This discussion explores the complexities of national security strategy, emphasizing the critical balance between managing immediate crises and pursuing long-term strategic goals, drawing on Jake Sullivan's experience as National Security Advisor.
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Jake Sullivan, Biden's former national
security advisor, currently a professor
at the Harvard's Kennedy School, and as
of next week, my near peer, a podcaster.
Jake, welcome to Try Talk.
>> Well, thank you for having me. Now, I
have a whole different vantage point on
being a guest on a podcast before, so
I'll spend my time silently judging you.
>> Yeah. Yeah. No, we're going to teach you
some lessons here. This is a little
master class. Um, you call you're going
to call your new show The Long Game. How
did you you know, what's your
reflections on how crisis interacted
with, you know, national power
maximizing or however you want to define
the long game? Well, part of the reason
we're calling it the long game is I
think it's incredibly important for us
to lift our heads up and out of the
smoke of immediate crisis and say, how
do we put the US on the strongest
strategic footing going forward? And
that really is the ultimate essence of
the long game. How do we marshall and
husband the sources of American power in
service of our national security, our
prosperity, our values? Um, so that's
the ethos behind the long game. Now to
your question about
the interaction between crises in the
long game, it takes an enormous amount
of discipline, especially,
you know, in my time in the seat when we
were dealing with a lot of crises, a lot
of different types of incoming to say
we're going to set aside the time, the
effort, the resources, the top level
attention to actually focus on the long
game. And I'm actually quite proud that through
through
Ukraine and the Middle East and
Afghanistan and Chinese balloons and
lots of other stuff, we set aside the
time to really invest in our alliances,
invest in our industrial base, invest in
a set of technology policies that I
think advanced America's capabilities
and help protect those capabilities from
being used against us. So that requires
discipline, a huge amount of discipline.
And I tried to bring that discipline
with me to work every day. I also was
lucky to have a lot of people who were
assigned to the long game things and not
just the crisis who had no trouble
banging on my door and saying, "Jake,
don't forget we have to be working on
this issue, whether it was chip controls
or infrastructure projects in Africa or
what have you." And having that kind of
team around you, people who keep you
honest and say, "We're not going to let
you just get swallowed by the inbox."
That was very important as well. Um, is
there a design fix around this? Like,
should there be two NSAs, the
firefighter and the sort of long-term
person? Like, why why does this need to
be one job?
>> I think it's a great question and um
maybe it's maybe it's right that that
you know, if you think about the close
advisors to the president, there
shouldn't be any reason you couldn't
have two people essentially dividing the job.
job. Um,
Um,
I guess my overall reaction is that
that's probably a process fix better done
done
um, you know, with other senior people
who are devoted to specific crises, not
just someone who's like, I come in and
handle all crises.
uh and that
a national security adviser should
actually have the both dispensation and
the instinct to say, "I'm just not going
to spend a lot of time on this
particular set of issues. I'm going to
have the principal deputy do that or an
envoy do that or someone else in
government do that because I need to be
allocating more of my time to the longer
term things." That's probably a better
way to do it than formally divide the
role in two. Um, but one thing I reflect
on in my time in government is should I
have just more kind of consciously and
systematically said this is something
I'm putting on someone else's plate and
I will check in on it every now and
again, but it's not going to be
something I'm responsible for.
>> What were the things that you decided
you needed to own in order um and like
you know drive personally very
aggressively and why did you make those
calls? Well, first I felt I was unusual
as a national security adviser in that I
thought I had to be at the table as an
advocate, a designer, and to a certain
extent an implementer of domestic
industrial policy because I thought it
was important that we have the national
security perspective on that that we be
pushing that forward on chips, on clean
energy, on infrastructure. Uh so that
was one thing that I put a lot of effort
into particularly in the in the first
two years. Second, I thought the
intersection of technology and national
security was going to be defining and so
we created from whole cloth a new
directorate on technology and national
security and I saw it as my
responsibility to stay on top of that
set of issues. Yes, semiconductor export
controls but also other areas, biotech, quantum
quantum
uh and as I mentioned before uh the
clean energy transition and then third I
believed from the beginning that a
defining feature of modern geopolitics
is the competition between the US and
China and I thought it was my
responsibility to play a central role in
the design and execution of our China
strategy and in the management of the
USChina relationship. So those were
areas that I felt regardless of what
else was going on anywhere else in the
world I had to be focused on and tied to
all of those industrial policy,
technology policy, US China were allies
and that meant husbanding and stewarding our
our
uh relationships with core allies the G7
plus um India, Korea, Australia in
addition to the G7 seven and uh I put a
lot of thought, energy, and effort into
trying to elevate those relationships so
that they were in the strongest possible state.
state.
>> Just saying that though, like that
sounds like an enormous amount of stuff.
>> Yes. And what didn't I mention in that?
I didn't mention the war in Yemen, right?
right?
>> Or the multiple overlapping uh crises in
the Middle East or uh the draw down from
Afghanistan or a lot else besides Yeah,
there's a lot going on. Uh, but I mean
what I just named those things,
they're they're also interconnected and
they're not just four different piles of work.
work. >> Yeah.
>> Yeah. >> They're
>> They're
at at our best moments a coherent
strategy that we were trying to drive.
So I guess maybe that's the followup
then is like to what extent does one
person both being the push the long-term
stuff and the you know crisis manager
like what are the upsides to having that
all be on your shoulders?
>> Well first of all if you just take it
from the top the president of the United
States has to do everything. There is no
division of that job into multiple
>> um you know multiple different units. So
at some point as you go up any
institution, any organization, you get
to a CEO or a cabinet secretary or a
president or a national security
adviser. And so the question is um you
know, can you have a multi-headed
monster at the top of the National
Security Council enterprise? I think
that's difficult because you're trying
to execute and run a process that
allocates time, energy, resources,
priority, and then unity of vision and
coherence of execution across
everything. And I do think at the end of
the day, you need a belly button for
that. Uh, and that's why I think it has
to be, you know, basically in the the
job of the national security adviser.
But I also believe that theories of delegation
delegation
of relative levels of personal
engagement on different issues um have
to be an important part about how
someone in that role thinks about what
they're doing dayto-day.
>> Uh what do you think the pluses and
minuses were of being the second
youngest uh national security adviser
when you started the job?
>> Well, you know, it's interesting. I've
thought I've thought a fair amount about
this and I think it may strike some of
your listeners as surprising. I was 44
years old when I took the job. That's
only a couple years younger than
Kissinger was when he took the job. I
think he was 46. >> 45.
>> 45.
>> Okay. You you've you've got it.
>> 45 and a half. Chat GPT made us a chart.
This is not sponsored. >> Anyways,
>> Anyways,
>> and Brzinski 47 48.
>> Brzinski 48. There's like a big cluster.
Mc George Bundy was 41, which is insane.
Um and then Condi was 486.
