uh operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Okay.
Bank and Gaza. Okay. noted anti-semite. Now, this is
noted anti-semite. Now, this is something they do on purpose. If you
something they do on purpose. If you don't tow the Israeli line, you're
don't tow the Israeli line, you're anti-Semitic
anti-Semitic even though you're not.
even though you're not. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> Or in the case of any Arab, actually
>> Or in the case of any Arab, actually very Semitic because you're Arab.
very Semitic because you're Arab. >> So, um, [snorts] people like Tucker
>> So, um, [snorts] people like Tucker Carlson. Tucker Carlson was named a
Carlson. Tucker Carlson was named a couple of weeks ago as the anti-semite
couple of weeks ago as the anti-semite of the year. I know Tucker. He's a
of the year. I know Tucker. He's a friend of mine. There's not an
friend of mine. There's not an anti-semitic bone in his body.
anti-semitic bone in his body. >> Yeah, I met Tucker as well.
>> Yeah, I met Tucker as well. >> He supports Palestinian human rights.
>> He supports Palestinian human rights. That's it.
That's it. >> He's a guy who wants to put American
>> He's a guy who wants to put American America first. Exactly. He's he's asking
America first. Exactly. He's he's asking the same questions that I'm asking now.
the same questions that I'm asking now. >> Exactly. Right.
>> Exactly. Right. >> And I just want to know why.
>> And I just want to know why. >> It is. This is this pro-Israel thing has
>> It is. This is this pro-Israel thing has been going on for so long that most
been going on for so long that most Americans, I think, have fallen into its
Americans, I think, have fallen into its propaganda.
propaganda. And it's led by
And it's led by it. It's led by wealthy, in most cases,
it. It's led by wealthy, in most cases, Jewish voters who have donated money to
Jewish voters who have donated money to Apac, the um the American Israel Public
Apac, the um the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which is essentially
Affairs Committee, which is essentially the Israel lobby.
the Israel lobby. >> And they spend millions, tens of
>> And they spend millions, tens of millions of dollars every single year on
millions of dollars every single year on political races across the country at
political races across the country at every level. It's not just Congress,
every level. It's not just Congress, it's the state races and even the local
it's the state races and even the local races. Oh, so they from from the
races. Oh, so they from from the grassroots
grassroots >> from the grassroots. And I'll get back
>> from the grassroots. And I'll get back to that in a second. If you are not 100%
to that in a second. If you are not 100% pro-Israel, they will run a candidate
pro-Israel, they will run a candidate against you and they'll spend millions
against you and they'll spend millions of dollars to beat you and they're
of dollars to beat you and they're successful.
successful. >> So, they're playing the system.
>> So, they're playing the system. >> Yeah. And they've they've spread this
>> Yeah. And they've they've spread this idea around the United States that has
idea around the United States that has taken hold that if you're not pro-
taken hold that if you're not pro- Israel, like somebody asked me this the
Israel, like somebody asked me this the the other day, are you pro- Israel? And
the other day, are you pro- Israel? And I said, "No, you're with the Iranians."
I said, "No, you're with the Iranians." It's like, "What? No,
It's like, "What? No, >> no, I'm not with Iranians." Like,
>> no, I'm not with Iranians." Like, "What's wrong with you?"
"What's wrong with you?" Or,
Or, "You're with al-Qaeda."
"You're with al-Qaeda." No, I'm not with al-Qaeda. Are you
No, I'm not with al-Qaeda. Are you crazy? I just don't think that the
crazy? I just don't think that the Israeli policy of killing everybody is a
Israeli policy of killing everybody is a viable policy. You know, you can't under
viable policy. You know, you can't under you can't have undergone a terrorist
you can't have undergone a terrorist attack and then have your policy as to
attack and then have your policy as to kill every man, woman, and child who
kill every man, woman, and child who breathes in Gaza. That's not a policy.
breathes in Gaza. That's not a policy. That's a genocide. There are very clear
That's a genocide. There are very clear laws about this to which the Israelis,
laws about this to which the Israelis, by the way, happen to be signitories.
