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0:06 Speed 38. Clear line 27 left. The wind
0:08 21 10 knots
0:11 27 left. Speed 38.
0:14 Flying over London. A British Airways
0:18 Boeing 7 is on final approach. In just a
0:19 few minutes, the aircraft should be
0:22 safely on the ground. As the first
0:24 officer takes control to execute the
0:27 landing, he suddenly notices a drop in
0:30 air speed. The aircraft's automation
0:32 increases engine power, but the speed
0:35 keeps falling. Then comes a chilling
0:38 realization. Neither engine is responding.
0:39 responding.
0:42 The aircraft begins to sink toward the
0:44 ground. The pilots don't have time to
0:46 diagnose the problem. They need to act
0:48 quickly or risk crashing into one of
0:52 London's densely populated suburbs.
0:54 Can the crew glide the aircraft safely
0:56 to the runway or is disaster
0:59 unavoidable? This is the story of
1:02 British Airways Flight 38.
1:05 Mayday. Mayday. Speed bird. Speed bird
1:15 The story of British Airways Flight 38
1:19 began in Beijing, China on January 17th, 2008.
1:21 2008.
1:25 Operated by a Boeing trip 7, flight 38
1:27 was the return leg to London of the
1:29 regularly scheduled flight between the
1:32 two countries. The aircraft had touched
1:34 down in Beijing hours earlier and was
1:36 being serviced in preparation for the
1:39 journey to London.
1:42 In command of flight 38 was 43-year-old
1:45 Captain Peter Burkhill, a seasoned pilot
1:48 with 12,700 hours of total flight time
1:53 and 8,500 hours on the Boeing trip 7.
1:56 His senior first officer, 41-year-old
1:59 John Coward, had a total of 9,000 hours
2:02 of flight time and 7,000 hours on the
2:06 trip 7. First Officer Connor McGinness,
2:09 a 35-year-old pilot with 5,000 hours of
2:12 total flight time and 1,100 hours on the
2:20 He would replace Captain Burkel and
2:22 First Officer Coward in turn, allowing
2:24 them to leave the flight deck and get a
2:26 few hours of rest during the cruise
2:29 portion of the flight. All pilots had
2:31 arrived in Beijing several days prior
2:34 and had spent almost 2 days off duty
2:38 before operating flight 38.
2:40 The planned route of flight would take
2:42 the trip 7 over the northern parts of
2:45 China, then continue northeast across a
2:47 large part of Russia before reaching
2:49 Europe and culminating in the United
2:52 Kingdom. According to the flight plan,
2:54 the aircraft would climb to an initial
2:57 altitude of 34,100
3:00 ft before descending to 31,500
3:04 ft over the China Mongolia border due to
3:06 extremely low air temperatures that were
3:09 forecast on route.
3:11 Unbeknownst to anyone on board, the
3:13 expected drop in outside air temperature
3:15 would play a major role in the story of
3:25 At 10:09 Beijing time, carrying 136
3:29 passengers and 79,000 kg of fuel on
3:32 board, the Boeing 77 took off and
3:35 turning northeast began climbing away
3:36 from Beijing.
3:39 Shortly after, air traffic control
3:40 requested the crew to climb to an
3:44 initial cruise altitude of 34,800
3:47 ft. Although this was slightly higher
3:49 than the originally planned altitude for
3:51 the first portion of the flight, the
3:55 crew accepted the request.
3:57 Flying at higher altitudes in extremely
3:59 cold conditions can have subtle but
4:01 serious effects on the aircraft,
4:03 especially on systems like the fuel
4:06 supply. Considering a higher than
4:08 planned cruising altitude and the cold
4:10 conditions expected on route, the pilots
4:12 made a decision to closely monitor the
4:15 fuel temperature, ensuring that it does
4:18 not drop below the allowed limits.
4:20 As the aircraft continued its journey
4:23 over Russia and Northern Europe, burning
4:25 off fuel, it became significantly
4:28 lighter. The lower weight allowed the
4:30 crew to select a higher cruise altitude
4:34 for more optimized flight performance.
4:37 This practice called a step climb is
4:39 standard on longer flights.
4:42 Passing by Moscow, Russia, the flight
4:44 crew engaged the vertical speed mode to
4:46 command a shallow climb to an altitude
4:50 of 38,000 ft. A few hours later,
4:53 overflying Sweden, the aircraft climbed
4:56 further up to 40,000 ft.