>> So you're not like an outlier on the
young side. I guess the mean is like 53
or something,
>> right? But the way I look at this is
there's a number of national security
adviserss around my age when I took the
job. I felt very young in a way taking
it because you think of the the black
and white photographs and and the old,
you know, gray hairs and so forth. But
that's a you know a solid list of folks
in their mid to late 40s entering this
job with in some cases not a lot of
government experience at all coming
before them. In other cases like Condi
quite a substantial amount of government
experience coming before.
pluses of being on the younger side. Um,
uh, you know, energy, stamina, the
capacity to really dig in and do the job
full boore, full, you know, full scale 247.
247.
I believe that being willing to push the
envelope and be creative and be dynamic
and say we're going to do things a
different way. We're going to have a
theory of the case and try to execute
against it. um that having kind of
youthful vision and energy and
creativity and that's not just the
person as national security advisor it's
also the team they build and the dynamic
they build and and in my case I felt I
was able to build a very flat structure
where everyone could come in challenge
question raise ideas feel like they had
a voice and there wasn't some oracle up
top and hierarchy and I think that made
for a much better well first of all it
was better working environment just more
fun to work in that way but I also think
it allowed us to develop more
interesting more creative more dynamic
strategies in critical areas
um downsides look the biggest downside
is having done this job for four years I understand
understand
deeply like to my bones the value of
experience both positive experience and
and hard one experience Um, and there's
no substitute for it.
>> But, but I would I would just I would
just say on this point,
>> you know, if you spend, let's say I
spend another 10 years not as national
security adviser, but as something else,
there's actually no substitute for
experience as national security adviser.
It is a truly unique
um type of seat to sit in that in some
ways nothing can really actually prepare
you for.
>> Well, more on that then. I don't know
what what is uh what did year four uh uh
Jake Sullivan what was year four Jake
Sullivan able to do that year one went one
one
>> well actually the most interesting part
about experience is that to essentially
metabolize experience
you need distance
um so ask me in a year and I'll give you
an answer to the question I mean I'm
being a bit glib but but what I mean is
it's less that like in year two I was
like now I can do this that I couldn't
do in year one and year three it's more
the accumulation
of that experience and then stepping
away and then being able to say, "Okay,
I now have
lessons learned, things that worked
well, things that didn't work well." Um,
you know, as this conversation goes on,
I'll point out some of those, I assume. Um,
Um,
I sometimes think that actually the
right way for someone to do a job like
this is to come in for two years, leave
for 6 months, and then come back for 18
months or something like that. Or in for
18, out for a year, back, I don't know,
whatever it adds up to. because I do
think that leaving even for a little
while just gives you a an angle on, you
know, what you were doing in the
trenches that you just don't have when
you're sitting in those trenches. So, I
think that's kind of an interesting
model for how to think about this going
forward that you surf for a while, then
you step away for a little while, then
you come back and say, "Okay, now I've
actually had the chance, as I said, to
metabolize that experience." But anyway,
that's a an idol idle thought for for
others to consider down the road.
>> So the like on what dimensions
do you feel like like experience gets acred?
acred?
Well, living through a crisis and
actually having to stare square in the
face the hard trade-offs and the
imperfect choices, u the lack of clear
information, the need to form
assumptions in the shadow of uncertainty.
uncertainty.
You can read all about that, but until
you actually have to live through it,
you're not, I think, going to fully understand
understand
what both the opportunities and
limitations of that are. That's one. two,
two,
converting vision into action.
How do you actually turn the idea of an
industrial strategy into results?
Yeah, you kind of got to go through the
thick and the thin of that and make
progress, but also come up short to
really be able to expose and understand,
okay, what are the obstacles? What are
the modes of operating? How could we
have done things differently, faster,
more ambitiously, more creatively? So,
those are a couple of examples of where
I think
uh having to actually do
is what teaches you um what works, what
doesn't, and how to be most effective.
>> What about on the management side?
>> I mean, on the management side, it comes
down to a combination of how do you get
the best out of people? And um here
experience can cut both ways to be
honest with you because you know one
thing that I observed over the course of
my time in government is you get ground
down like your kindness, your patience,
your sense of uh vivra gets just ground
down and I think you become more impatient.
impatient.
Government is hard so you become harder.
Uh and I had to constantly fight against
that. So that's that's a asterisk
proviso. Set that aside. That's how too
much experience,
too much time in the trenches can
actually degrade you rather than than
enhance you. But um but how how you
actually get the most out of a team, how
you run a process, what works and
doesn't work with respect to trying to
get to to surface and crystallize
options for the president. how to make
um the you know the government as a
whole all pull in the same direction.
These are things that I think require
trial and error and every you know it's
a very human exercise. So any particular
group of people is going to have its own
psychology its own um sort of operating
operating
uh capacity.
So you can take experience from one and
it won't map neatly on to one
administration won't map neatly onto
another. But there are some broader
lessons that you can learn from it. In
20th century American history we have a
bit of a pendulum between uh you know on
the one side we maybe have like FDR and
Trump of just like presidents kind of
winging it. Um and then on the other
side the sort of reactions to that of
like Truman being like man this FDR guy
was crazy. We need to create ansey or
the Biden administration. this Trump guy
was crazy. We need to like bring in a a
a Yale law school person to like
organize things. Um uh how do you see
after doing this job the sort of
trade-offs of both models?
>> Yeah, I this is going to maybe be true
to brand, but I actually think that the
right answer is um to try to land in the
middle of that pendulum. And what I mean
by that is I think rigorous, fair,
honest process is really important to
the long-term strength of the United
States and to the discipline of strategy
on the big picture.
But I also believe that a president, a
national security adviser, uh that they
need a theory of what's really important
and they need to get after it.
So, you know, I had um kind of two
people that I really looked at to try to
approximate, not emulate because, you
know, couldn't live up to these two
guys, but but approximate Brent
Skraftoft and Brazinski.
Skraftoft for process and for being an
honest broker and for not coming in and
just calling the shots, but rather
teeing up the debates and principles to
the president. uh Brzinski
because he had a theory of geopolitics
and a worldview that helped shape and drive
drive
decision-m even as he dealt with a bunch
of crises on the on the edges and
margins of that. Um and I think a blend
of those two strategies is the best way
to pursue statecraftraft.
Um, are there dimensions
on which you wish you would have had
more freedom of maneuver or what what
felt the most constraining?
>> You know, I think you've you've had Dan
Wang on your podcast, right? So, um, he
wrote this book break neck, which I
thought was just incredibly
thoughtprovoking, interesting, and his
kind of overall thesis that America's
run by lawyers, of which I
>> Yeah, you're the archetype for
>> of which I am one. Um,
and uh, China's run by engineers.
There's there's a there's a truth to
that. And I would say
democratic administrations are even more
run by lawyers. Now I don't think in the
role of national security adviser um
um
this the the kind of challenge of being
a lawyer manifested the way other kind
of elements of the government did.