by the way, happen to be signitories. You cannot kill civilians. And they do
You cannot kill civilians. And they do it every single day. Literally every
it every single day. Literally every single day. with what you've said, I
single day. with what you've said, I think it's very relevant to speak about
think it's very relevant to speak about the about Iran and the relationship
the about Iran and the relationship between Mossad
between Mossad >> and you have a book uh about it as well,
>> and you have a book uh about it as well, right?
right? >> Um it was released in 2000 uh about
>> Um it was released in 2000 uh about about Iran in specific. Oh, no. That
about Iran in specific. Oh, no. That that one was released in 20
that one was released in 20 >> sorry 2020 2020. Was it
>> sorry 2020 2020. Was it >> 2020?
>> 2020? >> Sorry. 2020. Sorry.
>> Sorry. 2020. Sorry. >> In 2020. Um that book was released and
>> In 2020. Um that book was released and because America was very close to going
because America was very close to going to war um during the Trump presidency,
to war um during the Trump presidency, the first term.
the first term. >> That's right.
>> That's right. >> With Iran. So you wrote a book about it
>> With Iran. So you wrote a book about it and you wrote it with with with another
and you wrote it with with with another person,
person, >> Gareth Porter.
>> Gareth Porter. >> Gareth Porter. and um you explained the
>> Gareth Porter. and um you explained the history of of of the relationship
history of of of the relationship between Iran and the United States. And
between Iran and the United States. And there was one thing that I'm going to
there was one thing that I'm going to quote from the book that's going to set
quote from the book that's going to set this conversation is you said that you
this conversation is you said that you argue that one of the reasons US policy
argue that one of the reasons US policy had repeatedly failed according to the
had repeatedly failed according to the book is a deep ignorance of Iranian
book is a deep ignorance of Iranian history.
history. Um, and you've you've also produced
Um, and you've you've also produced other layers and and since you've
other layers and and since you've already mentioned Israel, how would we
already mentioned Israel, how would we look at the Iranian US relationship? And
look at the Iranian US relationship? And is it inevitable that they're going to
is it inevitable that they're going to go to war?
That's the one of the toughest questions. It doesn't have to be
questions. It doesn't have to be inevitable. But I will say that
inevitable. But I will say that that I think the United States is to is
that I think the United States is to is more to blame than the Iranian side for
more to blame than the Iranian side for the the current
the the current status quo.
status quo. Americans just simply don't understand.
Americans just simply don't understand. Americans as a people don't understand
Americans as a people don't understand what happened in 1953. They don't
what happened in 1953. They don't understand that Iran had democratic
understand that Iran had democratic elections. They chose a democratically
elections. They chose a democratically elected prime minister, Muhammad
elected prime minister, Muhammad Masadek, and the UK and the US overthrew
Masadek, and the UK and the US overthrew him and installed a dictator, uh,
him and installed a dictator, uh, Muhammad Resa.
Muhammad Resa. Americans don't have any idea that that
Americans don't have any idea that that happened. It's not something that's
happened. It's not something that's that's discussed in the United States.
that's discussed in the United States. It's not something that's taught in the
It's not something that's taught in the schools. It's just ignored.
schools. It's just ignored. But one of the other things that the
But one of the other things that the that the American people don't
that the American people don't understand is the scar that this has
understand is the scar that this has left in modern day Iran.
left in modern day Iran. >> In Iran, it's as though it happened
>> In Iran, it's as though it happened yesterday. That's how fresh it is. This
yesterday. That's how fresh it is. This this outside uh uh interference.
this outside uh uh interference. Um, in in 1979, November 4th, 1979, uh,
Um, in in 1979, November 4th, 1979, uh, Iranian students overran the American
Iranian students overran the American embassy, what was left of the American
embassy, what was left of the American embassy in Tehran, and took hostages
embassy in Tehran, and took hostages that they held for 444 days. They didn't
that they held for 444 days. They didn't do that in a vacuum. They had reasons
do that in a vacuum. They had reasons for doing that. I disagree with those
for doing that. I disagree with those reasons. There are international laws
reasons. There are international laws that govern this kind of thing. Um, but
that govern this kind of thing. Um, but the Americans
the Americans are only taught the American side.