4:59 By using the VS mode, the pilots could
5:02 avoid high pitch angles and abrupt
5:04 changes in engine power, providing a
5:06 more comfortable experience to the
5:09 passengers. As we will discuss further,
5:11 this seemingly positive choice
5:13 contributed significantly to the fate of
5:15 Flight 38.
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7:02 The cruise portion of the flight
7:04 continued as planned, and approximately
7:07 40 minutes prior to landing, the flight
7:09 crew initiated the descent. As the
7:12 aircraft approached London, air traffic
7:15 control instructed flight 38 to enter
7:17 the Lamborghorn holding just northeast
7:21 of London at 11,000 ft. The airplane
7:23 spent approximately 5 minutes in the
7:25 holding pattern and after descending to
7:28 9,000 ft in the hold was cleared for an
7:34 ILS approach to runway 27 left.
7:36 Having pre-programmed the aircraft's
7:38 automation, the crew instructed the
7:41 autopilot to intercept the ILS signal,
7:43 line up with the runway, and begin
7:46 descending on the glide slope. Passing
7:48 through a layer of clouds at 3,000 ft,
7:50 the pilots saw the airport straight
7:53 ahead and in clear view. They were only
7:55 a few minutes away from completing the
7:58 long journey from Asia. And the approach
8:00 continued without issue until the
8:02 aircraft descended through the last
8:05 1,000 ft of altitude. 1,00
8:07 1,00
8:09 at 1,000 ft above the ground with the
8:11 landing gear in the down position and
8:15 the wing flaps extended to 30°. The trip
8:17 7 was fully configured for the approach.
8:19 Although the captain was the pilot
8:21 flying for the initial approach, he
8:23 would hand over control to the first
8:25 officer in a few moments per the company
8:28 procedures. The autopilot was still
8:31 engaged at this time, but as briefed by
8:33 the crew earlier in the flight, the
8:35 first officer would complete the landing
8:37 manually, planning to disconnect the
8:40 autopilot at around 600 ft above the ground.
8:42 ground.
8:44 Throughout the aircraft's descent on the
8:46 glide slope, the auto throttle
8:49 maintained the desired approach speed of
8:51 135 knots by slightly moving the thrust
8:55 levers and thus adjusting the power. At
8:58 720 ft, the right engine began to
9:01 gradually spool down. Sensing the drop
9:03 in thrust, the auto throttle advanced
9:06 the left thrust lever to compensate, but
9:08 the engine did not respond. As the
9:11 aircraft descended another 100 ft, the
9:15 left engine also began losing thrust.
9:18 Just a minute from touchdown, the 160
9:20 ton airliner had lost nearly all
9:22 available power. Yet, it was still miles
9:30 To avoid overstressing the engines, the
9:32 auto throttle limited the movement of
9:35 the thrust levers, splitting them. The
9:37 resulting stagger with the left thrust
9:39 lever further ahead than the right
9:40 caught the attention of the first
9:44 officer. Focusing on the engines, he did
9:46 not disconnect the autopilot at 600 ft
9:49 as intended. The auto throttle then
9:51 gradually moved both thrust levers
9:54 forward to the full power position, but
9:56 nothing happened. 500.
9:57 500.
9:59 A short moment later, the radio
10:01 alimter's automatic call out informed
10:03 the crew that they had passed the
10:06 altitude of 500 ft. The captain
10:08 confirmed that the approach was stable
10:10 by making a corresponding call out and
10:12 the crew received the landing clearance
10:16 from Heathrow's tower controller.
10:18 We speak at 38 little line 27 left and
10:21 wind 2110 knots.
10:23 The aircraft was now only 30 seconds
10:26 from touchdown. Still having trouble
10:28 with the aircraft's thrust, the pilots
10:29 noticed that both engines were just
10:32 above idle power and the air speed
10:34 started to drop below the calculated
10:38 approach speed of 135 knots. The crew
10:40 moved the thrust levers back and forth
10:43 several times, but the engines did not respond.
10:45 respond.