Meaning um
it would have been great to have more
freedom of maneuver to actually just
build at speed and scale than we were
able to accomplish because we had every
conceivable obstacle to being able to do that.
that.
Uh that's true from the defense
industrial base to infrastructure to uh
building a semiconductor fab in Arizona. >> Sure.
>> Sure.
>> Um so that would be one area where more
freedom of maneuver, more capacity to
move fast would have helped. That's one. Two,
Two,
the US is funny. We're the richest
country on the planet.
deep and liquid capital markets,
a massive federal budget, and yet our
ability to mobilize capital in an
intentional way to serve national
security ends both domestically and
globally is wanting. And so I would have
loved more freedom of maneuver to be
able to offer a value proposition to the
countries of the global south for
building infrastructure and um competing
with the Bell Road Initiative. And it
was hard to even get nickels and dimes
to be able to do that. And I think um
that was maddening because for pennies
on the dollar, I think we could have
competed more effectively and can to
this day compete more effectively and
we're not doing it because we can't get
that money.
>> Um okay. So what's the homework
uh connected to that?
>> Well, so a couple things. one uh and you
know this is something that that Larry
Summers and I have had a running
conversation about most recently at a
conference up at Harvard is um we really
need I think a deep and rigorous study of
of
uh what is are the objectives of
industrial policy what should be the
limits of industrial policy what are the
tools that work and don't work and then
once it's being applied what are the
obstacles to actually executing in a way
that delivers results on a reasonable
time frame and to the extent those
obstacles need to be adjusted
um how to adjust them and that entire
chain of questions I would say people
are looking at um you know some of my
former colleagues like Todd Fischer and
Mike Schmidt who uh were central to the
chips act effort are are really doing a
deep study of some of this today but
there is not a body of work on this in
part because industrial policy was
basically considered I don't know like
unacceptable to stare at work on and I
think we've got to bring it front and
center and not just with kind of the
core economics profession but that's got
to be a dialogue between national
security professionals and economists
coming up with a range of answers to
those questions that are rooted in
empirics and evidence and rigorous study
and I would ask anyone out there who's
thinking about,
you know, contributing to
the national security literature of the
future. This to me is a set of questions
for which we need better answers than we
have and those answers will be in large
measure defining of whether we're able
to pursue an effective strategy.
>> So, you know, chips act kind of like a
long game play. Yeah. Um, but there is a
world in which you do the October 7th
controls or you roll out the next batch
December 2023 and China decides to play
the rare earths card in the way that
they did this year. Um, I don't know
what what what you wake up the next day
like what do you what do you do? Well,
first of all, we didn't wake up the next
day and think about what to do because
we thought about that before we did the
controls. We thought about retaliation
risk. We thought about
um how to structure a strategy to
protect our most advanced technology
without getting on an escalation ladder
that could end in harm to us or a
downward spiral or as we've just seen
recently the need for us basically to
blink and back down. Um
so we executed the controls in a way
consistent with this theory of small
yard high fence precisely
to avoid the massive counter reaction
that we have seen once President Trump
decided to slap on 145% tariffs. And I
think that that was a credible and
sensible strategy.
Um, now
I also think it's totally fair to ask
and this gets to the point of like hard
one experience.
We knew that rare earths was a supply
chain vulnerability for the United
States. We knew that China was
weaponizing it. We were explicit about
that, open about that. We took steps on
it. I could, you know, send you a note
with a whole list of things that all
would look like perfectly credible steps
one would take to try to reduce that
supply chain vulnerability. And yet it
obviously didn't end that vulnerability
or even really truly dramatically reduce
it. Um why?
And I've kind of really reflected on
this question and there's a a few
reasons. One is
it is a new set of muscles for the
government to intervene in markets where
the markets have failed or where a
competitor like China has taken
advantage of those markets basically to
dominate supply. So we were trying to
build that muscle. Um second it's a
dynamic game. So you know we made
investments in US firms. We also made
investments in allies and China was
counterreacting by cratering the price
or you know driving a particular
processing plant out of business and so
forth. And we hadn't yet kind of gotten
fully up to speed in terms of that
reaction counter reaction.
And the thing that concerns me right now
is I think the Trump administration is
taking good steps on this and they're
obviously motivated, but it's still kind
of linear from where we were and we need
to go really nonlinear. We need a much
more in my view aggressive strategy. And
and so if I had woken up the next day to
your question uh after the imposition of
the semiconductor export controls and
they'd played the massive rare earth
card, I would have said like drop
everything. We need to solve this within
the shortest possible span of time. and
essentially have operation warp speed to
get it done. And I still think that is
what the Trump administration should do.
I think they're moving in that
direction. But I think
now is the moment for more elacrity. And
I say that as someone recognizing
Trump won recognized this, not enough
elacrity. Our administration in the end,
not enough elacrity. And I'm worried
that that remains the case today. Um,
zooming back like we have two countries
who are competing, who are deeply
economically intertwined. Say you solve
rare earths. Say you solve APIs. Like it
seems to me that in so far as the two
countries have an enormous amount of uh
sort of economic interaction with each
other, like there will still be ways for
either country to sort of squeeze and
cause the other one pain. Even if it's
not commercial. I mean, we saw the
typhoon. Like what the hell are you
doing in water treatment plants, right?
I'm sure you told them to knock it off
and they didn't. Um, you know, like
it it it's like it's a game worth
playing, but like what does um sort of
uh is it a wrestling metaphor? It's like
if you're winning points in the round,
but all of a sudden like someone could
still pin you if they really felt like
they needed to. How much does the
incremental like resiliency izing uh
help the US when it comes to these sorts
of uh negotiations?
>> Uh first of all to your question about
homework to your listeners.
Okay, let's fully map
the vulnerabilities as far as we can see
them. Let's ask where they are. Let's
test this hypothesis you put forward
that there is simply no end to
interdependence and that there will be
some fundamental vulnerability
that can be exploited by China or for
that matter by the United States. Um
Um
I think that is worth a deep dive not
not just sort of all of us talking back
and forth about it. I have three answers
to this question. The first is
there are different forms of vulnerability.
vulnerability.
Meaning some act very fast
and can be the the pain can be applied
asymmetrically, powerfully and swiftly.
some act much more slowly and give you
time to adjust or
uh they act in a way that harms the
country imposing that action so there's
some degree of deterrence. So that's one
answer is let's just not have a list of
all the interdependents but we need to
isolate the examples that are like rare
earths. How many of those are there actually?
actually?
>> Second um I would prefer to have fewer
vulnerabilities rather than more. >> Sure.
>> Sure.
>> Um so if I can take some bullets out of
your gun, could I still end up dead?
Maybe. But if you gave me the choice
between you having a full magazine and
less than a full magazine, I would say
let's make investments to do that.