are only taught the American side. They're not taught the reason why this
They're not taught the reason why this happened. They're not taught about Sabak
happened. They're not taught about Sabak and the horrors that Saddak, you know,
and the horrors that Saddak, you know, inflicted on the Iranian people. They're
inflicted on the Iranian people. They're not taught about why we have so many
not taught about why we have so many Iranians in the United States that they
Iranians in the United States that they were forced to flee their country in
were forced to flee their country in 1978 and 1979 or subsequently. And so I
1978 and 1979 or subsequently. And so I think part of the problem is this
think part of the problem is this ignorance
ignorance >> of recent history, this ignorance of
>> of recent history, this ignorance of Iran and Iranian society.
Iran and Iranian society. And instead, you know, it's it's very
And instead, you know, it's it's very easy to just demonize a person. That way
easy to just demonize a person. That way you don't have to understand the
you don't have to understand the background. You can say
background. You can say you can say Muslims are terrorists,
you can say Muslims are terrorists, right? Muslims are in ISIS. They're in
right? Muslims are in ISIS. They're in al-Qaeda. They're in Hezbollah. So that
al-Qaeda. They're in Hezbollah. So that means Muslims are terrorists. Well,
means Muslims are terrorists. Well, that's ridiculous and it's wrong. But
that's ridiculous and it's wrong. But it's hard to educate yourself on the
it's hard to educate yourself on the history. It takes time. It takes
history. It takes time. It takes sensitivity. You have to have an eye for
sensitivity. You have to have an eye for nuance. You know, that would be like
nuance. You know, that would be like like me saying, "Well, we have these uh
like me saying, "Well, we have these uh militias in the Western United States.
militias in the Western United States. They're all conservative Christians, so
They're all conservative Christians, so Christians are terrorists." Well, that's
Christians are terrorists." Well, that's ridiculous, too.
ridiculous, too. >> It is.
>> It is. But most Americans don't have the desire
But most Americans don't have the desire >> to understand the nuance. So what made
>> to understand the nuance. So what made see even we're going to speak about 2001
see even we're going to speak about 2001 and what happened that the stereotypes
and what happened that the stereotypes of of of Muslims but Sean why was there
of of of Muslims but Sean why was there a almost like a deliberate and you
a almost like a deliberate and you mentioned also in the book that there
mentioned also in the book that there has been for nearly three decades over
has been for nearly three decades over five different administrations
five different administrations US Iran policy had been enveloped in a
US Iran policy had been enveloped in a political narrative.
political narrative. >> Yes. that portrayed the Islamic Republic
>> Yes. that portrayed the Islamic Republic as a secretly as secretly working on the
as a secretly as secretly working on the ultimate goal of obtaining nuclear
ultimate goal of obtaining nuclear weapons.
weapons. >> Right?
>> Right? >> So there's there's
>> So there's there's there's a people working in the United
there's a people working in the United States wanting the administrations to
States wanting the administrations to believe that Iran's working towards a
believe that Iran's working towards a nuclear weapon that's going to blow up
nuclear weapon that's going to blow up the West and and the US and that's
the West and and the US and that's dangerous for them. Um so so why is that
dangerous for them. Um so so why is that happening? Why is there a deliberate
happening? Why is there a deliberate push in a way where you think that is
push in a way where you think that is does not represent the reality of Iran?
does not represent the reality of Iran? >> I might argue sometimes a little bit
>> I might argue sometimes a little bit different because we know throughout his
different because we know throughout his history history Persia as an empire
history history Persia as an empire always wanted to
always wanted to >> take over the the Middle East. Um
>> take over the the Middle East. Um >> so from when we look at Iran and we look
>> so from when we look at Iran and we look at Persia, we know whether it's an
at Persia, we know whether it's an Islamic republic or a liberal republic
Islamic republic or a liberal republic or whatever it is
or whatever it is >> at the at the core of it is Persia and
>> at the at the core of it is Persia and they want to
they want to >> which could be a hegemon. Yeah.