10:47 Without sufficient air speed over the
10:49 wings, the aircraft would no longer be
10:51 able to produce enough lift to maintain
10:54 the desired approach path and the trip 7
10:56 started to slowly descend below the
10:59 glide slope. Because the first officer
11:02 had not disengaged the autopilot earlier
11:04 in the approach, the automation
11:06 attempted to catch the glide slope again
11:09 by raising the nose of the aircraft and
11:12 moving the thrust levers forward. But as
11:14 the engines were stuck, these commands
11:16 only caused the air speed to drop even
11:19 further, pushing the aircraft closer and
11:23 closer to entering an aerodynamic stall.
11:25 At 300 ft, this stall would be unreoverable.
11:32 Although the engines did not respond to
11:34 any input, they continued operating at
11:37 just above idle power and did not shut
11:40 down. There was no sound or visible
11:41 damage that could have explained the
11:44 sudden behavior to the pilots. So what
11:46 could have caused the issue at the most
11:49 critical stage of the flight? As is the
11:51 case with many accidents, it was a
11:53 combination of actions and environmental
11:55 conditions that led to the events of
11:58 flight 38.
12:02 The Boeing 7 has a total of three tanks,
12:04 one in each wing, as well as the center
12:08 tank located in the fuselage. By design,
12:10 the center tank was to be used before
12:12 fuel could be supplied from the wing
12:14 tanks. Although the fuel in the center
12:17 tank was fairly warm after takeoff, as
12:19 it traveled to the engines via the fuel
12:21 feed lines routed through the main
12:23 tanks, it began to gradually cool down
12:26 to freezing temperatures. The fuel
12:28 itself did not freeze, but the exposure
12:30 to this cold weather turned small water
12:33 droplets within it into ice crystals.
12:35 The temperature of the fuel during the
12:38 first few hours fell within what's known
12:40 as the sticky range, allowing the ice
12:42 crystals to form a slushy substance that
12:44 attached to the inner surface of the
12:47 fuel lines.
12:50 Although it may seem unusual, jet fuel
12:52 is known to contain water in very minor
12:54 concentrations. And due to the low
12:56 temperatures at high altitudes in which
12:58 aircraft operate, this water is expected
13:01 to freeze. Aircraft and engine
13:03 manufacturers have designed fuel systems
13:05 with consideration for the presence of
13:07 ice crystals.
13:09 For that reason, before fuel is supplied
13:12 to the engine, it passes through a fuel
13:15 oil heat exchanger, a vital engine
13:17 component that roots hot engine oil
13:20 around cold fuel lines, thus reducing
13:22 the temperature of the oil and warming
13:25 up the fuel before it is supplied to the
13:27 engine. Ice passing through the heat
13:29 exchanger melts and returns to liquid
13:32 form, ensuring uninterrupted engine operation.
13:35 operation.
13:37 However, because the crew of Flight 38
13:39 used the vertical speed mode to change
13:42 cruise altitudes, the fuel flow within
13:44 the aircraft's fuel feed lines remained
13:46 relatively low, and it was not strong
13:48 enough to push the ice crystals toward
13:51 the fuel oil heat exchanger. Instead,
13:53 once the aircraft flew through a region
13:55 of cold weather, the fuel cooled down
13:58 further, solidifying the ice that had
14:00 accumulated inside the fuel lines. It
14:02 was not until the aircraft began its
14:05 approach to London that the outside air
14:07 temperatures increased again, warming up
14:10 and softening the ice. Once the airliner
14:12 turned onto the final approach course
14:14 and established on the ILS, several wind
14:17 gusts shook the plane around, causing
14:20 its air speed to fluctuate. The auto
14:22 throttle responded to these drops in air
14:24 speed with multiple quick adjustments to
14:26 engine thrust.
14:28 Combined with a few jolts from light
14:30 turbulence, the resulting sudden
14:33 increase in fuel flow broke off the
14:35 softened chunks of ice inside the fuel
14:38 lines and sent them toward the engines.
14:40 Too big to pass through the mesh screens
14:42 of the fuel oil heat exchangers and
14:44 still too cold to thaw completely, the
14:47 ice continued to build up on the faces
14:49 of the heat exchangers. By the time
14:52 flight 38 descended below 1,000 ft, a
14:55 critical amount had accumulated, almost
14:56 completely cutting off the fuel supply
15:03 Back in the flight deck, still trying to
15:05 make the engines respond to the thrust
15:07 levers. The flight crew received an
15:09 airspeed low message on the engine
15:13 indicating and crew alerting system.