And then third, and I think this is
really important, um the more a country
shows it has the muscle to be able to
adapt and adjust if another country
tries to weaponize interdependence,
I think the more of a broader base
deterrent effect it ends up having. So
being having the wherewithal to
relatively rapidly identify and then
close a gap even if you know there are
other gaps out there I think has a
knock-on effect on those other gaps too.
So for all those reasons I think we
should still have a resilient strategy
though I do acknowledge that this is a
very legitimate question um and part of
the answer to it has to come down to a
costbenefit analysis of of you know
trying to deal with this resilience in
the rare earth's case. The costbenefit
analysis seems to be pretty
straightforward. This is not a massive
market. It doesn't require us moving
heaven and earth to resolve the
vulnerability. It requires some
determined concerted action and we
should take it. Um the closest thing we
got to a Sullivan doctrine was um given
September 2022. Given the foundational
nature of certain technologies, we must
maintain as large of a lead as possible.
Um, you know, there's the maximalist
version of that where everything get
gets cut off. You're sucks netting, you
know, private companies. Um, and there's
the small yard high fence version, you
know, of Biden vintage where um, every
day you put out, you know, when you put
out a new export controls, the next day
we're recording an emergency podcast
talking about all the loopholes. Um, I'm
curious for your reflections on what
were the sort of uh, you know, what was
the calculus and like how did what was
constraining it? Was it domestic stuff?
Was it political economy? Was it worries
about retaliation? Like how did how did
the level end up getting set?
>> One element's retaliation risk and we
kind of talked that through, right? If
you just say to China like basically
we're cutting you off alto together then
you're going to induce a really dramatic
reaction. That's what happened when we
fired a bazooka of 145% tariffs and they
fired a bazooka back. So that is one
element of it for sure. A second element
of it is um trying to actually have some
discipline about a threshold above which
you actually have national security
concerns and below which you're just
talking about broad-based commercial or
consumer applications and
wanting to have the American idea that
we're not for just a total technology
blockade. we are for focusing on those
elements of technology that have genuine
national security and strategic uh
implications for us. A third aspect of
it is um what you said about kind of
political economy that you're trying to
bring allies along, you're trying to
bring your private sector along. Uh
you're trying to organize a government
that has very different views on this.
And so I think you said in your question
sort of reflect on this a bit. I
if you and I sat down for an hour and
kind of went through 22, 23, 24 um
um
do I think we got all the calibrations
right, all the levels? Of course not.
>> Sure. I mean, first of all, in 22 they
knocked out the interconnect and had the
H99 and we had to, you know, update the
controls in part because that
interconnect speed uh criteria didn't
make sense. So, we were learning as we went.
went. >> Sure.
>> Sure.
um the stockpiling of some of the
manufacturing equipment, those timelines
like we we could walk through, but you
you know we were
executing a novel strategy
trying to make sure that we were
nurturing and sustaining our advantages,
protecting our most advanced technologies,
technologies,
um while at the same time dealing with
this other set of considerations. I had
uh breakfast with a guy I respect a huge amount
amount
uh in the in the technology field who uh
was basically like my only objection to
small yard high fence is that it should
be big yard high fence. [laughter] And I
was like, and he had a, you know, his
argument was
control legacy chips. Control it all,
you know. Um,
Um,
I actually think the experience of this
year and how things have played out
compared with the experience of the last
three years
is good uh is a good argument for small
yard high fence for a particular style
and strategy of a pretty aggressive policy
policy
that is conducted
uh with a degree of care and precision.
because I think that was a more
sustainable policy for the United States
over the longer term than just going,
you know, letting her rip. Um, now, you
know, it's hard to say for sure that
that's right. There's no algorithm for
this. Um, but that was the judgment that
we reached and that's why we proceeded
the way that we did. The last thing I
would raise on this is having watched
You know, was the right answer just FTPR,
FTPR,
the foreign direct product rule from the
start? Basically, don't negotiate with
our allies over coordinated
semiconductor manufacturing equipment
controls. Just tell them they got
American content. you're not selling
them. Done. I think about that
sometimes. Um that comes down to a
question really of what are the longer
term costs of treating your friends that
way? And I I believe that there are
genuine longerterm costs for that that
are real and strategic and meaningful.
But I can't prove that. That's something
we're going to have to watch over time
because now we're running a real lab experiment.
experiment.
All right, let's do some China stuff. Uh,
Uh,
so you've seen all
>> Am I boring you?
>> No, no, no, no, no. Oh, no. No. I'm just
This is part of the game. It's like it's
this is not obvious where to go next.
Like there's 10 different questions. I
could ask you about, you know, you said,
"Okay, well, with the breaking the
fourth wall on the podcasting stuff, you
said like there's not an algorithm. I
could pick on that and be like, all
right, how would you use AI in your job
today if you had there's
>> there's more industrial policy
questions? I could I could do another
question on the um uh on the tech
control. Okay, big fence FDPR like would
do you think China would have freaked
out like you know should we have had
like Huawei is still a thing like you
probably could have
>> made it not a company or come close
if you really wanted to it could have
been smaller than it is. I guess here's
what I would say about some of these arguments,
arguments,
>> uh, like if only you do this extra thing
on Huawei, then that happens. It reminds
me of the real socialism has never been
tried argument,
>> you know, like
>> well, look, there's
>> it's possible. You're right. Just one
more crushing sanction or export control
this the the the chart of
>> By the way, I'm being because you may be
right. I'm just saying there is a certain
certain
you may be right but I think
the the question that one has to grapple
with is some of the assumptions that underpinned
underpinned
the Huawei controls that were put in
place in the Trump administration
and the statements about what would
happen as a result of those controls not
the next better version later down the
line didn't quite bear out and you know
we to grapple with that too. You may be
right that just taking more steps in the
Biden administration could have, you
know, could have made all the difference.
difference.
>> I mean, I think I think you you
identified the biggest what if is FTPR
on um equipment earlier because the, you
know, the big chart is the one whereme
exports like double and double again and
double again and it's like you're trying
to control it
>> but it's not happening. And then we had
this BIS 50% rule and now it's not here
anymore. So, it's going to keep
doubling, right? Yeah.
>> So that that seems to me to be the big
fork in the road.
>> I think it's a big question and I'm not
sure what the right answer is. Um
you know we had a thesis with respect to
our allies. You work with them rather
than coerced them.
Uh that obviously meant China got access
to more manufacturing equipment than if
we had just coerced them.