>> which could be a hegemon. Yeah. >> Yeah. I listen I lived in Bahrain for
>> Yeah. I listen I lived in Bahrain for two years and they were obsessed with
two years and they were obsessed with the Iranians and the Iranians were
the Iranians and the Iranians were genuinely a threat to the Bahraini
genuinely a threat to the Bahraini government. So yeah, I I get it. I
government. So yeah, I I get it. I understand it. Um,
understand it. Um, at the same time, looking specifically
at the same time, looking specifically at the Iranian nuclear issue, the CIA
at the Iranian nuclear issue, the CIA has repeatedly released national
has repeatedly released national intelligence estimates or special
intelligence estimates or special national intelligence estimates saying
national intelligence estimates saying that they do not have any intelligence
that they do not have any intelligence showing that the Iranians are attempting
showing that the Iranians are attempting to make a weapon, a nuclear weapon.
to make a weapon, a nuclear weapon. >> What doesn't why doesn't it translate
>> What doesn't why doesn't it translate into the the into the White House? Why
into the the into the White House? Why is there a disconnect between those
is there a disconnect between those reports and the White House? because at
reports and the White House? because at the CIA they're not subject to political
the CIA they're not subject to political pressure from Apac or from Jewish
pressure from Apac or from Jewish voters. At the White House they are. And
voters. At the White House they are. And so, you know, the intelligence may say
so, you know, the intelligence may say one thing, policy is going to say
one thing, policy is going to say something that's different. That's how
something that's different. That's how you get elected.
you get elected. >> So, the the CIA, if you go to the CIA
>> So, the the CIA, if you go to the CIA today, they know that Iran
today, they know that Iran >> isn't a nuclear threat.
>> isn't a nuclear threat. >> Correct. And they release those reports.
>> Correct. And they release those reports. They're released to the public. They're
They're released to the public. They're declassified.
declassified. Mhm.
Mhm. >> Wow.
>> Wow. >> Yeah. Yeah. It's a real disconnect.
>> Yeah. Yeah. It's a real disconnect. >> I don't even know how to reply to this.
>> I don't even know how to reply to this. So,
So, >> see, but the thing is the the Israel for
>> see, but the thing is the the Israel for the Israelis, Iran is an existential
the Israelis, Iran is an existential threat, right? Iran has what 92 million
threat, right? Iran has what 92 million people. It's a gigantic country in terms
people. It's a gigantic country in terms of land mass. It has a history of
of land mass. It has a history of threatening its close neighbors,
threatening its close neighbors, including Kuwait. We all know this as a
including Kuwait. We all know this as a historical fact. There used to be an
historical fact. There used to be an active cell here in Kuwait that was
active cell here in Kuwait that was financed by
financed by seriously threatened the Kuwaiti
seriously threatened the Kuwaiti government. Uh so the the Iranians are
government. Uh so the the Iranians are not nifes in this thing. They're not
not nifes in this thing. They're not innocents in in this uh in this thing.
innocents in in this uh in this thing. At the same time,
At the same time, I get that the Israelis are afraid of
I get that the Israelis are afraid of Iran. I get it. But that doesn't mean
Iran. I get it. But that doesn't mean then that the United States has to
then that the United States has to attack Iran and overthrow its government
attack Iran and overthrow its government at all costs just to protect what may or
at all costs just to protect what may or may not be a real threat to Israel.
may not be a real threat to Israel. >> Right.
>> Right. >> Are like I don't even have the words.
>> Are like I don't even have the words. I'm struggling to get words out.
