Immanuel Kant's moral theory posits that true autonomy and moral worth stem from acting out of duty, by adhering to self-imposed universal moral laws derived from pure reason, rather than from personal inclination or external consequences.
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last time we began trying to we begin by
trying to navigate our way through Kanta
moral theory now fully to make sense of
continuity in the ground work requires
that we be able to answer three questions
questions
how can duty and autonomy go together
what's the great dignity in answering to
duty it would seem that these two ideas
are opposed duty and autonomy what's con
censored that need someone here to speak
up on Khan's behalf does he have an
answer yes go ahead stand up Khan
believes that you only act autonomously
when you work when you're pursuing
something only in the name of duty and
not because of your own circumstances
such as like you you're only doing
something good and moral if you're doing
it because of duty and opteka something
of your own personal gains now why is
that acting at what's your name - Matt
Matt why is that acting out of freedom
is what you choose to accept those moral
laws in yourself and not brought on from
outside upon okay good because acting
out of duty yeah is following a moral
law that you impose on yourself
that you impose on yourself that's what
makes Duty compatible with freedom yeah
okay that's good man that is con censor
that's great thank you
so Khan's answer is it is not in so far
as I am subject to the law that I have
dignity but rather insofar as with
regard to that very same law I'm the
author and I'm subordinated to that law
on that ground
that I took it as Matt just said I took
it upon myself I willed that law so
that's why for Kant acting according to
duty and acting freely in the sense of
autonomously are one in the same but
that raises the question how many moral
laws are there because if dignity
consists in being governed by a law that
I give myself what's to guarantee that
my conscience will be the same as your
conscience who has counts answer to that
yes because a moral law trend is not
contingent upon subjective conditions it
would transcend all particular
differences between people and so would
be a universal law and in this respect
there would only be one moral law that's
exactly right
what's your name Kelly Kelly so Kelly
can't believes that if we choose freely
out of our own consciences the moral law
we're guaranteed to come up with one in
the same moral law yes and that's
because when I choose it's not me
Michael Sandel choosing it's not you
Kelly choosing for yourself what is it
exactly who is doing the choosing who's
the subject who's the agent who's doing
the choosing reason
well reason pure reason pure reason and
what you mean by pure reason is what exactly
exactly
well pure reason is like we were saying
before not subject to any external
conditions that may be imposed yeah
that's great so the reason that does the
Willing the reason that governs my will
when I will the moral law is the same
reason that operates when you choose the
moral law for yourself and that's why
it's possible to act autonomously to
choose for myself for each of us to
choose for ourselves
as autonomous beings and for all of us
to wind up willing the same moral law
the categorical imperative but then
there is one big and very difficult
question left even if you accept
everything that NAT and Kelly have said
so far how is a categorical imperative
possible how is morality possible to
answer that question Kant says we need
to make a distinction we need to make a
distinction between two standpoints two
standpoints from which we can make sense
of our experience let me try to explain
what he means by these two standpoints
as an object of experience I belong to
the sensible world there my actions are
determined by the laws of nature and by
the regularities have caused an effect
but as a subject of experience I inhabit
an intelligible world here being
independent of the laws of nature I am
capable of autonomy capable of acting
according to a law I give myself now
Kant says that only from this second
standpoint can I regard myself as free
for to be independent of determination
by causes in the sensible world is to be
free if I were wholly an empirical being
as the utilitarians assume if I were a
being wholly an only subject to the
deliverances of my senses the pain and
pleasure and hunger and thirst and
appetite if that's all there were to
humanity we wouldn't be capable of
freedom Kant reasons because in that
case every exercise of will would be
conditioned by the desire for some
object in that case all choice would be
heteronomous choice governed by the
pursuit of some external and when we
think of ourselves as free con Trites
we transfer ourselves into the
intelligible world as members and
recognize the autonomy of the will
that's the idea of the two standpoints
so how are categorical imperatives
possible only because the idea of
freedom makes me a member of an
intelligible world now Kant admits we
aren't only rational beings we don't
only inhabit the intelligible world the
realm of freedom if we did if we did
then all of our actions would invariably
accord with the autonomy of the will but
precisely because we inhabit
simultaneously the two standpoints the
two realms the realm of freedom and the
realm of necessity precisely because we
inhabit both realms there is always
potentially a gap between what we do and
what we ought to do between is and ought
another way of putting this point and
this is the point with which Kant
concludes the groundwork morality is not
empirical whatever you see in the world
whenever you discover through science
can't decide moral questions morality
stands at a certain distance from the world
world
from the empirical world and that's why
no science could deliver moral truth now
I want to test Kant's moral theory with
the hardest possible case a case that he
raises the case of the murderer at the
door Kant says that lying is wrong we
all know that we've discussed why lying
is at odds with the categorical
imperative a French philosopher Benjamin
constant wrote an article responding to
the groundwork where he said this
absolute prohibition on lying is wrong
what if a murderer came to your door
looking for your friend who was hiding
in your house and the murderer asked you
point-blank is your friend in your house
Costin says it would be crazy to say
that the moral thing to do in that case
is to tell the truth Cal Stone says the
murderer certainly doesn't deserve the
truth and Kant wrote a reply and Kant
stuck by his principle that lying even
to the murderer at the door is wrong and
the reason it's wrong he said is once
you start taking consequences into
account to carve out exceptions to the
categorical imperative you've given up
the whole moral framework
you've become a consequentialist or
maybe a rule utilitarian but most of you
and most of Kant's readers think there's
something odd and implausible about this answer
answer
I would like to try to defend
on this point and then I want to see
whether you think that my defense is
plausible and I would want to defend him
within the spirit of his own account of
morality imagine that someone comes to
your door you were asked a question by