But in a net assessment of the overall
health, vitality, strength of those
relationships and how they would play
out in to coin a phrase, the long game. >> Yeah,
>> Yeah,
>> I think that's a big question. And and
again, Trump is tested, President Trump
is testing that question because he's
basically saying, I don't buy it. I can
go punish all these people as much as I
like and they're just going to have to
keep being friends because they have no
other choice. And he seems to think
that'll just be how it is. I happen to
think what's more likely is you get a
group of countries that were coming
along with us to derisk from China who
now are sitting there thinking
I got to do what I got to do today but
over time I need to derisk from the
United States and uh I don't think that
in the end that that is going to be a
winning strategy. So
these are the kinds of calls that you
have to make in the shadow of
uncertainty. I will say there was not
we didn't have knockdown dragouts about
FDPR. I think there was a general sense like
like
that we should try try to negotiate this
with our allies rather than just club
them over the head. And you know there
are also other ways to get at this
challenge than FDPR like timelines on
implementation and how companies went
about doing allowing the stockpiling
despite government agreements and so
forth. So that's that's for another
You you've seen the arc, man. You were
you were present at the creation of uh
the she era. What um I don't know. What
do you believe about him that's not consensus?
Oh, what do I believe about him that's
not consensus? That's interesting.
I think he is more improvisational than
the kind of theory that he's just set
out a
you know a coherent strategy that they
are just going to execute and he's like
basically any other leader of any other
big unruly country and that he's got to
make a lot of stuff up as he goes along.
Accidental conflict
um it's something Americans worry about.
I personally am skeptical that like if
two countries really don't want to
fight, they can be like they can like
trip into a war neither side really
wants. Am I wrong here? Is this
something I should be more scared of? I
think it's such a fair question. It's
almost like a shibilith of like the risk
of mistake, miscalculation, escalation,
the ships bumping into each other in the
South China Sea and all of a sudden
you're in World War II.
I share a degree of your skepticism. I
think that there are restraining factors
that can allow disengagement and
deescalation, but let me give you a let
me give you a hypothetical scenario and
you tell me if it
worries you or you're like, "Ah, they'd
work it out. It's just fine." So, as you
know, the PRC is pressing
closer and closer to the island of
Taiwan in the air and on the sea,
bumping up against, you know, fewer and
fewer nautical miles offshore. Right.
And they're doing that with manned
aircraft. They're doing it with ships.
They're doing it with drones.
At some point, let's just say Taiwan
says, "We can't tolerate this anymore.
We got to go like fire a warning shot or
we got to go, you know, do a fake dog
fight with one of these planes to show
them that we're not tolerating the
continued encroachment.
And then one thing leads to another and
You think next day it's cool. I mean,
does that bother you? Does that worry
you? cuz that scenario does do I think
automatically we're off to the races?
No. But
that kind of scenario in an already
operational environment,
I don't know that
the risk of
a tactical mistake leading to a change
in the strategic situation.
I'm not I'm not like at one end of the
spectrum on this that you're pushing
against, but I'm I'm not quite where you
are, I don't think.
>> Yeah. I mean, it's wouldn't be a nice
thing. It it you know, you'd lose some
sleep over it.
>> Yeah. And that's kind of I mean, the
thought experiment to me is that like
why would you lose sleep over? Because
you'd be like, well, there is a
possibility now.
Maybe not that immediately the invasion
force comes flowing over the horizon,
It leads to a change in the national conversation
conversation
on the mainland. It leads to
uh arguments that we just can't tolerate
this. There has to be punishment, you
know, and so on. And yes, can that
contribute to a shift
in a negative direction that raises the
risk of outright conflict? I think it
can. I don't want to overstate the case
because I take your point.
But that kind of scenario worries me
more in a way than the US and China
bumping up against each other. India
Pakistan's another example where I think
mistake can lead to very rapid
escalation. Um so it to me it's a little
bit more condition specific than just um
sort of in the abstract.
>> But isn't isn't the lesson of in the
most recent India Pakistan almost the
other thing? It's like okay we have a
game now and we just play it every five
years. Yeah, actually
>> it probably doesn't feel like that if
like you know you're getting woken up at
1:00 in the morning.
>> You know what? I'll take that point. I
think that's fair because I basically
agree with you that at the end of the
day the two sides don't want to go to
allout war and so there's reasons for
them to end up not doing so. So I
>> Was it a mistake for Pelic to go to China?
China?
>> To China?
>> Yeah. Jesus.
>> I'm gonna look, I want to be fair to the
speaker of Mmerida. Give her um her air time.
time. >> Uh
>> Uh
>> she's declined her invitation for the record.
record.
>> I I went up and No, no, no. I'm saying
I'm going to give her her air time right
now. Okay. Okay. So,
>> by because I'm going to answer your
question, but I don't you know, I want
to do it in a fair way. Uh, I spoke with
her about going to Taipei and she
basically said to me, "All you white
houses, Democrat, Republican, you know,
like you're all too restrained. I should
be able to do what I want to do and
nobody should tell us whether we can go
to a city and so forth." Um,
so she was pretty clear and direct in
her view.
Uh I believe that the cost to Taiwan
of that visit far exceeded the benefit
to Taiwan of that visit. So for me it's
pretty simple calculus.
>> How so? Well, I think it led to not just
an immediate reaction by China that put
a huge amount of pressure on Taiwan, but
it led to a change in the operational
environment around Taiwan that has not
gone back to the way it was before. So, substantive
substantive
changes in Taiwan's immediate
environment to the negative.
on the positive side
kind of what some symbolism I guess but
>> reporting that chip controls only happen
because of this.
>> Well that's crazy.
>> Okay. All right. On the accidental risk
stuff um speaking of you getting
stressed out. Uh I mean Putin nuclear
scenario is probably like the I I assume
is the the scariest thing you like you
know had a five 10% chance of seeing. Um
I don't know like you've already given
some reflections on this but maybe from
like we had all these like NYSE
management questions like okay this is
like you you know it wasn't your first
year but like this is the big one. What
is what I'm uh I don't know what sticks
in sticks with you. Um
this is fall of 22.
The Ukrainians are on this
counteroffensive in here and Harkke
and the intelligence community at the
most senior levels comes to the
president and says
uh if there's a catastrophic collapse of
Russian lines
and Putin feels that he's in danger of
potentially losing the war,
he will there's a 50% chance a coin toss
that he will use tactical nuclear
weapons to avert that defeat and shore
up his lines. Okay.
Okay. So,
So,
and by the way, this is not
just people guessing out of thin air.
This is people who have studied this
issue or watching everything going on
who have amassed a fairly broad-based
view across the intelligence community
of this judgment.
So, you're the president of the United
States. You're the national security
adviser, the secretary of defense, and
you're like, "All right, we got to deal
with that. Can't be paralyzed by it. You
got to keep supporting Ukraine, but we
got to deal with that." So, we
we
gathered in the situation room. We ran
tabletop exercises. What would happen?
What would we do in response? What would
I would say not very pleasant scenarios,
all told.