I'm struggling to get words out. Is it up to Benjamin Netanyahu to come
Is it up to Benjamin Netanyahu to come to Washington and to look the American
to Washington and to look the American people in the eye on television and say,
people in the eye on television and say, "I want you to send your children to the
"I want you to send your children to the Middle East to potentially die to
Middle East to potentially die to protect Israel."
protect Israel." >> Yeah, he did that in Congress.
>> Yeah, he did that in Congress. >> Yeah, I'm not doing that. I have five
>> Yeah, I'm not doing that. I have five children, four sons. I'm not sending
children, four sons. I'm not sending them to die for Israel. No. No. You need
them to die for Israel. No. No. You need to fix your foreign policy. Maybe start
to fix your foreign policy. Maybe start murder start stop Let me do that again.
murder start stop Let me do that again. maybe stop murdering Palestinians and
maybe stop murdering Palestinians and you won't have these constant political
you won't have these constant political pressures.
pressures. >> Yeah. So the the the Lud party and the
>> Yeah. So the the the Lud party and the farright party of um
farright party of um >> Smotri and
>> Smotri and >> Yeah. And and and even though the far
>> Yeah. And and and even though the far right party even throughout history
right party even throughout history before Smidge and Benavir and their
before Smidge and Benavir and their influence Yes. on on on the
influence Yes. on on on the administration and um speak to me about
administration and um speak to me about that. So how does that work in the US?
that. So how does that work in the US? Um, and I've I've seen old speeches for
Um, and I've I've seen old speeches for Netanyahu be while he was prime minister
Netanyahu be while he was prime minister and the times when he wasn't when we
and the times when he wasn't when we calculated his the time he is a prime
calculated his the time he is a prime minister, it's almost 20 years. So
minister, it's almost 20 years. So that's more
that's more >> he's the longest serving prime minister
>> he's the longest serving prime minister in Israeli history.
in Israeli history. >> And now he's the longest serving prime
>> And now he's the longest serving prime minister in the Middle East.
minister in the Middle East. >> Yes.
>> Yes. >> And he says and and when they say that
>> And he says and and when they say that they have democracy, I I I look at this
they have democracy, I I I look at this fact as well. So that aside, how are we
fact as well. So that aside, how are we supposed to how do we see why is there
supposed to how do we see why is there so much influence or is there so much
so much influence or is there so much influence by the liquid party as you
influence by the liquid party as you state in your book specifically the
state in your book specifically the party or the farright movement of Israel
party or the farright movement of Israel on US policy or is it just Apac is just
on US policy or is it just Apac is just the whole Israel thing? I want I want to
the whole Israel thing? I want I want to differentiate.
differentiate. >> Yeah, I think it's I think it's a
>> Yeah, I think it's I think it's a combination of the two. But don't
combination of the two. But don't underestimate Netanyahu and his and his
underestimate Netanyahu and his and his political prowess. He's a brilliant
political prowess. He's a brilliant politician. Plus, he's born and raised
politician. Plus, he's born and raised in the United States. He speaks English
in the United States. He speaks English like an American. Um, and he's been
like an American. Um, and he's been around for so long that he's established
around for so long that he's established these relationships on Capitol Hill that
these relationships on Capitol Hill that others just don't have. Couple that with
others just don't have. Couple that with the money and the political pressure
the money and the political pressure coming from Apac and and you have a
coming from Apac and and you have a juggernaut. You can't lose. There's
juggernaut. You can't lose. There's there's another thing too
there's another thing too there. There was something there was a
there. There was something there was a nent movement in the United States
nent movement in the United States called the BDS movement uh boycott
called the BDS movement uh boycott devest and sanction and states
devest and sanction and states immediately at Apex urging immediately
immediately at Apex urging immediately began working against BDS.
began working against BDS. So that 35 of the maybe 38 now of the 50
So that 35 of the maybe 38 now of the 50 states have anti-BDS legislation. So for
states have anti-BDS legislation. So for example,
example, if I gave a speech in any one of these
if I gave a speech in any one of these 38 states and I said I believe that we
38 states and I said I believe that we should boycott Israeli goods and we
should boycott Israeli goods and we should devest in from investments in
should devest in from investments in Israeli companies and we should sanction
Israeli companies and we should sanction Israel until they start to respect human
Israel until they start to respect human rights. I can be arrested for saying
rights. I can be arrested for saying that.
that. >> Wow. In the US.