15:15 Programmed to maintain the glide slope,
15:17 the autopilot continued to raise the
15:20 nose of the aircraft and the air speed
15:23 dropped to 115 knots, 20 knots below the
15:26 desired approach speed. Coming to a
15:28 shocking realization that the aircraft
15:31 was too low, too slow, and still too far
15:34 from the runway, the captain moved the
15:42 It would cause the aircraft to lose some
15:44 lift, but moving the flaps up would also
15:47 reduce drag, allowing the crew to stay
15:49 in the air longer and increasing their
15:52 chances of reaching the runway. In a
15:54 matter of seconds, the trip 7 lost
15:57 another 7 knots of air speed, coming
15:58 dangerously close to reaching stall speed.
16:04 As a final warning to the flight crew
16:06 about the hazardous condition, the
16:08 aircraft's stick shaker, a mechanical
16:10 device attached to each pilot's yoke,
16:13 became active, sending strong vibrations
16:16 through the control columns.
16:18 Responding to the stick shaker, First
16:21 Officer Coward pushed the yoke down,
16:23 lowering the nose of the trip 7 and
16:25 preventing it from losing any more air speed.
16:28 speed.
16:30 Following manual flight control input
16:32 from the first officer, the autopilot
16:35 disconnected. The crew had avoided the
16:37 stall, but they continued to lose
16:39 altitude at a much higher than normal
16:41 rate. One thing became clear to the
16:43 pilots. They were not going to make it
16:46 to the runway. As the first officer
16:48 pulled back on the yoke to reduce the
16:51 descent rate, the captain made a mayday
16:54 call on the tower radio frequency.
16:59 Mayday. Mayday. Speed bird. speed 95 95.
17:01 He did not have time to warn the cabin
17:03 crew and instruct the passengers to take
17:06 the brace position. Thus, nobody on the
17:08 other side of the flight deck door
17:09 realized that they were mere seconds
17:12 from a crash landing and shortly after
17:21 Aircraft accident. Aircraft accident.
17:23 Aircraft. The position is the threshold
17:26 runway 27 left. Aircraft type is a
17:28 triple 7.
17:32 Flight 38 made ground contact only 330 m
17:35 short of the runway. Upon impacting the
17:38 ground, its landing gear collapsed and
17:40 the right landing gear punctured the
17:42 fuselage, severely injuring one of the
17:46 passengers. As the aircraft slid further
17:47 toward the runway, it veered to the
17:52 right before coming to a complete stop.
17:54 Despite the hard impact, the fuselage
17:58 remained largely intact. Many passengers
17:59 and crew members received minor
18:02 injuries, but by a true miracle,
18:05 everyone on board Flight 38 survived.
18:08 The story of British Airways Flight 38
18:11 shows how quickly a tiny design flaw can
18:13 turn a routine flight into a life or
18:15 death situation.
18:17 At the time of the accident, the effects
18:19 of ice accumulation within aircraft fuel
18:22 systems were not well understood, and
18:24 the investigation team spent months
18:27 recreating multiple scenarios before
18:29 making a determination that the design
18:32 of the fuel oil heat exchangers was the
18:34 most likely cause.
18:37 Postac accident calculations showed that
18:39 Captain Burkel's decision to retract the
18:42 flaps shortly before the impact resulted
18:44 in the aircraft traveling some 50 m
18:47 further. This seemingly short distance
18:50 allowed the trip 7 to overfly the ILS
18:53 antenna of runway 27 left without
18:55 contacting it. The damage from such a
18:57 collision was likely to have been more
19:00 severe. In November of the same year,
19:02 while the investigation into this
19:05 accident was still in progress, a Delta
19:08 Airlines 7 experienced an uncommanded
19:11 roll back of an engine while in cruise
19:14 flight due to the same issue. The flight
19:16 crew of that flight, however, was able
19:18 to clear the blockage by setting both
19:21 engines to idle power as they were at a
19:23 higher altitude, a luxury that the
19:28 pilots of flight 38 did not have.
19:29 The results of the British Airways
19:32 accident and the Delta Airlines incident
19:34 have forced the engine manufacturer
19:36 Rolls-Royce to review the structure of
19:39 the fuel oil heat exchanger, eventually
19:41 leading to a newer design that was no
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