And so we communicated directly with the
Russians about the consequences of
taking such an action. And of course we
reached out to among others China uh to
get them to weigh in as well. But this
is the kind of thing where the
difference between a commentator sort of
saying ah I don't think it's a very
serious risk and actually being in the
seat having the responsibility to the
American people
of taking very seriously what sober
senior intelligence professionals are
telling you while also continuing to
that that was very real and very
challenging and I do not believe
that um this was all just BS. I think
this was a
a risk. Um,
if it had happened, the first nuclear
use since Hiroshima Nagasaki,
uh, the United States would have had to take
take
meaningful action in response and that
action could easily have led to a
totally different form of escalation
between us and Russia. Um, so it's good
it did not happen.
Uh, I think a lot of people look at the
fact that it didn't happen and say this
was all what it was. I think there, you
know, I think we had some influence over
it and events on the battlefield had
some influence over it as well.
>> So, you know, we've talked about a few
different escalatory ladders. We have
the sort of like econ tech fights. We
have the okay like some planes hit each
other in the sky and but this is like
you know you're I mean sort of different
than what they were theorizing in the
50s and 60s but um uh
uh
I don't know
you have a comment what's my question?
>> Well I think your question is how the
hell do you deal with that? >> [laughter]
>> [laughter]
>> I know. I mean, [gasps]
>> well, I mean, it's like it's like you
could Well, maybe it's like you can mess
up a little bit with the rare stuffs and
the trip controls and like it's
manageable, right? But, um, maybe
>> Well, look, it raises a question about
risk tolerance, right? So, um,
um,
you're walking on a narrow mountain path
and there's a steep cliff off to, you
know, one side's the mountain, the other
side's a steep cliff. the path is, you
know, call it five feet wide. Okay.
Like, do you walk right on the edge, say
I I don't think I'll slip, or do you
walk up against the mountain? And
And
I feel like a lot of the debates over
the nuclear escalation thing is why
weren't you closer to the edge? Why were
you closer to the mountain? Um,
and I think the right answer on this is
you have to keep moving forward. You got
to go from point A to point B. You can't
stop providing weapons to Ukraine,
intelligence to Ukraine, capacity to Ukraine,
Ukraine,
but you also have a responsibility to
the American people not to fall off the cliff.
cliff.
Can you talk about sort of
psychologically sort of yourself and
your team? I mean, again, it's one thing
to like be in the CIA for 30 years and
be thinking about Russian nuclear
posture, and it's another thing when
it's like the week when it's more risky
than any time since the 80s or even the
60s. And you know, the same for you.
One thing that I'm like playing around
with my head, I don't want to say it
wrong because it's going to sound
somehow like
I didn't take my job seriously enough
and I took my job
effing deadly seriously. Uh is that I
think somehow stress and stakes and consequences
consequences
normalize. What I mean by that is like
the human capacity to just adjust to
your circumstance. So, I was an
associated law firm in Minneapolis
working on commercial litigation and
and
we had these cases that kept me up at
night, okay? And I stressed out over
did we get this right or get that wrong
and I second guessed and recriminated in
the whole thing. Then I end up in this
nuclear scenario.
It's, you know, these are night and day,
human beings don't just have like an infinite
infinite
>> level of calibrating stress. They just
have their bands and then they're
presented with things and some of them
are life or death situations and some of
them are life or death decision-making situations.
situations.
And so you get up in the morning and you
go to work and you do your job and then
you go home at night and you execute
your responsibility to the best of your
ability to do so. I don't have a better
answer than that. But I don't feel like
oh I I was some special person. I was
just a guy who had a job and this was
the problem problem presented in that
job and I had to deal with it. Uh, but a
lot of it is just about being able to
inhabit that mindset and say, "I got to
go to work. This is my this is my job
today." Uh,
but that didn't mean I didn't sweat
through a lot of shirts.
>> It's a good point. It's like, look, the
Marines fought on Paleolu and Eroima.
>> Yeah, exactly. You're going to an office.
office.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. This is such a good
way of putting it. Somebody is walking
into the teeth of gunfire
at Omaha Beach who a year before was a
school teacher in my hometown of Minneapolis.
Minneapolis.
>> School teacher was a high schooler, you know.
know.
>> Yeah. Was a high schooler. Was a Yeah.
Exactly. So the
>> the ability to normalize just your
situation like this is my job today. Right.
Right.
>> Exactly. And that's so much more real
than anything I had to deal with. Yeah.
And and yet, you know, like we all have
really stressful and complicated
situations in our lives. And
so even when something is objectively
not that high stakes, I don't begrudge
people that they feel super stressed in
that situation because they're just
operating within the range we all
operate of stress and stakes based on
their lived experience. But there have
been very few humans in like human
history who have like
stared down a nuclear war and like
managed through it. So even then it
still is kind of a it's unique
>> yeah experience.
>> Yeah it's a lot. I mean it is is a lot.
It's it's heavy. And you know, the other
important thing is
um you know, we're all just human beings like
like
leading three-dimensional lives. Um
you know,
while dealing with all of this, dealing
with family stuff or uh health stuff or
whatever the case may be. And so,
you know, I talked about before about
how you can get ground down in these
jobs and kind of lose a certain sense of
There is a way in which the stress and
the stakes harden you um
um
that you don't even quite realize at the
time. and being vigilant for that to try
to remember at the end of the day that
it's your job to be a good and decent
person is a really important thing and
that requires more discipline than I
think often in a given day you can bring
to bear.
Um, you said on a podcast you still
don't sleep well. Like did you sleep
well before?
I feel like
in Trump one
there was a period where I had a really
hard time sleeping post 2016. But
But
yeah, I would say I slept pretty good.
Um, and I don't now because
there in many ways a lot of the things
that we dealt with
had no
perfect outcomes achievable. And so the
outcome was going to be
painful in one way or another. And there
were some painful outcomes and then they
happen and you're like,"Well,
what if I had done this or what if I
done that or what if we had done this or
what could we learn from that?" And you
turn it over in your head and then you
do all of that with perfect hindsight,
which is a super problematic thing to do
because you could only make those
decisions in the moment.
But I don't know that I think that's
just going to be
what it is for me for a while. And I
don't think that's a bad thing. I think
in a way it's it's the completion of
discharging your responsibility in a job
like I had
is not to walk out the day you're done
and just go all right someone else's
problem. It's to continue to wrestle
with it kind of indefinitely. That's
>> as our first gift I know we're we're
past the $50 limit. Um,
uh, Amazon sent a un like a kind of
comically large bag of chamomile
flowers. So, you know, just to help you
out with that a little bit.
>> I love it. That's so kind. Does this work?
work?
>> It's just chamomile tea. So, yeah, as
far as that goes, so it doesn't work.
Okay. All right. But I can
>> I can't like prescribe you drugs here. Like,
Like,
>> maybe not on the podcast.
