The discussion explores the philosophical underpinnings of affirmative action, questioning whether distributive justice (like college admissions) should be based on moral desert or serve a broader social purpose, and introduces Aristotle's teleological approach to justice as a counterpoint to modern theories.
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when we ended last time we were
considering arguments for and against
affirmative action counting races of
factor in admissions and in the course
of the discussion three arguments
emerged three arguments for affirmative
action one of them was the idea that
race and ethnic background should count
as a way of correcting for the true
meaning of test scores and grades
getting a more accurate measure of the
academic potential
those scores those numbers represent
second was what we called the
compensatory argument the idea of
writing past wrongs past injustice and
the third was the diversity argument and
when Cheryl Hopwood in the 1990s
challenged the University of Texas law
schools affirmative action program in
the federal courts the University of
Texas made another version of the
diversity argument saying that the
broader social purpose the social
mission of the University of Texas law
school is to produce leaders in the
legal community in the political
community among judges lawyers
legislators and therefore it's important
that we produce leaders who reflect the
background and the experience and the
ethnic and the racial composition of the
state of Texas it's important for our
serving our wider social mission that
was the University of Texas law schools
argument and then we considered
an objection to the diversity argument
which after all is an argument in the
name of the social mission the common
good we saw that Rawls does not simply
believe that arguments of the common
good or the general welfare should
prevail if individual rights must be
violated in the course of promoting the
common good you remember that was the
question the challenge to the diversity
rationale that we were considering when
we finished last time and we began to
discuss the question well what right
might be at stake may be the right to be
considered according to factors within
one's control maybe this is the argument
that Cheryl Hopwood implicitly was
making she can't help the fact that
she's white why should her chance at
getting into law school depend on a
factor she can't control and then Hannah
who was advancing an argument last time
said Harvard has the right to define its
mission any way it wants to it's a
private institution and it's only once
Harvard defines its mission that we can
identify the qualities that count
so no rights are being violated now what
about that argument what I would like to
do is to hear objections to that reply
and then see whether others have an
answer yes and tell us your name da da
right you spoke up last time all right
how do you answer that argument well I
think I was two things in there one of
them was that a private institution to
define its mission however it once but
then that doesn't make however it defy
it right like I couldn't find my
personal mission as I want to collect
all the money in the world but does that
make it even a good mission so you can't
like you can't say that just because a
college is a private institution it
could just define it whatever once is we
still have to think about whatever the
way it's defining it it's right and in
the case of affirmative action a lot of
people have said that since there's a
lot of other factors involved we could
why not race like if we already know
that this is I want to stick with your
first point yeah
here's das objection can a college or
university define its social purpose any
way it wants to and then define
admissions criteria accordingly what
about the University of Texas law school
not today but in the 1950s then there
was another Supreme Court case against
the admissions policy of the University
of Texas law school because it was
segregated it only admitted whites and
when the case went to court back in the
50s the University of Texas law school
also invoked its mission our mission as
a law school is to educate lawyers for
the Texas bar for Texas law firms and no
Texas law firm hires african-americans
so to fulfill our mission we only admit
whites or consider Harvard in the 1930s
when it had anti-jewish quotas president
Lowell president of Harvard in the 1930s
said that he had nothing personally
against Jews but he invoked the mission
the social purpose of Harvard he said
which is not only to Train intellectuals
part of the mission of Harvard he said
is to train stockbrokers for walls
presidents and Senators and there are
very few Jews who go into those
professions now here's the challenge is
there a principle distinction between
the invocation of the social purpose of
the college or university today in the
diversity rationale and the invocation
of the social purpose or mission of the
university by Texas in the 1950s or
Harvard in the 1930s is there a
difference in principle
what's the reply Hannah well I think
that's the principle that's different
here is basically the distinction
between inclusion versus exclusion I
think that it's morally wrong of the
university to say we're going to exclude
you on the basis of your religion or
your race that's denial on the basis of
arbitrary factors what Harvard is trying
to do today with its diversity
initiatives is to include groups that
were excluded in the past good let's see
if stay there let's see if someone would
like to reply go ahead as actually this
was kind of in support of Hannah rather
than a reply but so I was gonna say
another principal difference can be
based on malice being the just or the
motivation I guess for the historical
segregation act so it's saying that
we're not going to let blacks or Jews in
because they're worse as few people are
as a group good so the element of malice
isn't present and what's your name
Stevie Stevie says that in the in the
historic segregationist racist
anti-semitic quotas or prohibitions
there was built into them a certain kind