>> Wow. In the US. >> In the US.
>> In the US. >> But don't you have amend it first
>> But don't you have amend it first amendment rights? Oh, don't we have
amendment rights? Oh, don't we have first amendment rights to freedom of
first amendment rights to freedom of speech? Yes. So, how is it that these
speech? Yes. So, how is it that these laws can can run in parallel with the
laws can can run in parallel with the American Constitution? Hasn't been
American Constitution? Hasn't been decided by the Supreme Court yet, but
decided by the Supreme Court yet, but it's coming to that. I'll give you
it's coming to that. I'll give you another example. A good friend of mine
another example. A good friend of mine who is pro Palestinian was invited to
who is pro Palestinian was invited to give a speech at the University of
give a speech at the University of Georgia. So, when she went, she was
Georgia. So, when she went, she was told, "In order to be paid, you have to
told, "In order to be paid, you have to sign this pledge." And it was a pledge
sign this pledge." And it was a pledge where she was pledging [snorts]
where she was pledging [snorts] support for Israel.
support for Israel. It's like, "Wait a minute. I'm giving a
It's like, "Wait a minute. I'm giving a speech at the University of Georgia. Why
speech at the University of Georgia. Why would I pledge my support for Israel? I
would I pledge my support for Israel? I don't support Israel." They said, "Then
don't support Israel." They said, "Then you can't you can't speak at the
you can't you can't speak at the university. This is part of the BDS law.
university. This is part of the BDS law. You have to say in writing, I support
You have to say in writing, I support Israel or you can't work." And she said,
Israel or you can't work." And she said, "Forget it." So she sued.
"Forget it." So she sued. >> Yeah. And she won at the federal
>> Yeah. And she won at the federal district court level and then at the
district court level and then at the circuit court level she lost.
circuit court level she lost. >> Why?
>> Why? >> Because they said that the state
>> Because they said that the state governments had passed this law saying
governments had passed this law saying that you are not allowed to take any
that you are not allowed to take any state money unless you pledge your
state money unless you pledge your support for Israel. The reason they did
support for Israel. The reason they did that was to just allow the Supreme Court
that was to just allow the Supreme Court to make the final decision.
to make the final decision. So that's what we're waiting for now.
So that's what we're waiting for now. >> That's crazy, huh?
>> That's crazy, huh? >> It's crazy. There was a there was an
>> It's crazy. There was a there was an article I was in Miami just a couple of
article I was in Miami just a couple of days ago and there was an article about
days ago and there was an article about a woman in Miami Beach. Miami Beach is
a woman in Miami Beach. Miami Beach is very heavily Jewish. So she lives in
very heavily Jewish. So she lives in Miami Beach and she wrote a Facebook
Miami Beach and she wrote a Facebook post saying that she supported
post saying that she supported Palestinian human rights. Next thing you
Palestinian human rights. Next thing you know, the very next day,
know, the very next day, police, we want to talk to you about
police, we want to talk to you about that Facebook post. And she just closed
that Facebook post. And she just closed the door, talked to my lawyer. So, is
the door, talked to my lawyer. So, is that where we are now? Where if you say
that where we are now? Where if you say you support Palestinian human rights,
you support Palestinian human rights, the police come to your house to
the police come to your house to investigate you?
investigate you? I'm willing to fight for that.
I'm willing to fight for that. >> Yeah. I think any what I think fighting
>> Yeah. I think any what I think fighting for that is today it's human rights.
for that is today it's human rights. It's it's Palestinian rights. Tomorrow
It's it's Palestinian rights. Tomorrow it can be your rights. The next day you
it can be your rights. The next day you can't speak for Greek Greek rights.