>> Okay. Okay. I do want to ask you the uh
you mentioned earlier like you think the
the thinking around AI is uh uh AI
national policy is really poor like what
are the what are the sort of most uh you
know hottest questions you wish there
was [clears throat] better thought on
>> let me be absolutely clear if I may have
said that if I did I I don't mean to say
it's really poor I mean to say
>> early innings because I look I think are
brilliant people thinking about this and
they're thinking thoughts way beyond in
complexity and sophistication that I
could think
my concern is that
uh and who's the we because it's a
combination of this government plus
these big private companies that are
driving the frontier
without really kind of fully unearthing
um the assumptions underlying those strategies.
strategies. So
a world in which we are rapidly approaching AGI and ASI versus a world
approaching AGI and ASI versus a world in which it's a kind of bounded and
in which it's a kind of bounded and jagged pathway towards greater
jagged pathway towards greater capability.
What you would do across a range of different inputs is different in those
different inputs is different in those two worlds. And yet I don't think we sit
two worlds. And yet I don't think we sit and kind of work out
and kind of work out you know what is our relative confidence
you know what is our relative confidence in one world as opposed to the other.
in one world as opposed to the other. What are the can't fail or the the the
What are the can't fail or the the the mustd dos no regrets and then what are
mustd dos no regrets and then what are things we have to be able to adjust as
things we have to be able to adjust as we gain more information. And that's
we gain more information. And that's just one example of many of where
just one example of many of where I think getting technologists and
I think getting technologists and strategists together to really go
strategists together to really go through the underlying assumptions of
through the underlying assumptions of where all this is going
where all this is going um is important and I think most of this
um is important and I think most of this conversation floats above at a plane of
conversation floats above at a plane of abstraction
abstraction and as a result we pursue a policy with
and as a result we pursue a policy with a lot of hidden assumptions that we
a lot of hidden assumptions that we haven't fully validated or unearthed.
haven't fully validated or unearthed. So, that's my that's my main concern and
So, that's my that's my main concern and uh um something I'm kind of turning over
uh um something I'm kind of turning over in my head and thinking about how to
in my head and thinking about how to articulate better than I just did.
articulate better than I just did. >> Um maybe more broadly like the the
>> Um maybe more broadly like the the process of gathering information even
process of gathering information even though it's under, you know, uncertainty
though it's under, you know, uncertainty and you'll never get to, you know, much
and you'll never get to, you know, much less 80% confidence with some of these
less 80% confidence with some of these things. like how did you think about it
things. like how did you think about it and the sources and how did that sort of
and the sources and how did that sort of evolve over time for you?
evolve over time for you? >> Well, first of all, when you're in
>> Well, first of all, when you're in government, access to information is
government, access to information is amazing. Um, my friend Kirk Campbell
amazing. Um, my friend Kirk Campbell likes to say, you know, when you're in
likes to say, you know, when you're in government, the comes to you. When
government, the comes to you. When you're out of government, you have to go
you're out of government, you have to go find the Okay? And I think there's
find the Okay? And I think there's uh a kind of simple crude elegance to
uh a kind of simple crude elegance to that. Um
first of all we could have senior people from the AI
we could have senior people from the AI labs come in and actually present to us
labs come in and actually present to us where they were in their capabilities
where they were in their capabilities and where they were going and what
and where they were going and what concerned them like literally in the in
concerned them like literally in the in the flesh just do it. you know, we could
the flesh just do it. you know, we could also get all of the, you know, industry
also get all of the, you know, industry data and analysis synthesized by a team
data and analysis synthesized by a team of people at name your agency in the US
of people at name your agency in the US government and supplied to you as well.
government and supplied to you as well. So um
So um I would say that that the biggest
I would say that that the biggest weakness on the US government's side in
weakness on the US government's side in terms of the consumption of information
terms of the consumption of information is that we tend to over prioritize
is that we tend to over prioritize classified information over unclassified
classified information over unclassified information because we somehow think
information because we somehow think it's more special and particularly in
it's more special and particularly in technology it's the unclassified
technology it's the unclassified information where you really find out
information where you really find out what the hell is going on. Um,
what the hell is going on. Um, but basically all you can do is try to
but basically all you can do is try to bring in as much as you can and then I I
bring in as much as you can and then I I believe in the debate method basically
believe in the debate method basically of having people on opposite sides or at
of having people on opposite sides or at different ends of the spectrum on a
different ends of the spectrum on a given question of what's likely to
given question of what's likely to happen. actually kind of debate it out,
happen. actually kind of debate it out, unear it and figure out where they agree
unear it and figure out where they agree and where they disagree and isolate the
and where they disagree and isolate the points of disagreement because I think
points of disagreement because I think that method
that method gives you the best confidence that
gives you the best confidence that you've actually kicked the tires on all
you've actually kicked the tires on all the potential perspectives and then you
the potential perspectives and then you just have to decide where you land,
just have to decide where you land, where you fall. Trump 2 does not seem to
where you fall. Trump 2 does not seem to see China as the threat that you guys,
see China as the threat that you guys, you know, and Trump one seem to
you know, and Trump one seem to characterize it as. Um,
characterize it as. Um, two questions fall out of that. Like to
two questions fall out of that. Like to what extent do you think if he really
what extent do you think if he really tries he can change the tenor of this
tries he can change the tenor of this relationship? How structural is the
relationship? How structural is the competition basically? And you know
competition basically? And you know given that this is what they're seeing,
given that this is what they're seeing, is there uh, you know, if you had
is there uh, you know, if you had foresight into this, is there any like
foresight into this, is there any like would the bias have been to push harder
would the bias have been to push harder um or push less hard? Oh, second's a
um or push less hard? Oh, second's a good question and I think increasingly
good question and I think increasingly it's going to be a salient question
it's going to be a salient question because I think we are going to see more
because I think we are going to see more swings in US foreign policy in the years
swings in US foreign policy in the years ahead. So, future national security
ahead. So, future national security adviserss will have to contemplate
adviserss will have to contemplate dramatic departures one way or the
dramatic departures one way or the other. Um,
other. Um, uh, and we're kind of seeing that play
uh, and we're kind of seeing that play out, the lessons of that right now. On
out, the lessons of that right now. On the first question, here's what I think.
the first question, here's what I think. I think it's structural. I think the
I think it's structural. I think the United States and China are two big,
United States and China are two big, ambitious, dynamic countries with proud
ambitious, dynamic countries with proud people who want to succeed and frankly
people who want to succeed and frankly don't want someone else calling the
don't want someone else calling the shots
shots or having undue influence or having
or having undue influence or having greater capacity than they have. And we
greater capacity than they have. And we have two different political systems
have two different political systems uh two different value systems and
uh two different value systems and therefore I think competition is a
therefore I think competition is a feature of the relationship.
feature of the relationship. What I don't think is structural is that
What I don't think is structural is that it has to be conflict where I think we
it has to be conflict where I think we have the ability to influence things is
have the ability to influence things is to manage that competition effectively.
to manage that competition effectively. But I think the idea that you can just
But I think the idea that you can just wish the competition away and go with
wish the competition away and go with win-win peaceful coexistence and all
win-win peaceful coexistence and all these kinds of phrases, I I don't really
these kinds of phrases, I I don't really buy that and frankly I don't think China
buy that and frankly I don't think China buys that deep down.
buys that deep down. So I think President Trump can talk
So I think President Trump can talk about the G2 and I completely agree. He
about the G2 and I completely agree. He looks at this through an economic lens,
looks at this through an economic lens, a mercantalist lens and not a lens of
a mercantalist lens and not a lens of strategic competition.
strategic competition. Uh but at the end of the day I think
Uh but at the end of the day I think these structural factors will shine
these structural factors will shine through.