of malice a certain kind of judgment
that african-americans or Jews were
somehow less worthy than everybody else
whereas present-day affirmative action
programs don't involve or imply any such judgment
judgment
when it amounts to saying is so long as
a policy just uses people in a way as
valuable to the social purpose of the institution
institution
it's okay provided it doesn't judge them
maliciously as Steve Eve might add as
intrinsically less worthy I'd like to
raise a question
doesn't that concede that all of us when
we compete for positions or for seats in
colleges and universities in a way are
being used not judged but used in a way
that it has nothing to do with moral
desert remember we got into this whole
discussion of affirmative action when we
were trying to figure out whether
distributive justice should be tied to
moral desert or not and we were launched
on that question by Rawls and his denial
his rejection of the idea the
distributive justice whether its
positions or places in the class or
income and wealth is it is a matter of
moral desert suppose that were the moral
what letters would they have to write to
people they rejected or accepted for
that matter
wouldn't they have to write something
like this you're unsuccessful applicant
we regret to inform you that your
application for admission has been
rejected it's not your fault that when
you came along society happened not to
need the qualities you had to offer
those admitted instead of you or not
themselves deserving of a place nor
worthy of praise for the factors that
led to their admission we are in any
case only using them and you as
instruments of a wider social purpose
better luck next time what was the
letter you actually got when you were
admitted perhaps it should have read
something like this
dear successful applicant we are pleased
to inform you that your application for
admission has been accepted it turns out
lucky for you that you have the traits
that society needs at the moment so we
propose to exploit your assets for
society's advantage you are to be
congratulated not in the sense that you
deserve credit for having the qualities
to let your admission but only in the
sense that the winner of a lottery is to
be congratulated and if you choose to
accept our offer you will ultimately be
entitled to the benefits that attach to
being used in this way we look forward
to seeing you in the fall now there is
something a little odd morally odd if
it's true that those letters do reflect
the theory the philosophy underlying the
policy so here's the question they posed
and it's a question that takes us back
to a big issue in in political
philosophy is it possible and is it
desirable to detach questions of
distributive justice from questions of
moral desert and questions of virtue in
many ways this is an issue that
separates modern political philosophy
from ancient political thought
what's at stake in the question of
whether we can put desert moral desert
aside it seemed when we were reading
Rawls that the incentive the reason he
had for detaching distributive justice
from moral desert was an egalitarian one
that if we set desert to one side
there's greater scope for the exercise
of egalitarian considerations the veil
of ignorance the two principles the
difference principle
helping the least well-off
redistribution and all that but what's
interesting is if you look at a range of
thinkers we've been considering there
does seem to be a reason they want to
detach justice from desert that goes
libertarian rights oriented theorists as
a kind we've been studying as well as
egalitarian rights oriented theorists
including Rawls and for that matter also
including can't all agree
despite their disagreements over
distributive justice and the welfare
state and all of that they all agree
that justice is not a matter of
rewarding or honouring virtue or more
moral desert now why do they all think
that it can't just be for egalitarian
reasons not all of them argue 'let
areum's this gets us to the big
philosophical question we have to try to
sort out some how they think
is going to lead away from freedom from
respect for persons as free beings well
in order to see what they consider to be
at stake and in order to assess their
shared assumption we need to turn to a
thinker to a philosopher
who disagrees with them who explicitly
ties justice to honor
honoring virtue and merit and moral
desert and that thinker is Aristotle now
in many ways Aristotle's idea of justice
is intuitively very powerful in some
ways it's strange I want to bring out
both its power its possibility and its
strangeness so that we can see what's at
stake in this whole debate about justice
and whether it's tied to dessert and
virtue so what is Aristotle's answer the
question about justice for Aristotle
justice is a matter of giving people
what they deserve giving people their
due it's a matter of figuring out the
proper fit between persons with their
virtues and their appropriate social
roles well what does this picture of
justice look like and how does it differ
from the conception that seems to be
shared among libertarian and egalitarian
rights oriented theorists alike justice
means giving each person his or her due
giving people what they deserve but what
is a person's do what are the relevant
grounds of merit or dessert Aristotle
says that depends on the sort of things
being distributed justice involves two
factors things and the persons to whom
the things are assigned in general we
say Aristotle writes that persons who
are equal should have equal things
assigned to them but here there arises a
hard question equals in what respects
Aristotle says that depends and the sort
of thing we're distributing
suppose we're distributing flutes what
is the relevant merit or basis of
dessert for flutes who should get the
best ones
what's Aristotle's answer anyone the
best the best flute players right those
who are best in the relevant sense the
best flute players is it just to
discriminate in allocating fluids yes
all justice involves discrimination
Aristotle says what matters is that the