this murder you're hiding your friend is
there a way that you could avoid telling
a lie without selling out your friend
does anyone have an idea of how you
might be able to do that yes stand up I
was just gonna say if I were to let my
friend in my house to hide in the first
place I'd probably make a plan with them
so I'd be like hey I'll tell the
murderer you're here but escape and
that's one of the actions mentioned so
but I'm not sure that's a Content option
hmm you're still lying though no because
he's in the house but he won't be oh I see
alright good enough one more try if you
just say you don't know where he is
because he might not be locked in the
closet he might have left the closet you
have no clue where he could be so you
would say I don't know which wouldn't
actually be a lie because you weren't at
that very moment looking in the closet
exactly so it would be strictly speaking
true yes
and yet possibly deceiving misleading
but still true what's your name John
John all right John has now John may be
on to something John you're really
offering us the option of a clever
evasion that is strictly speaking true
this raises the question whether there
is a moral difference between an
outright lie and a misleading truth from
Kant's point of view there actually is a
world of difference between a lie and a
misleading truth why is that even though
both might have the same consequences
but then remember Kant doesn't base
morality on consequences he bases it on
formal adherence to the moral law now
sometimes in ordinary life we make
exceptions for the general rule against
lying with a white lie what is a white
lie it's it's a lie to make well to
avoid hurting someone's feelings for
example it's a lie that we think of as
justified by the consequences now Kant
could not endorse a white lie but
perhaps he could endorse a misleading
truth suppose someone gives you a tie as
a gift
and you open the box and it's just awful
what do you say thank you you could say
thank you but they're waiting to see
what you think of it or they ask you
what do you think of it you could tell a
white lie and say it's beautiful but
that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's
point of view could you say not a white
lie but a misleading truth you open the
box and you say I've never seen a tie
like that before
can you think of a contemporary
political leader who engaged you can
what are you thinking of remember the
hole carefully worded denials in the
Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton
now those denials actually became the
subject of very explicit debate and
argument during the impeachment hearings
take a look at the following excerpts
from Bill Clinton is there something do
you think morally at stake in the
distinction between a lie and a
misleading carefully couched truth I
want to say one thing to the American
people I want you to listen to me I'm
going to say this again I did not have
sexual relations with that woman miss
Lewinsky I never told anybody to lie not
a single time never these allegations
are false did he lie to the American
people when he said I never had sex with
that woman you know he doesn't believe
he did and because of the way I
explained congressman what he said was
to the American people that he did not
have sexual relations and I understand
you're not gonna like this congressman
because it you will see it as a
hair-splitting evasive answer but in his
own mind his definition was not okay I
so there you have the exchange now at
the time you may have thought this was
just a legalistic hair-splitting
exchange between a republican who wanted
to impeach clinton and the lawyer who is
trying to defend him but now in the
light of Conte
do you think there is something morally
at stake in the distinction between a
lie and an evasion a true but misleading
statement I'd like to hear from
defenders of God people who think there
is a distinction are you ready to defend
Conte well I think when you try to say
that lying in the same truths are the
same thing you're basing it on a
consequentialist argument which is that
they achieve the same thing but the fact
of the matter is you told the truth and
you intended that people would believe
what you were saying which was the truth
which means it is not morally the same
as telling a lie and intending that they
believe it is the truth even though it's
not true good what's your name
Diana so Diana says there if that kinda
has a point here and it's a point that
might even come to the aid of Bill
Clinton and that is well what about that
someone over here for compote evasion is
key so if you give to someone because
primarily you want to feel good about
yourself Khan would say that has no
moral worth well this the motivation is
the same it's to sort of mislead someone
it's to lie it's to sort of throw them
off the track and the motivation is the
same so there should be no difference
okay good so here isn't the motivate
motive the same Diana what do you say to
this argument that well the motive is
the same in both cases there is the
attempt or at least the hope that one's
pursuer will be mislead well that you
could look at it that way but I think
that the fact is that your immediate
motive is that they should believe you
the ultimate consequence of that is that
they might be deceived and not find out
what was going on but your immediate
motive is that they should believe
you because you're telling the truth may
I help a little sure um can't why don't
you say and what's your name I'm sorry
what why don't you say to Wesley it's
not exactly the case that the motive in
both cases is to mislead they're hoping
they're hoping that the person will be
misled by the statement I don't know
where they are or I never had sexual
relations you're hoping that they will
be mislead but in the case where you're
telling the truth your motive is to
mislead while at the same time telling
the truth and honoring the moral law and
staying within the bounds of the
categorical imperative
I think Kant's answer would be Diana yes
you like that okay so I think Constantia
would be unlike a falsehood unlike a lie
a misleading truth pays a certain homage
to duty and the homage it pays to duty
is what justifies that the work of even
the work of the evasion Diana yes you
lie okay and so there is something some
element of respect for the dignity of
the moral law in the careful evasion
because Clinton could have told an
outright lie but he didn't and so I
think Kant's taunts inside here is in
the carefully couched but true evasion
there is a kind of homage to the dignity
of the moral law that is not present in
the outright lie and that Wesley is part
of the motive it's part of the motive
yes I hope he will be misled I hope the
murderer will run down the road or go to
the mall looking for my friend instead
of the closet I hope that will be the
effect I can't control
that I can't control the consequences
but what I can control is standing by
and honoring however I pursue the ends I
hope will unfold to do so in a way that
is consistent with respect for the moral
law Wesley I don't think is entirely
persuaded but at least this brings out
this discussion brings out some of
what's at stake what's morally at stake
in constant ocean of the categorical imperative
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