I have to think about whether it would have made us do something different.
have made us do something different. That's a bit of a mindbender projecting
That's a bit of a mindbender projecting back and then forward. Uh, but it's a
back and then forward. Uh, but it's a totally reasonable question.
totally reasonable question. Um, so you know, you talked earlier
Um, so you know, you talked earlier about like the personal weight of all
about like the personal weight of all this. Uh, and you said somewhere that
this. Uh, and you said somewhere that you almost envy the people who can have
you almost envy the people who can have more confidence in their calls. Uh, the
more confidence in their calls. Uh, the irony of course there's this new book
irony of course there's this new book about McNamera at war and you know he's
about McNamera at war and you know he's the one who projected the most
the one who projected the most confidence out of any of these folks and
confidence out of any of these folks and he had panic attacks and you know it was
he had panic attacks and you know it was actually all a cover for all his sort of
actually all a cover for all his sort of insecurity. So
insecurity. So >> I was being a little ry when I said
>> I was being a little ry when I said that. Um, in so far as kind of I that's
that. Um, in so far as kind of I that's like understated Minnesota. I don't
like understated Minnesota. I don't know. Uh, Ryus
know. Uh, Ryus kind of what I meant was I just find it
kind of what I meant was I just find it so interesting that people can assert
so interesting that people can assert things
things like like yes, it's this, you know, and
like like yes, it's this, you know, and you're like, well, congratulations. Like
you're like, well, congratulations. Like I'm so glad that
I'm so glad that >> you just know that. Um I will tell you
>> you just know that. Um I will tell you going back to the point about hard one
going back to the point about hard one experience is
experience is um
um most of these issues do not have easy
most of these issues do not have easy calls and they have tradeoffs and they
calls and they have tradeoffs and they have puts and takes and so
have puts and takes and so I I rightly admire the self-confidence
I I rightly admire the self-confidence because it's I could sleep at night
because it's I could sleep at night super easily then and you know it's just
super easily then and you know it's just like a hell of a lot less pain and
like a hell of a lot less pain and suffering but I don't think it's right.
suffering but I don't think it's right. >> All right. Well, we got three more
>> All right. Well, we got three more midnight reading books for you.
midnight reading books for you. >> Cool.
>> Cool. >> Sign off one. I think this is best
>> Sign off one. I think this is best suited for midnight. Feeding ghosts.
suited for midnight. Feeding ghosts. It's actually a graphic memoir.
It's actually a graphic memoir. >> Wow.
>> Wow. >> It just won the Pulitzer.
>> It just won the Pulitzer. >> Damn.
>> Damn. >> It's a sort of
>> It's a sort of >> personal history with a US China arc in
>> personal history with a US China arc in it that
it that >> I can't wait.
>> I can't wait. >> Um,
>> Um, you know, it's really fun. Um,
you know, it's really fun. Um, the social history of the machine gun.
the social history of the machine gun. Uh, it is one of the most stylishly,
Uh, it is one of the most stylishly, well, it is probably the most stylishly
well, it is probably the most stylishly written sort of military history I've
written sort of military history I've ever come across. Um, and it sort of
ever come across. Um, and it sort of goes through the technology, the
goes through the technology, the companies, the sort of acquisition side,
companies, the sort of acquisition side, and then the like human and strategic
and then the like human and strategic implications. And
implications. And >> fantastic.
>> fantastic. >> Someone's going to have to write the
>> Someone's going to have to write the social history of the drone. Oh, we
social history of the drone. Oh, we didn't get to drones today. We'll have
didn't get to drones today. We'll have you back maybe. Um uh but that book's a
you back maybe. Um uh but that book's a real treat. Last one. Um To Run the
real treat. Last one. Um To Run the World. To Run the World is already on
World. To Run the World is already on the list.
the list. >> I It's on the list. I don't have it
>> I It's on the list. I don't have it though, so I'm glad you gave it to me,
though, so I'm glad you gave it to me, but I'm excited to read this book.
but I'm excited to read this book. >> Okay. The the sort of the the bit that
>> Okay. The the sort of the the bit that calls back so much right now was Brev
calls back so much right now was Brev getting really stressed that Nixon went
getting really stressed that Nixon went to China. And then they have this
to China. And then they have this meeting and he's like, "We can be a G2.
meeting and he's like, "We can be a G2. Us together can rule the world." And
Us together can rule the world." And Nixon's like, "Maybe, I'll think about
Nixon's like, "Maybe, I'll think about it. TVD." Um, oh, final thing. Uh,
it. TVD." Um, oh, final thing. Uh, feedback for China talk. What do you
feedback for China talk. What do you What do you want to put on my plate or
What do you want to put on my plate or our our team's plate actually? I think
our our team's plate actually? I think this, you know, uh, bringing on some
this, you know, uh, bringing on some more people on on future of
more people on on future of manufacturing, supply chains, industrial
manufacturing, supply chains, industrial strategy, all the things that, you know,
strategy, all the things that, you know, we were talking about a little bit ago
we were talking about a little bit ago that I think deserve so much more depth,
that I think deserve so much more depth, like getting getting folks in um to
like getting getting folks in um to really unpack a lot of the kinds of
really unpack a lot of the kinds of questions Dan was posing that Larry and
questions Dan was posing that Larry and I have been grappling with that Chris
I have been grappling with that Chris Miller has been thinking a lot about. I
Miller has been thinking a lot about. I know you do this, but doing a dedicated
know you do this, but doing a dedicated series on this subject um with this, you
series on this subject um with this, you know, a specific emphasis on the the
know, a specific emphasis on the the particular challenge China poses
particular challenge China poses and what the United States should be
and what the United States should be using government tools for to deal with
using government tools for to deal with it and what we should not be uh so that
it and what we should not be uh so that we don't try to out China. Um
we don't try to out China. Um yeah, that'd be a piece of advice I
yeah, that'd be a piece of advice I would give.
would give. >> All right. Well, we'll see how well
>> All right. Well, we'll see how well Jake, who's going to the Knicks
Jake, who's going to the Knicks Timberwolves game, uh, fares at security
Timberwolves game, uh, fares at security with a giant bag of chamomile tea
with a giant bag of chamomile tea >> and and several books.
>> and and several books. >> Several book, you know, cuts off.
>> Several book, you know, cuts off. >> Thank you so much. Thank you.
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