discrimination be according to the
relevant excellence according to the
virtue appropriate to having flutes he
says it would be unjust to discriminate
on some other basis in giving out the
flutes say wealth just giving the best
flutes to the people who can pay the
highest price or nobility of birth just
giving flutes to aristocrats or physical
beauty giving the best flutes to the
Aristotle says birth and beauty may be
greater Goods than the ability to play
the flute and those who possess them may
surpass the flute player more in these
qualities than he surpasses them in his
flute claim but the fact remains that he
is the person who ought to get the best
fluid it's a strange idea this
comparison by the way that I mean could
you say am i more handsome than she is a
good lacrosse player it's a strange kind
of comparison but putting that aside
Aristotle says we're not looking for the
best overall whatever that might mean
we're looking for the best musician now
why this is important to see why should
the best flutes go to the best flute players
well why do you think anybody what
they'll produce the best music well and
everybody will enjoy it more
that's not Aristotle's answer Aristotle
is not a utilitarian he's not just
saying that way but there will be better
music and everyone will enjoy it
everyone will be better off his answer
is the best flutes should go to the best
flute players because that's what flutes
are for to be played well the purpose of
flute playing the purpose is to produce
excellent music and those who can best
perfect that purpose ought properly to
have the best ones now it may also be
true as a welcome side effect that
everyone will enjoy listening to that
music so that answer is true enough as
far as it goes but it's important to see
that Aristotle's reason is not a
utilitarian reason it's a reason that
looks here's where you might think it's
a little bit strange it looks to the
purpose the point the goal of flute
playing another way of describing this
looking to the goal to determine what
the just allocation the Greek for goal
or end was Tilos so Aristotle says you
have to consider the point the end the
goal the Telos of the thing in this case
of flute playing and that's how you
define a just allocation a just
discrimination so this idea of reasoning
from the goal from the Telos is called
teleological reasoning teleological
moral reasoning and that's Aristotle's
way reasoning from the goal from the end
now this may seem as I said a strange
idea that we're supposed to reason from
the purpose but it is does have a
certain intuitive plausibility consider
the allocation let's say at Harvard of
the best tennis courts or squash courts
how should they be allocated who should
have priority in playing on the on the
best courts well you might say those who
can best afford them set up a fee system
charge money for them Aristotle would
say no you might say well Harvard
bigshots the most influential people at
Harvard who would they be the senior
faculty should have priority in playing
on the best tennis courts no Aristotle
would reject that some scientists may be
a greater scientist than some varsity
tennis player is a tennis player but
still the tennis player is the one who
should have priority for the best
playing in the best tennis court there
is a certain intuitive plausibility to
this idea now one of the things that
makes it strange
is it an Aristotle's world in the
ancient world it wasn't only social
practices that were governed in
Aristotle's view by teleological
reasoning and teleological explanation
all of nature was understood to be a
meaningful order and what it meant to
understand nature to grasp nature to
find our place of the nature was to
inquire into and read out the purposes
or the key laws of nature and with the
advent of modern science it's been
difficult to think of the world that way
and so it makes it harder perhaps to
think of Justice in a teleological way
but there is a certain
naturalness to thinking about even the
natural world as teleologically ordered
as a purpose of whole in fact children
have to be educated out of this way of
looking at the world I realized this
when my kids were very young and I was
reading them a book Winnie the Pooh and
we need the Pooh gives you a great idea
of how there is a certain natural
childlike way of looking at the world in
a teleological way you remit you may
remember a story of Winnie the Pooh
walking in the forest one day he came to
a place in the forest and from the top
of a tree there came a loud buzzing
noise we need the Pooh sat at the foot
of the tree put his head between his
paws and began to think here's what he
said to himself that buzzing noise means
something you don't get a buzzing noise
like that just buzzing and buzzing
without its meaning something if there's
a buzzing noise somebody's making a
buzzing noise and the only reason for
making a buzzing noise that I know of is
because you're a bee then he thought for
another long time and said and the only
reason for being a bee that I know of is
making honey and then he got up and he
said and the only reason for making
honey is so I can eat it so he began to
climb the tree this is an example of
it isn't it isn't so implausible after
all now we grew up and we're talked out
of this way of thinking about the world
but here's the question
even if teleological explanations don't
fit with modern science even if we've
outgrown them in understanding nature
isn't there something still intuitively
and morally plausible even powerful
about Aristotle's idea that the only way
to think about justice is to reason from
the purpose the goal the Telos of the
social practice and isn't that precisely
what we were doing when we were
disagreeing about affirmative action you
could almost recast that disagreement as
one about what the proper appropriate
purpose or end of a university education
consists in reasoning from the purpose
or from the Telos or from the end
Aristotle says that's indispensable to
thinking about justice is he right think
about that question as you turn to
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